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To the deminers, 
who risk life and limb 
so that others might live.
“...if  any one saved a life, 
it would be as if he saved 
the life o f the whole people... ”
-  Al-Qu’ran 5:32
Abstract
While governance has traditionally been the realm of states, new “Emerging Political 
Complexes,” as Mark Duffield calls them, incorporate networks of public and private 
actors. These networks of governance come in two competing ideal types:
a) strategic-commercial complexes, shaped by particularist interests, that provide 
protection to a select few, whether citizens of a great power or ‘the client’, and
b) human security-civil society complexes, shaped by norms, ideals and more global 
notions of public interest, that aim to extend protection to whole populations.
This PhD examines the effects and impact of these two approaches in managing and 
neutralizing the threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance. At the donor level, it 
compares the US and Norway, arguing that Norway, working with NGOs, churches and 
other small states, has been at the forefront of efforts to ban landmines and cluster 
munitions, whereas the US has resisted tight regulation. Moreover, US funding of 
clearance and mitigation programs was shaped by narrow strategic interests and favored a 
commercially-driven process. In contrast, Norway’s programs, implemented through 
international NGOs, were shaped more by more global conceptions of interest and 
normative commitments to humanitarianism, multilateralism and international law.
At the level of implementation in mine and ordnance-affected countries -  
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan -  the PhD argues that Norwegian long-term grants to 
international NGOs produced demining that, while more expensive and slower, was 
better targeted on humanitarian priorities, safer and of better quality. Such programs also 
attempted to build inclusive institutions and resist the politics of violence. In contrast, 
US efforts, often driven by strategic concerns and tendered out to commercial companies, 
were cheaper and faster but also less safe and of lower quality. These companies were 
also embedded in the political economy of war and may have contributed to the 
fragmentation of the public monopoly on force.
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Governance and Security 
in a Post-Statist World
“We need to shift more attention from government to governance. ”
-  William W. Boyer1
The contamination of conflict-torn countries by explosive remnants of war kills and injures some 15,000 to 20,000 people every year.2 Long after guns fall silent, landmines, cluster bombs and unspent shells block access to farmland, 
prevent refugee return and are a constant psycho-social reminder of the brutality of war. 
Responding to this security threat, international donors, NGOs and commercial 
companies have developed a new aid sector called ‘mine action,’ mitigating the impact of 
landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) through clearance, education, survivor 
assistance, stockpile destruction and political advocacy.3 Mine action is now considered 
a major component of international post-conflict reconstruction efforts, contributing to 
the creation of a secure environment, assisting in refugee return, opening access to roads
1 William W. Boyer. (March 1990) “Political Science and the 21st Century: From Government to 
Governance.” PS: Political Science and Politics. 23(1). p. 50.
2 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (2006) “What’s the Problem?” 
<http://www.icbl.org/problem/what>.
3 In this dissertation, I will occasionally use ‘demining,’ ‘mine clearance’ and ‘mine action’ 
interchangeably. For background on mine action, see: Robert Keeley. (September 2003) “Understanding 
Landmines and Mine Action.” Mines Action Canada.
<http://www.minesactioncanada.org/techdocuments/understandinglandmines_mineaction.pdf>; Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). (July 2003) A Guide to Mine Action. Geneva, 
GICHD; Stuart Maslen. (2004) Mine Action After Diana: Progress in the Struggle Against Landmines. 
London, Landmine Action/Pluto Press.
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for commerce and aid, rehabilitating agricultural land and providing employment for 
demobilized soldiers.
This dissertation is about the political economy of clearing these landmines and other 
explosive remnants of war. But ultimately it describes the ways in which institutions deal 
with the problem of security -  the management, reduction, mitigation or elimination of 
risk, particularly the risk of violent harm. For mines and unexploded ordnance pose a 
violent threat of bodily harm -  even death -  to human beings living or transiting in their 
vicinity. In describing mine mitigation and clearance programs, the dissertation will 
show how the statist ways of conceiving security are no longer valid -  the Weberian 
bureaucracy and relationships of command and control are slowly eroding. In their place, 
new forms of ‘networked governance’ are developing to manage the conflicted ‘frontiers’ 
of the international system. This thesis will show that the differing constituent members 
and institutional structures of these networks shape the approach taken to mines and 
unexploded ordnance (UXO). Different ways of organizing these networks produce 
different outcomes, both in terms of demining performance and the impact on the 
peacebuilding and reconstruction process.
On the one hand, great power states try to limit the regulation of mines and other 
weapons and contract out clearance through private security companies, prioritizing 
military or strategic objectives. Such networks tend to produce a low cost and rapid 
demining process but sacrifice quality and safety. They are also more likely to 
compromise with the political economy of conflict and contribute to the privatization of 
the use of force. On the other hand, middle power states, in coalition with NGOs and 
social movements, try to heavily regulate the use of mines and prioritize humanitarian 
need in clearance programs. Their demining programs are often slower and more costly, 
but value high levels of quality and safety. They are also often more inclusive 
organizations, try to build local capacity and advocate for limits on the politics of 
violence.
This introductory chapter will give a brief overview of the new developing networks 
of governance and security before reviewing the existing literature on landmines and 
UXO. It will close by providing an overview of the PhD.
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In his perceptive and provocative study of the architecture of the Israeli occupation of 
Palestine, Eyal Weizman describes the development of a West Bank settlement called 
Migron.4 Responding to Israeli settlers’ complaints of poor mobile phone reception in 
the West Bank, the telecommunications company Orange erected an antenna on a hill. 
Because secure communications are considered a security issue by the Israeli military, 
Orange did not have to seek permission from the Palestinian owners of the land. 
Supposedly to support the construction work, electric and water companies connected the 
hill to utility grids and a private security guard was hired to protect the site. Slowly, with 
encouragement and protection from the Israeli government, an outpost settlement 
developed around the antenna. Weizman claimed the Migron settlement was a form of 
political organization and action that
...cannot simply be understood as the preserve of the Israeli government executive power alone, 
but rather one diffused among a multiplicity of -  often non-state -  actors ... [including] young 
settlers, the Israeli military, the cellular network provider and other capitalist corporations.. ..5
Meanwhile, an equally complex network has engaged in a variety of activities to 
publicize, condemn and counteract the development of settlements and the ‘Separation 
Barrier.’ This “diffused global campaign” was “waged via the UN, the Israel High Court 
of Justice, local and international NGOs, the International Court of Justice, the media and 
scores of foreign governments acting along visible or backstairs diplomatic channels....”6 
Both these complexes represent efforts to provide security in a manner quite unlike 
the traditional centralized bureaucratic state security apparatus. They are, however, not 
unique to Israel and Palestine. They represent new forms of globalized public-private 
partnerships attempting to deal with the rise of transnational sources of insecurity, such as 
the ‘New Wars’, organized crime, international terrorism, nuclear proliferation and, of 
specific interest for this dissertation, landmines and other explosive remnants of war. 
They echo Mark Duffield’s description of “strategic networks and complexes” that have 
replaced the traditional idea of ‘security through government’ with security through 
“polyarchical, non-territorial and networked relations of governance.”7 However,
4 Eyal Weizman. (2007) Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation. London, Verso, pp. 1-6.
5 Ibid. p. 5.
6 Ibid. p. 165.
7 Mark Duffield. (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. 
London, Zed Books, p. 2. Governance can be defined as: “the action of government plus its interaction
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Duffield’s tendency to conflate all these complexes into one “emerging system of global 
liberal governance,”8 actually prevents an understanding that there are multiple types of 
the networks that can operate in very different ways. This PhD will show that, while there 
is some overlap, they can be divided into at least two broad ideal types:
1) Strategic-Commercial Complexes, shaped largely by the interests of a 
privileged few, in which militarized and securitized public bodies contract out 
significant authority to commercial contractors. Security is derived from the 
construction of “externally alienated and internally homogenous ethno- 
national enclaves”9 such as the Migron settlement.
2) Human Security-Civil Society Complexes, shaped by humanitarian norms 
and a more global understanding of interest, in which public and multilateral 
agencies form partnerships with NGOs and social movements. They aim to 
provide protection to the general population, especially the vulnerable, 
through aid, advocacy, persuasion and the legal process, such as the 
international campaign against the Occupation.
The premise of this dissertation is that studying mine clearance can offer particular 
insight into the development of these new complexes of security governance. Mine 
action is ultimately about mitigating and neutralizing one type of threat in insecure and 
conflicted areas that are the focus of international intervention and peacebuilding efforts. 
Demining makes an interesting field to study how norms, interests and the multiple 
shifting layers of governance can shape foreign aid and security provision in a post­
conflict zone. This PhD thus intends to contribute to the literatures on security, 
governance and the political economy of aid in conflict.
The aim is to show the effects of the above two approaches in managing the threat of 
landmines and unexploded ordnance in conflict zones. At the global level, the PhD will 
compare the US and Norway, arguing that Norway, working with NGOs, churches and 
other small states, has been at the forefront of efforts to ban landmines and cluster 
munitions, whereas great powers, including the US, have resisted tight regulation.
with its nongovernmental partners in the process of governing” (Boyer. “Political Science and the 21st 
Century.” p. 51.)
8 Duffield. Global Governance, p. 2.
9 Weizman. Hollow Land. p. 7.
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Moreover, it will show that the macro structure of US funding of clearance and 
mitigation of explosive remnants of war is shaped largely by its strategic interests and 
favors a commercially-driven process. In contrast, Norway’s programs, implemented 
through international NGOs, were shaped by a more global conception of interest and 
normative commitments to humanitarianism, multilateralism and international law. At the 
level of mine and ordnance-affected countries -  Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan -  the 
PhD will argue that Norwegian long-term grants to international NGOs produced 
demining that, while more expensive and slower, was better targeted on humanitarian 
priorities, safer and of better quality. In contrast, US efforts, often driven by strategic 
concerns and tendered out to commercial companies, were cheaper and faster but also 
less safe and of lower quality.
This thesis will add to the nascent social scientific literature on mine action. Unlike 
more established humanitarian sectors, like health, food aid or community development, 
there is not a long pedigree of academic research into mine action. As the following will 
show, research on mine action from a social scientific, rather than a technocratic or 
campaigning, point of view is in its nascent stages.
Prior to the early 1990s, landmines and demining were considered solely military 
issues. Much early literature thus derives from military science, studying the use, doctrine 
and utility of landmine warfare, or means to counter it.10 As the Cold War proxy wars 
slowly drew to a close, there was a growing awareness of the enormity of the landmine 
problem. Led by human rights groups, there was a concerted effort to document the 
extent of the landmine crisis and its impact -  primarily medical and socio-economic -  on
10 cf. R.H. Dewing. (March 1924) “Anti-Tank Mines in Mobile Warfare.” Royal Engineers Journal; 
Department of the Army. (1 November 1943) Field Manual FM 5-31, Landmines and Booby Traps. 
Washington DC, Department of the Army; Department of the Army. (December 1985) Field Manual FM 
20-32, Mine/Countermine Operations. Washington DC, Department of the Army; B.K. Young. (1945)
“The Development of Landmine Warfare.” Army Quarterly. 49(2); R.H. Hough. (1954) “Disposal of Old 
Minefields in the United Kingdom.” Royal Engineers Journal. 68(3); Milton F. Perry. (1965) Infernal 
Machines: The Story of Confederate Submarine and Mine Warfare. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State 
University Press; B.F. Halloran. (1972) “Soviet Landmine Warfare.” Military Engineer. 64(418); L. Golino 
& A. Grimaldi. (April 1983) ‘The Mined Obstacle in American Tactical Doctrine.” Defence Today; 
Daniele Voldman. (1985) Attention Mines 1944-47. Paris, France-Empire; C.E.E. Sloan. (1986) Mine 
Warfare on Land. London, Brassey’s; Peter Stiff. (1986) Taming the Landmine. Alberton, South Africa, 
Galago.
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civilian populations.11 This raised awareness of the problem and led to a widening debate 
about how it should be addressed. The discussion developed into a literature on possible 
international legal frameworks for regulating mines12 and renewed examination of their 
military utility/disutility.13 This finally coalesced around the debate resulting in the 
Ottawa Convention in 1997, which banned the production, trade, stockpiling or use of 
anti-personnel landmines, and obligated parties to clear existing minefields.14 The success 
of the NGO movement leading to Ottawa -  the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines -  provoked analysis of how the ban came about. It became a key case study 
in the role of the new ‘global civil society,’ the redefinition of sovereignty and the 
renegotiation of state and society relations.15 There was also a concerted effort to 
monitor states’ compliance with the ban.16
11 cf. Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights. (1991) Land Mines in Cambodia: The 
Coward’s War. New York, Human Rights Watch; Human Rights Watch. (1992) Hidden Death: Landmines 
and Civilian Casualties in Iraqi Kurdistan. New York, Human Rights Watch; Rae McGrath & Human 
Rights Watch. (1993) Land Mines in Angola: An Africa Watch Report. New York, Human Rights Watch; 
Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights. (1993) Landmines: A Deadly Legacy. New York, 
Human Rights Watch; Human Rights Watch. (1994) Landmines in Mozambique. New York, Human Rights 
Watch; Robin M. Coupland & Remi Russbach. (1994) “Victims of Antipersonnel Mines: What is Being 
Done?” Medicine and Global Survival. 1; Paul Davies. (1994) War of the Mines: Cambodia, Landmines 
and the Impoverishment of a Nation. London, Pluto Press; Chris Giannou & H. Jack Geiger. (1995) “The 
Medical Lessons of Land Mine Injuries.” Clearing the Fields: Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis. 
Kevin M. Cahill (Ed.). New York, Basic Books; Shawn Roberts & Jody Williams (1995) After the Guns 
Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines. Washington, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation.
12 cf. Anita Parlow. (November 1994) “Banning Land Mines.” Human Rights Quarterly. 16(4); Richard 
Falk. (1995) “Walking the Tightrope of International Humanitarian Law: Meeting the Challenge of Land 
Mines.” In: Cahill (Ed.). Clearing the Fields', W. Hays Parks. (1995) “The Humanitarian Law Outlook.” In: 
Cahill (Ed.). Clearing the Fields', Yves Sandoz. (1995) “Turning Principles into Practice: The Challenge for 
International Conventions and Institutions.” In: Cahill (Ed.). Clearing the Fields', Fiona M. Watson. (1995) 
The Inhumane Weapons Convention and the Question of Anti-Personnel Land Mines. London, House of 
Commons Library.
13 cf. Stephen D. Biddle, et. al. (June 1994) “The Military Utility of Land Mines: Implications for Arms 
Control.” Institute fo r Defense Analyses Paper. D-1559; Richard H. Johnson. (1995) “Why Mines? A 
Military Perspective.” In: Cahill (Ed.). Clearing the Fields', International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). (March 1996) Anti-Personnel Land Mines: Friend or Foe? Geneva, ICRC; Robert G. Gard. (1998) 
“The Military Utility of Anti-Personnel Mines.” To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban 
Landmines. Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson & Brian W. Tomlin (Eds.). Toronto, Oxford 
University Press.
14 (18 September 1997) “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.” <http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm>.
15 cf. Jean-Philippe Lavoyer & Louis Maresca. (1999) “The Role of the ICRC in the Development of 
International Humanitarian Law.” International Negotiation. 4(3); Nicola Short. (March 1999) “The Role 
of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines.” International Negotiation. 4(3); Kenneth Anderson. 
(2000) “The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-governmental 
Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society.” European Journal of International Law. 11(1); 
Don Hubert. (2000) “The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy.” Thomas J Watson Jr. 
Institute for International Studies Occasional Paper. 42; Kenneth Robin Rutherford. (2000) “The Evolving
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The ‘hegemony’ of the campaigning discourse in the early expositions of the mine 
problem led to many statistical exaggerations17 and a tendency to be uncritical of 
demining programs. After the passage of the Ottawa Convention, it became more 
acceptable to ask these difficult questions. As a result, academics have begun to apply 
cost/benefit analysis to demining,18 integrate socio-economic considerations into mine 
action programs19 and call for greater community participation in priority setting.20
There has also been a rise of ‘new management’ style analyses, calling for the application
0 1of management principles, and/or better data analysis, to mine action. Meanwhile,
Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines.” World 
Politics. 53(1); Kenneth Robin Rutherford. (March 2000) “Internet Activism: NGOs and the Mine Ban 
Treaty.” International Journal on Grey Literature. 1(3); J. Marshall Beier. (2004) ‘“Emailed Applications 
Are Preferred’: Ethical Practices in Mine Action and the Idea of Global Civil Society.” The Future of 
Humanitarian Mine Action. Kristian Berg Harpviken (Ed.). New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
16 cf. International Campaign to Ban Landmines. (2007) Landmine Monitor Report 2007. 
<http://www.icbl.org/lm>; Angela Woodward. (2001) “Verifying the Ottawa Convention.” Verification 
Yearbook 2001; Paul Chamberlain & David Long. (2004) “Europe and the Ottawa Treaty: Compliance with 
Exceptions and Loopholes.” Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War’s Hidden 
Legacy. Richard Anthony Matthew, Bryan McDonald & Kenneth Rutherford (Eds.). Albany, State 
University of New York Press.
17 Maslen. Mine Action After Diana, pp. 24-36.
18 cf. Geoff Harris. (2000) “The Economics of Landmine Clearance: Case Study of Cambodia.” Journal of 
International Development. 12(2); Geoff Harris. (March 2002) “The Economics of Landmine Clearance in 
Afghanistan.” Disasters. 26(1); Gareth Elliot & Geoff Harris (December 2001) “A Cost-Benefit Analysis 
of Landmine Clearance in Mozambique.” Development Southern Africa. 18(5); Ted Paterson. (2001) 
“Commentary on ‘The Economics of Landmine Clearance: Case Study of Cambodia.’” Journal of 
International Development. 13(5); Gregory L. Bier. (May 2003) ‘The Economic Impact of Landmines on 
Developing Countries.” International Journal of Social Economics. 30(5); Sandra Bams, Michael 
Cameron, et al. (April 2005) ‘The Value of a Statistical Life and the Economics of Landmine Clearance in 
Developing Countries.” <http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/0504.pdf>; Michael 
Cameron, John Gibson, et al. (2005) “Value of Life and Measuring the Benefits of Landmine Clearance in 
Cambodia.” Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society 49th Annual Conference. 
<http://www.agric.uwa.edu.au/ARE/AARES/Conf2005/PapersPDF/CameronAARES2005.pdf>.
19 cf. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) & Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD). (2001) A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action. Geneva, GICHD; 
James Trevelyan. (2003) Farming Minefields: Remediating Land with Moderate Landmine and UXO 
Contamination. EUDEM-SCOT Conference on Demining Technologies, Brussels.
20 cf. Aldo A. Benini, Lawrence H. Moulton & Charles E. Conley. (June 2002) “Landmines and Local 
Community Adaptation.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. 10(2); Susan Willett & United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). (2003) Participatory Monitoring of Humanitarian 
Mine Action: Giving Voice to Citizens of Nicaragua, Mozambique and Cambodia. Geneva, UNIDIR; 
Christopher Horwood. (2004) “Ideological and Analytical Foundations of Mine Action: Human Rights and 
Community Impact.” In: Harpviken (Ed.). Future of Humanitarian Mine Action; Joanne Durham, Sue 
Gillieatt & Bounpheng Sisavath. (2005) “Effective Mine Risk Education in War-Zone Ares—A Shared 
Responsibility.” Health Promotion International. 20(3).
21 cf. Bob Eaton. (2004) “Crisis, Containment and Development: The Role of the Landmine Impact 
Survey.” In: Harpviken (Ed.). Future of Humanitarian Mine Action-, Belinda Goslin. (2004) “Making 
Analytical Tools Operational: Task Impact Assessment.” In: Harpviken (Ed.). Future of Humanitarian
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scholars have continued to examine the impact of mine contamination on communities in 
more sophisticated detail.22
Surprisingly thin though, is discussion of how demining interacts with both the 
politics of conflict and the politics of the international arena in which it inevitably is 
located. This is evident in the apolitical and technocratic discourse of mine action.23 
However, if there had not been a war in the first place, the mines would not be there. 
Therefore, one can safely assume that mine action almost always occurs in a tense and 
fraught political environment.
When political issues have been discussed, they were either:
1. Noted in passing, such as the acknowledgment that “allegations of corruption” are 
the “Achilles’ heel” of many mine action programs24 or
2. Focused on single subjects: Spearin questions the involvement of private security 
companies in demining,25 GICHD analyses the role of the military and local 
organizations,26 Mather examines mine action’s depoliticized management 
discourse,27 Harpviken & Roberts explore the impact of mine action on
Mine Action; Kristian Berg Harpviken, Ananda S. Millard, et al. (2004) “Acting as One? Co-ordinating 
Responses to the Landmine Problem.” In: Harpviken (Ed.). Future of Humanitarian Mine Action.
22 cf. D.M. Joss. (May 1997) “Anti-Personnel Landmine Injuries: A Global Epidemic.” Work. 8(3); D.J. 
Somasundaram & K.K. Renol. (July-September 1998) “The Psychosocial Effects of Landmines in 
Cambodia.” Medicine, Conflict and Survival. 14(3); Willy Egset & Suzanne Hammad. (1999) “Landmine 
Victims in Jordan: A Needs Assessment Study.” Fafo-paper 1999(3); Jeffrey V. Rosenfeld. (2000) 
“Landmines: The Human Cost.” ADF Health. 1; Jon D. Unruh, Nikolas C. Heynen & Peter Hossler. 
(November 2003) “The Political Ecology of Recovery from Armed Conflict: The Case of Landmines in 
Mozambique.” Political Geography. 22(8); Joseph R. Oppong & Ezekiel Kalipeni. (2005) “The Geography 
of Landmines and Implications for Health and Disease in Africa: A Political Ecology Approach.” Africa 
Today. 52(1). pp. 3-25.
23 Charles Mather. (2002) “Maps, Measurements, and Landmines: The Global Landmines Crisis and the 
Politics of Development.” Environment and Planning. 34.
24 Maslen. Mine Action After Diana, p. 124. cf. Bill Purves. (2001) Living with Landmines: From 
International Treaty to Reality. Montreal, Black Rose Books, p. 72; Jacques Bure & Pierre Pont. 
(November 2003) “Landmine Clearance Projects: Task Manager’s Guide.” World Bank Social 
Development Papers: Conflict
Prevention and Reconstruction Paper No. 10.
<http://lnwebl8.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/LandmineClearanceTaskManagersGuide/ 
$FILE/WP1 Owebversion.pdf>. p. 18-19.
25 Christopher Spearin. (November 2001) “Ends and Means: Assessing the Humanitarian Impact of 
Commercialised Security on the Ottawa Convention Banning Anti-Personnel Mines.” YCISS Occasional 
Paper Number. 69. <http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP69-Spearin.pdf>.
26 GICHD. (June 2003) The Role of the Military in Mine Action. Geneva, GICHD. 
<http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Role_Military_MA.pdf>.
27 Mather. “Maps, Measurements, and Landmines.”
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peacebuilding28 and Bolton & Griffiths look at the problems surrounding the 
privatization of demining.29
The only major attempt to study “The Politics of De-mining” in detail was written a 
decade ago and focused solely on Southern Africa.30 While an important start, this was 
largely a descriptive work that lacked theoretical depth. In short, analysis of the 
demining process has lacked foundation in broader social scientific theory. Part of the 
purpose of this study is to address this gap by exploring how the politics of the demining 
can be understood through social science, primarily political science. The study will 
draw particularly from the academic debates on post-statist governance, realism versus 
idealism; peace and security; privatization and contracting; the political economy of war; 
and foreign aid.
The next chapter, though not specifically focused on mine action, lays the theoretical 
foundations of the dissertation, creating a typology of responses to insecurity, since the 
threat of mines and explosive remnants of war is essentially a threat of physical violence. 
It shows that traditional state-centric responses -  realist ‘National Security’ and idealist 
‘Collective Security’ -  are no longer appropriate in responding to ‘New Wars’ and other 
transnational threats. In their place there are two new forms of ‘post-statist’ networked 
governance, comprising both public and private actors: Strategic-Commercial Complexes 
and Human Security-Civil Society Complexes.
The rest of the PhD uses this binary typology as the theoretical frame with which to 
understand and compare different ways of structuring mine action programs and the 
implications for the outcome of mine clearance as an element of post war reconstruction. 
It traces the development, operation and impact of these two models in the mine action 
sector, from the macro-level of global politics down to the micro-level of implementation 
in affected countries. Chapter 2, on methodology, outlines how this research project was 
done and looks specifically at some of the difficulties of conducting fieldwork in 
countries undergoing transition from conflict.
28 Kristian Berg Harpviken & Rebecca Roberts. (2004) Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine Action in 
Support of Peacebuilding. Oslo, PRIO.
29 Matthew Bolton & Hugh Griffiths. (September 2006) Bosnia’s Political Landmines: A Call for Socially 
Responsible and Conflict-Sensitive Mine Action. London, Landmine Action. 
<http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Bosnias_Political_Landmines.pdf>.
30Laurie H. Boulden & Martin Edmonds. (1999) The Politics of De-mining: Mine Clearance in Southern 
Africa. Johannesburg, The South African Institute of International Affairs.
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Chapter 3 gives a historical overview of the global politics of mine action, illustrating 
the ways in which relations in the international arena have shaped the response to the 
problems of mine and UXO contamination. After a description of post-WWII state- 
centric demining efforts, it traces the development of alternative models of mine action, 
through the Indochinese Wars to contemporary ‘New’ and ‘Post-Modern’ Wars. It shows 
how, by the turn of the 21st Century, two competing conceptions of mine action had 
crystallized into approximations of the two complexes outlined in Chapter 1. The 
Strategic-Commercial approach is opposed to strict controls on mine and cluster munition 
use, securitizes demining aid and favors the commercialization of mine action 
implementation. The Human Security-Civil Society approach favors a strong 
international regime controlling and cluster munition use, directs demining aid toward 
‘humanitarian’ priorities and uses international NGOs to implement mine action projects.
Taking a closer look at the internal workings of these complexes, Chapter 4 argues
that the mine action policies of the US and Norway can be useful as rough proxies for
comparing a Strategic-Commercial vs. Human Security-Civil Society approach to mine
action. Borrowing Jan Egeland’s argument that the US is more constrained by strategic
1
and commercial interest than Norway, the chapter shows that the US has, with only a 
few exceptions, consistently tried to block tight regulations on mines and cluster 
munitions, while Norway has championed them. Likewise, US aid for demining is 
influenced heavily by military and security concerns and much of it is contracted out to 
commercial companies. In contrast, Norwegian demining aid is rooted in humanitarian 
concerns and is largely implemented by international NGOs.
The next three chapters focus down on the impact of ideals and interests on 
implementation in three mine and UXO affected countries: Afghanistan, Bosnia and 
Sudan. Chapter 5 provides the background and history of demining efforts in each 
country, focusing on US and Norwegian supported programs. It then shows that, in 
general, it appears that when a donor’s strategic and commercial interests were higher, 
they tended to opt for a commercial tendering model. When they had less strategic 
interests at stake they were able to act in a more humanitarian fashion and give long-term
31 Jan Egeland. (1988) Impotent Superpower—Potent Small State: Potentials and Limitations of Human 
Rights Objectives in the Foreign Polices of the United States and Norway. Oslo, Norwegian University 
Press.
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grants to international NGOs. The performance of these two models of funding -  
commercial tendering and grants to NGOs -  is then compared in Chapter 6. Basic 
statistical analysis shows that while it tends to be slower and more expensive, the 
granting model tends to concentrate on more difficult demining tasks and conduct the 
process to a higher standard of quality and safety. Chapter 7 then looks at the wider 
impact of the two ‘Demining Complexes’ on the broader socio-political context of 
transition from war to peace. It finds that while implementing agencies operating in a 
Strategic-Commercial mode may contribute to the strengthening of state security organs, 
they are also more likely to strengthen the fragmentation and privatization of security 
granted only to the few with political and economic power. In contrast, the Human 
Security-Civil Society Complex’s greater freedom from expediency enables it to resist 
the politics of violence, advocate for limits on the technologies of war and set up systems 
that distribute protection according to need.
The dissertation concludes by summing up the main points and, in closing, offers 
some final reflections on security in a post-statist world. Recommendations for mine 
action policy, based on the findings of this research project, are attached as an appendix.
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CHAPTER 1
Post-Statist Responses to Insecurity: 
A Theoretical Framework
In a 1907 lecture, Lord Curzon, former Viceroy of India, declared that “Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations.”1 This PhD looks at how states and other powerful 
actors attempt to govern (that is mitigate, manage and neutralize) insecurity in what Mark 
Duffield called the post-modern “Global Borderlands” -  zones of lawlessness and 
conflict.2 For it is in these regions that one finds the concentration of landmine and UXO 
contamination. In fact, such munitions are often used to demarcate the frontiers of these 
‘zones of war.’ However, the state-centric understandings of global politics, in which the 
primary sources of insecurity were other states or internal subversion, no longer hold 
true. Faced by new transnational and non-state forms of insecurity, states and other 
powerful actors now try to penetrate and manage the territories and populations of the 
‘borderlands’ through complex multilevel networks of public and private actors. 
Countries like Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan are governed by an array of UN agencies, 
NGOs, bilateral donors and multinational companies all interacting with local public and 
private powerholders. Duffield has argued that this is a form of ‘neo-medievalism’, in 
which political authority is diffused over multiple levels and overlaps many different 
actors.3
This understanding of the shift from government to governance in the ‘borderlands’ is 
the theoretical starting point for this PhD. However, fully understanding the actors, intra­
1 Lord Curzon of Kedleston. (1907) “Frontiers.” 1907 Romanes Lecture. <http://www- 
ibru.dur.ac.uk/resources/docs/curzon 1 .html>.
2 Mark Duffield. (2001) “Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid.” Disasters. 25(4).
3 Ibid. p. 308.
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complex dynamics and outcomes of this system of governance requires going further. 
While Duffield has a tendency to conflate these networks into one “emerging system of 
global liberal governance”4, this can actually hinder understanding. For this system 
includes multiple types of actors, who negotiate relationships between themselves in 
different ways. This chapter argues that there are at least two ideal types of these 
complexes: 1) a Strategic-Commercial Complex incorporating great power states, 
military alliances and commercial companies and 2) a Human Security-Civil Society 
Complex incorporating middle power states, multilateral agencies, NGOs and social 
movements. The rest of the dissertation will map how these complexes govern the threat 
of mines and UXO, and the different outcomes they produce: the former, preventing legal 
restrictions on weapons and prioritizing militarized, commercialized, low-cost and low- 
quality demining; the latter, strong legal restrictions on weapons and prioritizing 
humanitarian, high cost and premium quality demining.
In order to place the new system of governance in context, this chapter will start by 
reviewing the traditional state-centric understanding of the world system and how it 
conceived of insecurity in terms of the threat to the state. It will then show, however, that 
not all states responded to this threat in the same way. Some took a ‘realist’ or ‘national 
security’ position, arguing that the state’s security dilemma was such that, in the anarchy 
of the international arena, a state’s interests were constantly threatened by other powerful 
states. Thus realists argued states should build up a strong military apparatus to deter 
potential challengers and to secure national strategic and economic interests. Other states 
took an ‘idealist’ or ‘collective security’ position. They sought to eliminate the security 
dilemma by trying to entrench supranational legal norms and institutions. They thus 
conceived of strategic interests in a more international sense of the global public good.
The chapter will then show how both the traditional understanding of government and 
the classical understanding of war has been challenged by the rise of the New Wars, the 
growing power of non-state actors and the tendency to view insecurity as a threat to a 
population. In the international arena states are now embedded in diffuse networks of 
public and private actors. Again, however, not all these networks react to the insecurity
4 Mark Duffield. (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. 
London, Zed Books, p. 2.
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of the ‘New Wars’ in the same way. Some take a kind of ‘post-statist realist’ position 
and organize themselves into Strategic-Commercial Complexes. Others take a ‘post­
statist idealist’ position and organize into Human Security-Civil Society Complexes. 
Finally, the chapter shows how relationships between organizations within these two 
complexes are governed by differing approaches to the ‘principal-agent problem’. The 
Strategic-Commercial Complex is held together by contracts, in which principal 
organizations engage the profit motives of their agents. In contrast, the Human Security- 
Civil Society Complex is held together by a sense of trust and shared commitment to 
similar values.
a. Statism: Territoriality, Sovereignty and Old War
The modern international system -  with its zenith approximately from 1860 to 1970 -  
was structured around twin pillars of ‘territoriality’ and sovereignty.5 Having slowly 
replaced multilayered, overlapping forms of medieval authority, the age of ‘Statism’ 
nationalized and centralized political power around sovereign governments claiming the 
sole legitimate monopoly on the use of force.6 Government was characterized by 
hierarchical and bureaucratic relationships of command and control, with authority 
extending throughout the territory of the nation-state, ending at its boundaries. To reduce 
the potential for contesting claims to territory, areas considered ‘ungovemed’ -  for 
instance, the American and Russian frontiers and continent of Africa -  were colonized 
and/or annexed, incorporating them into the statist system.7 International politics were 
marked by mutual recognition that the sovereign of each state had the right to determine 
the nature of government, content of policy and even religious and ideological affiliations 
of its citizens. While this is admittedly a simplification of a rich history and literature, 
much of the debate in the study of security is rooted in this state-centric understanding of 
global politics.
5 Charles S. Maier. (2000) “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the 
Modem Era.” The American Historical Review. 105(3). 
<http://www.historycooperative.Org/joumals/ahr/105.3/ah000807.html>.
6 cf. Charles Tilly. (1992) Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 - 1992. Rvsd Ed. Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishers.
7 cf. Lord Curzon. “Frontiers.”
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i. The Threat: Nation-State Aggression and Internal Subversion
As with many political institutions, the threat to the statist international order came
from agents that were unwilling to play by its basic rules -  in this case mutual recognition 
of territoriality and sovereignty. Insecurity arose when one state refused to recognize the 
sovereign and territorial right of another or when local rebels contested the right of the 
government to rule and sought to replace it with an alternative sovereign. However, since 
a basic tenet of Statism was noninterference in the politics of another state, this meant 
states had little control over other states. They could never be certain of another state’s 
intentions. This situation led to what international relations scholars have called the 
‘Security Dilemma.’ State A would suspect State (or rebel group) B’s intentions and arm 
itself. This would make State B nervous and so it too would arm itself. Without some 
kind of intervention or de-escalation, this would lead to an unstable arms race that 
actually made both State A and B more insecure.8
When this broke into outright conflict -  either nation-state aggression or internal 
subversion -  the manner in which war was conceived fit into the Statist framework. 
Combat was to be conducted by uniformed personnel acting as agents of the state (or the 
pretenders who wanted to be the state), not in a private capacity. War occurred, at least 
in theory, within confined time (between the declaration of war and the cessation of 
hostilities -  both determined by the sovereigns involved) and space (upon the battlefield). 
Moreover, conduct of hostilities were regulated by governments in formal and codified 
Laws of War. The primary objectives of the warring parties were either to compel the 
enemy state (or rebel group) into submission with overwhelming force, or to prevent 
themselves being overwhelmed through a defensive war of attrition.9 This classical 
conception of warfare has been described by some as “Old War.”10
Within this conception of war, mines were only laid by the regular armed forces of 
the nation-state (or an armed rebel movement), either as an offensive weapon targeted at 
an enemy state, or to defend defined areas of strategic national importance such as 
frontlines and bases. Given the regulated nature of ‘Old War’, mines tended to be laid in
8 cf. John H. Herz. (1951) Political Realism and Political Idealism. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
9 Carl von Clausewitz. (1997) On War. J.J. Graham (Trans.). Ware, Hertfordshire, Wordsworth Editions 
Ltd.
10 Mary Kaldor. (1999). New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge, Polity Press, 
pp. 13-30.
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accordance with the laws of war on discrimination, proportionality and the protection of 
noncombatants. Thus, for example, minefields in WWII were largely placed between 
lines on battlefields. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
It would be inaccurate, however, to think that the statist system of territoriality and 
sovereignty was a monolith. Governments reacted to the basic existential threat of Old 
Wars in different ways. The study of international relations has generally divided the 
alternative ways of conceiving state security into two broad camps: realism and idealism. 
The following subsections will briefly explore these two schools of thought.
ii. The Realist Solution: National Security
Realist11 conceptions of security come from a particular understanding of the security
dilemma. Realists believed international relations were tragically characterized by a 
Hobbsian ‘anarchy’ (with no supranational governing authority to impose rule of law) in 
which states must secure their survival in the ruthless competition for strategic and 
economic interests. International stability, if at all possible (some ‘tragic realists’ 
believed such anarchy was inherently unstable12), could only be achieved through an 
equilibrium ‘balance of power’ between states (in which states and blocs were equally 
matched in strength)13 or through imposition by a super-powerful imperium or hegemon 
-  a Pax Romana.14 In other words, if there was any way to escape the security dilemma, 
it was through constantly ensuring that one’s state was stronger and more able to secure 
vital interests than the other players of the game.
111 include in this category the neo-realists who have tried to use the realist preoccupation with power 
politics as the foundation for a ‘scientific’ understanding of international relations, such as: Hans J. 
Moregenthau & Kenneth W. Thompson. (1985) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace. 6th Ed. New York, Knopf; John J. Mearsheimer. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New 
York, Norton.
12 cf. Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
13 cf. Edward V. Gulick. (1955) Europe’s Classical Balance of Power. Ithaca, Cornell; Michael Sheehan. 
(2000) The Balance of Power: History and Theory. London, Routledge; Emerson M.S. Niou, Peter C. 
Ordeshook and Gregory F. Rose. (1989) The Balance of Power: Stability and Instability in International 
Systems. New York, Cambridge.
14 cf. Robert O. Keohane. (1980) “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International 
Economic Regimes, 1967-1977.” Change in the International System. Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson 
& Alexander L. George (Eds.). Boulder, Westview; Timothy J. McKeown. (Winter 1983) “Hegemonic 
Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe.” International Organization. 37(1). pp. 73-91.
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Security for a state, then, could only be achieved through strength and ability to 
defend itself from other states. Drawing on the tradition of Sun Tzu15 and Machiavelli,16 
many realists argued that moral reasoning could not provide adequate guidance for a 
leader wishing to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their state. As 
Clausewitz said, “in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit 
of benevolence are the worst.”17 Force was necessary to protect ‘benevolent’ politics -  
democracy, non-violence, rule of law -  from external invasion or internal subversion. 
Likewise, international law, such as it existed, was seen as taking a back-seat to the 
necessity of state survival. As Bismarck said, “All treaties between great states cease to 
be binding when they come in conflict with the struggle for existence.”18 Similarly, 
Condoleezza Rice has cautioned against “pursuing symbolic agreements of questionable 
value” that might limit ability to secure US vital interests.19
Realism therefore privileged military, police and intelligence agencies -  the 
institutions of ‘National Security’ that fortified the state against insecurity. Other 
governmental bodies were expected to serve, or at least accept their lower priority to, the 
primary objective of state security. For instance, Rice has argued that the top priority of 
US foreign policy should be ensuring “that America’s military can deter war, project 
power, and fight in defense of its interests if deterrence fails.”20 As a foreign policy 
doctrine, realism has guided many of the ‘great powers’-  larger states (whether 
economically or geographically) which have considerable military forces -  that have the 
resources and strength to maintain international dominance.21
That said, realism was not a monolith. Many realists believed that while a military- 
driven foreign policy was necessary for dealing with hostile powers, a state could enter 
into dialogue, agreement and alliance relationships with ‘like-minded’ states. For
15 Sun Tzu (1998) The Art of War. Ware, Hertfordshire, Wordsworth Editions Ltd.
16 Niccolo Machiavelli. (1997) The Prince. Ware, Hertfordshire, Wordsworth Editions Ltd.
17 von Clausewitz. On War. p. 6.
18 Otto Von Bismarck in: Michael C. Thomsett & Jean F. Thomsett (Eds.) (1997) War and Conflict 
Quotations: A Worldwide Dictionary of Pronouncements from Military Leaders, Politicians, Philosophers, 
Writers and Others. Jefferson, North Carolina, McFarland & Co. p. 141.




21 Jack S. Levy. (1983) War in the Modem Great Power System, 1495-1975. Lexington, Kentucky, 
University Press of Kentucky.
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instance, Condoleezza Rice has argued that while relationships with great powers by 
necessity are driven more by hard security concerns than ideals of human rights and 
democracy, relations with “democratic allies” can be governed by a spirit of cooperation 
and trust. Moreover, when dealing with “weak and poorly governed states” that pose 
little direct threat to national security, the US could focus on enhancing “peaceful 
political and economic development” rather than military or economic competition.22
Within a realist framework, mines and cluster munitions were seen as an integral part 
of the state’s arsenal. As with other forms of arms control, great powers engaged in 
negotiations over how to control the use of mines and cluster munitions largely in order 
to maintain their freedom to deploy their own kinds of weapons, while banning the kinds 
used by other states. For example, the US has often argued for banning the 
technologically simplistic mines used by other countries, while allowing loopholes for its 
own sophisticated hi-tech ones. Since knowledge of explosives were seen as state 
secrets, closely guarded and monopolized by the military, the realist state saw demining 
as a task for the state. Therefore, demining priorities were determined according to their 
strategic importance to the security of the state and actual clearance was planned, 
managed and conducted by the armed forces or police. Clearance of civilian areas was 
conducted for strategic advantage (e.g. winning hearts and minds) or concentrated within 
the boundaries of the state at the end of the conflict. For example, in the aftermath of 
World War II, demining and clearance of unexploded ordnance was organized and 
funded internally by each state, which generally used its military to manage clearance.
iii. The Idealist Solution: Collective Security
The traditional challenge to realism came from the diverse set of thinkers collectively
known as ‘idealists.’ They argued that while the threat to the state may be very real, 
realism was a recipe for instability and injustice by legitimizing the use of violence for 
narrow self-interest. Indeed, they conceived of the security dilemma in less tragic terms, 
believing that by creating norms, legal rules and multilateral institutions, states could
22 Condoleezza Rice. (July/August 2008) “Rethinking the National Interest: American Realism for a New 
World.” Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080701faessay87401/condoleezza- 
rice/rethinking-the-national-interest.html>.
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reduce the potential for mistrust and miscommunication.23 By doing so, they believed 
they could eliminate, or at least reduce, the development of a security dilemma. For 
idealists, then, security was collective and came from formalizing the rules guaranteeing 
territoriality and sovereignty.24 Indeed, modem idealism is primarily founded on the 
political philosophy of Immanuel Kant, who believed that “perpetual peace” depended on 
the formation of a worldwide federation of states -  each governed by “republican” 
constitutions and committed to cosmopolitan values -  which resolved disputes through 
collective negotiation.25 Modem idealists26 have thus looked to intergovernmental 
institutions, such as the United Nations, as guardians of global security.
Unsurprisingly, the concept of ‘Collective Security’ has been more popular among 
smaller powers, such as the Scandinavian states, which have seen the development of 
collective security institutions as a means to blunt the aggressiveness of great powers.27 
Put more cynically, collective security was a means for the little powers to tie down 
superpower Gullivers with treaties and international regulation. For this reason, some 
have argued that ‘idealism’ was thus really only a ‘realism of the weak.’ For instance, 
some realists, notably the ‘English School’, believed that, driven by interests, states came 
together to form a stable ‘international society’, including norms and institutions, to
23 e.g. Danilo Zolo. (1998) “Hans Kelsen: International Peace through International Law.” European 
Journal of International Law. 9(2). pp. 306-324; John R. Oneal & Bruce Russett. (1999) ‘The Kantian 
Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992.” 
World Politics. 52(1). pp. 1-37.
24 For more on Collective Security, see: Charles A. Kupchan & Clifford A. Kupchan. (Summer 1995) “The 
Promise of Collective Security.” International Security. 20(1). pp. 52-61; Thomas R. Cusack & Richard J. 
Stoll. (March 1994) “Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System.” International Studies 
Quarterly. 38(1). pp. 33-59; Inis L. Claude. (1984) “Collective Security as an Approach to Peace.” Swords 
Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization. Inis L. Claude (Ed.). 4th Ed. 
New York, Random House, pp. 245-285.
25 Immanuel Kant. (1983) “To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” Perpetual Peace and Other 
Essays. Ted Humphrey (Trans.). Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 106-143.
26 Examples of scholarly works by modem idealists include: Claude (Ed.). Swords Into Plowshares; Harold 
K. Jacobson. (1984) Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political 
System. 2nd Ed. New York, Alfred E. Knopf; Saul H. Mendlovitz. (1975) On the Creation of a Just World 
Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990's. New York, Free Press. An interesting statement of the classical 
idealist position can actually be found in the following Papal Encyclical: John XXIII. (11 April 1963)
“Pacem in Terris: Encyclical of Pope John XXIII on Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, 
Charity, and Liberty.” <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j- 
xxiii_enc_l 1041963_pacem_en.html>.
27 Robert L. Rothstein. (1968) Alliances and Small Powers. New York, Columbia University Press, p. 29.
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reduce unpredictable behaviour.28 Collective security was thus still self-interested, only a 
broader and more global understanding of state interest that was willing to sacrifice the 
immediate gain of narrow national self-interest for long-term security.
However, many idealists were not convinced that international norm-building was 
based simply on expediency. There is a long tradition of political philosophy arguing a
90stable and just society must be rooted in moral reasoning. For instance, Kant believed 
that “all politics must bend its knee before morality”30 and that all people, even those of 
other states, must be treated “as an end and never merely as a means to an end.”31 This 
idea has influenced the development of human rights norms and international 
humanitarian law (governing the conduct of armed groups in warfare).
However, like realism, idealism was still deeply rooted in the classical “Old War” 
conception of conflict, with nation-state aggression seen as the primary source of 
insecurity. Therefore, traditional UN peacekeeping respected the sovereignty of the two 
antagonistic states, was staffed by uniformed military personnel and typically deployed 
along the former frontlines. Likewise, traditional humanitarian groups like the Red Cross 
tried to stay neutral and apolitical, as war was seen as the preserve of states.
Within the traditional idealist understanding, mines and cluster munitions were thus 
seen as weapons needing careful regulation by international humanitarian law. Demining 
was still a military and state-led activity but was put under the control of the United 
Nations, especially in the context of a peacekeeping mission, in which UN personnel 
would remove, or supervise the removal, of mines between the former frontlines. Rather 
than national interest, priority was given to contaminated areas that had the highest 
humanitarian impact, or had the potential to build confidence between conflicting parties.
28 Hedley Bull. (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York, Columbia 
University Press; Martin Wight. (1977) Systems of States. Leicester, Leicester University Press.
29 See, for example: Mozi. (c. 772-221BCE) “Book 4: Universal Love.” Chinese Text Project 
<http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=106&if=en>; Cicero. (1991) On Duties. M.T. Griffin and F.M. 
Atkins (Trans.). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Thomas Aquinas. (1988) On Law, Morality, and 
Politics. William P. Baumgarth & Richard J. Regan (Ed.). Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company; 
Hugo Grotius. (2008) “Prolegomena.” <http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/grotius/gro-100.htm>; Jean 
Jacques Rousseau. (1762) ‘The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right.” 
<http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm>.
30 Kant. “Perpetual Peace.” p. 135.
31 Immanuel Kant. (1993) Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. James W. Ellington (Trans.). 3rd Ed. 
Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, p. 36.
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For example, in the early 1990s, the UN took a leading role in mine clearance in regions 
such as Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique and Cambodia.
iv. Summary
The modem international system, at least in theory, was ordered into mutually 
recognized sovereign and territorial nation-states, ruled by governments. The perceived 
primary security threats were state aggression or internal subversion by rebels who 
wished to become the government. However, states and their leaders reacted to these 
threats differently based on differing understandings of their security dilemma. Realists 
were pessimistic about the ability of states to escape the security dilemma game -  thus 
security could only come from sufficient strength to deter aggression. The realist 
preoccupation with ‘national security’ and states’ interests thus meant that mines were 
considered a valuable tool in service of the state and demining was conducted for 
strategic advantage by the military. In contrast, idealists were more optimistic about the 
ability of states, working together, to develop stabilizing norms and institutions and 
minimize security dilemmas. Therefore idealists promoted tight regulation of mines and 
cluster munitions and advocated for their clearance by intergovernmental agencies. That 
said, both these conceptions of security were ultimately state-centric, which many believe 
renders them inadequate for understanding and dealing with the new transnational 
security threats.
b. Post-Statism: Global Governance and Privatization
Globalization -  the increasing breadth and depth of transnational 
“interconnectedness” -  has led to a hollowing out of the state, as governments have
33privatized key industries and services and liberalized regulations on trade and finance. 
While governments are still among the most powerful actors on the globe, the primacy of 
the statist model of world politics is thus being challenged. Non-state actors grow more 
prominent on the world stage. Many multinational companies now command greater 
resources than small countries and NGO movements can instigate new international
32 Kaldor. New and Old Wars. p. 3.
33 H. Brinton Milward & Keith G. Provan. (April 2000) “Governing the Hollow State.” Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory. 10(2). pp. 359-379.
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treaties. Moreover, states are beginning to form strategic partnerships with these non­
governmental agents in complex networks of public and private actors.
Political scientists have described this as a shift from government to governance.34 
Political power can no longer simply be traced upward through hierarchical bureaucratic 
relationships. Rather, understanding politics now requires mapping the distribution 
among and exercise of power by nodes embedded in networks.35 Echoing Hedley Bull, 
Mark Duffield describes these complexes as ‘neo-medieval’ or ‘neo-feudal’ as they 
hearken back to pre-Westphalian Europe, constituting networks of public and private 
actors with overlapping sources of authority and power. Moreover, according to 
Duffield, insecurity is perceived in biopolitical terms -  a threat to a population (so-called 
‘species-life’), whether a specific few or as a whole, rather than the state.37 As the next 
subsections show, an international system comprised of global governance networks 
implies both a very different perception of and response to insecurity than the classical 
Old Wars.
i. The Threat: New War Complexes and Transnational Insecurity
Both the traditional realist and idealist understandings of security have been 
challenged in the post-Cold War era by the growing realization that states, even 
pretenders with statist ambitions, are not the only potential sources of disorder. On one 
hand, human communities face existential threats from natural phenomena such as 
HIV/AIDS and natural disasters like the Indian Ocean Tsunami or Hurricane Katrina. On 
the other hand, global finance, communications and market deregulation have contributed 
to the growth and interconnectedness of the so-called ‘underside’ of globalization -  
transnational non-state networks incorporating organized crime, warlords, profiteers and 
extremist movements.38 These networks are at the center of the contemporary conflicts
34 William W. Boyer. (March 1990) “Political Science and the 21st Century: From Government to 
Governance.” PS: Political Science and Politics. 23(1). pp. 50-54.
35 cf. Michel Foucault. (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London, Penguin Books, pp. 
24-28; Michel Foucault. (1980) Power/Knowledge. New York, Pantheon, p. 39.
36 Bull. The Anarchical Society, p. 254; Mark Duffield. (Spring 1998) “Post-modem Conflict: Warlords, 
Post-adjustment States and Private Protection.” Civil Wars. 1(1). pp. 65-102.
37 Mark Duffield. (2007) Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples. 
Cambridge, Polity Press.
38 Cherif Bassiouni. (1997) “Organized crime and new wars.” New Wars. Mary Kaldor & Basker Vashee 
(Eds.). London, Pinter; Frank Cillufo & George Salmoiraghi. (Autumn 1999) “And the Winner Is.. ..the 
Albanian Mafia.” Washington Quarterly. 22(4); Peter L. Bergen. (2002) Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret
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and, argues Mark Duffield, represent a new form of social organization; parodying the 
characterization of conflicts as ‘complex political emergencies’ he calls them “emerging 
political complexes.”39 As a result, in many parts of the world, a violent threat to a 
person’s life is now more likely to come from a warlord’s private militia than regular 
government forces. Some have argued that these deregulated, privatized and globalized 
conflicts are a type of “New War”, characterized by targeting of civilians, prolonged, 
hostilities and exclusivistic ethnic, religious and sectarian ideologies.40
As will be described in greater detail in Chapter 3, in these New Wars, mine-laying 
was significantly different from the more Clausewitzian patterns of WWII. Arising out 
of the strategic logic of the New Wars, minefields were used to target or control the 
migrations of civilians. Likewise, displaying a lack of coherence, discipline and 
commitment to the laws of war, troops in these conflicts often laid mines in non-linear 
patterns, failing to map and mark areas of contamination.
Traditional understandings of national and collective security are unprepared to deal 
with the threats from New War Complexes. The realist conception of national security 
gave responsibility for security to the military, which was generally organized, equipped 
and trained to fight inter-state war or insurgency. However, the armed forces are less 
well adapted to managing insecurities like climate change, international terrorism or 
organized crime. Moreover, dealing with these problems would be a global public good, 
and so nations that follow narrow self-interest may not be able to muster the collective 
action necessary to deal with them. Collective security too is ultimately based on similar 
statist assumptions. International humanitarian law is only signed by governments; it is 
difficult to persuade a mafioso or warlord to abide by it. In addition, international 
institutions are vast bureaucracies, lacking flexibility to respond quickly to problems. 
Relying on state contributions of funds and personnel, they struggle with chronic budget
World of Osama bin Laden. New York, Touchstone; Michael Charles Pugh, Neil Cooper & Jonathan 
Goodhand M. and N. Cooper, (Eds.). (2004) War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of 
Transformation. London, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Inc.; Misha Glenny. (2008) McMafia: A Journey 
Through the Global Criminal Underworld. New York, Knopf.
39 Duffield. Global Governance and the New Wars. pp. 14,44-74.
40 Herfried Miinkler. (2005) The New Wars. Cambridge, Polity Press; Duffield. Global Governance and the 
New Wars. pp. 136-201; Kaldor. New and Old Wars; Martin van Creveld. (1991) The Transformation of 
War. New York, The Free Press.
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shortages and a lack of the necessary troops and materiel to impose order on places like 
Bosnia and Rwanda.
Therefore, the security dilemma has become far more complex than in the statist era. 
It has more layers, occurring at the sub- and supra- state level, with companies, ethnic 
groups and individuals also facing their own security dilemmas. It also involves more 
actors, as states face threats from non-state agents that cannot be deterred by traditional 
military means, nor engaged with in international treaties and institutions.
ii. Governing the Borderlands
Just as the imperial metropolitan states annexed ‘ungovemed’ frontiers in the statist
era, the New Wars have prompted the powerful actors (both state and non-state) to 
innovate new technologies of power for governing the new zones of global insecurity, 
which Duffield calls the “global borderlands.”41 It is in these very frontiers of the 
international system that one finds the concentration of mine and UXO contamination.
Duffield argues that while globalization and privatization have been seen primarily as 
the retrenchment of the state, it has also enabled powerful states to project their power in 
new ways. He argues that the powerful “metropolitan states” at the center of the global 
system attempt to regulate the risk of insecurity in the periphery through a combination of 
practices including trade, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, development aid and 
military intervention. Contracting these activities out to private actors enables states to 
penetrate farther into the ‘borderlands’, without the same political cost as direct 
annexation or occupation 42 Instead of operating solely at the inter-state level, these 
contractors are able to operate ‘biopolitically’ at the level of the population 43 Duffield 
sees the resultant “polyarchical, non-territorial and networked relations” between 
metropolitan governments and their non-state partners as an “emerging system of global 
liberal governance.”44
This understanding of the international system is the theoretical starting point of this 
PhD. However, this thesis argues that Duffield’s “emerging system of global liberal 
governance” is a conflation of many different types of complex systems. The
41 Duffield. “Governing the Borderlands.” p. 309.
42 Ibid. p. 309.
43 Duffield. Development, Security and Unending War.
44 Duffield. Global Governance and the New Wars. p. 2.
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‘metropolitan states’ and the ‘international non-state actors’ that he talks about are not 
monoliths. There are different kinds of metropolitan states -  great powers may not act in 
the same manner as middle powers. There are also different kinds of international non­
state actors -  international NGOs may not act in the same way as commercial companies. 
Duffield does not fully explore the possible differences within the complexes of ‘global 
liberal governance.’ This PhD argues that in order to understand them, one has to 
understand the different constituent actors, their motivations and the institutions that 
structure the relationships between them. Different sets of actors, in different kinds of 
institutional structures may produce different outcomes, as this case study of mine action 
will illustrate.
Indeed, just as traditional statist understandings of international relations maintained 
that there were two basic rationales for international action (realist and idealist), this 
dissertation argues that there are at least two ideal types of these new complexes of global 
governance. Both have moved away from state-centrism to develop institutional 
complexes incorporating both public and private actors. However, one type, called here a 
Strategic-Commercial Complex, is ‘post-statist realist’, as it maintains a pessimism about 
the security dilemma, believing that in the new insecurity, one is tragically forced to 
privilege the security of one’s ‘own people’ and possessions over that of ‘the other.’ The 
other type, called here a Human Security-Civil Society Complex, is ‘post-statist idealist’, 
in that it is shaped by a commitment to multilateralism and a perception of the primacy of 
global public interest over narrow private or parochial interest. These two developing 
forms of governance are explored in detail below.
c. Post-Statist Realism: Strategic-Commercial Complexes
The actors within the Strategic-Commercial Complex inherit from traditional realism 
a pessimism about the security dilemma and the tragic necessity of forceful protection. 
Faced by the new transnational security threats, post-statist realists believe that one is 
forced, by necessity, to fortify one’s ‘own people’ in safe enclaves to prevent 
encroachment from the unstable ‘borderlands.’ The intentions of those who seek to 
fortify their private spaces are not necessarily marked by hostility to those ‘outside the 
fence.’ Rather they feel trapped in a game in which the most logical and safest route to 
self-preservation seems to be separation from dangerous spaces.
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However, the post-statist realist conception of the state moves away from the 
centralized Weberian state bureaucracy toward the out-sourced neo-liberal “hollow 
state.”45 Therefore, post-statist realism attempts to govern insecurity through creating 
enclaves of security for a subpopulation (rather than the state) and managing the insecure 
‘borderlands’ through a complex of commercial security companies in contractual 
partnership with public military, intelligence and police agencies. Non-military aspects 
of foreign policy, such as humanitarian and development aid, are both ‘securitized’ (made 
to serve security objectives) and ‘marketized’ (outsourced to competing private actors). 
Other commentators have described this phenomenon as a “strategic complex,”46 “new 
security-industrial complex”47 or “disaster capitalism complex.”48 However, in this 
dissertation, this institutional system will be called a ‘Strategic-Commercial Complex’ to 
indicate both its realist understanding of strategic issues and extensive involvement of 
for-profit actors.
The evolution of this system is explained below by four interrelated factors: 1) a 
growing enclavization and distrust of the public sphere, 2) the neo-liberal critique of the 
state, 3) the growth of the private security sector and 4) the utility of contractors in 
dispersing political accountability.
i. Enclavization and Fortification: The Privatization of Public Space
The first factor that distinguishes post-statist realism from its traditional cousin is a 
growing distrust in government and fear of insecurity in public spaces, even inside states’ 
borders. The ancient Greeks celebrated the public sphere; their word for ‘private’ -  idios 
-  is the root of the English word ‘idiot.’ However, the word public is now often 
associated with poor quality -  such as public works, public education and public health 
care.49 Public space also has connotations of danger; discourses about ‘public toilets’ or 
the ‘the streets’ portray them as places of violence, crime and predation.
45 Milward & Provan. “Governing the Hollow State.”
46 Duffield. Global Governance and the New Wars. p. 12.
47 Solomon Hughes. (2007) War on Terror, Inc.: Corporate Profiteering from the Politics of Fear. London, 
Verso, p. 7.
48 Naomi Klein. (2007) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. London, Allen Lane. p. 12.
49 P.W. Singer. (2003) Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, pp. 69-70; Richard Sennet. (1976) The Fall of Public Man. New York, W.W. Norton.
26
These fears of the ‘public’ have occurred in tandem with increasing doubts about the 
ability of the public sector to provide security, indeed suspicion that the government itself 
may be a source of insecurity. In the US, the Vietnam War, CIA ‘dirty tricks’, Watergate 
scandal and 1993 Waco siege, have all contributed to public suspicion of the 
government.50 This has developed alongside growing fears of violent crime and 
international terrorism. In much of the developing world, citizens fear authoritarian, 
corrupt or weak public security forces and are forced to look for private solutions to their 
security problems, such as militias, vigilantism or private guards.
This suspicion of public security provision has contributed to a trend of 
‘enclavization’ or “forting up”51, in which individuals, communities, corporations and 
even government agencies seek “protection through separation,” by barricading private 
space behind rings of protective walls, barbed wire, armed guards and electronic 
surveillance systems.53 In many countries, oil companies and other extractive industries 
no longer rely on state security organs to protect their business, preferring private security 
companies that guard highly secure enclaves for their expatriate workers.54 Likewise, in 
South Africa,55 the US56 and elsewhere, there has been a precipitous growth in gated 
communities. Researchers have found that, driven by a fear of crime and dissatisfaction 
with public services, residents of such suburban fortifications seek to privatize public 
spaces, such as roads, playgrounds and parks, and exclude access to those people 
perceived as security threats. In many of these communities, control of public services,
50 James William Gibson. (1994) Warrior Dreams: Paramilitary Culture in Post-Vietnam America. New 
York, Hill and Wang.
51 Edward J. Blakely & Mary Gail Snyder. (1997) Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United 
States. Washington DC, The Brookings Institution, p. 2.
52 Ibid. p. 148.
53 Klein. Shock Doctrine, pp. 406-422; Jon Coaffee. (March 2004) “Rings of Steel, Rings of Concrete and 
Rings of Confidence: Designing out Terrorism in Central London pre and post September 11th.” 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 28(1).
54 Mary Kaldor, Terry Lynn Karl & Yahia Said. (2007) Oil Wars. London, Polity Press; James Ferguson. 
(2005) “Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa.” American 
Anthropologist. 107(3). pp. 377-382.
55 For more on South African gated communities, see: Ulrich Jurgens & Martin Gnad. (2002) “Gated 
communities in South Africa -  experiences from Johannesburg.” Environment and Planning B: Planning 
and Design. 29(3). pp. 337-353; Charlotte Lemanski. (October 2004) “A new apartheid? The spatial 
implications of fear of crime in Cape Town, South Africa.” Environment and Urbanization. 16(2). pp. 101- 
112; Derek Hook & Michele Vrdoljak. (2002) “Gated communities, heterotopia and a ‘rights’ of privilege: 
a ‘heterotopology’ of the South African security-park.” Geoforum. 33. pp. 195-219.
56 Blakely & Snyder. Fortress America, p. 1.
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such as protection, waste management, street maintenance and even governance of the 
community itself are contracted to private companies.57
The walled enclave has taken a new meaning in the war in Iraq, with a significant 
portion of the US command and control holed up in the so-called Baghdad “Green Zone.” 
Journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran has described the Green Zone as a cloistered “Little 
America” where “Iraqi customs and laws didn’t apply” and “Whatever could be 
outsourced was.” While outside in the “Red Zone” Iraqi citizens faced looting, blackouts 
and sewage in the streets, inside, serviced by a bevy of contractors, the occupation 
authorities enjoyed air conditioning, a pool and, to avoid contamination and possible 
poisoning, food flown in from Kuwait and the US.58 According to Stephen Graham, the 
US Green Zones in Iraq and Afghanistan are the result of a developing ‘imaginative 
geography’ of the post-9/11 world, which constructs “a mutually exclusive binary -  a 
securitized ‘inside’ enclosing the urban places of the US Empire’s ‘homeland’, and an 
urbanizing ‘outside’, where US military power can pre-emptively attack places deemed 
sources of ‘terrorist threats.’”59 This, he argues, is also expressed domestically by a 
growing emphasis on the ‘homeland’ (e.g. ‘homeland security’) and a suspicion that 
certain populations, notably Arab-Americans, are part of the ‘outside.’ In other words, 
many Americans feel that the only way to secure their ‘way of life’ and government, is to 
fortify the ‘homeland’ against encroachments from the ‘borderlands.’
While these enclaves often rely on a realist preoccupation with the use of 
surveillance, deterrence and force, they are forming at levels below and beyond the 
territorial boundaries of the nation-state. Gated communities form at the sub-state level, 
and actually hearken back to the medieval practice of fortification, in which the 
sovereignty of the state overlapped with the privatized protection of the feudal elite. 
Enclavization and fortification also occurs at levels beyond the nation-state. In the case 
of Israel’s ‘separation barrier’ and settlements, fortification may envelop space and 
“extraterritorial islands”60 that are outside the official boundaries of the state. Likewise,
57 Ibid.
58 Rajiv Chandrasekaran. (2007) Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad’s Green Zone. London, 
Bloomsbury Publishing, p. 12,19.
59 Stephen Graham. (June 2006) “Cities and the ‘War on Terror.’” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research. 30(2). p. 256.
60 Eyal Weizman. (2007) Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation. London, Verso, p. 176.
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the ‘Green Zones’ in Iraq and Afghanistan exist in another state, but are controlled by the 
US and its allies, similar to overseas imperial fortifications in strategic ports or crusader 
citadels in the ‘Holy Land.’ They are, in effect, aiming to protect specific and privileged 
subpopulations rather than the borders and institutions of the state.61
While landmines are now used less than 20 years ago, they are a weapons system 
designed for protecting borders and enclaves. For example, in the Bosnian war, factions 
used landmines to demarcate and protect ‘ethnically-clean’ enclaves. As will be shown in 
Chapter 3, several great and regional powers, such as the US, Russia, China, India, 
Pakistan and Israel, continue to assert a right to create secure enclaves for themselves by 
creating rings of minefields and cluster munitions strikes around their borderlands and 
strategic locations.
ii. Neo-Liberalism: The Privatization of Public Services
A related factor behind the development of Strategic-Commercial Complexes is the
neo-liberal belief that states are inefficient, create market distortions and encourage rent- 
seeking behavior. Based largely on the ‘Chicago School’ of economic theory, 
represented particularly by Friedrich Hayek,62 Milton Friedman,63 and George Stigler,64 
neo-liberals called for a ‘rolling back’ of the state through deregulation, liberalization and 
privatization. They believed markets, when freed from public interference, would result 
in optimality and equilibrium. Privatizing public services would spur innovation, 
increase quality and save costs.65
The resultant system, in which the government acts basically as a contract manager, 
outsourcing much of its activities to the private sector, has been described as the “Hollow 
State.”66 For instance, many mine and cluster munition weapon systems are developed 
for militaries by private industry. The new US landmine systems, for example, are being
61 cf. Duffield. Development, Security and Unending War.
62 Friedrich Hayek. (1994) The Road to Serfdom. 50th anniversary edition. Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press.
63 Milton Friedman. (2002) Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition. Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press.
64 George J. Stigler. (1987) The Theory of Price. 2nd Rvsd Ed. London, Collier Macmillan.
65 E.S. Savas. (1996) “Applications in Protective and Human Services.” Privatization: Critical 
Perspectives on the World Economy. Vol. II. George Yarrow & Piotr Jasiriski (Eds.). London, Routledge. 
pp. 324-331; E.S. Savas. (1982) Privatizing the Public Sector: How to Shrink Government. Chatham, NJ, 
Chatham House.
66 Milward & Provan. “Governing the Hollow State.”
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developed by defense contractor Alliant Techsystems.67 Contracting out has not only 
been limited to the domestic sphere. Several countries have begun to contract significant 
elements of their foreign policy to commercial companies. For instance, US foreign aid 
programs have increasingly been implemented through private for-profit development 
contractors, with NGOs also receiving significant funds.68 USAID especially has 
pressured NGOs to act in a more commercial manner, making them bid for contracts and 
grants, putting them in competition with each other and causing them to “behave like for- 
profit organizations.”69
Mine action has been particularly affected by the neo-liberal trend of contracting-out. 
One commentator observed that it might be the most commercialized sector of 
humanitarian aid.70 This is because many mine action policymakers and researchers 
believe the rigors of competition lead to better demining performance. Fitz-Gerald and 
Neal, for instance, argued in favor of using commercial companies, arguing they are
71efficient. Likewise, Eddie Banks has called for “a more business-like response to mine 
action.” Using quantitative analysis he demonstrated that tendering, rather than granting, 
demining funding led to higher productivity and lower costs in Bosnia. Subtly criticizing 
the good intentions of international NGOs, Banks said that if demining wished to be 
“truly humanitarian” it must adopt a contracting model.72
iii. The New Mercenaries: The Privatization of Security
While there was initially some reluctance among governments to contract out
activities related to the use of force -  considered the very core of state competency -  this
67 Alliant Techsystems Inc. (2008) “Spider.”
<http://www.atk.com/Customer_Solutions_MissionSystems/cs_ms_w_fp_spider.asp>; Alliant 
Techsystems Inc. (2008) “Intelligent Munitions System (IMS).”
<http://www.atk.com/Customer_Solutions_MissionSystems/cs_ms_w_fp_ims.asp>; Christopher Moraff.
(3 October 2006) “Along Came a Spider.” The American Prospect.
<http://www .prospect.org/cs/articles ?article=along_came_a_spider>.
68 Reuben Berrios. (2000) Contracting for Development: The Role of For-Profit Contractors in U.S.
Foreign Development Assistance. Westport, CT, Praeger.
69 Ibid. p. 58.
70 Chris Horwood. (March 2000) “Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a New Sector in 
Humanitarian Aid.” RRN Network Paper. 32. p. 31.
71 Ann Fitz-Gerald & Derrick J. Neal. (2000) “Dispelling the Myth Between Humanitarian and Commercial 
Mine Action Activity.” Journal of Mine Action. 4(3). 
<http://maic.jmu.edu/Joumal/4.3/features/myth/myth.htm>.
72 Eddie Banks. (August 2003) “In the Name of Humanity.” Journal of Mine Action. 7(2). 
<http://maic.jmu.edu/joumal/7.2/focus/banks/banks.htm>.
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is dissipating in many countries. Private security guards have long guarded buildings or 
valuable objects. However, in the 1990s the industry shifted from guarding ‘things’ to 
guarding people, as companies became involved in transporting prisoners, running 
prisons and managing asylum seeker detention centers.73 Concurrently, the US began to 
contract elements of peacekeeping operations, the ‘War on Drugs’ and management of 
military bases to private security companies, notably DynCorp and Kellogg, Brown and 
Root (until recently a subsidiary of Halliburton).74
In addition to growing demand for private protection, there were also supply side 
factors. The military draw-down at the end of the Cold War and collapse of apartheid in 
South Africa released into the private sector significant amounts of military personnel 
and materiel. With many of the former Soviet arms stocks up for the highest bidder, and 
a large unemployed workforce of people trained in military operations, conditions were 
ideal for ‘military entrepreneurs’ to capitalize on the growing insecurities of the New 
Wars.
The 1990s saw a steady growth of the private military sector, with firms like 
Executive Outcomes, Sandline International and Military and Professional Resources, 
Inc. (MPRI) grabbing the headlines.75 The rise of the private soldier, like the return of 
the fortress, has echoes back to older, medieval phenomena, such as the Italian 
condottieri (literally ‘contractors’, private soldiers employed by the Italian city states in 
the medieval and renaissance eras) and the Vatican’s Swiss guards.76 However, modem 
private military and security companies are distinguished from their feudal predecessors 
by their corporate and globalized nature.77
The ‘War on Terror’ has seen a massive expansion in the willingness of countries like 
the US and Britain to contract out military services once seen as the reserve of the state, 
including managing supply chains, interrogating prisoners, guarding military bases, 
destroying abandoned ordnance, training military and police forces and analyzing secret 
intelligence. This has created explosive growth in the private security market, with older 
companies like ArmorGroup and DynCorp expanding rapidly, and newer start-ups, like
73 Hughes. War on Terror, Inc. p. 6.
74 Ibid. p. 71-92.
75 Singer. Corporate Warriors, pp. 49-70; Duffield. Global Governance and the New Wars. p. 65-68.
76 Singer. Corporate Warriors, pp. 22-29.
77 Ibid. pp. 42-48.
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Blackwater, Erinys and Triple Canopy enjoying a meteoritic rise. According to 
conservative estimates, there are now some 21,000 commercial security personnel in 
Iraq.78 This was partly because the retrenchment of state security organs following the 
Cold War meant that the post-9/11 rapid expansion of security capabilities required hiring
70many of these personnel back, through the private sector. However, there is also an 
enduring belief that the private sector is able to do many activities more efficiently than 
the state, and that its flexibility enable it to more effectively combat the diffuse and ad 
hoc ‘New War Complexes.’80 For example, one commentator has referred to the private 
military company Blackwater as “Anti-Qaeda” or “A1 Qaeda for the good guys”, arguing 
its diffuse, networked and private nature makes it more attuned to fighting terrorist 
networks than the US government.81
The commercial demining market has risen in tandem with the private security 
market and there are many linkages and overlaps between the two industries. Indeed 
there are many companies provided both services since employees are often recruited 
from similar backgrounds and operations occur in the same conflicted locations.82
iv. Diffusion of Power: The Privatization of Public Authority
Finally, the post-statist realist enthusiasm for contracting is due partially to the way in 
which it can reduce political liability for a state’s actions, making the chains of authority 
and accountability more diffuse and networked. Contractors give the state ‘plausible 
deniability’ and lower possibility of exposure. If seen as abhorrent by the electorate, a 
contractor’s actions can be dismissed as those of a rogue company rather than the fault of 
the state. This allows states room to ‘innovate’ around the edges of legal and moral 
norms when faced with security threats, while minimizing blame. Likewise, electorates 
seem less concerned when a contractor is killed than a regular soldier. By outsourcing to
78 Deborah Avant. (Spring 2006) “The Privatization of Security: Lessons from Iraq.” Orbis. 50(2). p. 330.
79 For details on the private security industry, see: Singer. Corporate Warriors', Christopher Kinsey. (2007) 
Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies. London,
Routledge; Deborah Avant. (2005) The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
80 Hughes. War on Terror, Inc. pp. 56-70; Singer. Corporate Warriors, pp. 49-70.
81 Josh Manchester. (19 December 2006) “A1 Qaeda for the Good Guys: The Road to Anti-Qaeda.” 
TCSDaily. <http://www.tcsdaily.com/Article.aspx?id= 121606A>.
82 Christopher Spearin. (November 2001) “Ends and Means: Assessing the Humanitarian Impact of 
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the private sector, state leaders can reduce the risk that soldiers will be killed and thus 
reduce oversight from public and legislative bodies.83
v. The Resultant System: A Strategic Commercial Complex
The result of the above trends is a Strategic-Commercial system in which the world is
pockmarked with privileged enclaves for specific subpopulations with high levels of 
protection, insurance and services. These enclaves are protected by rings of fortification, 
both real (such as barbed wire, minefields and concrete bollards) and ‘virtual’ (such as 
CCTV), and access to both public and private security forces. Those outside the ring, in 
the ‘Red Zone’, are surveilled, managed, combated and governed by complexes of public 
agencies and contractors. This system is suggestive of Garrett Hardin’s ‘Lifeboat Ethics. 
Hardin argued that the world’s environment and resources tragically can only support a 
small portion of the population; those privileged to live in the ‘lifeboat’ of the developed 
world must unfortunately prevent “boarding parties” -  i.e. immigrants -  who might 
threaten to overwhelm the boat.84





The Strategic-Commercial Complex is thus a segregative system that allocates 
physical and social protection to populations according to mixed criteria of the market
83 Hughes. War on Terror, Inc. p. 121, 201; Singer. Corporate Warriors, pp. 209-211.
84 Garrett Hardin. (September 1974) “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor.” Psychology 
Today, <http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_lifeboat_ethics_case_against_helping_poor.html>.
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(ability to pay for protection) and nation/ethnicity (chance of birth in a well protected 
country or community). For example, US citizens are protected by police and armed 
forces and given the right to a fair trial, whereas, those outside its borders are at risk of 
‘rendition’, abuse and torture in military prisons managed in part by commercial 
contractors. Even within the US, those living in gated communities may have access to a 
private golf course and guards at the gate. In contrast, after Hurricane Katrina, the poor 
of New Orleans were neglected by public agencies and subject to the control of private 
security contractors fresh from Iraq.85 Though some have argued that private security and 
services relieve the burden on central public services, Blakely and Snyder found that 
gated communities actually resulted in “a two-tiered system of security: more for those 
who pay to supplement police with private security, and less for those who cannot or do 
not do so.”86
Thus post-statist realism maintains realism’s sense of a ‘great divide’ between the 
privileged inside the ring and ‘the others’ outside. However, unlike traditional realism, 
these rings are not necessarily constructed at the borders of the nation’s territory. Instead 
the divide can exist below or beyond the state boundaries. Similarly, post-statist realism 
maintains the interest-driven nature of realism. However, the Strategic-Commercial 
Complex is not a unitary actor, rather a network of actors each with their own 
particularist interest-driven agendas. Critics of realism would, of course, argue that the 
state has never been a unitary actor, but is rather made up of competing agencies and 
interest groups. Nevertheless, it is the complexity of the network of both public and 
private actors that creates especially diffuse and complicated systems of decisionmaking 
and authority.
85 Klein. Shock Doctrine, pp. 406-413.
86 Blakely & Snyder. Fortress America, p. 129.
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In a post-statist realist understanding, the Strategic-Commercial Complex develops 
landmine and cluster munition systems through public-private partnerships and reserves 
the right to deploy them to protect the privileged. Likewise, mine action activities are 
conducted either to secure key ‘green zones’ or for other strategic reasons, through 
contractual relationships with commercial demining companies or local security forces.
vi. Intra-Complex Relationships: The Principal-Agent Model
While the above sub-sections have described the development and nature of the
Strategic-Commercial Complex, it is also important to understand how the disparate 
networks hold together and coordinate action. While states were never completely unitary 
actors, the Strategic-Commercial Complex, incorporating both public and private actors, 
faces many more difficulties than governments in coordinating movement in one 
particular direction. Indeed, many studies of privatization have shown that contracting 
relationships inevitably run into ‘principal-agent’ problems. That is, why should one 
organization do what another organization tells it to do? What is to stop it hijacking or 
subverting the overall agenda or following its own altogether? As one study put it, “The 
chance that agents do not share the same interests and utility choices as their principals is
35
substantial.”87 The literature on contracting and management has paid a great deal of 
attention to this issue and proposes a whole host of methods, incentives and institutional 
structures to overcome it.
One such model is that of a ‘principal-agent’ relationship, in which the principal (in 
this case a state agency) pays an agent (such as a business) to do the work for them. It 
thus relies on the agent’s pursuit of self-interest -  profit -  to ensure the principal’s 
objectives are met.88 To avoid being overcharged for the service, and to choose a 
contractor best suited for the job, the principal will often hold a competitive tendering 
process. Once the contract is awarded, the principal faces several problems. Since the 
agents are the ones actually doing the work, they often have more information than the 
principal about the context in which they are working, the quality of the job they are 
doing and ways to bend the contract to their own advantage. These information 
asymmetries mean that principals risk being deceived about the actual progress of the 
work they wish to see done. Moreover, if the agent fails to meet standards, the principal 
has fewer institutional levers to control the process than if it had conducted the work 
itself. Therefore contracting procedures often require very specific language as to the 
work needed, thorough systems of audit, monitoring and evaluation and close
OQ
supervision. Therefore, an agent has little incentive to question the overall 
appropriateness of the work they have been assigned, question the political agenda of the 
principal or suggest changes in the principal’s behavior in any way other than to make the 
terms of the contract more favorable.
As will be shown in greater detail in later chapters, the principal-agent model governs 
many of the relationships between the public and private actors within Strategic- 
Commercial Complexes doing demining. It seems that when strategic or commercial
87 James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman & Lex Donaldson. (1997) ‘Toward a Stewardship Theory of 
Management.” The Academy of Management Review. 22(1). p. 22.
88John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, eds. (1984) Principals and agents: The structure of business. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, pp. 1-35; Kathleen M. Eisenhardt. (1989) “Agency theory: 
An assessment and review.” Academy of Management Review. 14. pp. 57-74; Dietmar Braun. (April-June 
1993) “Who Governs Intermediary Agencies? Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making.” 
Journal of Public Policy. 13(2). pp. 135-162.
89 David M. Van Slyke. (April 2007) “Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government- 
Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship.” Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory. 17(2). pp. 162-164.
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interests are at stake and the principal wants to control the process very tightly, they opt 
for a principal-agent model of contracting.




In the case of demining, a donor will put out competitive bids for specific mine 
clearance tasks and then award them to commercial demining companies. To avoid 
vagueness that could be exploited by the agent, contracts usually specify the precise 
geographical area to be cleared and impose penalties for shoddy or inefficient work. As a 
result, the demining agency has little room to determine the nature of the project, no 
incentive to go outside the terms of their contract and, when there is significant 
competition, little room to negotiate for better conditions for their workers. Finally, in 
this relationship, the only accountability is that of the agent to the principal. If the agent 
has ideological objections to the principal’s activities, they have little incentive to raise 
them. Thus commercial demining companies have not joined the campaigns to ban 
landmines or cluster munitions. Moreover, since the agent is only accountable to the 
principal (and its shareholders), there may be little ‘downward’ responsibility to the 
community in which they work. They may feel little responsibility for the welfare of the 
deminers, the appropriateness of their activity or the broader impact of their demining 
operations on the peace and reconstruction processes.
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vii. Criticisms of Post-Statist Realism
There are three main criticisms of the post-statist realist position. Firstly, some have
normative concerns about a system that allocates security and services only to the 
privileged, while those outside the ring are expected to be self-reliant.90 Such a system is 
seen as inherently unjust, reinforcing patterns of social exclusion through a form of 
segregation and can only be sustained through violence.91 Some argue that the very 
process of segregating into ‘green’ and ‘red zones’ generates discontent and resentment, 
that can feed into disorder and insecurity. By treating people in the ‘Red Zones’ as 
somehow less worthy, it can encourage a backlash, in the form of protests, crime, 
insurgency or even terrorism (that is, insecurity) against those in the ‘green zone.’ 
Within the ‘Green Zones’ separation contributes to an ever growing cycle of fear and 
prejudice, as “Gates and walls reflect fear and serve as daily reminders of the perceived 
dangers on the other side.”92
The ungrounded fear and prejudice that develops in the isolation of an enclave can 
make it hard to understand the situation outside the walls. This can exacerbate the 
insecurity of those inside the enclave, whose ill-informed decisions have consequences 
outside. For instance, Chandrasekaran described how Americans working in the 
Baghdad Green Zone knew little of what went on outside the concrete ring that 
surrounded them. As a result, they struggled to deal with the growing insurgency, which 
would rocket the Green Zone with increasing intensity.93
Secondly, neo-liberalism, privatization and contracting out have not always led to the 
expected gains in quality and cost savings in social service provision.94 This is partly due 
to prosaic technocratic reasons such as poorly written contracts, lack of sufficient 
competition, high cost of contract oversight and misplaced faith in commercial
90 Duffield. Development, Security and Unending War.
91 Klein. The Shock Doctrine, p. 15.
92 Blakely & Snyder. Fortress America, p. 128.
93 Chandrasekaran. Imperial Life in the Emerald City. pp. 24-25.
94 Berrios. Contracting for Development, pp. 24-25, 30-33; Svetlana Glinkina. (1999) “Russia’s 
Underground Economy During the Transition.” Underground Economies in Transition. Edgar L. Feige & 
Katarina Ott (Eds.). Aldershot, Ashgate; Joseph E. Stiglitz. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. 
London, Penguin Books; Steven R. Smith & Michael Lipsky. (1993) Nonprofits fo r Hire: The Welfare 
State in the Age of Contracting. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; Katarina Ott. (1999) 
“Economic Policy and the Underground Economy in Transition.” In: Feige & Ott. Underground 
Economies.
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companies’ ability to deliver. For instance, in the demining sector, the analysis of 
commercialization advocate Eddie Banks focused only on the impact of tendering on 
speed and price,95 while this author has shown that commercial demining often produces 
poorer quality and safety practices.96
More fundamentally, some say the diffuse nature of authority in the Strategic- 
Commercial Complex and the profit-motive of commercial contractors is prone to abuse. 
With information asymmetries and low standards of rule of law in conflict zones, it is 
difficult to impose discipline on companies, as one can see in the stunning levels of 
corruption and overcharging in Iraq reconstruction.97 In his study of privatization in 
Bosnia, Timothy Donais argued that
Attempts to push through liberalization and privatization in the absence of a viable and 
enforceable legal framework can be expected to almost invariably produce unanticipated and 
distorted outcomes.98
Within the demining sector, the World Bank,99 Geneva International Center for 
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)100 and Bolton and Griffiths101 have all warned that 
tendering systems can become corrupted in post-conflict countries (where mine action 
inevitably takes place). Likewise, private security (and demining) companies often hire 
personnel that have been rejected from the state sector, either because they were 
somehow unfit for their job or involved in more nefarious activities (eg. apartheid or
95 Banks. “In the Name of Humanity.”
96 Matthew Bolton & Hugh Griffiths. (September 2006) Bosnia’s Political Landmines: A Call for Socially 
Responsible and Conflict-Sensitive Mine Action. London, Landmine Action. 
<http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Bosnias_Political_Landmines.pdf>.
97 Transparency International. (2005) Global Corruption Report 2005: Corruption In Construction And 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction.
<http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2005>. pp. 73-92; Avant. 
“The Privatization of Security.” p. 332-337.
98 Timothy Donais. (2005) The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia. London, 
Routledge. p. 108.
99 Jacques Bure & Pierre Pont. (November 2003) “Landmine Clearance Projects: A Task Manager’s 
Guide.” Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction 10. 
<http://go.worldbank.org/H9XPUBHKP0>. pp. 18-19.
100 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). (2004) A Study of Local 
Organisations in Mine Action. Geneva, GICHD. pp. 45-89.
101 Bolton & Griffiths. Bosnia’s Political Landmines.
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Pinochet-era soldiers). The seeming impunity for private security companies involved 
in human rights violations in Iraq and Afghanistan is particularly worrying.103
Finally, mirroring President Eisenhower’s concerns about the military-industrial 
complex,104 some commentators worry that an expanding private military sector creates a 
‘war lobby’ -  vested interests in favor of an aggressive and combative foreign policy. For 
example, military contracting companies lobbied in favor of a US intervention in Iraq.105 
The presence of such a sector may also make public policymakers feel that warmaking is 
easier, due to the presence of extra troops, less subject to public scrutiny, just a contract 
away. Certainly private military companies are less likely to lobby against starting new 
wars. Lastly, there is the danger that, like the Italian condottieri, privateers may use their 
training, resources and materiel to carry out their own agenda. The involvement of 
several former private military personnel in the 2004 attempted coup in Equatorial 
Guinea displayed the danger that security contracting has the potential to actually be 
destabilizing and create new insecurity.106
viii. Summary
Trends of globalization, deterritorialization and privatization in armed conflict, 
sometimes called “New War,” have led to the development of models of security 
provision that move beyond state-centrism. One such model, is the ‘Strategic- 
Commercial Complex,’ which draws upon traditional realism’s pessimistic understanding 
of the security dilemma and drive to secure interests but does so through networks of 
public and private actors. To do this, it engages the self-interested profit motive of agents 
such as private companies. Rather than protect the institutions of the state per se, this 
form of post-statist realism secures privileged subpopulations in well-serviced enclaves
102 Hughes. War on Terror, Inc. London, Verso, pp. 158-169.
103 Singer. Corporate Warriors, pp. 220-221; Nils Roseman. (2005) “The Privatization of Human Rights 
Violations -  Business’ Impunity or Corporate Responsibility? The Case of Human Rights Abuses and 
Torture in Iraq.” Non-State Actors and International Law. 5. pp. 77-100; Avant. “The Privatization of 
Security.” pp. 338-340.
104 Dwight D. Eisenhower. (17 January 1961) “Farewell Address.”
<http:// ww w .eisenhower. archives .go v/speeches/farewell_address .html>.
105 Klein. Shock Doctrine, pp. 306-307; Hughes. (2007) War on Terror, Inc. pp. 135-137; Avant. “The 
Privatization of Security.” p. 341; Singer. Corporate Warriors, pp. 213-215.
106 Adam Roberts. (2006) The Wonga Coup: Guns, Thugs and a Ruthless Determination to Create Mayhem 
in an Oil-rich Corner of Africa. New York, Public Affairs; Robert Young Pelton. (2006) Licensed to Kill: 
Hired Guns in the War on Terror. New York, Random House, pp. 302-333.
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(Green Zones), managing and governing those ‘outside the perimeter’ with surveillance, 
force and securitized aid.
d. Post-Statist Idealism: Human Security-Civil Society 
Complexes
While some who object to the Strategic-Commercial Complex wish to return to either
1 07of the statist conceptions of security, several states and organizations have developed a 
post-statist idealism, which shares idealism’s optimism that creating ‘international 
society’108 -  international norms, law and institutions -  will abolish security dilemmas, 
through regulating, governing and demobilizing sources of insecurity. However, post­
statist idealists direct their efforts not only at relations between states, but also at 
diffusing security -  in the form of aid, institutions and norms -  out into the ‘global 
borderlands.’ It thus operates ‘bio-politically’ at the level of human populations, rather 
than states. In order to achieve this penetration into the ‘borderlands’, it operates through 
complex networks of partnerships between public, multilateral and private organizations.
Unlike the Strategic-Commercial Complex, the private actors that hold prominent 
roles in this mode of foreign policy tend to be NGOs and social movements. Moreover, 
while the Strategic-Commercial Complex tends to be favored by great or regional powers 
(like the US, Britain and Israel), this model is supported by smaller states, particularly 
internationally engaged middle powers, like the Scandinavian countries and Canada. 
This model has been variously called the “Middle Power-NGO Coalition,”109 the 
“Norwegian Model” of foreign policy110 or, by Mary Kaldor in parody of her earlier 
work, “new peace.”111 However, in this dissertation it will be called a ‘Human Security- 
Civil Society Complex.’ As will be described in more detail below, this brings together 
two concepts: ‘Human Security’ is an attempt to focus security on the human being,
107 For example Naomi Klein, in her criticism of what she called the “disaster capitalism complex,” tends 
toward an old leftist state-centric nostalgia (Klein. Shock Doctrine, pp. 443-466).
108 cf. Bull. The Anarchical Society.
109 Kenneth R. Rutherford, Stefan Brem & Richard A. Matthew (Eds.). (2003) Reframing the Agenda: the 
Impact ofNGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security Policy. London, Praeger.
110 0yvind 0sterud. (September 2005) “Introduction: The Peculiarities of Norway.” West European 
Politics. 28(4). p. 714.
111 Mary Kaldor. (2007) Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention. Cambridge, Polity 
Press, p. 8.
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rather than on the nation-state;112 the term ‘Civil Society’ refers both to voluntary 
organizations like NGOs and social movements, but also to a more normative “notion of 
minimizing violence in social relations ... [and] the public use of reason as a way of 
managing human affairs....”113
The evolution of this type of system can be explained by three interrelated factors: 1) 
the increased activism of middle powers following the end of the Cold War, 2) growing 
norms of humanitarian intervention, human rights and human security and 3) the rise of 
global civil society and ‘socially responsible’ business.
i. The Rise of Middle Powers: The Diffusion of International Politics
International relations scholars have found that ‘middle powers’114 often play the role
of innovating norms, providing third party mediation, advocating multilateralism and 
championing generous foreign aid appropriations.115 While a broader and more global 
understanding of self-interest than great powers, such action is not purely self-sacrifice 
on the part of the middle powers. They have an interest maintaining a high profile in the 
international system, so they are not overlooked and ignored by the great powers. They 
have an interest in a law-governed world, to reduce great power bullying as well as the 
chance of insecurity spreading to their own territory in the form of organized crime or 
terrorism.
During the Cold War, middle powers did not have tools to effectively pursue these 
interests. They had neither the military clout, economic power nor Security Council 
vetoes necessary to coerce other nations into following their agenda. Indeed, “most 
middle powers would be expected to toe the line behind one or the other
1,2 Ibid. p. 182.
113 Mary Kaldor. (2003) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Cambridge, Polity Press, p. 3.
114 Precisely which countries count as ‘Middle Powers’ is notoriously difficult to determine, partly because 
realists and neorealists have paid little attention to them (see: Joshua S. Goldstein. (2004) International 
Relations. 5th Ed. New York, Longman, pp. 96-97). The term Middle Powers will be used here to refer to 
high and middle income countries that have neither a permanent seat on the UN Security Council nor 
nuclear weapons. A few examples include: Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Germany, Austria, Italy, the 
Scandinavian states, Egypt, South Africa, Japan, South Korea and Australia.
115 Christine Ingebritsen. (2002) “Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics.” Cooperation 
and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association. 37(1). pp. 11-23; Olav Stokke (Ed.). 
(1989) Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Uppsala, Scandinavia Institute of African Studies;
Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott & Kim Nossal. (1993) Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada 
in a Changing World Order. Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press; Andrew Cooper (Ed.).
(1997) Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War. New York, St. Martin’s Press.
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superpower....”116 The end of the Cold War has given middle powers more space to raise 
these concerns in the international arena and they have been able shift the agenda through 
the use of ‘soft power.’117 By linking with international NGOs and multilateral agencies, 
they have contributed to the development of new international norms constraining the 
actions of the great powers or appealing directly to the electorates within them. As one 
study put it:
.. .middle powers are developing beyond their conflicted historic role as the lieutenants of the great 
powers and the selective champions of peace and justice, and entering creative high-impact 
partnerships with powerful coalitions of non-state actors that are having a significant effect on a 
set of important security issues in the arena of world politics.118
As Duffield would indicate, this is not simply a hollowing out of the middle power 
state; rather it is simultaneously an augmentation of it, for the middle power is able to 
assert itself and project its power into the international arena and penetrate the global 
peripheries in ways it was never able to do before. Through these partnerships, middle 
powers and NGOs have been able to carry out democratization, humanitarian and 
development programs in the developing world and campaign for tighter international 
regulations on child soldiers, the International Criminal Court, nuclear nonproliferation, 
disability rights and small arms control. As will be discussed in future chapters, the 
campaigns against mines and cluster munitions are particularly indicative of the Middle 
Power-NGO partnership.
ii. Human Rights and Human Security: The Humanization of 
International Politics
The post-statist idealist position has evolved in part from critiques of the state from
the left (rather than the neo-liberal critiques from the right). Throughout the 1960s, 70s 
and 80s, the peace movement and human rights community began to see the state as a 
potential source of insecurity, rather than protection. They argued that state structures, 
especially those of the executive branch, have authoritarian tendencies toward violent 
repression and excessive surveillance. As a result, they believed the state needed to be
116 Rutherford, Brem & Matthew (Eds.). Reframing the Agenda, p. 8.
117 Joseph S. Nye. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York, Public Affairs.
118 Richard A. Matthew. (2003) “Middle Power and NGO Partnerships: The Expansion of World Politics.” 
In: Rutherford, Brem & Matthew (Eds.). Reframing the Agenda, p. 7.
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held in check by society, both domestically and internationally.119 Occurring 
concurrently with the ongoing expansion of human rights and humanitarian norms, this 
has contributed to developing ideas of conditional sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention.120 Unlike idealists of the past, who saw collective security as a means to 
protect sovereignty and humanitarianism as a neutral activity, today’s idealists often 
believe in the right of the international community to intervene at the level of the 
population in countries that fail to protect human rights. As then UN Secretary General
Boutros Ghali declared in 1992 “The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has
121passed.” In its place, the UN General Assembly has declared that the international 
community had the “Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”122 The manner in which populations in 
the metropolitan core of international politics were sensitized and became politically 
mobilized around the ‘humanitarian’ issues of landmines and cluster munitions in the 
global periphery illustrates this diffusion of humanistic and interventionist norms.
These related strands of thought have coalesced into the concept of ‘Human 
Security’, which adherents offer as a kind of neo-Kantian critique of national security. 
According to this view, the objective of security must be to manage and reduce threats to 
a human being’s right to life and dignity, rather than to the strategic interests of the state. 
As the Human Security Centre explained, “While national security focuses on the
defence of the state from external attack, human security is about protecting individuals
12^and communities from any form of political violence.” This calls on policymakers to 
consider ways to protect populations of human beings from a wide range of threats 
generally not considered matters of ‘national security’, such as domestic violence and 
crime. Moreover, it calls on governments to see security through a universal lens. 
Therefore, the security of a person from another nation is just as important as that of
119 Kaldor. Global Civil Society, pp. 50-77.
120 Kaldor. Human Security, p. 16-72; Jonathan Goodhand. (2006) Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in 
Armed Conflict. Bourton on Dunsmore, Intermediate Technology Publications, pp. 77-81.
121 Boutros Boutros Ghali. (17 June 1992) “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and 
peace-keeping.” <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.
122 UN General Assembly. (15 September 2005) “2005 World Summit Outcome.” A/RES/60/1. 
<http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html>. p. 31.
123 Human Security Centre. (2005) “What Is Human Security?”
<http://www.humansecurityreport.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=24&Itemid=59>.
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one’s own.124 It is, then, a broader and more global understanding of interest than the 
national interest of realists.
iii. Global Civil Society: The De-Statization of International Politics
The development of Human Security-Civil Society Complexes owes much to the rise
of global civil society -  the “emergence of horizontal transnational global networks” 
demanding “global rule of law, global justice and global empowerment.”125 Such 
networks include the increasing numbers of international NGOs and grassroots 
organizations, as well as transnational social movements such as the anti-globalization 
movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the campaign for the 
International Criminal Court. The increased prominence of NGOs can in part be 
explained by the distrust of the state from both the left and the right, and trends toward 
privatization of government services. The current aid orthodoxy believes that NGOs are 
often more effective at delivering social services than government or multilateral 
agencies because they are considered less bureaucratic and closer to the communities in 
which they work. By the end of the 1990s, NGOs were distributing more humanitarian 
and development aid than the UN. While some scholars believe the growth and effect 
of these movements has been exaggerated,127 there is no doubt that increasing amounts of 
international aid are dispersed through NGOs and that such groups have more influence 
in the shaping of international opinion that 50 years ago.128 For example, within the 
demining community, several donors and advocates have argued in favor of using NGOs,
124 There is a debate among adherents to the concept of human security about whether it should have a 
narrow definition, focusing on overt violence (see for example: Human Security Centre. “What Is Human 
Security?”) or a broad definition including poverty, environmental degradation, natural disasters and 
disease (see for example: UNDP. (1994) Human Development Report 1994: New dimensions of human 
security. New York, Oxford University Press.) The author leans toward the narrow definition, but for the 
purposes of this dissertation believes that it is not necessary to take a side in this debate. The primary 
value-added of the concept comes from its movement of the locus of security-building from the state to the 
human.
125 Kaldor. Global Civil Society, pp. 6, 12.
126 Duffield. Global Governance and the New Wars. p. 53.
127 e.g. Thomas Richard Davies. (December 2006) “The Rise and Fall of Transnational Civil Society.” 
<http://www.bisa.ac.uk/2006/pps/davies.pdf>.
128 Lester Salamon. (1994) “The Rise of the Non-Profit Sector.” Foreign Affairs. 73(4). pp. 109-122; 
Kaldor. Global Civil Society, pp. 86-95.
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saying their humanitarian motives put them on the leading edge of advocacy efforts,
1 <2Q
developing standards and putting the community before contract.
Moreover, there has been a growing interest in corporate social responsibility. This 
represents an attempt by companies to do business in a way that is conducive to and 
works in partnership with civil society. Therefore, commercial phenomena like Code 
Red, the Fair Trade label or the Cooperative Bank show that the Human Security-Civil 
Society Complex can incorporate for-profit actors. Some NGOs and ‘socially responsible 
business’ may be using humanitarian and cosmopolitan ideals instrumentally -  as a 
marketing strategy to win grants or new customers. Indeed, much criticism of NGOs 
focuses on how they often have self-interested motivations of organizational survival. 
However, NGO advocates respond that at least their institutional survival interests are 
somewhat linked to humanitarian goals and the global public good, rather than profit 
alone.
iv. The Resultant System: A Human Security-Civil Society Complex
The result of the above trends is a Human Security-Civil Society Complex that
responds to the insecurity of the New Wars by trying to raise the level of protection for 
broad populations. This position claims to deconstruct the traditional ‘Great Divide’ 
between domestic and international politics, favoring instead a more global and 
universalist understanding of security -  at least a rhetorical commitment to the security 
and welfare of the global population, especially the poor and oppressed. Rather than 
trying to shore up ‘green zone’ enclaves, post-statist idealism claims to make the ‘red 
zones’ of the world safer -  a little greener, so to speak. By creating links with 
populations in the ‘red zones’, they aim to diffuse safety (through deploying aid workers, 
peacekeepers and diplomats) out from the core into the periphery. Unlike traditional 
idealism, it sees this as a task not just for an intergovernmental club like the UN, but 
rather for partnerships between organizations of all types which share their mission. This 
is often expressed institutionally as a network of middle power states, UN humanitarian 
agencies and NGOs. To return to the metaphor of ‘neo-medievalism,’ the Human 
Security-Civil Society Complex hearkens back to the partnerships between medieval
129 e.g. Bill Howell. (May 1997) “NGOs perform vital role.” Landmines. 22. pp. 10, 11, 13.
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monarchs and the transnational, non-governmental and ideological institution of the 
Catholic Church.
Figure 4: Diffusion of Security to the Periphery in a Human Security-Civil Society Complex
Together, its partnership aims to assist those most in need through a commitment to 
aid for development, humanitarianism and peacebuilding. For example, the Scandinavian 
states have the highest levels of aid per GNI, much of which is allocated through NGOs 
and multilaterals. This is supplemented with the money NGOs raise privately. Moreover, 
this Human Security-Civil Complex dedicates significant effort to building peace in 
regions of conflict that may have low strategic importance. For instance, Norway, in 
partnership with NGOs, has spent considerable resources on peacebuilding efforts in 
Guatemala, Sri Lanka and Sudan.130
Akin to its traditional idealist cousin, the Human Security-Civil Society Complex has 
an aversion to the use of force, except when used to protect people from genocide and 
crimes against humanity or restoring stability to regions affected by conflict.131 Unlike 
traditional peacekeeping operations, however, this Complex does not see peace processes 
as simply about an agreement between two states. Rather, it tries to build support for
130 Ann Kelleher & James Larry Taulbee. (October 2006) “Bridging the Gap: Building Peace Norwegian 
Style.” Peace & Change. 31(4); John Stephen Moolakkattu. (2005) “Peace Facilitation by Small States: 
Norway in Sri Lanka.” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association. 
40(4).
131 Kaldor. Human Security.
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peace at the local and global levels and seeks protection for the victims of war, such as 
civilians and internally displaced persons. At the global level, NGOs and middle powers 
work together to develop international law through advocacy and diplomacy. Working in 
partnership allows the Human Security-Civil Society Complex an opportunity to mobilize 
on several different levels. They can operate both through the state-centric traditional 
diplomatic channels, as well as through the ‘Second Track’ by using NGOs to build links 
to citizens and society.132












With its enthusiasm for the development of international law and its concern for the 
civilian victims of conflict, the Human Security-Civil Society Complex has campaigned 
for strong international restrictions against the use of landmines and cluster munitions, 
both through transnational advocacy networks and diplomacy. Demining and other mine 
action programs are conducted through humanitarian NGOs. Rather than prioritizing 
demining tasks according to strategic or commercial interests, this approach emphasizes
132 Rutherford, Brem & Matthew. Reframing the Agenda', Kelleher & Taulbee. “Bridging the Gap.” ; 
Moolakkattu. “Peace Facilitation.”
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those who need demining the most, either because of life circumstance or proximity to 
contaminated areas.
v. Intra-Complex Relationships: The Principal-Steward Model
Like the Strategic-Commercial Complex, the Human Security-Civil Society Complex
is a network of actors and thus requires some system of power relationships to coordinate 
action. However, it tends to rely on a different response to the principal-agent problem, 
called a ‘principal-steward relationship,’ in which the principal devolves implementation 
of a task to a trusted steward who believes that “collectivistic behaviors have a higher 
utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviors.”133 The principal may trust this 
steward for many reasons: a long track record of effective implementation, shared values 
or a shared mission. Most importantly, the steward’s idealistic and professional 
commitment to the achievement of the principal’s goals is trusted.134 Therefore, the 
principal will control few of the operational details and largely trust that the job will be 
done effectively, perhaps with some basic monitoring and evaluation. This can actually 
reduce costs, as there is less need to rebid contracts or micromanage the steward. 
Moreover, the stability of the relationship acts as an incentive for the steward to increase 
the quality of programming by investing in increasing the capacity of their organization 
and staff, as they can expect long-term funding.135 Because of the confidence of the 
principal in the steward, the steward also has more room than an agent to question the 
principal, especially if the steward is not wholly reliant on the principal’s funds. 
Therefore, the steward may have a great deal of power in determining the actual nature of 
the tasks to be implemented, and how the work will be done. Indeed, principal-steward 
relationships create systems that “facilitate and empower rather than...monitor and 
control.”136 There is therefore, a more equal relationship between the principal and 
steward than between a principal and an agent.
133 Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson. “Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management.” p. 24.
134 Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson. “Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management.”; Van Slyke.
“Agents or Stewards.” pp. 164-167; Lisa A Dicke. (2002) “Ensuring accountability in human services 
contracting: Can stewardship theory fill the bill?” American Review of Public Administration 32; Lisa A. 
Dicke & Steven J. Ott. (2002) “A test: Can stewardship theory serve as a second conceptual foundation for 
accountability methods in contracted human services?” International Journal of Public Administration. 25. 
pp. 463-87.
Milward & Provan. “Governing the Hollow State.” pp. 368-376.
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The potential problems with the principal-steward relationship are two-fold. Firstly, 
the principal effectively gives up some control over the precise nature and operation of 
the activities conducted by the steward. This means the steward may actually conduct 
activities the principal had not originally intended. Secondly, it is possible that the 
steward, by having more information about its work and the general context, may abuse 
its trusted position, hiding malpractice or corruption from the principal.
As will be shown in the rest of this dissertation, many of the relationships in the 
Human Security-Civil Society Complex take the form of the principal-steward model. In 
the case of demining, a state donor will give a grant (rather than a tendered contract) to 
support the activities of an NGO, often over a period of time (such as a year), rather than 
specifying geographic areas to be cleared. Because there is often a shared mission and 
values between the principal and steward, they sometimes collaborate on advocacy issues 
such as calling for a ban on landmines or cluster munitions. Because of the mutual trust 
in this relationship, the steward may also have more room to challenge, shape or set the 
agenda of the principal, such as suggesting particular demining projects, influencing 
priorities and relaying community concerns upwards. There is thus more room for the 
steward to be receptive to its responsibility to additional actors, such as beneficiaries, 
other than the principal.
vi. Criticisms of Post-Statist Idealism
While many admire the motivations of post-statist idealism, it faces five main sets of
criticism. Firstly, some critics argue that its good intentions cause it to underestimate the 
gravity of the situation and the very real security dilemmas involved. This means 
members of a Human Security-Civil Society Complex may be unaware of the ways in
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which their intervention interacts with the political economy of conflict or the real 
agendas of their local partners.137 For instance, several commercial demining personnel in 
Afghanistan doubted the ability of demining NGOs to deal with violent threats from the 
Taliban. Moreover, those of a realist bent would argue that the impact such a complex 
could have is limited when confronted with armed groups willing to use lethal force. This 
is especially the case when domestic electorates may become dissatisfied with foreign 
adventures. Ultimately, critics say, resolving the problem of failed and rogue states 
requires the political and military might of the great powers and a resolve to use violent 
force when necessary.138 In other words, they believe post-statist idealism is not 
successful in diffusing security out to the peripheries, rather it allows the diffusion of 
insecurity (in terms of unwanted immigration, crime and terrorism) into the core.
Secondly, some have argued that the universalism of post-statist idealism fails to
acknowledge differences in culture and national context. Proponents, for instance, of the
so-called ‘Asian Values’ would argue that human rights is a ‘Western’ invention and
1should not be imposed upon other parts of the world. Similarly, some have seen the 
involvement of the Human Security-Civil Society Complex in other countries as a 
violation of the principle of sovereignty. For example, the Russian state has increasingly 
come to see NGOs, including local ones, as a sort of externally sponsored ‘fifth column’ 
that subverts the state’s ability to safeguard national security (such as its ability to 
conduct military operations in Chechnya without international exposure).140 For example,
137 David Rieff. (2002) A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis. London, Vintage; Alex de Waal.
(1998) Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press; Mary B. Anderson. (1999) Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace -  or War. 
Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
138 Wolf-Dieter Eberwein. (October 2001) “Realism or Idealism, or Both? Security Policy and 
Humanitarianism.” Arbeitsgruppe Internationale Politik Discussion Paper P 01-307. 
<http://skylla.wzb.eu/pdf/2001/p01-307.pdf >. p. 14; Richard Perle. (21 March 2003) “Thank God for the 
death of the UN.” The Guardian (Manchester).
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/mar/21/foreignpolicy.iraql>.
139 For more on the ‘Asian Values’ debate, see: Chan Heng Chee. (1993) “Democracy: Evolution and 
Implementation: An Asian Perspective.” Democracy and Capitalism: Asian and American Perspectives. 
Robert Bartley, Chan Heng Chee, Samuel P. Huntington and Shijuro Ogata (Eds.). Singapore, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies; Amartya Sen. (July 14-July 21, 1997) “Human Rights and Asian Values.” The 
New Republic.
140 A recent Russian NGO law declared that NGOs can “create a threat to the sovereignty, political 
independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage and national interests 
of the Russian Federation.” Quoted in: Carl Gershman & Michael Allen. (2006) “The Assault on 
Democracy Assistance.” Journal of Democracy. 17(2). p. 39.
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Russia has harassed the NGO HALO Trust’s demining operations in Chechnya, accusing 
it of aiding the rebels.141 Less state-centric criticisms argue that NGOs and international 
agencies have a tendency to act patemalistically -  so convinced of the rightness of their 
cause that they adopt a patronizing or disparaging attitude to local culture, authority and 
society. This can be expressed in a reluctance to hand meaningful authority and capacity 
in aid operations over to local personnel and organizations.142
Thirdly, the enthusiasm of middle powers (and other industrialized countries) for 
international aid and peacebuilding has sometimes been criticized as a way to try to stem 
the flow of migrants from poor and war-torn countries. Many of the industrialized middle 
powers are undergoing significant internal political struggles over the issue of 
immigration. Aid and peacebuilding efforts are sometimes seen as ways to ameliorate 
conditions in the migrant-sending countries, in order reduce the number of people who 
want to leave. As such, some would argue that the Human Security-Civil Society 
Complex is at least somewhat motivated by ‘containment’ of international migration, 
rather than good intentions.143
Fourthly, there are technocratic criticisms that highlight the ineffectiveness and 
inefficiency of using NGOs as partners. NGOs have been criticized for confused 
mandates, poor management, amateurism and inefficient use of resources. Similarly, 
some neo-liberals argue that NGOs are simply a channel for rent-seeking and do not 
engage in ‘productive’ economic growth-enhancing activities like businesses. For 
instance, Milton Friedman, has argued that it is impossible to “do good with other 
people’s money.”144 This has led some to wonder why donors often use NGOs to manage 
activities (such as construction of roads, schools and clinics) that would more suited to a 
commercial company. Competition for funding and poor communication also means that 
in comparison to state organizations, NGOs are continually dogged by failures to
141 Angela Charlton. (10 August 2000) “Russia accuses British mine-clearing charity of aiding Chechens.” 
The Independent. < http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-accuses-british-mineclearing- 
charity-of-aiding-chechens-711627.html>.
142 Monica Kathina Juma & Astri Suhrke (Eds.). (2002) Eroding Local Capacity: International 
Humanitarian Action in Africa. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
143 Duffield. Development, Security and Unending War. pp. 184-222.
144 Milton Friedman. (1979) Tax Limitation, Inflation, and the Role of Government. Dallas, Texas, The 
Fisher Institute, p. 7.
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effectively coordinate their activities.145 Many demining professionals interviewed by 
the author had similar criticisms of demining NGOs.
Finally, some argue that since NGOs may be funded by external donors and have no 
local electoral mandate, they have less potential for political accountability than local 
states. Thus they often face the criticism that they are inherently undemocratic. For 
instance, NGOs operating in areas where state control is lacking can often become de 
facto state institutions, albeit unelected and not bound by a social contract to the 
citizenry146 -  “Philanthrocracy,” as Maurice Amutabi called it.147 With pressure to come 
up with success stories for donors and a lack of cultural and linguistic knowledge among 
expatriate staff, the Human Security-Civil Society Complex may have poor systems of 
needs assessment and program evaluation. Indeed, international NGOs are particularly 
prone to accusations of neo-colonial behavior as they are often “too close for comfort” to 
external donors that might have interests in the country and have a tendency to bypass the 
concerns of local authority.148 Moreover, international NGOs may sometimes be just as 
prone to enclavization as commercial companies. They create walled compounds to 
protect themselves and through the geographical fragmentation and local focus of their 
programming, can create “islands of development” rather than an improvement of general 
wellbeing.149 Therefore, some have criticized the Human Security-Civil Society 
Complex as just a whitewashed form of the neoliberal privatization of aid or another 
‘technology of social control’ used by the north to dominate and exclude the south.150
145 Thomas W. Dichter. (2003) Despite Good Intentions: Why Development Assistance to the Third World 
Has Failed. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press; Ian Smillie. (1995) The Alms Bazaar: Altruism 
Under Fire—Non-Profit Organizations and International Development. West Hartford, Kumarian; 
Goodhand. Aiding Peace? pp. 91-92.
146 Terje Tvedt. (1994) ‘The Collapse of the State in Southern Sudan after the Addis Ababa Agreement: A 
Study of Internal Causes and the Role of the NGOs.” Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan. Sharif 
Harir & Terje Tvedt (Eds.). Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies; Volker Riehl. (2001) Who 
Is Ruling in South Sudan? The role of NGOs in rebuilding socio-political order. Uppsala, Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet; Michel Leezenberg. (2000) “Humanitarian Aid in Iraqi Kurdistan.” Cahiers d ’etudes sur la 
Mediterranee orientale et le monde turco-iranien. 29. <http://www.ceri- 
sciencespo.com/publica/cemoti/textes29/leezenbe.pdf>. pp. 1-18.
147 Maurice N. Amutabi. (2006) The NGO Factor in Africa: The Case of Arrested Development in Kenya. 
New York: Routledge. p. xxiii.
148 David Hulme & Michael Edwards. (1997) NGOs, States and Donors Too Close for Comfort?
Macmillan, Basingstoke.
149 Amutabi. The NGO Factor in Africa, p. 34.
150 Duffield. Development, Security and Unending War.
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Both Mark Duffield151 and William Easterly152 have shown how there are shockingly 
similar parallels between the rhetoric of imperialism’s ‘White Man’s Burden’ and today’s 
aid workers, ‘peacebuilders’ and Western diplomats. There is a danger then, that the 
‘petty sovereignty’ held by the Human Security-Civil Society Complex over aid 
recipients is simply a form of neo-imperialism.
vii. Summary
As with post-statist realism, post-statist idealism is an attempt to deal with the 
security challenges of the New Wars by forging polyarchical networks of governance -  
Human Security-Civil Society Complexes. However, the public and private actors 
involved are shaped by humanitarian norms, a commitment to entrenching international 
law and a more global understanding of interest than the classical realist conception of 
the ‘national interest.’ Moreover, the core of the network is largely made up of middle 
powers, international NGOs and UN agencies who try to intervene at the level of the 
whole population (or at least those most vulnerable), rather than the state or the 
privileged few.
e. Conclusion
The era of sovereign and territorial government is giving way to an era of 
governance, diffused through global networks of authority below and beyond the state 
and incorporating polyarchical constellations of public and private actors.153 Meanwhile, 
insecurity can no longer be adequately conceived of as the possibility of threat to the state 
by another state or a rebel pretender with statist ambitions. Insecurity has become de­
territorialized, de-statized and no longer contained to bounded space and time. In the 
quest to govern these threats, many states, companies and individuals have abandoned 
faith in traditional realist and idealist understandings of security and have sought to 
mobilize protection through the new networked modes of social organization.
However, these new forms of governance are organized and constructed in different 
ways, depending on the motivations, understandings and institutional structures of the
151 Ibid.
152 William Easterly. (2006) The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So 
Much III and So Little Good. London, Penguin Books.
153 Maier. “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History”; Milward & Provan. “Governing the Hollow 
State.”
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constituent members. Some of these networks are organized to protect the private space 
a privileged subpopulation, employing surveillance, force and securitized aid to separate 
safe enclaves from the zones of disorder around them. Such Strategic-Commercial 
Complexes engage the ‘hard power’ of coercion and economic incentives to overcome 
the ‘principal-agent problems’ that inevitably arise in such a diffuse and complicated 
organizational form. In essence they are Neo-Machiavellian, and draw on the belief that 
optimal outcomes can arise from the pursuit of national and/or commercial interest.
In contrast, there are coalitions of middle powers, multilateral agencies, NGOs, social 
movements, media and ‘socially responsible’ businesses that are drawn together by 
shared values of cosmopolitanism, humanitarianism and a broader understanding of 
interest as the global public good. Such Human Security-Civil Society Complexes try to 
raise the level of protection and services available to the whole population, or those 
perceived as most in need, through the diffusion of ‘soft power’ -  persuasion, aid, rule of 
law and non-violent dispute resolution -  out into the conflicted peripheries. This complex 
is generally not pacifist, but they are reluctant to deploy military force except to protect 
those in danger of genocide and crimes against humanity. In essence they are Neo- 
Kantian or Neo-Durkheimian, and stem from assumptions that the pursuit of interest must 
be at least regulated and constrained by a commitment to humanistic values and ideals.
The real world is obviously more complicated than the simple dichotomy of ideal 
types presented in this chapter. Some actors will operate according to a Human Security- 
Civil Society model in one situation and adopt a Strategic-Commercial model in the next. 
Moreover, sometimes these models converge into complex blends or agents are 
embedded in multiple kinds of networks. It is rare to find any one actor wholly 
motivated by ideals or completely driven by narrow self-interest. Indeed sometimes 
ideals are expressed instrumentally, in an attempt to secure self-interest. In some cases 
the two complexes will make an implicit division of labor; for instance in Afghanistan, 
the US/NATO-led Strategic-Commercial Complex is engaging in counterinsurgency 
operations while the Human Security-Civil Society Complex concentrates on 
development, grassroots peacebuilding and humanitarian aid.
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Table 1: Responses to Insecurity
National O l d  W a r Few/ National Public Unitary actor Hard
Security/ The Nation- Interest Power
Realism State
Collective Old War All/ Ideals and Public International Hard and




Strategic New Few/ Particularist Public- Principal-Agent Hard
Commercial War The Interest, Private Model Power
Complex Privileged Profit Partnerships
Human New All/ Ideals and Public- Principal- Largely
Security- War The Global Private Steward Model Soft
Civil Society Vulnerable Public Partnerships Power
Complex Interest
This PhD will not attempt to determine the overall advantages and disadvantages of 
these two complexes in every given situation. Rather, it will focus on describing how 
they have developed and the impact they had in one particular sector -  demining. 
Specifically, it will try to determine the outcomes of each model as they attempt to 
protect populations from the threat of landmines and aid in the restoration of post-war 
political and economic systems. The next chapter will describe the methodologies used 




A Comparative Ethnography 
of the Political Economy of Conflict
The central methodological task of this PhD is to map the actors within the complexes of demining governance, their relationships and the outcomes of their activities. This is admittedly difficult to do and is made more complex by 
the fact that mine action necessarily operates in conflicted contexts, where truth, rumor 
and fiction are difficult to discern. Moreover, the sector involves many different actors at 
many different levels of the international political system.
This PhD tries to deal with the reality of this complexity through comparison and 
triangulation. It is thus a dissertation of multiple ‘multis.’ It is a multi-country, multi­
actor, multi-scale, multi-disciplinary analysis. While firmly rooted in the discipline of 
comparative politics, the dissertation also draws upon political philosophy, history, 
international relations, development studies, economics and sociology. Finally, it is 
multi-methodological, incorporating historical and archive research, key informant 
interviews, participant observation and basic statistical analysis.
This project would be impossible without immersion into mine-affected countries, the 
offices of mine action agencies and visits to the actual minefields themselves. Therefore, 
while an anthropologist would never allow this PhD to be called an ethnography (as the 
researcher’s immersion in each of the case study countries was not lengthy enough and 
the focus of study was political economy rather than culture) the author tried to use 
ethnographic techniques such as participant-observation, interviewing key informants and
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“thick description.”1 Moreover, rather than seeing ‘the field’ as a bounded geographic 
area, this dissertation conceived its field of study to be the bounded sector of mine action 
in a variety of locations. The point was less to learn the culture and politics of a 
particular place, rather to be immersed in the culture and politics of the demining sector 
generally. Raymond Apthorpe, for instance has argued that the aid sector forms a kind of 
‘aid-land’ that can be studied ethnographically even though it spans several countries.2 
The author thus uses the “loose definition” of ethnography, described by political 
scientists Lorraine Bayard de Volo and Edward Schatz as “those methods that seek to 
uncover emic (insider) perspectives on political and social life and/or ground-level 
processes....”3 Diverging from traditional ethnography, the dissertation places the data 
gathered into the framework of comparative politics -  comparing across places and times 
to seek potentially generalizable information and trends. The PhD is thus an attempt to 
heed Alex de Waal’s call for a “comparative political ethnography of disaster 
prevention”4 or what Mark Duffield’s calls ethnography of the political economy of 
conflict.5
This brief methodological chapter outlines how this research project attempted to 
discern the nature of the ‘demining complexes’ and measure their impact on the demining 
process and the socio-political context. It first shows how the complexes were mapped, 
the proxy organizations chosen to represent them and the logic behind the indicators used 
to measure their impact. The chapter then describes how the PhD employed a kind of 
‘global field work’ method and the criteria used to select the case studies. Finally, it 
examines some of the challenges of conducting fieldwork in tense political contexts.
1 Clifford Geertz. (1973) The Interpretation o f Cultures. New York, Basic Books.
2 Raymond Apthorpe. (2002) “Whose Development? An ethnography of aid, Emma Crewe and Elizabeth 
Harrison.” <http://www.development-ethics.org/document.asp?did=1082>.
3 Lorraine Bayard de Volo & Edward Schatz. (2004) “From the Inside Out: Ethnographic Methods in 
Political Research.” PS: Political Science & Politics. 37. p. 267.
4 Alex de Waal. (March 2006) “Towards a comparative political ethnography of disaster prevention.” 
Journal of International Affairs. 59(2).
5 Mark Duffield. (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. 
London, Zed Books, pp. 260-262.
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a. Mapping Complexes and Measuring Impact
i. Selecting Proxies
The central methodological problem faced by this PhD was finding real-world
proxies to represent, and indicators by which to measure, the impact of the two ideal type 
complexes. The proxies were organizations roughly conforming to one ideal type or the 
other, in the specific time and place studied. The same organization may find itself 
representing different ideal types if its action changes over time or acts in contrasting 
ways in multiple places. Determining whether organizations fell into one complex or the 
other required examining their sense of motivation (e.g. particularist strategic interest, 
profit, humanitarianism or global public interest), their institutional form and place within 
the international system (e.g. commercial company, NGO, multilateral agency, great 
power state, middle power state) and how they related to other organizations (e.g. 
coalitions of shared values, contracts, military alliances). This was obviously a rather 
subjective enterprise, made more difficult by obfuscating rhetoric from the organizations 
themselves or their rivals. There is no magical way around this problem, one can only try 
to correct for it through triangulation and comparison of the following forms of 
information:
1) Mode of operation, as discerned from observation and analysis of the 
historical record,
2) Description by other commentators, including mine action professionals and 
scholars,
3) Self-description by the organization itself,
4) Mode of operation in other sectors (outside mine action),
5) Peer review -  cross-checking information with trusted key informants and 
other scholars.
At the donor level, the US was chosen as a rough proxy for a great power with a 
foreign policy shaped largely by strategic and economic interest, while Norway was 
chosen as a rough proxy for a middle power with a foreign policy shaped by 
humanitarianism, multilateralism and a concern for global public interest. At the
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implementer level, military organizations, private security companies and organizations 
receiving the majority of funding from commercial tenders (especially those let by the 
US) were generally chosen as proxies for profit-driven action. International NGOs 
receiving the majority of their funding from long term grants (especially from Norway) 
were generally chosen as proxies for actors driven by a sense of humanitarianism and 
human rights. The reasons for choosing these proxies will be described in much more 
detail and depth in the following chapters.
ii. Measuring Performance and Impact
Once organizational proxies were found, the next methodological problem was how
to measure their performance in protecting people from the threat of mines and UXO, and 
their impact on wider social currents favorable to peace. At the donor level, I examined 
the ways in which their policies and activities impacted:
1) The development of international law governing mines, cluster munitions and 
other remnants of war, by examining policy positions and behavior in 
international negotiations and
2) The structures of mine action implementation, by examining policy positions, 
bureaucratic structures of funding and positions taken in international donor 
fora.
At the implementer level, I measured the efficiency and quality of the demining 
process with the following indicators:
1) Price of demining (a quantitative indicator of efficiency)
2) Speed of demining (a quantitative indicator of efficiency)
3) Complexity of minefields cleared (a quantitative indicator of efficiency)
4) Quality assurance inspection records (a quantitative measure of the quality of 
the process)
5) Demining accidents (a quantitative proxy for both the quality of management 
and supervision and the quality of demining itself)
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6) Reports of accidents and quality assurance inspections (a qualitative indicator 
of the quality of demining)
7) Opinions of key informants (a qualitative indicator of both the efficiency and 
quality of demining)
8) Observation of the process in the field (a qualitative indicator of both the 
efficiency and quality of demining)
I tried to trace the impact of the implementation process on the broader socio-political 
milieu, especially the peace process, by looking particularly at the following issues:6
1) Interaction with the political economy of war,
2) Development of systems of security and protection,
3) Social inclusivity and exclusion,
4) Advocacy for non-violent politics and limits on war,
5) Development of the capacity of local deminers, civil society and the state.
b. A Multi-Sited Field
Because of the difficulty of discerning and measuring the impact of interests and 
ideals, this PhD relied on the methodology of comparison. Through comparing processes 
and outcomes in diverse settings, one is able to determine which factors and trends are 
possibly generalizable and those more likely to be contingent to a particular time and 
place. Therefore, this dissertation examines and compares mine action across two donor 
countries, three implementation countries and over two decades. As such, it draws on the 
insights into comparative politics methodology offered by King, Keohane & Verba7 and 
Barbara Geddes.8
6 These issue areas were selected as they featured prominently in the literature on the impact of aid in 
conflict, see: Mary B. Anderson. (1999) Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace -  or War. Boulder, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers; Alex de Waal. (1998) Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry 
in Africa. Bloomington, Indiana University Press; Jonathan Goodhand. (2006) Aiding Peace?: The Role of 
NGOs in Armed Conflict. Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
7 Gary King, Robert D. Keohane & Sidney Verba. (1994) Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research. Princeton, Princeton University Press, pp. 115-149.
8 Barbara Geddes. (2003) Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in 
Comparative Politics. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, pp. 89-130.
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Furthermore, contemporary politics can no longer be studied without some 
understanding of globalization. Therefore, this PhD aims to trace the politics of mine 
action from the top to the bottom, from the global level to the level of bilateral donors 
down to the level of implementation. Unlike traditional ethnographic research, this 
requires a global methodology that defines the ‘field’ as the mine action sector, rather 
than a defined geographic territory. Therefore, my research took me to London, 
Washington DC, New York, Geneva, Oslo, Kabul, Sarajevo, Juba and Khartoum. 
However, a three year PhD cannot take the entire globe as its scope of study; the PhD 
narrows down to several cases that may enable some tentative generalization, which can 
at least be tested by future studies. Nonetheless, this dissertation is a small-N study and 
thus recognizes the limits to generalization.
i. Donor Case Studies
The US and Norway were chosen as cases for comparing donor policy for two key
reasons: 1) They are both among the top bilateral donors to mine action projects and 2) 
their mine action policies represent rough proxies for great powers vs. middle powers, 
with Norwegian mine action policy driven largely by multilateralism, humanitarianism, 
concern for international law and the global public interest and US policy shaped largely 
by narrower strategic and commercial interests. Additional characteristics that make them 
attractive for comparison include their both being wealthy industrial democracies that 
won independence from colonization, and both having significant histories of foreign aid 
provision. Moreover, as will be explained in the chapter 4, Jan Egeland’s comparison of 
US and Norwegian human rights policies provided a useful framework that could be 
borrowed and adapted for exploring different modalities of mine action.9 General 
information about these countries’ foreign polices was gathered from secondary sources. 
Particular information about mine action policy was gathered through archival research 
of policy documents and grey literature, interviews with senior policymakers in their 
respective capitals and in-country diplomatic missions, as well as secondary sources.
9 Jan Egeland. (1988) Impotent Superpower—Potent Small State: Potentials and Limitations of Human 
Rights Objectives in the Foreign Polices of the United States and Norway. Oslo, Norwegian University 
Press.
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ii. Mine-Affected Countries Case Selection Criteria
The three implementation countries -  Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan -  were chosen
carefully to try to avoid case selection bias, while ensuring that the cases would have 
enough material to make for an interesting study. The case countries had to:
1) Be among the countries with the largest mine action programs, so that there would 
enough activities to study (the top ten are Afghanistan, Lebanon, Angola, Iraq, 
Cambodia, Sudan, Bosnia, Laos and Sri Lanka),10
2) Be among the top recipients of funding from both the US and Norway, to make it 
more likely that these donors would have a coherent funding policy (these 
included Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, Lebanon, Bosnia and Sudan),11
3) Be safe enough for me to travel around to speak to the main actors without 
exceeding my own personal sense of acceptable risk (this excluded Iraq),
4) Be a country which I could navigate relatively effectively in English or with my 
basic Serbo-Croatian skills (this excluded Angola),
5) Have had programs that started in different time periods, to facilitate historical 
comparisons (Afghanistan is among the oldest programs, Sudan among the 
newest),
6) Be located in very different regions, with different political and economic 
situations and different climate and soil conditions (important in demining 
performance), to see if similar trends could be spotted in diverse circumstances,
7) Be of varying strategic interest to the US and Norway, to see if global strategic 
interest made any difference.
iii. Afghanistan
Afghanistan was chosen because it is one of the oldest and largest mine action 
programs. The author felt that any serious examination of mine action would have to 
start in Afghanistan, where one could explore the genesis of the sector and trace the roots 
of trends that appeared in other countries. Afghanistan also offered potential for tracing
10 International Campaign to Ban Landmines. (2007) “Major Mine Action Recipients.” 
<http://www.icbl.Org/lm/2007/es/mine_action_funding.html#Major_Mine_Action_Recipients>.
11 Compiled by author from several Landmine Monitor reports: <http://www.icbl.org/lm>.
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the impact of strategic interest, as it had been of critical importance in the Cold War 
during the 1980s, dropped off the global radar from 1992 to 2001 and then became a 
crucial battleground in the post-2001 ‘War on Terror’, with both US and Norwegian 
troops deployed to the country. In preparation for field research in Afghanistan, the 
author conducted a review of the secondary literature, did extensive archival research on 
the early USAID and UN mine action programs at the National Security Archive at 
George Washington University in Washington DC and interviewed key informants in 
New York, Geneva and the Washington DC area. The author also took a nine month 
evening language class in Persian at the School of Oriental and African Studies in 
London. He then spent two months at the end of 2006 in Kabul, interviewing around 35 
people in the mine action sector, gathering statistics and grey literature and observing 
demining agencies in the field. To obtain feedback on the research, the author presented 
some initial findings in an open seminar at the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan at 
the end of his stay. A few months later, he circulated a working paper among trusted key 
informants and fellow mine action scholars.12
iv. Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia was selected as the second case because of the author’s experience, basic
linguistic ability and immersion in the mine action sector there. The author had worked 
for a US NGO in Bosnia from 2002 to 2003 and had conducted a mine action needs 
assessment in the Brcko District,13 eventually organizing financing for a small demining 
project. During his master’s program at the LSE (2004-2005), the author worked as a 
consultant to UNICEF’s Bosnia mine action program and spent two months in Sarajevo 
doing research for a master’s dissertation on problems with demining privatization in 
Bosnia. Part of that thesis was then adapted and released as a report by Landmine 
Action, launched at the annual meeting of parties to the mine ban convention in 2006.14 
This publication generated considerable controversy, especially in the Bosnian demining
12 Matthew Bolton. (2008) “Goldmine? A Critical Look at the Commercialization of Afghan Demining.” 
Centre for the Study of Global Governance (LSE) Research Paper 01/2008. 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/ResearchPapers/RP_0108.pdf>.
13 Matthew Bolton. (August 2003) “Mine Action in Bosnia’s Special District: A Case Study.” Journal of 
Mine Action. 7(2). <http://maic.jmu.edU/JOURNAL/7.2/focus/bolton/bolton.htm>.
14 Matthew Bolton & Hugh Griffiths. (September 2006) Bosnia’s Political Landmines: A Call for Socially 
Responsible and Conflict-Sensitive Mine Action. London, Landmine Action. 
<http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Bosnias_Political_Landmines.pdf>.
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sector and the author was thus able to get significant feedback on the content and 
methodology of the study. The sections on Bosnia in this work are thus rooted in the 
authors master’s thesis but have tried to correct some of its methodological problems. 
The author was able to update and deepen his understanding of the situation by spending 
two months in Sarajevo in early 2007, where he collected new statistics, interviewed 15 
mine action professionals and gathered more grey literature. In addition to the author’s 
familiarity with the context, Bosnia made a good case study for other reasons. It has a 
very diverse mine action sector, with many different actors involved, allowing for some 
interesting in-country comparisons. It is also a ‘middle-aged’ mine action program, its 
genesis lying in growing trends of international intervention in the 1990s rather than the 
Cold War roots of the Afghan program. Finally, like Afghanistan, Bosnia has been of 
variable strategic importance over time. From 1996 to 2000, Bosnia received 
considerable international attention and significant numbers of US and Norwegian troops 
deployed as part of the NATO stabilization mission. However, since then, especially 
after 2001 when attention shifted to Afghanistan and Iraq, the US and Norway have 
drawn down their involvement in Bosnia.
v. Sudan
Sudan was primarily chosen to act as a potential ‘spoiler case.’ Following field 
research in Afghanistan and Bosnia, the author felt it was necessary to look at a third case 
that would challenge and test the predictive powers of his tentative hypotheses. Because 
the demining program in Sudan is quite new, beginning in earnest only in 2004, there has 
been little written about it. Moreover, unlike in the other two cases where the US seemed 
to favor commercial contracting, in Sudan, it had largely favored funding international 
NGOs. Sudan also differed from the other two cases in terms of strategic interest. While 
both Norway and the US have paid significant attention to the situation in Sudan, neither 
have found it of critical enough importance to make major commitments of troops to the 
country. For all these reasons, the Sudan case thus had the potential to prove the author’s 
ideas wrong, or at least force them to become more sophisticated. To prepare himself for 
fieldwork there, the author reviewed the secondary literature and attended meetings 
related to the situation in Sudan in Washington DC. He then spent a month in Juba and 
Khartoum in the middle of 2007, interviewing 35 people in the mine action sector,
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collecting statistics and gathering grey literature. Upon return to the UK, the author was 
granted access to a significant amount of archival material related to Sudan programs by 
the HALO Trust (based in Scotland) and Landmine Action (based in London). Toward 
the end of 2007, the author circulated a working paper with preliminary findings on 
Sudan to trusted key informants and fellow researchers.15
c. Working in Conflicted Contexts
Conducting field research in three fragile and conflicted states created a variety of 
challenges that are understudied in the methodology literature. Many of these difficulties 
limited the amount of information gathered. Four key points are worth highlighting here: 
Security and logistical issues, positionality, information politics and verifying rumor.
i. Security and Logistics
Operating in highly unstable societies required a constant evaluation of the value of 
information against the security risks involved in gathering it. This meant that there were 
times that the author opted against doing an interview (such as with some of the 
‘mafioso’ characters involved in Bosnian demining) or going to a place (such as 
Kandahar, Afghanistan) that would have benefited the PhD, but would have come at a 
greater risk than he was willing to take. Of course, estimating security risk is an inexact 
science and so there may be gaps in the data that a braver person would have filled.
Moreover, the logistics of operating in fragile and conflicted countries are often 
complicated, both in terms of time and money. Sudan was perhaps the most logistically 
complex field site, with transportation extremely expensive and difficult to arrange -  
especially in bad weather. In Afghanistan, the so-called ‘safe taxis’ (which were 
marketed to expatriates as being a safer option than ordinary street cabs) were very pricey 
and so one has to plan out one’s day carefully, to create the most efficient use of funds. 
Therefore, again, information gathering was constrained by the author’s ability to travel 
around and his generous but still limited research grant.
15 Matthew Bolton. (2008) “Sudan’s Expensive Landmines: An Evaluation of Political and Economic 




A researcher is embedded in a broad range of social, political and economic relations 
and is shaped by multiple identities, both self and socially constructed.16 These ‘social 
locations’ and identities can shift according to time and space. Since social location only 
makes sense in relation to other human beings, it is relative to the informant’s social 
location and their views, prejudices and ideas of the researcher’s social location. It is 
perhaps more appropriate then to speak of ‘social locations’ or ‘positionalities.’ Such 
positionalities can be deployed as a form of ‘symbolic capital’ to gain the attention and 
cooperation of informants. Nonetheless, they can also serve as a hindrance to research if 
an informant is intimidated, disdainful or suspicious of the researcher’s identity. In his 
fieldwork the author found five key attributes of his social location affected the research: 
gender, being a student, not having a military background, being a foreigner and living in 
enclaves.
Firstly, being a straight male undoubtedly affected the author’s research. The vast 
majority of demining personnel are men and, particularly with regard to Afghanistan and 
Sudan, are operating in cultures that are deeply patriarchal. Thus being a man gave the 
author access, freedom of movement and greater personal security. At the same time, 
however, it sometimes left him less able to step back from the constructions of 
masculinity that so define the sector. A possible weakness of this PhD is its lack of a 
gender-based critique of mine action’s hyper-masculinity.
Secondly, the author’s position as a student and researcher was interpreted in 
different ways by different people. For some, being a student indicated a low level status, 
with no access to resources or coercive power. This meant that the author was considered 
non-threatening, someone in whom to confide and reflect. However, it also meant the 
author was occasionally not taken seriously. For instance, during his Master’s fieldwork 
in Bosnia, it was difficult to arrange meetings with the government, because they saw the 
author as a low priority. Nevertheless, some informants did perceive the author’s 
gathering of information and ability to process and release it to be a threat. This was
16 Gillian Rose. (1997) “Situating knowledges: positionality, reflexivities and other tactics.” Progress in 
Human Geography. 21(3). pp. 305-320; Linda McDowell. (1992) “Doing Gender: Feminism, Feminists 
and Research Methods in Human Geography.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. New 
Series, 17(4). pp. 399-416.
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especially the case in Bosnia once the author had published his report on corruption in the 
demining sector.17 The author found that many of his Bosnian informants had read the 
report and were thus intimidated by, sometimes angry with, the author. This meant it was 
easier to get meetings -  people were eager to tell ‘their side of the story’ or give 
information that would ‘prove you wrong’ -  but it also made the interviews more 
combatitive and informants more guarded about what they would say.
Thirdly, since most demining professionals have been in the military, the author’s 
civilian background may have sometimes been a hindrance, as he did not share much of 
the culture and experience of the people he was researching. It also meant he was less 
versed in the technical aspects of strategy, mine warfare, explosives and military 
hierarchy. Being able to say he had been a soldier probably would have opened many 
doors. However, the author’s non-military background also gave him some distance from 
his subjects and allowed him to ask what would seem simple and obvious questions 
without being embarrassed. It also enabled him to see, and question, the sometimes 
authoritarian and patriarchal paramilitary culture of the demining sector.
Fourthly, being a foreigner undoubtedly affected the kind of information the author 
was able to gather. In all three mine-affected countries, foreigners, especially white 
foreigners in Afghanistan and Sudan, where race is an additional consideration, were 
associated with the powers of intervention and/or access to resources. This meant local 
staff, especially those farther down the hierarchy, would sometimes feel intimidated by 
the author or reluctant to give him much information. Many felt concerned that they 
needed to control tightly information, especially regarding problems in the sector, 
because they felt that the author may have power over resource allocation. The author 
found this was difficult to overcome and did not come up with any easy answers to this 
problem. Often the answers to interview questions seemed highly scripted; one local UN 
staff member actually replied to all the author’s questions by reading sections verbatim 
from his agency’s five year plan.
Speaking with expatriate staff was, in general, much easier. They usually felt less 
threatened by the author’s presence and questions -  feeling fairly secure in their jobs. 
There was also often a sense of solidarity in being a fellow foreigner in a ‘strange land.’
17 Bolton & Griffiths. Bosnia’s Political Landmines.
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This meant expatriate officials, who were also often those in charge of programs, were 
generally much freer with information and more willing to reflect on their experiences. 
Nonetheless, since the author often felt more comfortable in expatriate circles, he may 
have relied too much on information coming from those who were actually less attuned to 
the local context. Scholars more integrated with the local cultures in Afghanistan, Bosnia 
and Sudan would have had more insight into local knowledge.
Finally, while the author’s stipend from the Economic and Social Research Council 
and occasional consulting work with NGOs hardly made him rich, by developing world 
standards he was very privileged. This meant he was able to access many luxuries that 
ordinary Afghans, Bosnians and Sudanese would never be able to afford, such as nice 
living quarters, good food and access to the outside world through internet and telephone. 
This obviously limited the author’s ability to fully sympathize with the daily struggles 
faced by many local people. The security risks in Afghanistan also meant he was often 
sequestered away in expatriate enclaves that limited his ability to understand what was 
happening outside the high walls and barbed wire surrounding him. In some ways, the 
author’s behavior in Afghanistan was an exercise in the very ‘forting up’ and 
enclavization that this PhD critiques. While this enabled him to understand the mindset 
and motivations of enclavization, and perhaps kept him safe, he recognizes that he may 
have contributed to the very systems to which he objects.
iii. Information Politics
The high political and commercial stakes in a conflicted country mean that scholars
must be constantly aware of the politics and ethics of information gathering. The author 
found informants often sought information from him or gave him data with specific 
political or commercial agendas in mind. As a result, the author continually had to 
discern the agendas of informants and the extent to which he could ethically ‘trade’ 
information with people without breaching confidentiality of other informants. Moreover, 
in highly lawless societies, disclosing information sometimes carried security risks for 
informants. Therefore, due to the sensitivity of the situations studied, some of the primary 
documents and interview data will not be cited directly in this PhD. Moreover, 
information will occasionally be either discussed in general terms or anonymized to avoid 
repercussions for the individuals and organizations involved. All these ethical issues
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required an inexact triage that could only be guided by self-reflection and occasional 
discussion in confidence with other trusted scholars. The research thus was both shaped 
by and fed back into larger political struggles and commercial competition. This can be 
illustrated by a several incidents that occurred during the fieldwork.
The decision to publish and publicly launch a report on corruption in the Bosnian 
demining sector prior to the fieldwork had enormous impact on the author’s research.18 
The findings in the report were quite controversial and as the mine action sector had 
generally shied away from such confrontational reporting of its problems, caused quite a 
stir. This was particularly the case since it was launched at the 2006 annual meeting of 
states parties to the mine ban, where many the leading mine action personnel were in 
attendance. Former BBC war correspondent and UK politician Martin Bell wrote the 
foreword and attended the launch, further guaranteeing publicity.
While perhaps it was naive of the author, he was not aware of how profoundly this 
would affect the research, in both negative and positive ways. Naturally, many of the 
Bosnian demining agencies, especially the government body, were very angry about the 
report and concerned it would lead to a funding crisis. In his two month stay in Bosnia, 
the author was berated, shouted at, threatened with law suits and asked to explain the 
report line by line. While this attention did mean he was taken more seriously than 
during his Master’s fieldwork -  giving him access to some data unavailable previously -  
it made the fieldwork much less pleasant and meant that some informants were openly 
hostile. At the same time, persons within several international institutions began to see 
the author as a useful tool for pursuing their political agenda in Bosnia. Personnel at 
NATO and other international agencies leaked information about some of the local 
owners of demining companies to the author, clearly as a part of a larger effort to combat 
the ‘nationalistic underground’ in Bosnia. As a result, while the author’s self-image was 
that of a fairly harmless PhD student, he found drawn into larger political struggles.
The publication of the report had a very different impact on the research in the other 
two countries, though the author was no less prone to being pulled into political disputes. 
In Afghanistan, the author found the report gave him significant political capital with the 
Afghan NGOs and with the UN. This was because the report had been particularly
18 Ibid.
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critical of the role of commercial companies and many within the NGOs and UN were 
nervous about the introduction of commercial companies into Afghan demining. 
Therefore, the author was given considerable assistance and made very welcome by 
many people within the NGOs and UN. At the same time, the people running the 
commercial companies in Afghanistan had not read the report and so were not suspicious 
of him. Thus the impact of the report in Afghanistan was overwhelmingly positive -  it 
opened many doors. However, the author was aware that again, he was being pulled into 
institutional struggles over whether Afghan demining should be commercialized. To a 
certain extent, people and agencies were using the author’s research as a way to maintain 
particular institutional structures and funding systems within the country.
The author found that in Sudan no one had heard of or read the Bosnia report, but it 
still had an impact. The director of HALO Trust read it just as HALO itself was 
embroiled in a dispute with its local partner and the South Sudanese government over 
nepotism and corruption. HALO thus saw the author’s research as a way to further 
bolster their perspective on how problematic Sudanese demining had become. As a 
result, HALO went out of their way to facilitate access to their archives, information and 
even backed the author’s proposal for fieldwork funding for Sudan. Again, while this 
meant the author was given access to a wealth of information, it meant he constantly had 
to be careful not to become HALO’s hachetman.
The author also found that his research had commercial value, and could feed back 
into the commercial demining market. There were several occasions when he felt a 
commercial demining manager revealed information about the dirty tricks of another 
company as a way to discredit and smear them. The author had to be constantly aware 
that both companies and NGOs operated in a market and that some of the information 
they gave the author was shaped by an attempt to gain a competitive edge. One 
commercial demining manager was very interested in the research, taking the author to 
dinner, providing a lengthy interview and asking many questions. It took a while for the 
author to realize that in addition to being friendly, the informant was also interested in 
accessing information on the local demining market and potential competitors.
Occasionally the author was placed in an ethically difficult position, where he felt the 
right thing to do would have negative implications for a company’s bottom line and
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people’s employment. Uncovering corruption in the Bosnian demining sector possibly 
damaged some companies’ business. Likewise, after visiting a demining site of one 
company in Afghanistan the author felt disturbed by some of their safety practices. He 
felt his duty to confidentiality was trumped by danger to deminers’ lives. Therefore the 
author reported the company to the UN regulatory body, which had a definite impact on 
the company’s profit margins.
The author felt inadequately prepared to deal with the political economy of 
information in which my PhD was inevitably embedded. Therefore, he may have made 
several mistakes or become favorable to particular perspectives due to undue influence of 
certain political agendas. However, the author did his best to perform the difficult triage 
of remaining at least somewhat removed from these political struggles. He triangulated 
information from many different sources, treaded carefully and sensitively around 
problematic issues and submitted his work to peer-review by other mine action 
professionals and scholars.
iv. Verifying Rumor
Discerning social, political and economic trends in peaceful societies is difficult 
enough, but when confronted with what soldiers call the ‘fog of war’ -  especially in 
unfamiliar places -  the author sometimes felt more a soothsayer than scientist. 
Traditional social science offers little guidance on systematically studying the political 
economy of conflict and falsifying the disinformation and half-truths it generates.19 This 
causes potential problems of verifiability, especially when the qualitative data gathered 
through interviews was often unspecific, driven by personal, commercial and political 
agendas, and couched in hear-say or obtuse hints.20 To try to mitigate these problems this 
study ‘triangulated’ and corroborated the interview data with information available in the 
public record. Using the journalistic rule of thumb, claims were confirmed by at least two 
reliable sources, one of which published or official. Finally, the author disseminated
19 Carolyn Nordstrom & Antonius C.G.M. Robben (Eds.). (1995) Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary 
Studies of Violence and Survival. Berkeley, University of California Press; J. Christopher Kovats-Bemat. 
(March 2002) “Negotiating Dangerous Fields: Pragmatic Strategies for Fieldwork amid Violence and 
Terror,” American Anthropologist. 104(1). pp. 208-222.
20 Anna Simons. (1995) “Rumor: The Beginning of the End.” In: Nordstrom & Robben (Eds.). Fieldwork 
under Fire. pp. 42-61.
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findings to other scholars and mine action professionals through presentations and 
working papers, in order to gain feedback on potential mistakes.
d. Conclusion
This PhD is based on comparing data gathered through ethnographic and archival 
research in multiple locations around the globe. Working in zones of conflict and 
instability, it faced logistical, security and political issues that constrained the 
researcher’s ability to objectively and dispassionately gather and analyze information. 
Likewise, while giving access to certain forms of information, the author’s positionality 
and social location also created significant blindspots. The author must thus be humble 
about the very real limits this PhD faces.
Nevertheless, some of these problems were mitigated by rooting the research firmly 
in a comparative methodology -  triangulating information from a wide variety of sources 
and methodologies. By comparing agencies, countries, time periods, and information 
sources the author was able to deal with and hopefully correct for some of the inevitable 
bias and error. Moreover, through dissemination events, circulating drafts and publishing 
the research was submitted to preliminary peer review from other scholars and 
professionals. Feedback was taken very seriously and the author tried to correct 
misstatements, misinterpretations or methodological errors.
The next chapter will start the effort of describing the results of the research 




The Global Politics of Mine Action: 
A Historical Survey
“The history o f the landmine mirrors a 
century o f social and military history... ” 
-  Lydia Monin & Andrew Gallimore1
Landmines continue to kill and maim years after armed factions have shaken hands and sat down to negotiate. Moreover, up to 30% of modem munitions fail to detonate upon impact with their targets, leaving highly unstable explosives in 
the ground decades into the future. These weapons project the impact of war onto future 
generations. Throughout the ‘century of war’ beginning in 1914, people have attempted 
to mitigate this threat to civilian life. Initiatives have come from states and from non­
states, military and civilian entities. Most dramatically, in the late 1990s a combination of 
NGOs and medium-sized states were able to institute what is now almost a universal 
norm prohibiting the use of anti-personnel landmines. The struggle to restrict the threat 
of remnants of war continues as a growing movement to ban cluster munitions, which 
looks set to sign a treaty in December 2008.
This chapter will show that the evolution of attempts to control, mitigate and clean up 
the contamination left by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) has been 
intimately linked to the changing nature of the state, warfare, responses to war and the 
international system since 1945. Since the end of the Cold War, the explosive remnants 
of war regime has undergone a remarkable transformation, from individual sovereign
1 Lydia Monin & Andrew Gallimore. (2002) The Devil’s Gardens: A History of Landmines. London, 
Pimlico, p. xvi.
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states managing the problem internally to collective management through global systems 
that include, in addition to states, multilateral institutions, NGOs and commercial 
companies. This chapter tracks the shift of power in the governance of the remnants of 
war from state to non-state actors, superpowers to small states, military organs to civilian 
agencies, national governments to institutions of global governance.
The chapter is thus framed as a political history. It examines the rising prominence of 
norm-based, non-state and commercial actors in the international system by showing how 
global politics has written its biography across the world’s minefields. Imitating Olivier 
Razac’s history of barbed wire2 and John Ellis’ Social History o f the Machine Gun,3 the 
chapter is an ‘archeological’ investigation of the response to the global mine and UXO 
problem, through an examination of four cross-sections of its history: the aftermath of 
wwn, the wars in Indochina, the ‘New Wars’ and the development of ‘Post-Modern 
Warfare’ into the Global War on Terror. While other wars (such as those of 
decolonization in Africa or the Arab-Israeli conflicts) contributed to the development of 
mine and UXO governance regimes, in the interests of brevity, the author believes 
focusing on the four periods chosen is sufficient to make the key theoretical points.
The chapter will close with an abstracted description of two broad ‘Emerging 
Political Complexes’ of mine action that incorporate public and private actors in different 
ways: ‘Strategic-Commercial Complexes,’ shaped by strategic politics, incorporating 
networks of great power state organs and commercial companies; and ‘Human Security- 
Civil Society Complexes,’ shaped by humanitarianism and global understandings of 
interest and consisting of coalitions between middle powers, multilateral agencies and 
NGOs.
a. World War II
i. Mines and Remnants of War
Victim-activated landmines probably first appeared in the American Civil War,
though their predecessors -  booby traps and metal spikes laid to disrupt horses -  go back
2 Olivier Razac. (2002) Barbed Wire: A Political History. Jonathan Kneight (Trans.). New York: The New 
Press.
3 John Ellis. (1986) The Social History of the Machine Gun. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
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to the Roman era.4 However, mines came into their own in the era of mechanized 
warfare. While their initial innovation as a means to disable the newly invented tank saw 
some use in WWI,5 it was the WWII tank battles of North Africa and constantly moving 
frontlines in Eastern Europe and Russia that bred the first crisis of landmine 
contamination.6 By WWII’s end, there were an estimated 300 million landmines strewn 
across Europe and North Africa. Reflecting the technological and sociological character 
of WWII’s industrial and modernistic mode of ‘total war’, these mines were laid mostly 
by state militaries in massive, patterned constellations. The German army even designed 
precise algorithms to guide mine-laying, aimed at covering maximum area for minimum 
cost.7 They represented an example of how states had the power to regulate and reshape 
territorial space to an unprecedented degree.
In addition to the mine crisis, the aftermath of two mechanized World Wars left large 
swaths of Europe contaminated with millions of tons of unexploded ordnance. Artillery 
and strategic aerial bombing dumped unprecedented quantities of munitions in civilian 
areas, such as farms and urban settlements. So much of this was left behind that 
European countries continue to dispose of WWI and WWII mines and UXO even today.8
Unlike the imperial ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia or the proxy wars of the Cold War, 
the two World Wars directly pitted the great powers against each other. The battle for 
state survival was fought right at the very core of the international system, with limited 
skirmishes at the peripheries. Even the running battles in North Africa or East Asia, 
while outside the traditional center of global power, were fought largely between the 
principal great power antagonists. As a result, the majority of mine and UXO 
contamination in the aftermath of WWII was located at the very heart of the global 
system, in Europe and the European part of the USSR.
4 Mike Croll. (1998) The History of Landmines. Bamesly, Leo Cooper, pp. 1-24.
5 Croll. History of Landmines, pp. 25-36; Monin & Gallimore. Devil’s Gardens, pp 39-49.
6 Croll. History of Landmines, pp. 37-83.
7 Monin & Gallimore. Devil’s Gardens, pp 49-63.
8 Arthur H. Westing. (1985) “Explosive Remnants of War: An Overview.” Explosive Remnants of War: 
Mitigating the Environmental Effects. Arthur H. Westing (Ed.). London, Taylor & Francis, p. 6; Boguslaw 
A. Molski & Jan Pajak. (1985) “Explosive Remnants of World War II in Poland.” In: Westing (Ed.). 
Explosive Remnants of War. pp. 17-32; Khairi Sgaier. (1985) “Explosive Remnants of World War II in 
Libya: impact on agricultural development.” In: Westing (Ed.). Explosive Remnants of War. pp. 33-37; 
Margaret Buse. (June 2000) “WWII Ordnance Still Haunts Europe and the Asia Pacific Rim.” Journal of 
Mine Action. 4(2). <http://maic.jmu.edU/joumal/4.2/Features/ww2/ww2.htm>.
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ii. Clearance and Mitigation
The aftermath of WWII saw what is still the largest ever landmine and UXO
clearance campaign. While the technical side of demining and ordnance disposal has 
changed little since WWII, the political organization of the process was far more state- 
centric than today. It reflected the nature of the state and the international system, which 
in WWII saw the peak of government and military control over European politics. 
Firstly, as much of the contamination was at the very center of the international system -  
in Europe -  there was political and economic pressure to complete demining and 
explosive ordnance disposal quickly -  especially in major cities. In more peripheral 
areas, such as North Africa, clearance was longer in coming. Secondly, the military, 
which had been at the center of all social activity in WWII Europe -  with entire societies 
mobilized in total warfare -  took control of clearance.9 This, in effect, reinforced the 
notion that mine and UXO contamination was the purview solely of state security organs.
Therefore, clearance mirrored the unchallenged territoriality and sovereignty of the 
state. Unlike post-Cold War demining, funded by international donors and implemented 
by NGOs and companies, it was funded and handled internally by the state whose 
territory was mined. Even today, the ongoing clearance efforts in Europe are handled 
largely by government agencies.10 Moreover, the demining programs were state interest 
-  rather than human -  centered. They displayed a certain callousness to life (reflective 
of the prosecution of the war) with a high toleration for casualties, acceptance of a less 
than 100% clearance standard and even pressganging of POWs to work as deminers.11
iii. Advocacy and Policy
While the Hague Regulations at the turn of the Twentieth Century had seen several
humanitarian attempts to control ‘inhumane weapons’ such as ‘dum-dum’ bullets12 and
9 Westing. “Explosive Remnants of War.” p. 6; Molski & Pajak. “Explosive Remnants of World War II in 
Poland.” pp. 17-32; Croll. History of Landmines, pp. 84-95; M.J. Jappy. (2001) Danger UXB: The 
Remarkable Story of the Disposal of Unexploded Bombs during the Second World War. London, Channel 4 
Books.
10 Donovan Webster. (1998) Aftermath: The Remnants of War. New York, Vintage Books, pp. 11-80.
11 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). (August 2005) A Study of Manual 
Mine Clearance: 1. History, Summary and Conclusions of a Study of Manual Mine Clearance. Geneva, 
GICHD. pp. 17-21.
12 (2004) “1899 Hague Declaration 3 Concerning Expanding Bullets.” Documents on the Laws of War. 
Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff (Eds.). 3rd Ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 63-65.
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poisoned gases,13 and the aftermath of WWI led to the Geneva Protocol banning gas and 
bacterial warfare,14 the widespread landmine contamination after WWII provoked no 
such proscriptions in international law. Mines were seen as perfectly legitimate weapons 
in the nation-state’s arsenal. The 1949 Geneva Conventions made no attempt to regulate 
them. The only regulation specifically concerning landmines was a ban on further use of 
POWs as deminers.15 Of course, mine warfare was to be subject to same the principles of 
discrimination and proportionality, which were primarily aimed at constraining the use of 
airpower that had rained down ordnance on European and Japanese cities. However, as 
will be seen in the next sections, these proscriptions had limited impact on the massive 
and indiscriminate use of both mines and aerial bombing in Korea, Indochina, 
Afghanistan and many other places. In 1956 the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) raised concerns about the post-conflict impact of landmines, calling for a 
new legal instrument requiring the mapping of minefields, but this proposal met with 
disinterest from the world’s states.16
iv. Summary
Following WWII, both clearance efforts and policy concerning landmines and UXO 
reflected the unchallenged state supremacy over territory, security and the use of 
violence. Clearance efforts were organized and operated by states, often at great human 
cost and using POW forced labor. Post-war international regulations on land warfare 
placed few restrictions on state’s ability to deploy mines and munitions that might leave 
unexploded remnants in the manner they wished. As such, demining was conducted in 
the same statist manner as war.
13 (2004) “1899 Hague Declaration 2 Concerning Asphyxiating Gases.” In: Roberts & Guelff (Eds.). 
Documents on the Laws of War. pp. 59-61.
14 (2004) “1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.” In: Roberts & Guelff (Eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. 
pp. 155-167.
15 (2004) “Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War or August 12, 1949.” 
Documents on the Laws of War. In: Roberts & Guelff (Eds.). Documents on the Laws of War. Section HI, 
Article 52. p. 264.
16 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (2000) ‘The ICRC’s draft rules to protect civilian 
populations 1955-1956.” The Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines: The Legal Contribution of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross 1955-1999. Louis Maresca & Stuart Maslen (Eds.). Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-18; Stuart Maslen. (2001) Anti-Personnel Mines under Humanitarian 
Law: A View from the Vanishing Point. Antwerp, Intersentia. p. 26.
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b. War in indochina
i. Mines and Remnants of War
The years after WWII saw “a terrific growth in the killing power of antipersonnel
weapons.”17 By the late 1960s ordnance manufacturers had developed new innovations 
in fragmentation (such as the US Claymore mine that was more effective at wounding 
personnel than traditional blast m ines)18 and cluster munitions (in which an artillery or 
airdropped missile releases many smaller bomb lets or landmines over a large area).19
As the US commitment to counterinsurgency in South Vietnam deepened from 1965 
to 1975, it struggled to target an elusive and hidden enemy. The Vietcong was difficult to 
identify, hard to find and supplied by a complex network of trails through Cambodia and 
Laos, nicknamed the ‘Ho Chi Minh Trail.’ “The solution,” opined one commanding US 
general was “more bombs, more shells, more napalm ... till the other side cracks and 
gives up.”20 US warfare in Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) was thus the 
logical extension of its position as a super-modern industrial power, pitting the might of 
technology and heavy manufacturing against a poor, lightly armed guerilla force. While 
there was an “Other War” -  covert operations such which attempted to single out and 
eliminate individual Vietcong cadres -  much of the US effort consisted of blanket 
targeting of whole areas. By the war’s end, the US had expended 14.3 million tons of 
ordnance in Indochina. This was twice the total amount expended in all WWII theatres 
together.21 In Laos alone, between 1964 and 1973, the US dropped an average of one 
“planeload of bombs.. .every eight minutes.”22
While there were important similarities to the strategic carpet bombing of WWII -  
targeting a wide area, hoping to hit something valuable -  there were key differences. 
While a WWII bomb killed only those in the vicinity of its explosion, cluster munitions
17 Eric Prokosch. (1995) The Technology of Killing: A Military and Political History of Antipersonnel 
Weapons. London, Zed Book. p. 8.
18 Ibid. pp 33-39.
19 Ibid. pp 81-125.
20 Quoted in Ibid. p. 53.
21 Earl S. Martin & Murray Hiebert. (1985) “Explosive remnants of the Second Indochina War in Viet Nam 
and Laos.” In: Westing (Ed.). Explosive Remnants of War. pp. 39-40.
22 Rae McGrath. (2000) Cluster Bombs: The Military Effectiveness and Impact on Civilians of Cluster 
Munitions. London, Landmine Action.
<http://www.stopclustermunitions.Org//files/Cluster_Bombs%20LMA.pdf>. p. 30. For further details on 
US air war see: Webster. Aftermath, pp. 160-217.
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enabled covering an area with a more fine-grained distribution -  pixilation in computer 
parlance -  of ordnance. Likewise, aerially dispersed mines and delayed detonation 
cluster munitions distributed detonations over time -  projecting the deadly power of 
ordnance into the future, beyond the moment of the munitions’ impact with the ground.23 
Thus the US could continue ‘bombing’ Indochina even when its planes were not above its 
skies.24 These developments caused enormous civilian suffering. For instance, a US 
Information Service survey found that 80% of the victims of the bombing in the Laotian 
Xieng Khouang province were civilians.25 The legacy of the bombing continues to kill 
and wound civilians; in 2006 there were 92 new UXO casualties in Vietnam, 58 in Laos 
and 259 in Cambodia.26
The Vietnamese Communist forces also laid mines, but followed a very different 
strategy than the US. Unlike the large defensive constellations of minefields in WWII, 
the Viet Cong used mines as offensive weapons, setting booby traps, mining trails and 
laying them in non-Euclidian patterns. As such, their mine warfare reflected their 
guerilla strategy in which forces avoided concentration and relied on ambush and 
surprise. Therefore, while they used far fewer mines than WWII armies, the mines were 
more difficult to detect and in low densities, spread out over large areas. 27
Indochina continues to be heavily contaminated with mines and UXO. Over 21% of 
Vietnam’s territory, mostly in the former DMZ, is considered hazardous, and as much as 
600,000 tons of ordnance remain scattered throughout the country.28 In Laos, the UN 
estimated that about 500,000 tons of UXO remained in the ground in 1996.29
23 McGrath. Cluster Bombs, p. 30.
24 Titus Peachey & Virgil Wiebe. (November 2000) “Appendix 1: Laos.” Mennonite Central Committee. 
<http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/report/laos_appendix.html>; Center for International Studies. (1971)
The Air War in Indochina: A Report by the Center for International Studies. Ithaca, Cornell University; Jim 
Monan. (1998) Curse of the Bombies: A Case Study ofSaravan Province, Laos. Hong Kong, Oxfam.
25 Bruce Shoemaker. (March 1994) “Legacy of the Secret War.” Mennonite Central Committee. 
<http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/secret_war>.
26 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (2007) “Vietnam.” Landmine Monitor 2007. 
<http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/vietnam>; International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (2007)
“Laos.” Landmine Monitor 2007. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/lao>; International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL). (2007) “Cambodia.” Landmine Monitor 2007. 
<http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/cambodia>.
27 Croll. History of Landmines, pp. 102-108.
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ICBL. “Vietnam.” See also: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF). (2005) Report on 
Vietnam Unexploded Ordnance and Landmine Impact Assessment and Technical Survey. Hanoi, VVAF.
29 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (1999) “Lao PDR.” Landmine Monitor 1999. 
<http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/lao>.
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ii. Clearance and Mitigation
Despite the massive contamination problems during this era, attempts at clearing
mines and UXO for civilian purposes was done only on a small and ad hoc basis at the 
fringes of other programs. While there are accounts of internal military and 
governmental organs of North and South Vietnam and Laos conducting some clearance, 
the extent of the problem completely overwhelmed this indigenous capacity.30 In many 
cases it was local farmers and informal ‘village deminers’ that conducted what little 
clearance occurred. There was certainly no replication of the massive clean-up seen 
following WWII, nor the international financing of clearance seen in the post-Cold War 
era. This was probably because although Indochina represented a key Cold War 
battleground, it was at the periphery of the international system and did not have the 
resources or state strength to induce or coerce clearance. Moreover, in the Cold War 
context, such a massive and expensive effort would have required the financial and 
technical backing of one of the superpowers, which were reluctant to accept 
responsibility for the problem.
That said, both superpowers and other agencies did sponsor some small clearance 
efforts. While they never had much impact, in these programs one can detect the nascent 
development of two broad political models of mine and UXO clearance for civilian 
purposes: one rooted in state strategic interest and the other initiated by humanitarian 
organizations.
Both the US and USSR developed small clearance programs which benefited 
civilians, but were designed for military or Cold War political advantage. In response to 
Viet Cong mining and booby-trapping, the US Army and Marine Corps developed their 
capacity for mine detection and destruction and began training mine dogs. One major 
effort was keeping roads open, which the Vietcong re-mined repeatedly.31 While this 
clearance was for military purposes, it also benefited the civilian population. In the early 
1970s, US Air Force Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams working in Thailand 
were occasionally sent to Laos to clear UXO ostensibly for ‘humanitarian’ purposes but 
operating in the broader context of substantial US covert and economic aid used to
30 Shoemaker. “Legacy of the Secret War.”
31 Robert E. Low. (1985) “Explosive remnants of war: detection through the use of dogs.” In: Westing 
(Ed.). Explosive Remnants of War. pp. 73-74.
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prosecute the ‘secret war’ in Laos.32 One of these EOD operators said he “worked in 
civilian clothes with the CIA, picking up unexploded ordnance so the roads were clear 
and the farmers could work their paddies.”33 The teams operated at least until mid-1974, 
when it appears they were withdrawn to comply with the 1973 Vientiane Peace 
Agreement.34
For its part, in what appears to be a unique case, the Soviet Union sent 12 experts to 
Xieng Khouang, Laos, in 1979 to initiate an UXO clearance project at a state farm. This 
was part of a wider package of support to the revolutionary regime. For 18 months, these 
experts trained 120 Laotians to use jeep-mounted metal detectors, clearing some 5,000 
hectares of 12,700 UXO. After the Soviet advisors left, the trainees were spread out over 
a wider area, but lacking funding, expertise and spare parts, the program slowly fizzled
*  35out.
While these programs were novel for the time, they were pittance in comparison with 
the massive contamination of aerially dispersed mines, cluster munitions and other UXO 
littering Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The US has never accepted full responsibility for 
the problem and did not begin funding clearance programs in these countries until after 
the Cold War ended. Since the US was to blame for the majority of contamination, it had 
little incentive to publicize this problem by acknowledging responsibility for clean-up. 
Likewise, the USSR seemed uninterested in making much of an effort to assist its client 
states clean up, despite having extensive experience of landmine clearance on its own 
territory. One might have expected the USSR to see the propaganda value in clearing the 
mess caused by the other superpower. However, there was an institutional bias within the 
national security establishments of both superpowers to maintain strong control of all 
security issues. Acknowledging mines and remnants of war as a humanitarian issue 
would disadvantage the Soviet Union in other potential conflicts, especially since mine 
warfare and air power were so integral to the USSR’s military doctrine. The USSR may
32 This is mentioned in general terms in several US State Department diplomatic cables, e.g.: US Embassy 
Vientiane. (1974) “First Call on Foreign Minister.” Declassified Secret Cable to SECSTATE WASHDC. 
1974VIENT02960. <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/>. Section 2, p. 1.
33 Philip Long. (September/October 2005) “Ordnance Dangers.” Archeology, p. 9; Philip Long. (15 August 
2006) Telephone interview with the author.
34 W. Dale Nelson. (9 March 1982) “Reports Deal Possible on MIA Accounting.” Associated Press', 
Shoemaker. “Legacy of the Secret War.”
35 Shoemaker. “Legacy of the Secret War.”
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not have wanted to frame mines and UXO clearance as a humanitarian issue because to 
do so would delegitimize using them in their own future conflicts. One can detect the 
hints of a superpower collusion game (which was more visible in the Conventional 
Weapons Convention negotiations described in the next subsection), where superpowers 
had an implicit arrangement maintaining military hegemony over perceived security 
issues.
Surprisingly absent too, was significant response to the landmine and UXO issue 
from the UN system, despite its ostensibly pivotal role in both global disarmament and 
humanitarianism. Other than helping to organize the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons (see below), a UNEP study on explosive remnants of war36 and WHO research 
on the impact of antipersonnel weapons, the UN was rather inactive on the issue. This 
(lack of) UN response was symptomatic of the paralysis that affected the UN during the 
Cold War over any issue that impinged a) on the national sovereignty of its member 
states and b) the interests of the superpowers.
Though also small and ad hoc, an alternative model of clearance and mitigation, 
shaped by humanitarianism, religious imperative and solidarity, developed among small 
international NGOs working at the level of the population (rather than the state) in 
Indochina. Driven by their opposition to the war, the American Friends Service 
Committee (AFSC), a humanitarian arm of the American Quakers, and the Mennonite 
Central Committee (MCC) did relief work in both South and North Vietnam (this was 
illegal under US law) and began to see the impact unexploded munitions and mines were 
having on the civilian population. In Quang Ngai, AFSC supported a project 
rehabilitating war victims and producing prosthetics.37 MCC actually experimented with 
clearance efforts in rural areas of the same province, finding “plowing such ordnance- 
littered fields with an armored tractor -  dangerous as that was -  was safer than tilling by 
unprotected farmers.”38
After the 1975 communist revolution in Laos, the AFSC and MCC were the only 
Western relief agencies allowed to stay in the country. Both organizations, which
36 Arthur H. Westing et al. (1985) “Explosive remnants of conventional war: a report to UNEP.” In: 
Westing (Ed.). Explosive Remnants of War. pp. 117-136.
37 Shoemaker. “Legacy of the Secret War.”
38 Ibid.
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coordinated their efforts closely, again experimented with ways to address the ordnance 
problem, funded mostly by church-affiliated agencies. While they experimented with 
metal detectors and armored tractors fitted with chain flails, it was only after the end of 
the Cold War that MCC was able to develop UXO clearance into a viable program (see
. 3 9next section).
AFSC and MCC had more success with projects aiming to mitigate the impact of 
ordnance. For instance, the AFSC worked in partnership with a new French NGO, 
Handicap International, providing prosthetics and UXO survivor assistance. Handicap, 
which later became a prominent voice in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(see next section), was founded in 1982 to provide orthopedic services to war amputees 
in the refugee camps of Indochina.40 By the late 1980s, Handicap had an office of its own 
in Vientiane and scaled up its operations, supporting provincial prosthetics workshops 
around the country.
The AFSC and MCC also discovered that many UXO accidents were caused by 
farmers using traditional Laotian hoes to till the soil. The hoe, lifted above the head and 
then swung down hard, had a tendency to detonate cluster bomblets and strike them in the 
direction of the farmers’ own body. AFSC and MCC found that American-style shovels, 
which entered the ground more gently, were less likely to initiate the explosive. As a 
result, between 1977 and 1991, the AFSC and MCC distributed 30,000 shovels to farmers 
and helped a Laotian manufacturer start domestic production. This project attracted 
many more funders than any other mine or UXO mitigation project of the time, but these 
were mainly private donors, NGOs (such as Oxfam America) or Quaker affiliated groups. 
The only countries that provided substantive bilateral assistance were middle powers, 
including Norway.41 While the shovels project was less dramatic that the clearance 
efforts, it probably had a much greater impact on mitigating the impact of UXO.42
39 Bob Eaton. (2 August 2006) Personal interview with the author in Takoma Park, Maryland. Titus 
Peachey. (15 August 2006) Telephone interview with the author.
40 Handicap International, (n.d.) “History.” <http://www.handicap-intemational.org.uk/page_12.php>; Aid 
Watch. (2003) “Handicap International.” <http://www.observatoire- 
humanitaire.org/fusion.php?l=GB&id=21>.
41 Shoemaker. “Legacy of the Secret War.” USAID did provide a $600 Ocean Freight Reimbursement for 
some of the shovels, representing the “only U.S. governmental aid for UXO work in Laos between 1975 
and 1991.” See also: Barbara Crossette. (25 November 1987) “4 Aid Laos Against Bombis and Other 
Horrors.” The New York Times, p. A9.
42 Shoemaker. “Legacy of the Secret War.”
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Compared with the clean up after WWII and in the post-Cold War era, however, 
efforts to mitigate and neutralize the threat of landmines in Indochina were minimal. 
Affected states, in the periphery, lacked the resources to conduct clearance themselves, 
and superpowers were loath to take responsibility for the problem. Though a few 
humanitarian NGOs did what they could, their possibilities were limited. States were not 
willing to part with information on mine laying, bombing patterns or even counter­
mining techniques, which they considered military secrets. Without the support of large 
bilateral donors, NGOs were also unable to mobilize the necessary resources to make a 
real difference.
iii. Advocacy and Policy
Unsurprisingly, the US actively prevented information on ordnance contamination in 
Indochina reaching the rest of the world. Indeed the bombing of Laos was kept secret 
until 1969. While prompted by North Vietnam, it was non-state actors -  radical 
journalists and peace activists -  who first sounded the alarm.43 Likewise, the 1967 
International War Crimes Tribunal, an inquiry organized by philosophers Bertrand 
Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre, sent investigators to North Vietnam to examine whether US 
use of cluster munitions constituted a war crime.44 The most comprehensive account of 
the impact of the bombing of Laos was by a former Laos International Voluntary 
Services volunteer Fred Branfman who interviewed hundreds of people displaced from 
Xieng Khouang province and in 1972 published their stories in a book called Voices from  
the Plain o f Jars.45
As a result of their work in Laos, MCC and AFSC managed to get coverage of the 
UXO contamination in major news outlets. Both NGOs saw “public advocacy and 
awareness-raising [as] a main part of their response -  an effort which overall has been 
considerably more successful than actual UXO clearance.”46 The AFSC, in a coalition of 
Minnesotan and national anti-war groups, participated in a particularly high profile 
campaign exposing the impact Honeywell, a key manufacturer of parts of cluster
43 Prokosch. Technology of Killing, p. 87-89.
44 Ibid. p. 93-94.
45 Fred Branfman (Ed.). (1972) Voices from the Plain of Jars: Life under an Air War. New York, Harper 
Colophon.
46 Shoemaker. “Legacy of the Secret War.”
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munitions, was having on Indochinese civilians.47 After it was discovered in 1977 that 
Honeywell had collaborated with the FBI in illegal surveillance of the anti-war 
movement, peace groups filed for damages. When the federal government and 
Honeywell finally settled, the campaign garnered much publicity and donated some of
48the settlement to the Laos shovel project.
However, discussion of the effects of explosive remnants of war on Indochina 
remained largely at the margins of Western, especially US, society. The mainstream 
American press was reluctant to publicize an issue that would attract accusations of 
sympathy with the communists. A few congresspersons asked questions about the 
humanitarian impact of cluster munitions and aerially dispersed mines, but these were 
rare and met with euphemism and denial from the Pentagon.49
North Vietnam too, while it had fed information to anti-war activists on the effects of 
cluster munitions and had partially funded the International War Crimes Tribunal for 
propaganda purposes, was not interested in strict international regulations on weaponry. 
Rather than calling for a ban or restrictions on mines and cluster munitions, it felt an 
“imperialist weapon” became “a sacred tool” when borne by a “liberation fighter.”50 
While the US and North Vietnamese governments were unwilling to question the 
unrestricted right of states to use mines and cluster munitions, some middle powers, 
particularly Scandinavian and Non-Aligned countries, began to suggest new legal 
frameworks to regulate them. Reacting to widespread domestic discontent with the 
Vietnam War, Sweden convened a committee of military and medical experts to look at 
the effects of antipersonnel weapons. The resultant report, released in 1973, floated the 
idea of a ban on certain kinds of weaponry.51 Sweden found an ally in the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), whose unique status as both the mandated guardian 
of international humanitarian law and an NGO, has put it on the forefront of pressing for 
new norms on mines and cluster munitions. In addition to its trusted role in developing
47 Prokosch. Technology of Killing, p. 135-145.
48 Shoemaker. “Legacy of the Secret War.”
49 Prokosch. Technology of Killing, p. 98.
50 North Vietnamese delegate to the Lucerne Conference of Government Experts, quoted in Prokosch, 
Technology of Killing, p. 155.
51 Torgil Wulff. (1973) Conventional Weapons, Their Deployment and Effects from a Humanitarian 
Aspect: Recommendations for the Modernization of International Law: A Swedish Working Group Study. 
Stockholm, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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humanitarian regulation of war, the ICRC had operational experience in the field, where 
it was able to observe the actual impact of such weapons.52 Therefore, Sweden, along 
with 18 other countries, asked the ICRC to convene a Conference of Government Experts 
on Weapons that May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects to be 
convened by the ICRC in Lucerne in 1974.
At the conference, Sweden, Norway, Mexico, Egypt, Switzerland, Sudan and 
Yugoslavia presented a surprisingly direct and bluntly worded proposal to heavily restrict 
the use of antipersonnel weapons, including a ban on fragmentation cluster bomblets and 
aerially dispersed mines. The proposal was met with disdain and disinformation from the 
US and NATO countries, which cast aspersions on the information gathered by the 
Swedes and misled conference participants on the human impact of these weapons. As a 
result, participants could only agree to meet again in Lugano two years later. In the 
intervening years, the Non-Aligned Movement and the UN General Assembly passed 
resolutions calling for a response to the pernicious effects of explosive remnants of war, 
but concrete results were also lacking from the 1976 Lugano Conference. NATO 
countries continued to denigrate the data gathered by Sweden and Switzerland on the 
effects of antipersonnel weapons.53 The 1976 and 1977 conferences preparing the 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions again came up with nothing more 
concrete than vague prohibitions on weapons that cause “superfluous injury” or 
“unnecessary suffering”54 and a resolution recommending another conference on the 
issue of specific weapons.
While the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Friends 
World Committee for Consultation had observer status in the Lucerne and Lugano 
meetings, and the ICRC was deeply involved in calling for tighter restrictions on 
weapons, there was little civil society involvement in discussions and little press 
coverage. Many countries where such weapons were used were afraid to speak up -  “one
52 Jean-Philippe Lavoyer & Louis Maresca. (1999) “The Role of the ICRC in the Development of 
International Humanitarian Law.” International Negotiation. 4. pp. 501-525. See also: Maresca & Maslen 
(Eds.). Banning of Anti-Personnel Landmines, pp. 19-393.
53 Prokosch. Technology of Killing, p. 160.
54 (2004) “1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts.” In: Roberts & Guelff (Eds.). Documents on 
the Laws of War. Part III, Section I, Article 35. p. 442.
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does not want to tell one’s adversary which blows are landing hardest”55 -  and two of the 
most affected countries, Laos and Cambodia failed to show up. This left considerations 
of weapons’ impact on ordinary civilians in the hands of the military and security 
establishment.
Moreover, there was a struggle over which model of international law should regulate 
antipersonnel weapons like mines and cluster munitions. So-called “prohibitionists” -  
middle powers and the ICRC -  wanted the strongest proscriptions possible and for 
antipersonnel weapons treaties to be rooted in the humanitarian law tradition, which 
prioritized protection of war victims over military concerns.56 In contrast, the “realist” 
great powers argued that humanitarian law should not cover specific weapons. If there 
were to be any regulations at all -  one US negotiator admitted the US “was not 
particularly desirous of concluding a weapons agreement” -  they preferred the model of 
‘arms control’ which was more about preserving stability and balance of power than the
e n
possible humanitarian impact of weapons. As former Swedish Minister for 
Disarmament Alva Myrdal has argued, the ‘arms control’ model was often a superpower 
collusion game, enabling the US and USSR to maintain and legitimize their military 
hegemony.58
The UN finally convened the Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects in Geneva in 1979.59 The result, commonly known as the 1980 
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), placed weak and loophole-filled 
restrictions on mines and failed to regulate cluster munitions at all. “Indiscriminate” use 
of mines was prohibited, though the definition of this was left rather vague.60 The use of 
scatterable mines (dispersed by air, machine or artillery) had to be preceded by a warning
55 Prokosch. Technology of Killing, p. 155.
56 Frits Karlshoven & Liesbeth Zegveld. (March 2001) Constraints on the Waging of War: An Introduction 
to International Humanitarian Law. Geneva, ICRC; Geoffrey Best. (1980) Humanity in Warfare: The 
Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts. New York, Columbia University Press.
57 J. Ashley Roach. (1984) “Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian 
Law?” Military Law Review. 105. pp. 3-14.
58 Alva Myrdal. (1977) The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race. 
Manchester, Manchester University Press.
59 For more information on the CCW, see: Karlshoven & Zegveld. Constraints on the Waging of War. pp. 
155-168.
60 Ibid. Protocol II, Article 3. p. 529.
88
to civilians, “unless circumstances do not permit,” and unless they had self-destruct 
mechanisms.61 The location of both hand-laid and air-scattered minefields was to be 
recorded (a nearly impossible task from an airplane).62
While some commentators felt this was an important step forward, at least in 
establishing a new norm of special restrictions on mines, in reality the CCW was wholly 
inadequate in protecting civilians from the indiscriminate effects of landmines and UXO. 
In practical effect, the CCW did little or nothing to prevent or restrict further use of mines 
and cluster munitions, or to spur an effort to clear them up and mitigate their effects. 
Reflecting the ‘arms control’ rather than humanitarian agenda of the great powers, the 
CCW’s restrictions on mines give “the impression of having been written to satisfy the 
needs of military forces, which may later have to occupy a mined area, rather than to 
protect civilians.”63 As will be discussed in the next section, in the late 1980s and 1990s 
the CCW was actually followed by the most widespread crisis of mine and UXO 
contamination the world had ever known. The fact that the Soviet Union, a signatory to 
the CCW, used mines so widely and indiscriminately in the Afghan War (see next 
section) is a testament to the CCW’s inability to change states’ behavior.
The conferences between 1974 and 1980 failed to develop substantive restrictions on 
mines and cluster munitions because they were conducted in the great-power-centric 
context of the Cold War. Thus while humanitarian concern about the effects of mines 
and cluster bomblets were raised by norm entrepreneurs (such as activists, NGOs, the 
ICRC and middle powers) their energy was dissipated, depoliticized and stifled in the 
highly technical discourse and proceedings of Cold War disarmament meetings. While 
radical suggestions were put on the table by Scandinavian and Non-Aligned countries at 
the Lucerne conference, the superpowers and great powers domesticated them into weak, 
unenforceable provisions. The Cold War reification of ‘national security’ placed 
concerns about weapons firmly in the hands of the military, arms control negotiators and 
arms ‘experts’ rather than affected or concerned civilians.64 As one Norwegian diplomat 
explained, “Defense had a primacy at the time...it was possible for either Washington or
61 Ibid. Protocol II, Article 5. p. 529-530.
62 Ibid. Protocol II, Article 7.
63 Prokosch. Technology of Killing, p. 162.
64 Roach. “Certain Conventional Weapons Convention.” p. 14.
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Moscow to call the rest of their respective kinds to order in a way that you couldn’t do 
now.”65
iv. Summary
The post-WWII innovations in maiming, which led to massive contamination of 
Indochina by explosive remnants of war, had terrible effects on the civilians who were 
unfortunate enough to be targets, ‘collateral damage’ or future users of the land. By the 
late 1970s and early 1980s there began the soft rumblings of early discontent among 
churches, social movements and small states who began looking for ways to contain this 
crisis, as well as a few ad hoc clearance programs. However, the straitjacket of Cold War 
relations meant that great powers were unwilling to sacrifice any tool usable in the fight 
for national security and only engaged in small clearance programs if it was in their 
strategic advantage to do so.
As will be discussed in the next section, future activists concerned with mines and 
UXO were less willing to trust the judgment and capacity of great powers -  and their 
militaries and diplomats -  to protect civilians from the landmine crisis. Given an 
unprecedented opening at the end of the Cold War, they were able to wrest partial control 
of a security issue from the traditional security establishment. Until then, norm 
entrepreneurs wishing to replace raison d'etat with raison de Vhumanite were 
constrained to the margins of the regimes governing international security.
c. The Post-Cold War Era and the New Wars
i. Mines and Remnants of War
During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence and fear of total war prevented any direct
military confrontation between the East and Western blocs. However, disturbed by what 
it perceived as the growth of Soviet power in the Third World in the 1980s, the Reagan 
administration broke with the ‘Containment’ consensus and adopted an aggressive 
‘forward policy,’ aimed at Tolling back’ Soviet expansionism. The resulting policy, often 
called the ‘Reagan Doctrine,’ supported anti-government insurgencies in Third World 
socialist countries (Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua) through covert 
action. A keystone of this strategy was the creation of havens -  safe and secure rear areas
65 Steffen Kongstad. (3 September 2007) Personal interview with author in Oslo.
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-  for proxy forces in neighboring non-Socialist countries (Pakistan, Zaire, Thailand and 
Honduras, respectively). Rebels set up bases on the safe side of the border, often under 
the cover of refugee camps, and used these as staging grounds for cross-border raiding 
and infiltration. 66 In each case, the Communist forces quickly recognized the strategic 
importance of these cross-border infiltration routes and tried to cut them off by deploying 
extra troops to seal off the border and laying massive constellations of minefields -  both 
by hand and by air. While much of the mine-laying in these wars was usually done by 
the Communist forces, the US proxies also engaged in mine warfare to protect their 
‘liberated areas’ and bases vulnerable to cross-border raiding. Both sides often mined 
areas used primarily by civilians -  in contravention of international law -  and with little 
regard for proper marking, recording or regular patterns.67 By the end of the 1980s, all of 
these proxy war countries had significant landmine problems -  three of them, 
Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia, are among the ten most mine contaminated 
countries in the world.68
The ‘randomness’ and targeting of civilians in the proxy wars presaged the use of 
mines in the so-called ‘New Wars’ of the 1990s. These wars were fought in the 
periphery of the international system, in developing and post-communist states and 
sometimes morphed out of the proxy wars.69 Mine laying in the New Wars reflected the 
non-linearity of its strategy, with mines often strewn in unrecorded and non-Euclidean 
patterns and used to target and/or contain civilian populations.
ii. Clearance and Mitigation
The majority of mine and UXO contamination from the proxy and New Wars was in
territory of weak states, which were unable to marshal the fiscal and technical resources
66 Stephen S. Rosenfeld. (1986) “The Guns of July.” Foreign Affairs. 64(4); Robert H. Johnson. (1988) 
“Misguided Morality: Ethics and the Reagan Doctrine.” Political Science Quarterly. 103(3); Mark P.
Lagon. (1992) ‘The International System and the Reagan Doctrine: Can Realism Explain Aid to ‘Freedom 
Fighters.’” British Journal of Political Science. 22(1); James M. Scott. (1996) Deciding to Intervene: The 
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needed for clearance. Thus demining and mitigation efforts largely came at the initiative 
of outsiders -  aid donors, the UN and international NGOs. As will be discussed in the 
next chapter, the early US response to landmine contamination caused by the proxy wars 
was rather small and rooted in the logic of the Cold War, often assisting the logistical 
supply chains of their proxies. But by the early 1990s, the increasing tendency of external 
actors to intervene in the politics of conflict in the periphery spurred a massive increase 
in humanitarian demining programs. For instance, the UN launched its first demining 
program as a part of Operation Salam in Afghanistan, one of the first massive UN ‘post­
conflict’ operations. Further large scale UN interventions in Cambodia, Mozambique, 
Bosnia and Kosovo included mine action programs. In 1993, the General Assembly 
adopted a resolution to establish UN mine clearance program, which eventually became 
the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), located in the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations.
Indicative of the increasing role of non-state actors in international politics, 
international NGOs and commercial companies (which will be discussed in the next 
section) played a leading role in the new clearance efforts. Several existing development 
NGOs, such as Norwegian People’s Aid, DanChurchAid, HELP and Vietnam Veterans of 
America Foundation saw the terrible destruction caused by mines in the countries where 
they worked, or were asked by their donors to start up programs and expanded into mine 
clearance operations. At the same time a whole new set of NGOs specializing in mine 
action, such as Danish Demining Group, Mines Advisory Group, the HALO Trust, 
Landmine Survivors Network, Menschen gegen Minen and the Swiss Foundation for 
Mine Action, started up in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Non-state demining operations were suddenly made possible because donors wanted 
to show their electorates that they shared sentiments with the mine ban campaign 
(discussed below). A good example of the huge growth in interest in clearance and 
mitigation efforts following the Cold War is the UXO clearance programs in Laos. As 
discussed in the previous section, MCC’s UXO clearance efforts during the 1970s and 
1980s were rather sparse, underfunded and unguided. However, by 2006, the Lao UXO 
clearance programs had an annual budget of over $13 million.
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On the supply side, the demobilization of Cold War and Apartheid era armies enabled 
NGOs to hire military experts in mine warfare, explosive disposal and countermining. 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, only states were able to mobilize this kind of expertise. 
Now it was available to NGOs and commercial companies on the open labor market. 
Demobilization and democratization also led in some places to greater openness with 
military secrets, such as the location of minefields and bombing targets. The handover of 
Soviet minefield maps to HALO Trust by the communist regime in Afghanistan in the 
late 1980s was a watershed moment. It was the first time when superpower mine data -  
sensitive national security information -  was handed to a civilian non-state actor. This 
represented a sea change toward a partial humanitarianization of national security 
information. In the 1970s and 1980s, the AFSC and MCC had toiled for years to get the
7 0US Department of Defense to release bombing data for Laos. But in the aftermath of 
the Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq bombing campaigns, US bombing data was handed 
over almost voluntarily, with little fuss. A significant shift in the normative framing of 
mine and UXO issues had occurred. Mines and UXO were no longer simply a national 
security issue, with secret locations, hidden from the civilian population. They were a 
humanitarian, human security issue, whose locations should be revealed to the public and 
which should be dug up and destroyed.
The humanitarian rather than strategic spirit of the new NGO clearance organizations 
was embodied in the ‘Bad Honnef Framework’, a 1999 statement developed by the main 
mine action NGOs that laid out guidelines for running mine action programs “from a 
development-oriented point of view.” They called for mine action to be guided by the 
“needs and aspirations of people affected by mines”, rather than strategic interests or 
commercial profit. When compared to the mine clearance programs after WWII, this was 
a radically different framework.71
70 Shoemaker. “Legacy of the Secret War.”
71 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (June 1999) “Mine Action Programmes from a 
development-oriented point of view ( ‘The Bad Honnef Framework’).” 
<http://www.apminebanconvention.org/index.php?id=424>.
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iii. Advocacy and Policy
The early 1990s also saw a revolution in advocacy on mines. Following the 1991
publication of a Human Rights Watch report on the impact of landmines on Cambodia,72 
several NGOs involved in mine action and conflicted regions began discussing ways to 
campaign for the bold goal of banning antipersonnel landmines. In 1993 they formed the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which expanded rapidly to include 
hundreds of NGOs, religious groups and citizens associations from around the world. 
Based on their experience working with the many civilians who had fallen victim to 
mines and UXO, the core members of the ICBL were convinced that antipersonnel mines 
were a particularly egregious violation of the principles of proportionality and 
discrimination enshrined in international humanitarian law. However, they felt that with 
the lack of specificity in the Geneva Conventions and CCW, such principles meant 
nothing on the battlefield. Indeed, the USSR and the US-backed proxy armies had paid 
no attention to the regulations on mine use in the CCW. ICBL campaigners felt not only 
the use of mines had to be proscribed, but also the production, sale and transfer.
The ICBL found common cause with the ICRC that, in an unprecedented move, 
launched its first ever public advocacy campaign, calling for a ban on antipersonnel 
mines. ICRC medics in field hospitals in conflict zones were exhausted by the number of 
amputations they had to perform on mine survivors and pressured their headquarters to
n o
seek new restrictions on landmines. In 1996 the ICRC published a crucial study, 
endorsed by over 50 senior military officials from around the world, arguing that the 
negative humanitarian impact outweighed the military utility of landmines.74 This 
reportedly persuaded many political and military leaders to back or at least not object to a 
ban.75
While the ICBL drew leaders and lessons from the Cold War disarmament and peace 
campaigns (its executive director Jody Williams had risen to prominence raising 
awareness of US abuses in Central America in the 1980s), it also represented something
72 Human Rights Watch (HRW) & Physicians for Human Rights (PHR). (1991) Land Mines in Cambodia: 
The Coward’s War. New York, HRW.
73 Maslen. Anti-Personnel Mines under Humanitarian Law. p. 15.
74 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (1996) Anti-personnel Mines: Friend or Foe?
Geneva, ICRC.
75 Lavoyer & Maresca. “The Role of the ICRC.” p. 516. See also: Maresca & Maslen (Eds.). Banning of 
Anti-Personnel Landmines, pp. 127-652.
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new. Firstly, though largely rooted in rich countries, it was able to reach out on a more 
global scale than previous disarmament campaigns. Operating in countries affected by 
mines, constituent NGOs could gather field data to contradict misinformation of the 
militaries that had defused dissent in during the Cold War. Secondly, the ICBL was 
highly decentralized, allowing local campaigns to tailor messages to particular political 
contexts. Thirdly, using new communications technology they shared information and 
strategic planning rapidly and effectively. The campaign also effectively used the newly 
globalized news media to raise public consciousness, through dramatic images of mine 
victims and street theater (such as the ‘mountain of shoes’ representing amputees outside 
negotiation conferences).
Perhaps most importantly, the ICBL drew upon a much wider base than traditional 
arms control groups (limited largely to a specialized policy community), the ICRC or the 
peace movement (limited to the political left), which had sought regulations on mines and 
UXO during the Cold War. It was rooted more in the human rights and aid communities, 
which had broad appeal across the political center. Moreover, endorsements from 
celebrities, a tactic used effectively by NGOs during the Ethiopian famine, drew 
considerable attention. For example, Nelson Mandela and Princess Diana were crucial in 
raising public awareness.76 Diana endorsed the mine ban campaign at the height of her 
fame (to the consternation of the UK Tory government that was against a ban) and 
according to interviewees, her death just a day before mine ban negotiations began in 
Oslo made many diplomats feel pressure to pass the ban as a way to honor her life.77 
Even today the landmine issue is largely associated with Princess Diana in the UK and 
US general public.
The NGOs found sympathetic partners in a core group of middle powers -  states such 
as Canada, Austria, the Scandinavian countries, South Africa and Australia. As noted 
previously, middle powers found more space to assert themselves in the international 
arena following the Cold War. In international NGOs, middle powers sought 
humanitarian legitimacy and information gathering power, while the middle powers gave
76 Monin & Gallimore. D evil’s Gardens, pp. 13-16.
77 See also: Anonymous. (26 September 1997) “Fields of death: only days before her death, Princess Diana 
pleaded for an end to the use of land mines.” Current Events. <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/lGl-
19849595. html>.
95
NGOs state advocates to represent them in international conferences. The campaign to 
ban landmines probably became the most successful example of this alliance.78 Together, 
the ICBL, ICRC and middle powers were able to frame the landmines issues as a part of 
what some commentators were optimistically calling a “revolution of moral concern” -  a 
surge in public feeling that the end of the Cold War should also lead to a new and more
7Qnorm-based international political system. By reframing landmines as a humanitarian 
or human rights issue, rather than a security problem, they were able counter the 
arguments of military necessity and the monopoly of military personnel and arms control 
specialists over weapons issues.80 This use of moral discourse by a middle power-NGO 
coalition has been described as “a new model of diplomacy” rooted in negotiation of 
norms, rather than competition and collusion around narrow strategic interests.81 The 
following two graphs show how countries with smaller populations and lower military 
expenditures (i.e. middle and small powers) are much more likely to be supporters of the 
mine ban:
78 Leon V. Sigal. (2006) Negotiating Minefields: The Landmines Ban in American Politics. New York, 
Routledge. pp. 89-102, 155-174.
79 Monin & Gallimore. Devil’s Gardens, p. 6.
80 Kenneth R. Rutherford. (2000) “The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs 
in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines.” World Politics. 53(1).
81 Rosy Cave. (2006) “Disarmament as Humanitarian Action? Comparing Negotiations on Anti-Personnel 
Mines and Explosive Remnants of War.” Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From Perspective to 
Practice. Geneva, UNIDIR.
96
Figure 1: Probability of a State Being a Signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2007, by Size of 
Population and Military Expenditure.82
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Under pressure from the ICBL, the UN decided to convene a review conference of 
the CCW in 1995. In a striking example of how out of touch certain states were, all 
NGOs (except the ICRC) were excluded from the meetings leading up to the conference. 
It was also determined that decisions in preliminary meetings would be made by 
consensus, effectively giving veto power to the most conservative states. ' As a result, 
the CCW was unable to come to an agreement on whether to place further meaningful 
restrictions on mines, since all the great powers, including the US, were against doing so. 
While President Clinton had initially favored a ban, he became wary of a clash with the 
Pentagon, and US policy remained stuck in a realist Cold War framework. The US was 
willing to see some restrictions on mines, but not on technologically advanced ones 
(which they argued caused fewer civilian casualties) and with an exception for UN- 
mandated operations (i.e. the US-maintained minebelt in Korea).84
Rather than playing into a traditional great power-dominated arms control game,
85where decisions were always made by consensus and the lowest common denominator, 
the ICBL-middle power coalition decided to create a completely new game with a
82 State signatories list from: International Committee to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (15 August 2007) “States 
Parties.” <http://www.icbl.org/treaty/members>. Population statistics from: Population Reference Bureau. 
(2007) “World Population Data Sheet.”
<http://www.prb.org/Datafinder/Topic/Bar.aspx?sort=v&order=d&variable=l>. Military expenditure 
statistics from: Nation Master. (2005) “Military Expenditures Dollar Figure (Most Recent) By Country.” 
<http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil_exp_dol_fig-military-expenditures-dollar-figure>.
83 Prokosch. Technology of Killing, p. 185.
84 Sigal. Negotiating Minefields', Monin & Gallimore. D evil’s Gardens, pp. 20-27.
85 Myrdal. Game o f Disarmament.
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different set of incentives.86 In October 1996, Canada unilaterally announced that it 
would sponsor negotiations for a complete ban on antipersonnel landmines outside the 
CCW process, a move that was quickly backed by the ICBL and several other middle 
powers, including Norway. By demanding a maximalist position and daring other 
countries to join, Canada, the ICBL and the other middle powers created a game with 
strong incentives for countries to accept the treaty to avoid international stigmatization 
and domestic public opinion backlash. Unlike the CCW, the ‘Ottawa process’, as the 
Canadian-led negotiations came to be known, encouraged the involvement of NGOs and 
the ICRC at each stage of the process. The ICBL and ICRC were the main drafters of the 
treaty, were represented in the negotiating chamber and many countries (especially 
middle powers) incorporated mine ban campaign NGOs into their national delegations.
In December 1997, 122 countries signed the finalized Antipersonnel Mine Ban 
Treaty, also known as the Ottawa Convention, which came into force in March 1999. By 
August 2007 the treaty had been signed by 155 countries.87 In contrast to the vast 
majority of international treaties, which exclude non-state military actors, the campaign 
even persuaded several significant rebel movements, including the SPLA, PROSARIO, 
PKK and many Somali factions, to sign an equivalent document called the Geneva Call 
Deed of Commitment.88 The Ottawa Treaty banned the production, stockpiling, transfer, 
sale or use of antipersonnel landmines. It also required countries to destroy their existing 
stockpiles and clear mines from their territories, conduct mine awareness and assist mine 
survivors.89 It was the first disarmament treaty with provisions for those impacted and 
victimized by the weapon. Non-affected countries were called upon to provide assistance
86 Alexander Kmentt. (2008) “A Beacon of Light: The Mine Ban Treaty Since 1997.” Banning Landmines: 
Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security. Jody Williams, Stephen D. Goose & Mary 
Wareham (Eds.). Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 26-28.
87 ICBL. “States Parties.”
88 Geneva Call. (4 October 2001) “Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for Adherence to a Total Ban 
on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action.” <http://www.genevacall.org/about/testi- 
mission/gc-04oct01-deed.htm>; Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan. (2008) “Outside the Treaty Not the Norm: 
Nonstate Armed Groups and the Landmine Ban.” In: Williams, Goose & Wareham. Banning Landmines.
89 (2004) “1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.” Documents on the Laws of War. Adam Roberts & Richard 
Guelff (Eds.). 3rd Ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 645-666.
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for mine action programs, which many aid donor countries did. In the five years after the 
treaty was signed, donors gave some $1.3 billion to mine action.90
Though several great powers (like the US, Russia and China), regional powers (such 
as India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Israel) and a few ‘rogue’ states (such as Cuba, 
Burma and Iran) refused to sign, the treaty has succeeded in creating a broadly 
recognized norm against the use of mines. While there have been a few isolated 
incidents, the production, trade and use of antipersonnel mines has largely come to a halt. 
Even the US, which maintains stockpiles and has been developing new technologically 
sophisticated mines, has not used them in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq.
The ICBL and mine ban treaty have not been without critics, aside from those who 
feel mines are legitimate weapons of war. While the ICBL did include members from all 
over the world, its most dominant campaigners came from rich Northern countries, which 
some have argued confirms the continuing power of metropoles to determine the agenda. 
Moreover, the fact that the landmines issue gained more publicity than less glamorous but 
more deadly problems such as malaria or diarrhea shows how public opinion of what is 
an important ‘humanitarian’ issue is shaped by the nature and public image of a 
campaign. This has been accompanied by concerns that the ICBL vastly inflated the 
extent of landmine contamination.91 Others have criticized the narrow focus, leaving 
states and non-state actors with the ability to continue deploying anti-vehicle mines 
(including ones with anti-handling devices that in practice turn them into antipersonnel 
mines) and cluster munitions. It has also not stemmed the widespread use of Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IEDs) -  homemade mines -  by the insurgencies in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Thus some have argued that the treaty is merely part of a performative Western 
discourse ‘civilizing’ warfare, legitimizing it and making it an acceptable political 
practice by ‘humanizing’ it through accepting restrictions on marginal weapons like
92mines.
90 Stuart Maslen. (2004) Mine Action after Diana: Progress in the Struggle against Landmines. London, 
Pluto Press, p. 7.
91 Ibid. pp. 24-29.
92 Andrew Latham. (October 2000) “Global Cultural Change and the Transnational Campaign to Ban 
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Nevertheless, the mine ban treaty was a remarkable achievement. In the space of five 
years, a coalition of NGOs and middle powers was able to achieve a much tighter and 
effective treaty than the international conferences that had met since 1974. It also 
operated outside of the traditional security structures of international politics. The treaty 
was not negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament, the Security Council or the CCW 
-  and it was led by actors that until 1989 had been rather marginal. Moreover, 
implementation of the treaty has been closely monitored not by an international public 
organization, but by the ICBL itself, in its annual Landmine Monitor publications93 that 
are widely accepted by states parties as the definitive source of information on 
compliance. Together, these characteristics represented a truly new way of dealing with 
international security issues. The ICBL-middle power coalition had taken a security 
problem out of the hands of the great powers, the military and, to a certain extent, even 
states. This would have been unimaginable in the aftermath of WWII and practically 
impossible during the Cold War. In recognition of their contribution to international 
peace and security, the ICBL and its director Jody Williams were jointly awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 1997.
iv. Summary
The 1990s saw an ‘epidemic’ of mine contamination in developing countries tom 
apart by proxy wars and the New Wars. Fortuitously, this coincided with the end of the 
Cold War and the opening of space for ‘norm entrepreneurs’, such as international NGOs 
and middle powers, to link up and raise their concerns in the international arena. As a 
result, there was a rapid expansion of NGO demining programs and the middle power- 
NGO coalition succeeded in achieving an Antipersonnel Landmine Ban Treaty in 1997. 
However, a variety of ‘realist’ states have been unwilling to sign the treaty, which was 
also unable to stem the use of other similar weapons such as cluster munitions and IEDs.
93 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (2007) Landmine Monitor, <http://www.icbl.org/lm>.
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d. Post-Modern Warfare and the War on Terror
i. Mines and Remnants of War
Developing concurrently with the New Wars, and sometimes interacting with them,
was so-called ‘Post-Modern Warfare,’94 where great or regional powers intervened in 
regional conflicts (e.g. the Falklands/Malvinas War, Gulf War, NATO intervention in 
Bosnia and Kosovo; the British intervention in Sierra Leone; the US in Afghanistan and 
Iraq; Russia’s role in Chechnya and Georgia; and Israel’s recent war with Hezbollah in 
Lebanon). Their interventions were characterized by enormous asymmetries between 
local factions and the intervening power. The intervening great power had access to the 
massive use of firepower and airpower; super-sophisticated technology in guidance 
systems, communications and processing intelligence; and sensational, but well- 
managed, mass media footage. It was also characterized by close partnerships between 
government and private industry, which was increasingly involved in actual security 
operations.95 While local factions often engaged in widespread mining (such as Iraqi 
mining of Kuwait or Serb-laid minefields in Kosovo) or the use of IEDs, the employment 
of staggering amounts of air-dropped or artillery munitions by the intervening great 
power left considerable UXO contamination, especially of cluster bomblets (such as in 
Chechnya,96 Kosovo,97 Afghanistan,98 Iraq,99 Lebanon100 and Georgia101).
94 Steven Metz. (April 2000) Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post- 
Modern Warfare. Carlisle, Penn., Strategic Studies Institute. 
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For instance, the US fired some 23 million air-dropped and rocket dispersed 
submunitions in the first Gulf War.102 As a result, some 30,000 tons of unexploded
ordnance and millions of mines laid by Saddam’s forces contaminated Kuwait at the end
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of the war. In the first six months of its recent Iraq adventure, the US and its allies 
unleashed some 2.2 million submunitions on Iraq.104 Human Rights Watch has 
documented the extensive harm to civilians caused by these cluster bomblets.105 For their 
part, the current Iraqi insurgency has killed over 1,500 US soldiers with IEDs (some of 
which are basically homemade mines).106
ii. Clearance and Mitigation
While the 1990s saw the rise of NGO mine and UXO clearance, they also saw the
concurrent development of demining programs run by commercial companies contracted 
either to governments or other companies.107 This model of clearance began in the late 
1980s and early 1990s with RONCO’s contract to USAID in Afghanistan and the South 
African mine warfare research company MECHEM winning contracts in Angola and 
Mozambique.108 The development of this model, which like NGO demining is an advent 
of the post-Cold War world, is similarly linked to the rise of privatizing and contracting 
out public services since the 1980s. It was also helped by the supply of demobilized 
soldiers from First World and South African armies that brought expertise in explosives, 
mine warfare and counter-mining techniques into the private sector.109 The commercial 
model came into its own in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, when Kuwait let massive 
contracts worth $800 million to a variety of companies, notably Royal Ordnance, CMS 
and Sofremi, most of which were actually weapons developers and had produced both
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105 Ibid. pp. 104-110.
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mines and cluster munitions. It was a poorly run program, with 284 demining accident 
casualties.110
While commercial demining has occurred in many mine-affected countries, it is 
particularly prevalent in places where the US has been involved in the conflict. The 
massive boom in the private military industry provoked by the Global War on Terror has 
strengthened the commercial demining sector, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, where 
the US has let contracts worth millions of dollars for demining, UXO clearance and 
destruction of abandoned caches. This has contributed to the increasingly blurred lines 
between the commercial security and demining industries, with the involvement of 
companies like ArmorGroup and DynCorp spanning both sectors. While commercial 
demining companies have been employed to do a wide range of tasks, they have been 
much more likely than NGOs to take contracts from militaries and commercial clients. 
One major demining company, MECHEM, is owned by an arms manufacturer, DENEL, 
that until recently continued to produce cluster munitions, even while MECHEM cleared 
them in the field.111
The UN has also moved toward private contracting of demining, especially since its 
operations in Kosovo. This is partly due to responsibility for demining programs shifting 
from OCHA and UNDP, rooted in the humanitarian and development communities, to 
UNMAS, that is in the more militaristic Department for Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO). Whereas OCHA and UNDP had set up local NGOs to do demining in 
Afghanistan and Mozambique respectively, UNMAS operations have been managed by 
the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which prefers a commercial tendering 
model of service provision.
iii. Advocacy and Policy
While the Mine Ban Treaty has largely stemmed the use of antipersonnel landmines,
the ‘Post-Modern Wars’ have demonstrated its limits. Indeed the War on Terror seems to 
represent the possibility of a return to great power strategic politics and diminishing 
space for norm entrepreneurs on the international stage. Insurgents in Iraq and
110 Donovan. “Making a Killing.” pp. 14-15; International Committee to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (1999) 
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Afghanistan have shown that despite the end of trade in mass-produced mines, they have 
been able to improvise sophisticated IEDs. Moreover, advocacy aimed at persuading the 
great and regional powers to join the Ottawa process has met little success. While the US 
has not used mines, the Bush Administration has been less receptive to landmine 
campaigners than its predecessor and has developed several new landmine systems. In 
February 2004 it issued a statement declaring that “Landmines still have a valid and 
essential role protecting United States forces in military operations.”112 Similarly, in 
December 2006 Pakistan threatened to lay mines along the Afghan border.113 The great 
and regional powers have continued to block or stall efforts to fill the loopholes in the 
CCW and the Ottawa Convention. Despite repeated efforts, there has been no success in 
creating a legal instrument to regulate the use of anti-vehicle mines. Moreover, the CCW 
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, added in 2003, aimed to “minimize the risks 
and effects of explosive remnants of war” other than mines, but was full of escape clauses 
like “as far as practicable”, “subject to these parties’ legitimate security interests” and 
“where feasible.” 114
However, the middle power-NGO partnership has pushed back with a new campaign 
to ban cluster munitions -  the Cluster Munitions Coalition -  modeled explicitly on the 
ICBL. While some people who had been involved in the anti-cluster bombs campaigns in 
the 1970s continued to write about the problem in the 1990s (NATO’s use of 
submunitions in Kosovo piqued some interest) they tended to take a back seat to the mine 
ban campaigners. The success of the mine ban allowed those who had been involved in 
the ICBL to turn their attention to the continued use of cluster bombs in Chechnya, 
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Cluster bomb campaigners were suddenly thrust into the public eye following the 
2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, when Israeli forces fired thousands of cluster rockets at 
Lebanon, leaving behind some 1 million unexploded bomblets scattered largely in
112 US Department of State. (27 February 2004) “New United States Policy on Landmines: Reducing 
Humanitarian Risk and Saving Lives of United States Soldiers.”
<http:// www. state .go v/t/pm/rls/f s/30044.htm> .
113 BBC. (26 December 2006) “Pakistan plans border minefield.” 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/6210057.stm>.
114 (28 November 2003) “Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 Convention).” 
<http://www.mineaction.org/docs/1850_.asp>. Article 4. For further details see: Cave. “Disarmament as 
Humanitarian Action?”
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civilian areas.115 According to a UN mine action official in Lebanon, “The scope was 
extensive and unprecedented in any modem use of these types of cluster weapons” -  
some 26 percent of arable land in Southern Lebanon was contaminated.116 Such a flagrant 
disregard for the laws of war dramatically demonstrated the indiscriminate effects these 
weapons could have on noncombatants, even long after the war had finished. This put 
cluster bombs back on the agenda of world leaders and campaigners saw the opportunity 
to push for a ban.
While the middle powers tried to push for an amendment to the CCW regulating or 
banning cluster munitions, they met considerable resistance.117 Therefore, campaigners 
began calling for a maximalist voluntary treaty similar to the Ottawa Convention. Again, 
they found common cause with middle powers. In November 2006 the Norwegian 
government declared that it would host negotiations for a cluster bomb ban outside the 
CCW.118 At the time of writing, the draft treaty text of the ‘Oslo process’, as it has come 
to be called, had be agreed by over 100 countries in Dublin.119 Displaying a similar 
attitude shown to the mine ban treaty, the great powers such as the US, Russia and China 
and regional powers such as Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan have rebuffed the Oslo 
process, arguing that restrictions on cluster bombs should be dealt with in the CCW, 
where they have effective veto power,120 if at all. As with the mine ban convention, the 
Cluster Munition Convention is more likely to be supported by smaller states with lower 
military expenditure -  ie. small and middle powers:
115 Landmine Action. Foreseeable Harm. p. 3; Matthew Bolton. (9 September 2006) “Shooting ends, but 
bombs' danger lingers for decades.” The Examiner (Independence, Missouri, USA). 
<http://examiner.net/stories/090906/mat_090906020.shtml>; Reuters. (26 September 2006) “UN: It will 
take over a year to clear Lebanon of cluster bombs.” Haaretz. 
<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/767528.html>.
116 Scott Peterson. (7 February 2007) “Cluster bombs: a war's perilous aftermath.” The Christian Science 
Monitor, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0207/p01 sOl-wome.html>.
117 Cluster Munitions Coalition. (March 2006) “Report on CCW March 2006.” 
<http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/files/Report%20on%20CCW%20March%202006.doc>.
118 Jonas Gahr St0re. (20 November 2006) “Norway takes the initiative for a ban on cluster munitions.” 
<http://www.norway.org/policy/news/ban+cluster+munitions.htm>.
119 Cluster Munition Coalition. (30 May 2008) “Over 100 countries adopt groundbreaking treaty to ban 
cluster bombs.” <http://www.stopclustermunitions.Org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/l 00-final- 
dublin.pdf>.
120 Matthew Bolton. (23 June 2007) “Important step forward not enough for United States.” The Examiner 
(Independence, Missouri, USA), <http://examiner.net/stories/062307/new_179584763.shtml>.
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Figure 2: Probability of a State Being a Signatory to the Cluster Munition Convention in 2008, by
Size of Population and Military Expenditure. 121
Less than 1 1 to 10 Million
Million
Over 10010 to 50 50 to 100 
Million
Population  2007
1 to 25 26 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 150 151 to 168
Military Expenditure Rank 2005 (1 is top  spender)
iv. Summary
The evolution of ‘Post-Modern Warfare,’ which pits a network of great powers and 
private companies against asymmetric opponents, is responsible for ongoing 
contamination by cluster munitions. Moreover, insurgents, cut off from a supply of 
mass-produced mines, are increasingly learning to produce improvised ones. The great 
powers, especially the US, are also using private security companies to manage the mine 
and UXO contamination that poses a threat to their interests, thus spurring the growth of 
the commercial demining sector. However, the middle power-NGO coalition is resisting 
the War on Terror’s rebirth of militarism by pushing for a cluster munitions ban modeled 
on the Mine Ban Treaty.
e. Two Emerging Political Complexes of Mine Action
Toward the end of the first decade of the 21st Century, it appeared that the statist 
model of mine action seen at the end of WWII was a thing of the past. Very few 
demining programs were operated wholly by states marshaling resources from taxation in 
their own territory. Even a superpower like the US had lost the ability to conduct mine 
clearance itself. Showing just how hollowed-out state security organs have become, 
when US Army occupied mine and UXO contaminated bases in Afghanistan in 2001 it 
found it no longer had the expertise to conduct demining itself. Rather, it had to rely on
121 States parties list from: Cluster Munition Coalition. (30 May 2008) “ 107 Countries on Board.” 
<http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/the-solution/the-treaty/?id=84>. Population statistics from: 
Population Reference Bureau. “World Population Data Sheet.” Military expenditure statistics from: Nation 
Master. “Military Expenditures.”
106
RONCO, a private contractor, to make the land safe for their troops.122 This demonstrates 
a major fragmentation of the state’s monopoly on managing violent threats, even to its 
own soldiers. Mine action, reflecting trends toward multi-level and multi-actor models of 
governance, is now conducted with funding from a wide range of international donors 
and implemented by partnerships between public and private for-profit and non-profit 
actors. Mine action has become a form of networked governance, or in the words of 
Mark Duffield, an ‘Emerging Political Complex.’123
However, as has been described above, these complexes have been organized in a 
variety of different ways, incorporating different actors with different sets of motivations. 
There are obviously infinite ways these networks can be organized, but abstracting out 
from the preceding historical description, one can discern the two competing versions of 
the political complexes described in Chapter 1.
The first complex is that of a great or regional power that reserves the right to create a 
secure enclave for itself by creating rings of minefields and cluster munitions strikes 
around its borderlands and strategic nodes. For instance one can see similarities between 
the wall Israel has built to separate itself from the West Bank and its use of cluster 
munitions to create, in effect, a wall of depopulated territory in southern Lebanon, 
discouraging Hezbollah infiltration.124 This divides the world into safe ‘green zones’ that 
are mine and UXO free and dangerous ‘red zones’ where the use of mines and cluster 
munitions is acceptable. The danger of explosive remnants of war in the red zones is 
managed through commercial contractors, who focus on clearing areas of strategic 
significance so that they can be turned into new green zones or beachheads to control the 
red zones (such as new US bases). This complex is made of actors that are primarily 
motivated by state strategic interest or commercial profit. As such it mirrors the 
‘Strategic-Commercial Complex’ outlined in Chapter 1.
The second complex of actors is typified by the middle power-NGO coalition that has 
pushed for the bans on mine and cluster munitions. They argue that strategic ‘realist’
122 John L. Wilkinson. (December 2002) “Demining During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.” 
Journal of Mine Action. 6(3). <http://maic.jmu.edU/JOURNAL/6.3/notes/wilkinson/wilkinson.htm>.
123 Mark Duffield. (1999) “Globalization and War Economies: Promoting Order or the Return of History?” 
Fletcher Forum on World Affairs. 23(2). p. 31.
124 Reportage by Dan Rather has found evidence suggesting there was a deliberate attempt by Israel “to 
create de facto minefields” between Israel and Lebanon. Dan Rather. (2008) “Bombs Left Behind.” Dan 
Rather Reports, <http://www.hd.net/drr306.html>.
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models of international politics result in a proliferation of minefields and cluster munition 
strikes, actually reducing international security. Focusing more on the security of human 
populations, especially civilians, rather than the security of states (or enclaves) they see 
the abolition and clearance of all mines and UXO as the way to make the world a safer 
place. The distribution of clearance is also guided by this principle, with international 
NGOs and humanitarian UN agencies allocating their demining services according to 
need, rather than strategic interest or ability to pay. In short, the middle power-NGO 
coalition is primarily shaped by a humanitarian vision, in which the whole of the 
collective is made into a unified green zone, or at least a ‘greener zone.’ As such it 
mirrors the ‘Human Security-Civil Society Complex’ discussed in the Chapter 1.
f. Conclusion
The way that mines and other explosive remnants of war have been used and, in turn, 
managed through a governance regime of policy, mitigation and clearance, has been 
shaped throughout history by the dominant political constellations of the age. In the 
aftermath of WWII, demining was conducted in a manner very similar to the way the war 
itself was fought -  through mass mobilization of the military. Likewise, the developing 
international law of war placed few restrictions on states’ abilities to deploy mines to 
guard their national security. During the Cold War, strategic bipolar politics exported 
insecurity, including remnants of war, out to the peripheries. Therefore, the superpowers 
had little motivation to engage in mine and UXO clearance, except in the occasional 
circumstances when it benefited them strategically. Likewise, the superpowers were loath 
to place any significant restrictions on their arsenals and ability to wage war. That said, 
this period also saw the beginnings of popular social movements seeking to transform the 
militarism of the era. Rising out of the peace movement, one sees the beginnings of 
attempts to restrict the use of mines and cluster munitions and small NGO programs to 
mitigate and neutralize the threat to civilians.
The end of the Cold War suddenly opened up space for normative actors, such as 
middle powers and international NGOs, to link up and push for a universalistic agenda of 
peace, human rights and humanitarianism. Through mass mobilization and tactics 
employing new media and communications technology, they were able to create a new 
political constituency dedicated to the abolition of mines and cluster munitions and raise
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millions of dollars to clear them, raise awareness and assist survivors. At the same time, 
however, great and regional powers were less receptive to this agenda. In the massive 
asymmetries of post-modern warfare, they felt free to use cluster munitions with few 
restrictions. The resurgence of militarism with the advent of the Global War on Terror 
led to the explosive growth of the private security industry that increasingly consolidated 
with the commercial demining sector. Thus there appeared to be two ‘Emerging Political 
Complexes’ of mine action: the Human Security-Civil Society Complex -  a coalition of 
middle powers, UN humanitarian agencies and international NGOs -  and the Strategic 
Commercial Complex, a network of a great power, military organizations (including 
sometimes the UN DPKO) and commercial companies.
The next chapter looks at the role of two major mine action donor countries, the US 
and Norway, as nodes in these two differing types of networks.
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CHAPTER 4
Donor Policy Making: 
The US and Norway
“The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program seeks to 
relieve human suffering caused hy landmines and unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) while promoting U.S. foreign policy interests. ”
-  US Department of State1
“It is in N orway’s interest to ... improve the safety 
o f people who are ... exposed to mines and other explosives.... 
It is in N orway’s interest to defend an international system  
based on the rule o f law and respect fo r  human rights. ” 
-  Jonas Gahr Stpre, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs.2
In his book Impotent Superpower—Potent Small State, Jan Egeland argued that while Norway and the US shared strong moralistic foreign policy motivations, a great power like the US is a “more ineffective and inefficient human rights actor 
than the small state.”3 This was because, as a superpower, US foreign policy was 
constricted by numerous strategic and commercial interests that hijacked its ability to 
shape policies according to humanistic ideals. By contrast, a small state like Norway had 
fewer transnational interests and more space to pursue a normative foreign policy.
1 US Department of State, (n.d.) “Humanitarian Demining Program (HDP).” 
<http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/65535.htm>.
2 Jonas Gahr St0re. (17 September 2007) “Norway’s commitment to mine action and human security.” 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/About-the-Ministry/Minister-of-Foreign-Affairs-Jonas-Gahr- 
S/Speeches-and-articles/2007/mineaction.html?id=481024>.
3 Jan Egeland. (1988) Impotent Superpower—Potent Small State: Potentials and Limitations of Human 
Rights Objectives in the Foreign Polices of the United States and Norway. Oslo, Norwegian University 
Press, p. 185. Another interesting comparative study of Norway and the US is: Wayne S. Cole. (1989) 
Norway and the United States, 1905-1955: Two Democracies in Peace and War. Ames, Iowa State 
University Press.
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Indeed, such a policy might be the only way for a small state to be noticed on the global 
scene and build up international good will. This chapter will borrow Egeland’s 
theoretical framework, applying it to a comparison of US and Norwegian mine action, 
rather than human rights, policy. As noted previously, these countries were selected for 
study because they are among the top bilateral mine action donors.
Table 1: Top Mine Action Donors in 2006.4
1 United States $94.5





7 United Arab Emirates $19.9













18 United States 0.00070
This chapter will argue that Norway’s mine action policy, driven largely by an 
idealist foreign policy tradition and rooted in close partnerships between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and NGOs, approximates the ideal type of a Human Security-Civil 
Society complex. This is expressed through three key characteristics:
a. Championing tight regulation of mines, cluster munitions and other 
remnants of war,
b. Support to demining programs prioritizing humanitarian concerns,
c. Channeling significant amounts of assistance through international NGOs.
In contrast, it will show that US mine action policy, shaped by significant strategic
and commercial foreign policy interests that blunt its humanitarian elements, usually 
approximates a Strategic-Commercial Complex, with the following three characteristics:
a. Opposition to tight regulation of mines, cluster munitions and other 
remnants of war,
4 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (2007) “Mine Action Funding.” Landmine Monitor 
2007. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/es/mine_action_funding.html>.
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b. Support to demining programs shaped by strategic and commercial interests,
c. Channeling significant amounts of assistance through commercial 
companies and military units.
However, it will show that when the US has fewer strategic interests at stake, it is 
able to act in a more Human Security-Civil Society mode.
The chapter will first outline Egeland’s theory in more detail and try to update it for a 
‘post-statist’ era. Following this, it will compare US and Norwegian stances on 
international regimes controlling landmines and cluster munitions. The chapter will then 
focus on assistance given to mine action programs, first tracing the genesis of each 
country’s assistance to demining and then reviewing their current funding structures and 
primary implementing agencies.
a. Adapting Egeiand for a Post-Statist Age
While this chapter is rooted in Egeland’s comparison of the US and Norway, it also 
recognizes that, written in 1988, his theory needs to be updated to take into account 
trends of privatization and contracting in both US and Norwegian foreign policy. 
Therefore, this section will outline Egeland’s theory in detail and update it for a ‘post­
statist’ age.
i. Egeland’s Original Framework
Egeland believed the US was less able to form coherent and effective human rights
policies partly because the size of its polity meant more complex decisionmaking 
processes, diverse internal interests and more inter-bureaucratic battles, leading to less 
coherent polices. More importantly, he argued that a superpower has considerable 
transnational military and commercial interests that tend to blunt the effectiveness of 
human rights promotion. Since the military and capital are generally self-interested rather 
than idealistic, Egeland believed they were more likely to lobby for “‘constructive 
cooperation’ with dictators and junta generals” than transformative human rights policies 
that risked disrupting trade or military collaboration.5
For instance, while the US State Department is supposedly the focal point of US 
foreign policy, one often finds the US military’s regional Commanders are more
5 Egeland. Impotent Superpower, p. 5.
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powerful than country ambassadors.6 Moreover, the US has become the world’s leading 
arms supplier7 and, as one former US Commerce Department official argued, its foreign 
policy “has reflected an obsession with open markets for American firms.”8 The strength 
of military and commercial interests has also shaped US foreign aid, with an estimated 
70-80% of it “tied to the purchase of US goods and services.”9 Moreover, a review of US 
foreign aid argued it was often “motivated more by ... security concerns than by the 
objective needs” of recipients.10 Indeed, the ongoing War on Terror has seen a further 
securitization of assistance, as “fighting terrorism became the leading concern of 
American foreign aid.”11
In contrast, Egeland believed the small state’s minimal economic and military power 
meant it has fewer national interests to defend. As a result, a smaller nation has more
19space to conduct its foreign policy according to “altruistic norms and principles.” For 
instance, according to one historian, “the belief in...a foreign policy infused by high 
ethical standards has been a trademark of Norwegian aid policies.”13 As the steward of 
the Nobel Peace Prize, Norway has long seen itself as a ‘bridge builder’ or ‘honest 
broker’ in defusing international conflict and promoting peace.14 It also had a long history 
of sending missionaries to the developing world15 -  a spirit which seems continue within
6 Chalmers Johnson. (2004) The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic. 
New York, Metropolitan Books, pp. 124, 132-134; Dana Priest. (2004) The Mission: Waging War and 
Keeping Peace with America’s Military. New York, W.W. Norton and Company, p. 75.
7 Rachel Stohl. (January/February 2008) “Questionable Reward: Arms Sales and the War on Terrorism.” 
Arms Control Today, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_01-02/stohl.asp>.
8 Jeffrey E. Garten. (May/June 1997) “Business and Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs. 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19970501faessay3772/jeffrey-e-garten/business-and-foreign-policy.html>.
9 Carol Lancaster. (2007) Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. Chicago, Chicago 
University Press, p. 102.
10 Vernon W. Ruttan. (1996) United States Development Assistance Policy: The Domestic Politics of 
Foreign Economic Aid. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, p. xviii.
11 Curt Tamoff & Larry Nowels. (15 April 2004) “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. 
Programs and Policy.” CRS Report for Congress. Washington DC, Congressional Research Service. 
<http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/trade/files/98-916.pdf>. p. 2.
12 Egeland. Impotent Superpower, pp. 13-19.
13 Helge Pharo. (2003) “Altruism, Security and the Impact of Oil: Norway’s Foreign Economic Assistance 
Policy, 1958-1971.” Contemporary European History. 12(4). p. 546.
14 Ann Kelleher & James Larry Taulbee. (October 2006) “Bridging the Gap: Building Peace Norwegian 
Style.” Peace & Change. 31(4); John Stephen Moolakkattu. (2005) “Peace Facilitation by Small States: 
Norway in Sri Lanka.” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association. 
40(4).
15 Bergen Museum, (n.d.) “Norwegian Missionaries Practice and Representation in the Formation
of ‘S elf and ‘Other’, 1870-2005.” <http://bergenmuseum.uib.no/nettutstillinger/mission/index.htm>.
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the Norwegian aid community, much of which has close links to the Lutheran church.16 
Additionally, Norway has had a strong internationalist labor movement and an internal 
consensus that the welfare of the poor and needy is seen as the responsibility of society as 
a whole.17 Therefore, notions of Third Worldist solidarity and responsibility to share 
Norway’s enormous oil wealth with the ‘poor and oppressed’ have been very popular. 
This has encouraged a ‘race to the top’ among Norwegian political parties, vying with 
each other to produce the largest aid budgets.18 Therefore, Norway is one of only five 
countries that have surpassed the OECD aid target of 0.7% of GDP.19
Egeland did not argue that Norway had a more human rights-driven foreign policy 
because it was less self-interested than the US. He said that if key interests clash with 
norms, then a “small state is normally not any more willing than the big state to sacrifice 
national interests for ideals.”20 For instance, during the 1970s and 1980s, shipping 
interests delayed and hampered Norwegian sanctions against South Africa even while 
Norway was funding the ANC.21 Rather, Egeland said that in comparison with a 
superpower, these key ‘red-line’ interests were relatively few. Moreover, for a small 
state, becoming known as a champion of norms and ideals may be the only method by
99which it can gain prominence on the international scene. Joseph Nye has contended 
that because Norway lacks the resources for ‘hard’ economic and military power, it has 
built up sources of ‘soft power,’ using the symbolic power of its ideals and normative 
commitments to achieve its national interests.23 Therefore, Norway has been an 
enthusiastic champion of multilateralism, disarmament, international law and collective 
security. Unable to protect themselves in the event of an invasion by a great power, it is
16 Morten B0as. (2002) “Public attitudes to aid in Norway and Japan.” University of Oslo Centre for 
Development and the Environment Working Paper 2002/03. 
<http://www.sum.uio.no/publications/pdf_fulltekst/wp2002_03_boas.pdf>. p. 5.
17 Olav Riste. (2001) Norway’s Foreign Relations - A History. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, p. 257.
18 Pharo. “Altruism, Security and the Impact of Oil.” p. 542.
19 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2008) Development Co-Operation 
Report 2007. Paris, OECD. p. 137.
20 Egeland. Impotent Superpower, p. 14.
21 Egeland. Impotent Superpower, pp. 87-104; Tore Linne Eriksen & Anita Kristensen Kroken. (2000) 
‘“Fuelling the Apartheid War Machine’: A Case Study of Shipowners, Sanctions and Solidarity 
Movements.” Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa. Tore Linne Eriksen (Ed.). Stockholm, 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. pp. 193-210.
22 Riste. Norway’s Foreign Relations, p. 10.
23 Joseph S. Nye. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York, Pub lie Affairs, 
pp. 9-10, 89, 112. See also: Mark Leonard. (September-October 2002) “Diplomacy by Other Means.” 
Foreign Policy. 132. p. 53.
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in Norway’s strategic interest to tie great powers down to stable and predictable norms 
and to make sure its voice is heard on the international scene. The Norwegian 
Ambassador to Sarajevo put it this way: “small countries need to have some kind of
24international order...that’s not altruism, it’s a vital foreign policy interest.”
As a result, Egeland argues that in terms of promoting human rights, Norway may 
actually be more powerful than a superpower because it is freer to act according to 
humanistic ideals rather than the constraints of expediency. Moreover, becoming known 
as an idealistic rather than self-interested actor may actually assist a small state’s 
survival. Egeland’s research heavily influenced his practice as a major political advisor 
in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry for much of the 1990s and has been behind part of 
Norway’s drive to brand itself, somewhat hyperbolically, as a “humanitarian 
superpower.”25
ii. The Impact of Privatization
While already a trend when Egeland wrote his book, the past two decades have seen
an increasing tendency of both the US and Norway to privatize the implementation of 
significant elements of their foreign policies. However, they have done so in different 
ways.
The US has tended to rely more on the for-profit sector. The US military now relies 
on an extensive network of private contractors providing everything from laundry and 
food services to guard duty, intelligence gathering and interrogation. Likewise, State 
Department and USAID foreign assistance initiatives are often carried out by consulting 
companies, foundations and international NGOs.26 Therefore US foreign and aid policy is 
now conducted by a complex network of both civilian and military actors, which are 
public, commercial and non-profit. However, with a strong emphasis on competitive 
tendering, the US generally has a ‘principal-agent’ relationship with its implementers. 
This means implementing agencies have little say in the overall policy direction and 
‘speaking out’ may actually harm their chances of maintaining funding. Indeed, USAID
24 Jan Braatha. (8 March 2007) Personal interview with author in Sarajevo.
25 Brand Management Group. (18 December 2003) “Norway’s Public Diplomacy: a Strategy.” 
chttp ://w ww .brandmanagement.no/merkevareutvikling/hoyre/dbaFile 12106.html>.
26 Ruben Berrios. (2000) Contracting for Development: The Role of For-Profit Contractors in U.S. Foreign 
Development Assistance. Westport, Connecticut, Praeger Publishers.
115
has ‘commercialized’ its relationship with NGOs, through competition and tendering in 
grant allocation. This ‘marketization’ of NGO aid functions to reduce NGOs’ autonomy 
and independence. This process has been magnified by the growing ‘securitization of aid’ 
during the ‘War on Terror.’27 Many major US NGOs have felt uncomfortable being seen 
by the US government as “a force multiplier” and “an important part of our combat
9Rteam ....” However, they are dependent on US government funds and took note when 
USAID administrator Andrew Natsios threatened to rip up their contracts if they failed to
29understand that they are “an arm of the U.S. government” in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Therefore, the practice of contracting out has simultaneously multiplied the number of 
vested interests involved in shaping US foreign policy, while muffling the voices that 
might call for action contrary to narrow strategic interests. One might argue that 
privatization has actually exaggerated the tendencies in US policymaking that Egeland 
highlighted in 1988.
In contrast, Norway has tended to form close partnerships with a small group of 
trusted NGOs -  more akin to a ‘principal-steward’ relationship. Indeed, Norway channels 
more aid through NGOs than any other OECD country.30 Often called the ‘Norwegian 
Model’ of foreign policy31 or ‘Track 1 Vi diplomacy’32 in the literature, these NGOs act 
as the eyes and ears of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), gathering information 
about local conditions, and implementing programs designed with guidance from the 
MFA. In return, the MFA provides long-term grant funding (with little interference in 
day-to-day management) diplomatic cover and champions their causes in international 
fora. There is also a great deal of staff rotation between the NGO community, the MFA 
and the UN, contributing to ideological continuity.33
27 Mark Duffield. (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and 
Security. London, Zed Books, pp. 75-107.
28 Colin Powell. (26 October 2001) “Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of 
Nongovernmental Organizations.” <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_l l/powell_brief31.htm>.
29 Traci Hukill. (30 June 2003) “U.S.: AID Chief Outlines Change In Strategy Since 2001 Terrorist 
Attacks.” UN Wire. <http://comunica.org/pipermail/cr-afghan_comunica.org/2003-June/000043.html>.
30 NORAD. (September 2005) “Civil society as a channel for Norwegian development assistance.”
<http:// w w w .norad .no/default, asp ? V_ITEM_ID=3371 >.
31 0yvind 0sterud. (September 2005) “Introduction: The Peculiarities of Norway.” West European Politics. 
28(4). p. 714; Riste. Norway’s Foreign Relations, p. 264.
32 Kelleher & Taulbee. “Bridging the Gap.”
33 Kelleher & Taulbee. “Bridging the Gap.” Moolakkattu. “Peace Facilitation by Small States.” pp. 387- 
388.
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While some might argue that the tightly integrated partnership between the MFA and 
NGOs is a hegemonic one, designed to dominate and control civil society, this is not 
entirely true. On multiple occasions the Norwegian NGOs have acted as the MFA’s 
‘conscience’ and set the humanitarian and development agenda. Because of the shared 
ideological commitments and personal connections spanning both the MFA and NGOs, 
NGOs seem more able in Norway than the US to lobby successfully for policy changes. 
This was illustrated by Norway’s rapid changes in policy on both the landmine and 
cluster munitions bans (outlined below). As a result, while the reliance on NGOs has 
added another layer to Norwegian foreign policy, and possibly a strong vested interest, 
the ideological cohesion between the MFA and the NGOs contributes to a continuing 
commitment to cosmopolitan and humanitarian norms.
iii. Summary
In US foreign policy, idealist ventures are rarely sanctioned unless they can be 
justified in terms of ‘harder’ strategic and commercial interests or are used for rhetorical 
legitimation. While Norway also has ‘red lines’ of national interest which constrain its 
idealism, its status as a smaller power means it has fewer of these red lines to protect. 
Thus it has more space to express internal values of cosmopolitanism and 
humanitarianism in its foreign policy. One of these spaces is its foreign aid.
These differing basic institutional structures of foreign policies have influenced the 
way the two countries have ‘privatized’ their foreign policies. The US has a growing 
tendency to ‘marketize’ and ‘securitize’ its foreign assistance according to a ‘principal - 
agent’ model. In contrast, Norwegian foreign policy is implemented in partnership with a 
dense network of NGOs, academic institutions and thinktanks, in keeping with a 
‘principal-steward’ model.
b. Global Policy on Remnants of War
The general trends in US and Norwegian foreign policy outlined by Jan Egeland are 
reflected in their policies on international regimes controlling, managing and eliminating 
remnants of war. Focusing in particular on measures to control mines and cluster 
munitions, the following will examine how the US and Norwegian positions have 
evolved from domestic moratoria to three key international treaty processes -  the
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Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the Antipersonnel Mine Ban 
Treaty and the Oslo Process on Cluster Munitions. It will show how in both countries, 
the military was resistant to greater control over mines and cluster munitions. However, 
in Norway, the power of the military relative to civil society was much less than the US. 
Its objections were thus overruled. In contrast, the US military and security interests 
have been much more able to resist the influence of the pro-mine ban lobbies arrayed 
against them.
i. Background on Production and Use of Mines and Cluster Munitions
During WWII the US laid some 17 million mines,34 but by the Vietnam War, it was
dissatisfied with the slow process of manual mine-laying that left sappers exposed to 
enemy fire. Therefore, from the 1960s, the US developed systems to scatter mines 
remotely, by firing them as submunitions from artillery or air-dropped bombs. 
However, this had unintended consequences in the Vietnam War, when American 
soldiers often ended up “retreating through areas that their own pilots had previously 
saturated with mines.”35 Therefore, since the 1980s, the US has increasingly emphasized 
the development of self-destructing and self-neutralizing ‘smart mines’, intended to 
become inert after a given period of time.
US mines have been manufactured for both the Department of Defense and export by 
private companies, most notably Alliant Techsystems, a spin-off of Honeywell. While the 
US claims little responsibility for the landmine crisis,36 investigations by human rights 
groups have shown that the US was a major exporter.37 Moreover, by 1999, the US had 
stockpiles of around 12 million antipersonnel landmines.38 The US has also been a major 
developer and user of cluster munitions. As described in the previous chapter, the US 
dropped some 256 million bomblets on Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam during the 
Indochinese Wars and has continued to use them in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.
34 The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights. (1993) Landmines: A Deadly 
Legacy. New York, Human Rights Watch, p. 17.
35 Ibid. p. 28-29.
36 Ibid. p. 61. Similar statements continue to be made by the State Department.
37 Ibid. pp. 63-77.
38 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (1999) “United States of America.” Landmine 
Monitor 1999. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/usa>.
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That said, US landmine use has been relatively limited in recent years. The last time 
the US used antipersonnel mines was in the 1991 Gulf War. Until 1999, the US 
maintained minefields around the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, but these have 
now been cleared. While the minefields in the demilitarized zone in Korea are a major 
reason cited by the US to stymie landmine control efforts, these minefields are 
technically under the control of South Korea, though US war planning calls for sowing 
new minefields should North Korea invade.39
By contrast, Norway has never had a significant landmine production industry, 
though in the 1950s there was some “minor military production...of some very primitive 
mines” and overseas subsidiaries of the Norwegian company Dyno-Nobel manufactured 
mine components. Nevertheless, landmines formed an integral part of their defense 
doctrine, with plans to lay minefields in the north in the case of a Soviet invasion. For 
this purpose, Norway stockpiled mines imported largely in the early post-WWII period. 
By the mid-1990s many of these stocks had been destroyed simply because they were out 
of date. That said, Norway had allowed the US, its NATO ally, to store antipersonnel 
landmines on its territory, the exact amount being classified. These were removed in 
2002.40 Until recently, Norway stockpiled artillery and air-delivered cluster munitions, 
but there were no reports of using them in combat.41
ii. Unilateral Moratoria, 1992-1996
Most of the influential organizations that first called for a landmine ban were located
in the US, notably Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), Human Rights 
Watch and Physicians for Human Rights. They found a sympathetic and powerful 
supporter in US Senator Patrick Leahy (Democrat, Vermont), who had been a champion 
for civilian victims of war after meeting a Nicaraguan boy in Honduras who had lost a leg
39 J. Antonio Ohe. (2004) “Are Landmines Still Needed to Defend South Korea?: A Mine Use Case Study.” 
Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War’s Hidden Legacy. Richard A. Matthew, 
Bryan McDonald and Kenneth R. Rutherford (Eds.). Albany, State University of New York Press.
40 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (1999) “Norway.” Landmine Monitor 1999. 
<http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/Norway>; International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (2004) 
“Norway.” Landmine Monitor 2004. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/norway>.
41 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (n.d.) “The Norwegian Government’s initiative for a ban on 




to a landmine in the late 1980s.42 Leahy drafted legislation in October 1992, that, despite 
lobbying from mine manufacturers, made the US the first country to unilaterally place a 
moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines. The law, later extended and 
formalized, also called on the President to negotiate an international prohibition of “the 
sale, transfer, or export of anti-personnel landmines.”43
In September 1994, President Clinton, reading a speech Leahy helped draft, became 
the first world leader to call for the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel landmines. 
This led to a US-sponsored General Assembly resolution urging member states to impose 
export moratoriums “at the earliest possible date” and encouraging “further international 
efforts” to control antipersonnel landmines, “with a view to their eventual elimination.”44 
By 1996, the US had also placed a one year moratorium, beginning in 1999, on the use of 
antipersonnel landmines except along “internationally recognized national borders” or in 
“demilitarized zones” (i.e. Korea) 45 These legislative efforts and reports that President 
Clinton was personally dedicated to a landmine ban (keeping an antipersonnel mine on 
his desk to remind him of the issue’s importance), led many to believe the US would 
prove a major champion of a ban treaty.
Norway’s moratorium banning the use, production, trade and stockpiling of 
antipersonnel landmines in June 1995 followed the UN General Assembly resolution. 
This moratorium was much tighter than that passed by the US, but represented a major 
victory for Norwegian civil society over the resistance of the Norwegian government.46 
The government had initially considered a mine ban too drastic and unrealistic, arguing 
instead for strengthening the CCW Mines Protocol. A former Norwegian military officer 
recalled that “there was certainly resistance” within the officer corps to the idea of a
42 Leon V. Sigal. (2006) Negotiating Minefields: The Landmines Ban in American Politics. New York, 
Routledge. pp. 14-16; Mary Wareham. (1998) “Rhetoric and Policy Realities in the United States.” To 
Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines. Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson & 
Brian W. Tomlin (Eds.). Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 213.
43 Sigal. Negotiating Minefields, pp. 16-19; United States of America. (2 January 2006) “Title 22 - Foreign 
Relations and Intercourse: Chapter 39 - Arms Export Control, Subchapter III - Military Export Controls.” 
22 US Code Section 2778. <http://uscode.house.gov/search/criteria.shtml>.
44 Sigal. Negotiating Minefields, pp. 47-51; UN General Assembly. (15 December 1994) “Moratorium on 
the export of anti-personnel land-mines.” Document A/RES/49/75. 
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/res/resa49.htm>. p. 6.
45 Patrick Leahy. (Fall 1999) “Leahy Amendment Moratorium on Use of Anti-personnel Landmines.” 
Journal of Mine Action. 3(3). <http://maic.jmu.edU/Joumal/3.3/profiles/leahy_war_victims_fund.htm>.
46 Steffen Kongstad. (3 September 2007) Personal interview with author in Oslo.
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ban.47 As a result of lobbying by the Norwegian Campaign to Ban Landmines, Parliament 
requested the government to seek a total international ban.48
iii. The 1996 CCW Amended Mines Protocol
In the 1970s, Norway was among the seven smaller powers, led by Sweden, which
had called for tight CCW restrictions on cluster munitions and landmines. As a result, it 
was among the first countries that called for a strong international regime to govern 
conventional weapons. However, despite the Norwegian Parliament’s endorsement of a 
total ban in 1995, a year later the Foreign Minister continued to argue for a relatively 
weak compromise within the CCW 49
The US has had an ambivalent attitude toward the CCW. On one hand it has 
generally sought to use the veto the consensus process gives them to seek the weakest 
and least onerous restrictions. For instance, in the 1970s, the US, among other NATO 
countries, treated the Swedish proposal with disdain and made sure the 1980 CCW 
restrictions were as weak as possible. One US negotiator said the US “entered the CCW 
negotiations as a holding action.”50 Even then, it did not ratify the CCW until 1996, as a 
result of Leahy’s urging.51 On the other hand, the US has consistently argued that any 
new international norms regarding conventional weapons must be negotiated through the 
CCW or UN Conference on Disarmament processes, where they retain a veto. Thus US 
investment in the CCW is arguably an attempt to ensure that negotiations produce 
minimal restrictions, reflecting a broader US tendency to privilege strategic concerns in 
disarmament and humanitarian law treaties. Throughout the post-WWII era the US has 
been consistently skeptical of extending the laws of war, failing to accede to the 1977 
Geneva Protocols and actively working to undermine the International Criminal Court. 
This is driven, in part, by a fear that international treaties erode American sovereignty 
and thus the freedom of the electorate to determine policy.52
47 Per Breivik. (28 February 2007) Personal interview with author in Sarajevo.
48 ICBL. (1999) “Norway.”
49 Ibid.
50 J. Ashley Roach. (1984) “Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian 
Law?” Military Law Review. 105. p. 4.
51 Wareham. “Rhetoric and Policy Realities.” p. 214.
52 e.g. Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen (Eds). (2000) The United States and the International Criminal 
Court: National Security and International Law. Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield.
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Therefore, in the negotiations following the CCW review conference in 1994 the US, 
though rhetorically supportive of a ban, tried to make the resultant Amended Mines 
Protocol as weak as possible and exempt the self-destructing and self-neutralizing mines 
that made up the bulk of its stockpiles. While the ICBL had initially been impressed with 
Clinton’s rhetoric on mines, they were disappointed with what they saw as an 
“obstructionist” US attitude to the negotiations.53
When the 1996 CCW conference concluded the Amended Mines Protocol, which 
placed moderately tighter controls on the use of mines, those in favor of a complete ban 
were disappointed. Therefore, in October that year, Canada hosted a conference in 
Ottawa of states who were still interested in seeking a ban. On the last day of the 
conference, Canada’s Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy shocked the participants by 
calling for a maximalist ban on anti-personnel mines to be negotiated outside the CCW 
framework by the end of 1997. This came to be known as the ‘Ottawa Process.’54
iv. The 1997 Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty
Despite its initial reluctance to accept a ban, intense civil society pressure made the
Norwegian government an early and strong supporter of the ‘Ottawa Process.’ It came 
to believe that the CCW’s “consensus practice” and “lack of external exposure resulted in 
non-committal and weak solutions with little relevance to the situation of people living in 
mine-affected areas.”55 Norway became part of a ‘core group’ of pro-Ottawa states 
supporting activities aimed at encouraging the involvement of African countries. In 
September 1997 it hosted the negotiation of the treaty in Oslo and its “generosity and 
rapidity” in responding to the “enormous diplomatic and organizational challenge” of 
running the conference were credited as a major contribution to the Ottawa Process.56
During the negotiations, a Norwegian foreign minister later observed, the “strategic 
partnership” between middle powers such as Norway and international NGOs, “injected 
an internal dynamism” into the Ottawa Process that turned the incentive structure “upside
53 Wareham. “Rhetoric and Policy Realities.” p. 222.
54 For background on Canada’s decision to initiate this process, see: Sigal. Negotiating Minefields, pp. 89- 
102.
55 St0re. “Norway’s commitment to mine action.”
56 Robert J. Lawson, Mark Gwozdecky, Jill Sinclair & Ralph Lysyshyn. (1998) “The Ottawa Process and 
the International Movement to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines.” In: Cameron, Lawson & Tomlin (Eds.). To 
Walk without Fear. p. 171.
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down.” Instead of a ‘race to the bottom’, the state participants found themselves in a 
process where they were continually challenged by civil society actors to take a 
maximalist position. With decisions made on the basis of a supermajority instead of 
consensus, the negotiations were also not held hostage to the most conservative members. 
The result of the Oslo conference was a treaty text that was a straightforward and 
relatively loophole-free “prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of 
anti-personnel mines.” The treaty also required states to clear all minefields on their 
territory in ten years and called on donor countries to contribute to demining, survivor
c o
assistance and awareness programs. Since the treaty came into effect in 1999, Norway 
has seen the Mine Ban Treaty as the sole framework for its policy on antipersonnel 
landmines; the ICBL has praised the country as “a key promoter of the universalization 
and effective implementation” of the Ottawa Convention.59
In contrast, US officials were angry at what they saw as a unilateral move by Canada. 
It appears US diplomats misjudged the level of support for Ottawa initiative, dismissing it 
as a ‘pep rally’ and announcing in early 1997 that they would, instead, seek to negotiate a 
ban in the UN Conference on Disarmament.60 Meanwhile, opinion in the US government 
was divided. Senator Leahy was an active champion of a ban and found significant 
support within the State Department for participating in Ottawa Process. However, the 
Department of Defense was not in favor of doing so, and Clinton, burned by Somalia and 
clashes over gays in the military, wanted to avoid alienating the Pentagon.61 As a 
compromise, Clinton sent diplomats to the negotiations in Oslo but with a ‘package’ of 
non-negotiable demands aimed at “modifying the treaty to accommodate existing US 
policy.”62 The US insisted on “a geographic exception for Korea, a change in definition 
to exempt certain US ‘smart’ mines, and a nine-year delay in the effective due date of the
57 St0re. “Norway’s commitment.”
58 (2004) “1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.” Documents on the Laws of War. Adam Roberts & Richard 
Guelff (Eds.). 3rd Ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 645-666.
59 ICBL. (1999) “Norway.”
60 Wareham. “Rhetoric and Policy Realities.” pp. 226, 230-233.
61 For a detailed discussion of the debate within the US government on Ottawa, see: Sigal. Negotiating 
Minefields, pp. 103-154.
62 Sigal. Negotiating Minefields, pp. 194-199; Jody Williams & Stephen Goose. (1998) “The International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines.” In: Cameron, Lawson & Tomlin (Eds.). To Walk without Fear. p. 43.
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treaty.” 63 To this end they “cajoled and arm-twisted with great vigour,” alienating many 
sympathetic countries.64 Unsurprisingly, in the end they decided not to sign the treaty.
Disappointed by his misjudgment of the ability of the Ottawa ‘core-group’ and the 
ICBL to win a complete ban, Clinton developed an alternative unilateral landmine policy. 
In 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 64, he committed the US to stop using 
antipersonnel mines outside Korea by 2003. If suitable alternatives to mines were found, 
by 2006, the US would give up antipersonnel mines altogether and sign the mine ban 
treaty.65 Since taking office, the Bush Administration has taken the US even further 
from the Ottawa Convention, dismissing it as an “absolutist formulation” whose 
“simplicity” is its “greatest weakness.”66 Firstly, it has argued that joining the treaty 
would require the US “to give up a needed military capability” 67 required to “protect our 
forces, saving the lives of our men and women in uniform and of those civilians they 
defend.” 68 Second, they feel the treaty is inadequate as it does not address anti-vehicular 
mines (though it is unclear why this should be a reason against joining the Ottawa treaty 
and seeking other agreements on anti-vehicular mines). Third, they argue the treaty 
“commits its adherents to the costly and unnecessary act of clearing every last mine” -  
leading to diminishing returns on donor’s money.69
Therefore, in February 2004, the Bush Administration outlined the current US 
landmine policy, claiming to make both “humanitarian and military goals... fully 
compatible.”70 The new policy, they say, is to increase mine action spending by 50%71 
and commit “to leave no mine behind of any type on any battlefield anywhere in the
63 Williams & Goose. “International Campaign to Ban Landmines.” p. 44.
64 Ibid. p. 44.
65 ICBL. (1999) “United States of America.”
66 Richard Kidd. (21 November 2007) “U.S. Landmine Policy and the Ottawa Convention Ban on Anti- 
Personnel Landmines: Similar Path.” <http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/rls/rm/95596.htm>.
67 US Department of State. (27 February 2004) “New United States Policy on Landmines: Reducing 




70 Lincoln P. Bloomfield. (27 February 2004) “New Developments in the U.S. Approach to Landmines: 
Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs: On-The-Record Briefing.” 
<http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/rls/rm/29976.htm>.
71 US Department of State. “New United States Policy on Landmines.”
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world.”72 However, this is a misleading formulation, as the details of the new policy do 
not bear out the rhetoric:
1. ‘Persistent’ antipersonnel landmines will continue to be stockpiled for use 
within Korea until 2010.
2. Until 2010, ‘persistent’ anti-vehicle mines can still be used if specifically 
authorized by the President.
3. After 2010 the US will continue to stockpile and maintain the right to use ‘non- 
persistent’ or ‘smart’ mines.73
4. The US will invest more in developing landmine systems that incorporate 
“enhanced self-destructing, self-deactivating technologies and control 
mechanisms....”74
This policy has been criticized by mine ban campaigners for four major reasons. 
Firstly, the self-destruct or self-neutralization mechanisms in so-called ‘smart’ mines do 
not always function properly, meaning that humanitarian deminers have to treat ‘smart’ 
mines as if they were still dangerous. Secondly, such mines remain active for weeks or 
months before self-destructing, still posing a threat to civilians. Thirdly, the major 
commitments in this policy are only to take place in 2010, after Bush has left office. 
Finally, it is seen as an excuse for the US to develop two new landmine systems, the 
Spider Networked Munitions System and Intelligent Munitions System (IMS).75 If these 
systems go into production, they will join the existing US stockpiles of some 10.4 million 
antipersonnel mines and 7.5 anti-vehicular mines, third in size only to China and 
Russia.76
72 Richard Kidd. (4 April 2007) “State Official Discusses U.S. Policy on Land Mines.” 
<http://usinfo.state.gov/usinfo/Archive/2007/Apr/04-991121 .html>.
73 US Department of State. “New United States Policy on Landmines.”
74 Bloomfield. “New Developments in the U.S. Approach.”
75 Alliant Techsystems Inc. (2008) “Spider.”
<http://www.atk.com/Customer_Solutions_MissionSystems/cs_ms_w_fp_spider.asp>; Alliant 
Techsystems Inc. (2008) “Intelligent Munitions System (IMS).”
<http://www.atk.com/Customer_Solutions_MissionSystems/cs_ms_w_fp_ims.asp>; Christopher Moraff. 
(3 October 2006) “Along Came a Spider.” The American Prospect.
<http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=along_came_a_spider>; ICBL. (2007) “United States of 
America.” Landmine Monitor 2007. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2007/usa.html>; US Campaign to Ban 
Landmines. (2006) “Evolution of U.S. Policy on Antipersonnel Landmines.” 
<http://www.banminesusa.org/policy/evolution.html>.
76 ICBL. (2007) “United States of America.”
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v. Post-Ottawa Negotiations in the CCW
Following the Ottawa Convention, negotiations have continued in the CCW as a
means of tightening up regulation of other remnants of war. In these discussions, the US 
and Norway have demonstrated attitudes and positions similar to those they held 
concerning preceding treaties.
The US has continued to position itself rhetorically as a champion of tighter 
regulation, while simultaneously trying to limit actual restrictions on its freedom to 
deploy weapons according to ‘military necessity.’ For instance, it has signed the new 
Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, but this, as outlined in the previous chapter, 
has many loopholes.77 Even with these ‘escape clauses’ the US has not yet ratified the 
Protocol. Since 2001 the US has championed the idea of a new CCW protocol restricting 
anti-vehicle mines that do not have “effective self-destruction or self-neutralization 
mechanisms.”78 However, by the time such a Protocol would come into effect, according 
to the US landmine policy it would have given up such ‘dumb mines’ anyway -  banning 
a weapon they already consider antiquated and dispensable.
For its part, Norway has generally stood for a maximalist CCW, having ratified the 
new protocol on Explosive Remnants of War and calling for further restrictions on anti- 
vehicular mines and cluster munitions.79 However, Norway has become increasingly 
skeptical of the CCW, feeling that the consensus process effectively gives great powers a 
veto on the maximalist position. This has brought it into conflict with the US over the 
issue of cluster munitions. The US had argued that cluster munitions were already 
adequately regulated by Protocol V and by “strict implementation of international
77 (28 November 2003) “Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (Protocol V to the 1980 Convention).” 
<http://www.mineaction.org/docs/1850_.asp>. Article 4. For further details see: Rosy Cave. (2006) 
“Disarmament as Humanitarian Action? Comparing Negotiations on Anti-Personnel Mines and Explosive 
Remnants of War.” Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From Perspective to Practice. Geneva, 
UNIDIR.
78 Ronald Bettaur. (6 November 2006) “Third Review Conference of the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons: Press Statement by Ronald Bettauer, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State: U.S. 
Head of Delegation.” <http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/rls/rm/75707.htm>.






humanitarian law.”80 In contrast, by 2006, Norway, scandalized by Israel’s use of cluster 
munitions in Lebanon, decided there needed to be a “ban on cluster munitions that have 
unacceptable humanitarian consequences” and introduced its own unilateral moratorium 
as a step “towards developing an international norm....”81 At the November 2006 CCW 
review conference, Norway felt that such a ban was impossible within the CCW and 
invited other pro-ban states to start a course of action outside the CCW similar to the 
Ottawa Process.
vi. Oslo Process on Cluster Munitions, 2007-Present
In February 2007, Norway held a conference in Oslo where 46 countries signed a
declaration calling for a ban on cluster munitions causing “unacceptable harm to 
civilians” outside the CCW.82 At the time of writing, the draft treaty text of the ‘Oslo 
process’, as it has come to be called, had be agreed by over 100 countries in Dublin.83
The US, however, saw this as a unilateral move by Norway. Going outside the CCW 
framework, a State Department representative argued, was “not healthy for the 
development of widely adhered to rules of international humanitarian law.”84 While it 
has continued to play down the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions as “episodic 
and limited in scope, scale and duration”, 85 the US has changed its earlier position and 
now says it is open to discussing further restrictions on cluster munitions within the CCW 
-  because it “takes into account both military and humanitarian considerations.”
80 Ronald J. Bettauer. (17 November 2006) “Statement to the Closing Plenary Session of the Third Review 
Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW): Ronald Bettauer, Deputy Legal 
Advisor, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Head of Delegation.” 
<http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/rls/rm/76261.htm>.
81 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The Norwegian Government’s initiative.”
82 Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions. (22 -  23 February 2007) “Declaration.” 
<http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/files/Oslo%20declaration.pdf>.
83 Cluster Munition Coalition. (30 May 2008) “Over 100 countries adopt groundbreaking treaty to ban 
cluster bombs.” <http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/100-final- 
dublin.pdf>.
84 Bettauer. “Statement to the Closing Plenary Session.”
85 Richard Kidd. (20 June 2007) “U.S. Intervention on Humanitarian Impacts of Cluster Munitions.” 
<http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/rls/rm/87303.htm>. For a refutation of this speech see: Richard Moyes. 
(Autumn 2007) “Spiked!” Landmine Action Campaign. 13. 
<http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Campaign%2013.pdf>. p. 10.
86 Bettauer. “Statement to the Closing Plenary Session.”
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vii. Summary
Reflecting the general shape of US foreign policy, US policy on international law 
regulating mines and cluster munitions has shown a “significant gap between rhetorical 
leadership and policy realities.”87 While the US has shown greater openness to 
humanitarian concerns than other great powers (like China and Russia), as Egeland has 
shown with human rights policy, the US has been constrained by its strategic national 
security concerns. Therefore, some argue US mine and cluster munitions control policies 
are focused more on defending an institution of the state -  the military -  than the human 
security of civilians. When pushed by public and international pressure, the US has been 
open to negotiating restrictions on mines and cluster munitions, but only in fora where it 
has control over the final outcome and as long as the treaty does not threaten the freedom 
of the Pentagon to deploy weapons according to ‘military necessity.’88
The reaction of the Norwegian state to such restrictions was initially similar to that of 
the US. It was initially against a ban on antipersonnel mines and until 2006 considered 
cluster munitions a legitimate weapon of war. However, reminiscent of Egeland’s thesis, 
Norway’s lack of major strategic commitments meant it was more open to the 
humanitarian inclinations of its civil society. Therefore it has been more able to 
champion, and ultimately achieve, more potent restrictions. The following sections will 
show how these two contrasting positions are also expressed in the ways the US and 
Norway have developed and funded demining programs.
c. Emergence of Support to Humanitarian Mine Action
Comprehending the historical roots of policies is essential to a full understanding of 
them. Therefore, before looking at the current structure of US and Norwegian mine 
action funding, the following explores how the two countries initially became involved in 
supporting demining programs. The circumstances from which these programs arose 
shaped the way in which the two counties later institutionalized support for mine action.
i. The Genesis of US-Funded Demining
The previous chapter already outlined how early US ‘humanitarian’ demining efforts
in Indochina were rather small and only conducted when a clear strategic advantage was
87 Wareham. “Rhetoric and Policy Realities.” p. 212.
88 Sigal. Negotiating Minefields, p. 62.
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present. One saw a similar pattern when the US deployed military personnel to work 
with the Egyptian army clearing mines and UXO from the Suez Canal zone in the 
aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.89 The enormous strategic and commercial 
importance of the Suez Canal almost certainly played a role in initiating this program. 
Other than these brief and limited efforts in Indochina and the Middle East, however, the 
US largely avoided involvement in demining efforts till the close of the Cold War.
The late 1980s saw a massive increase in the proliferation of mines, caused by the 
‘Reagan Doctrine’ proxy wars, in which the US supported anti-government insurgencies 
in socialist countries of the Third World (such as Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and 
Nicaragua). It was the recognition that mines hampered the military efforts and political 
legitimacy of its proxy armies that contributed to the US’s nascent interest in sponsoring 
demining programs for civilian benefit. For instance, in 1986 US Army Special Forces 
trained Honduran Army sappers to clear agricultural land mined by Nicaraguan factions. 
While the US claimed the focus was “humanitarian, rather than military, mine clearance,” 
this operation was part of a series of joint US-Honduran military exercises and 
counterinsurgency training.90 Similarly, the US Army helped the Royal Thai Army 
develop a mine detection dog unit to demine areas blocking US proxies’ access across the 
Cambodian border.91
This model became most developed in Afghanistan where the US was engaged in 
“the biggest paramilitary affair in CIA history”,92 pumping some $2.75 billion worth of 
arms and aid into the mujahideen struggle against the Soviet occupation and Afghan
89 Task Force 65. (May 1975) “Suez Canal Clearance Operation, Task Force 65.” DTIC Accession No. 
ADAO10261.
<http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai ?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD A010261>.
90 US Department of State. (29 July 2003) “Milestones in Humanitarian Mine Action: Development of the 
Landmine Threat and the Discipline of Humanitarian Mine Action.
<http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/rls/fs/22948.htm>; US Department of State. (2003) “Operation Lempira.” 
<http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/pix/b/22970.htm>.
91 RONCO. (June 1998) “Humanitarian Demining: Ten Years of Lessons.” The Journal of Humanitarian 
Demining. 2(2). <http://maic.jmu.edu/joumal/2.2/fieId/ronco.htm>; Margaret Buse. (June 2000) “RONCO 
Executives Talk About Demining, Integration and the IMAS Contract: (An Interview with Lawrence 
Crandall, Stephen Edelmann and A. David Lundberg).” Journal of Mine Action. 4(2). 
<http://maic.jmu.edU/joumal/4.2/Features/ronco/ronco.htm>; Dave McCracken. (2001) “Thailand: The 
Land of Smiles (But Be Careful Where You Step!)” Journal of Mine Action. 5(1); Dan Hayter. (April 2003) 
“The Evolution of Mine Detection Dog Training.” Journal of Mine Action. Issue 7(1). 
<http://maic.jmu.edU/joumal/7.l/features/hayter/hayter.htm>.
92 John Prados. (1996) Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II 
through the Persian Gulf. Rvsd Ed. Chicago, Elephant Paperbacks, p. 480.
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communist regime.93 Coordinating with the CIA, USAID used ‘humanitarian’ assistance 
to develop the mujahideen’s logistical capacity, rehabilitating roads, building bridges and 
importing pack mules.94 While these programs were officially for humanitarian purposes, 
they also facilitated the movement of arms.95 Posing a major threat to this logistical 
system, the USSR littered the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the 
majority of mujahideen bases were located, with thousands of mines.96 By 1988, USAID 
began to realize that keeping the mujahideen supply lines open required a demining 
capacity.97 Therefore, USAID had its logistical contractor, RONCO Consulting 
Corporation, develop a demining program (which will be described in greater detail in the 
next chapter) working in collaboration with the mujahideen parties. The US also 
seconded military officers to the nascent UN demining program that started at around the 
same time, partly motivated by a desire to learn about Soviet mine warfare.98
These military and commercial-led models of demining continued to dominate US 
mine action assistance in the early 1990s. In Somalia, US soliders engaged in limited 
demining to support Operation Restore Hope. In Cambodia, military PSYOPs specialists 
developed mine awareness materials and Special Forces trainers trained Cambodian 
military deminers. The US Army also trained Latin American military deminers at the 
School of the Americas. In Mozambique, USAID, State Department and the Department 
of Defense contracted RONCO to clear priority roads in Mozambique 99 Consolidating
93 James M. Scott. (1996) Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy. 
Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, pp. 34-35.
94 US Agency for International Development (USAID). (24 October 1988) “A.I.D. Strategy: Afghan 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation.” Development Experience Clearinghouse. Document PN-ABR-629. 
<http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNABR629.pdf>. p. 7; US Agency for International Development 
(USAID). (1 June 1989) “Afghanistan: Briefing for the Deputy Administrator-designate.” Development 
Experience Clearinghouse. Document PN-ABR-629. <http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNABR629.pdf>. pp. 
3-4.
95 Kurt Lohbeck. (1993) Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA’s Secret War in Afghanistan. 
Washington DC, Regnery Gateway, pp. 92-93; RONCO. (1994) “USAID/Afghanistan Commodity Export 
Program (CEP) Contract No. 306-0205-C-00-9384-00, March 1,1989 through February 28, 1994: Final 
Report.” Available from USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse. Document PD-ABI-329. pp. 3- 
4; George Crile. (2004) Charlie Wilson’s War. New York, Grove Press, p. 369; Steve Coll. (2004) Ghost 
Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 
10, 2001. London, Penguin Books, p. 218.
96 Scott. Deciding to Intervene, p. 58.
97 USAID. “A.I.D. Strategy: Afghan Resettlement.” p. 11.
98 Martin Barber. (28 November 2006) Personal interview with the author in Kabul.
99 US Department of State. (1994) “Chapter VII: Case Studies.” Hidden Killers 1994: The Global 
Landmine Crisis, <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/rpt_9401_demine_ch7.html>.
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these efforts, in 1993, the US formally established its Demining Assistance Program, a 
joint endeavor involving the Department of State, Department of Defense and USAID, 
which would give priority to mine affected countries based primarily on balancing 
considerations of “US interests” and the “severity of the problem.” 100
ii. The Genesis of Norwegian-Funded Demining
As was noted earlier, Norway has long been an enthusiastic supporter of the UN.
Despite its small population, Norway is the UN’s seventh largest financial contributor101
and one of the few rich countries that consistently provides troops to peacekeeping
102missions. The post-Cold War era also saw Norway take on an increasingly 
internationalist role, participating in NATO operations and playing the role of the third- 
party negotiator in a variety of peace processes.
Therefore, in contrast to the strategic underpinnings of early US funding for 
demining, the genesis of Norwegian support was rooted in the post-Cold War rise of 
‘New Interventionism’ by the UN, Western powers and humanitarian organizations in 
conflict zones. The early 1990s saw the UN move beyond traditional peacekeeping to
i m“rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife.” 
The large UN program of assistance to Afghanistan from 1989 on was an early harbinger 
of the first such programs. Norway seconded military officers to the early UN Afghan 
demining program, one of whom became its head for a time.104 Later, Norway 
contributed financial resources to the UN-led, local NGO-implemented Afghan demining 
program.
When the UN launched its Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), (which ran 
Cambodia as a sort of ‘neo-trusteeship’ from 1992-1993) it became clear landmines 
posed a major threat both to post-war reconstruction and UN peacekeepers. As part of its
100 US Department of State. (1994) “Chapter V: Demining -  The U.S. Response.” Hidden Killers 1994: The 
Global Landmine Crisis, <http://www.state.gov/www/globaiyarms/rpt_9401_demine_ch5.html>.
101 Norway Mission to the UN. (2007) “Norwegian Contributions to the UN.” <http://www.norway- 
un.org/NorwayandtheUN/NorwegianContributions/Norwegian+contributions+to+the+UN.htm>.
102 Norway Mission to the UN. (2007) “Norway and peacekeeping.” <http://www.norway- 
un.org/NorwayandtheUN/PeacekeepingOperations/Norway+and+Peace-Keeping.htm>.
103 Boutros Boutros Ghali. (17 June 1992) “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and 
peace-keeping.” <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>.
04 UNOCA. (30 April 1990) “1990 Annual Reports Demining Headquarters Peshawar and Quetta.” 
Document PC-AAA-512. USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse, p. 22.
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UNTAC contribution, Norway asked the NGO Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to recruit 
former Norwegian military ordnance experts to serve as deminers in Cambodia under UN 
auspices.105 Since then, NPA has continued to provide technical assistance to the 
Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), preferring to build local capacity than run its 
own operations.106
An analogous pattern occurred in Mozambique, where the 1992 peace agreement 
mandated a similarly interventionist UN mission (UNOMOZ). Funded by Norway and 
UNHCR, NPA started the country’s first demining program in 1993, concentrating 
efforts on priority refugee return areas.107 Unlike many of the other mine clearance 
agencies in Mozambique, NPA tried to integrate demining into broader community 
development programs including health, education, water supply and microcredit.108 
Similarly, following the 1994 Angola peace agreement, the UN asked NPA to clear a 
road to facilitate World Food Program operations.109
iii. Summary
US and Norwegian demining programs rose out of different circumstances. The US 
originally supported ‘humanitarian’ demining as an extension of support to military or 
paramilitary operations in support of strategic objectives. Operations were conducted 
either by military units or a commercial company; humanitarian motivations tempered by 
strategic considerations. In contrast, Norway’s involvement stemmed more from a 
commitment to UN peacebuilding missions and was implemented largely through an 
international NGO.
d. The Current Structure of US Mine Action Funding
The US Humanitarian Mine Action Program, a conglomeration of programs within 
the Department of Defense, Department of State, USAID and a few other government 
agencies, has become by far the largest global contributor to mine action in absolute
105 Harvard Bach. (20 September 2006) Personal interview with author in Geneva.
106 NPA. (2008) “NPA Humanitarian Mine Action 2007-2008.” 
<http://www.npaid.org/filestore/5_3portfolio_A4_ll-07.pdf>. p. 7.
107 Hildegard Scheu. (August 2002) “Humanitarian Mine Action in Mozambique.” Journal of Mine Action. 
6(2). <http://maic.jmu.edU/joumal/6.2/focus/hildegardscheu/hildegardscheu.htm>.
108 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (1999) “Mozambique.” Landmine Monitor. 
<http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/mozambique.html>.
109 Nina Monsen. (2001) “The peace which never came.” A Mine-Free World is Possible. Norwegian 
People’s Aid (Ed.). Oslo, NPA. p. 24.
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terms, spending over $1.1 billion on demining, mine survivor assistance and mine risk 
education since 1993.110 However, critics point out that US funding for mine action is 
actually much smaller than many other countries, including Norway, if measured as a 
proportion of GNI.111
Figure 1: The Growth of US Mine Action Funding, 1993-2006 (Million US$).112
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110 US Department of State. (1 October 2007) “10th Anniversary of Public-Private Partnerships to 
Reinforce Humanitarian Mine Action.” <http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93023.htm>.
111 ICBL. “Mine Action Funding.”
112 Compiled by author from several Landmine Monitor reports: <http://www.icbl.org/lm>.
113 Ibid.
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The primary reason cited by the US for its nevertheless major commitment of 
resources to mine action is “to relieve human suffering caused by landmines and 
unexploded ordnance (UXO).”115 Indeed there is significant public commitment in the 
US for mitigating the humanitarian impact of mines, as evidenced by the large private 
contributions to mine action NGOs. However, the former “Humanitarian Demining 
Strategic Plan” explicitly acknowledged that one of its major goals was to “Promote U.S. 
foreign policy, security, and economic interests.”116 Indicating the importance of security 
matters, US mine action programs answer to a committee chaired by a representative of 
the National Security Council and that includes the CIA.117 Looking at the table above, 
one can see the influence of strategic considerations in the allocation of funds. Together, 
Iraq and Afghanistan received more funding than the rest of the top ten recipients 
altogether. While both these countries are among the most heavily mined in the world, 
they only received such large funding allocations after the US became strategically 
interested in them, as the below graph displays:
114 Ibid.
115 US Department of State. “Humanitarian Demining Program (HDP).” See also: Stacy Bernard Davis & 
Donald F. Patiemo. (2004) “Tackling the Global Landmine Problem: The United States Perspective.” 
Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War’s Hidden Legacy. Richard A. Matthew, 
Bryan McDonald and Kenneth R. Rutherford (Eds.). Albany, State University of New York Press, pp. 126- 
127.
116 Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining n.d.
117 US Department of State, (n.d.) “PCC Subgroup on Humanitarian Mine Action.” 
<http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/wra/c4306.htm>.
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The US also uses its demining funding as a way “of deflecting attention” from its 
refusal to join the Ottawa Convention.119 Unlike most bilateral mine action donors, the
US does not organize its funding within the framework of the Mine Ban Treaty,
120dismissing attempts to do so as “absolutist” and “not grounded in practical realities.” 
Citing the “law of diminishing returns,”121 State Department officials argue that the 
treaty’s commitment to “destroy...all antipersonnel mines in mined areas” in ten years122 
is a “losing proposition” resulting in “expanding expenditure of resources” for 
“decreasing humanitarian impact.” The US, they say, “can not afford the opportunity 
costs of trying to find the last ‘million dollar’ landmine.”123 Therefore, contrary to the 
Ottawa Treaty’s requirement that countries become ‘mine free’, the US argues that 
funding programs should aim to make the country ‘mine impact free’ -  that is, free from 
mines “that pose a high or medium threat to the ability of people to safely live normal 
lives....”124 Indeed, WRA Richard Kidd dismisses the Ottawa Treaty’s article on mine 
clearance as “inspiringpolitically, but operationally...literally insane.”125
Therefore, fitting into overall US foreign aid policy, US mine action programs are 
driven by tightly interlocking humanitarian and strategic interests and are implemented
118 US Department of State. (June 2006) “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The U.S. Commitment to 
Humanitarian Mine Action.” <http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2006/68014.htm>.
119 Sigal. Negotiating Minefields, p. 220; Wareham. “Rhetoric and Policy Realities.” p. 240.
120 Kidd. “U.S. Landmine Policy and the Ottawa Convention.”
121 Richard Kidd. (8 August 2006) Personal interview with author in Washington DC.
122 (2004) “ 1997 Ottawa Convention.” Article 5.1. p. 650.
123 Kidd. “U.S. Landmine Policy and the Ottawa Convention.”
124 Jacquelyn S. Porth. (14 December 2007) “U.S. Still Top Financial Contributor to Humanitarian Mine 
Action.” USINFO. <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
engl ish/2007/December/20071214110213sjhtrop0.828869.html>.
125 Kidd. Personal interview.
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by a complex network of public and private actors. The following will demonstrate this 
in detail by providing an overview of the different US government agencies involved.
i. Department of State Programs
It is telling that the vast majority of mine action funding has been placed not under
USAID, but under the Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which
1 9 f \“administers] military and other security-related programs.” Through its Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA), this Bureau manages two primary accounts 
contributing to mine action, with some additional funding coming from emergency 
supplementals (in addition to the regular budget) appropriations (for Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Lebanon). WRA acts as the lead agency in determining the policy framework for US 
mine action.
The majority of WRA mine action funding comes from the Nonproliferation, 
Anti terrorism, Demining and Related Projects (NADR) appropriation.127 WRA oversees 
this directly, allocating about half through prime commercial contractors and half through 
grants to NGOs, universities or multilateral bodies. The decision of when to allocate 
money through contracts versus grants is determined according to “the comparative 
advantages of both the private sector and not-for-profit sector”128 and “the best method in
190a given country and given situation to achieve U.S. objectives.” WRA director 
Richard Kidd explained, “resource allocation decisions are based on business models: 
.. .perceived return on investment, contractor value, contractor behavior, principal-agent 
relationship, etc.”130
Commercial contracting, using “price competition considerations,” is used when 
WRA is “procuring a supply or service” in exchange for a money. They are used “when 
the U.S. is conducting direct bi-lateral engagement with a sovereign state, or to oversee 
the actions and develop the capacity of local NGO’s.” 131 Thus “contractors are expected
126 Tamoff & Nowels. “Foreign Aid.” p. 22.
127 US Department of State. (5 April 2002) “The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program and NADR 
Funding.” <http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/rls/fs/2002/9183.htm>.
128 Kidd. “State Official Discusses.”
129 John Stevens. (5 December 2007) “Re: Reply to your query about PM/WRA's contract and grant 
funding.” Personal email to author.
130 Kidd. Personal interview.
131 John Stevens. (13 December 2007) “Re: Reply to your query about PM/WRA's contract and grant 
funding.” Personal email to author.
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to act as agents of the United States...a principal-agent relationship.” 132 In other words, 
contractors are used when the State Department wants greater control over the final 
product produced. From FY2003 to FY2004, there was only one primary contractor, the 
US-based demining company RONCO Consulting, profiled in the next section. Since 
then, WRA has selected an additional two prime contractors, the private security and 
military contracting firms ArmorGroup and DynCorp. When WRA has a new task to
1 Hcontract out, each of these three companies can bid on the tender.
Grants are used when WRA receives “only indirect, intangible benefits” in return for
its funding, but wishes “to facilitate continuation of the grantee’s mission.” Reflecting a
principal-steward relationship, “A grantee is already doing good things. ... [We] give
them a little more money; and they will do more of those good things.”134 The primary
1six grantees have largely remained consistent. They are:
❖ The mine clearance NGOs HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group and 
Norwegian People’s Aid.
❖ The Organization of American States, which funds military demining 
programs in Latin America.
❖ Cranfield University, which provides training to mine action program 
managers.
❖ James Madison University, which runs a Mine Action Information Center and 
edits the trade publication, the Journal o f Mine Action.136 Being the primary 
funder of the leading mine action periodical gives WRA significant power 
over mine action discourse as it has final editorial say over the publication,
1 o n
and makes sure any “political” or “anti-American” language is edited out.
In addition to these main recipients, WRA has made “a dedicated effort to expand the 
number of organizations receiving U.S. support” through a “Request for Application”
132 Kidd. Personal interview.
133 US Department of State. (9 May 2005) “U.S. Department of State Awards Multiple Contracts to Clean 
Up Battlefields and Control Conventional Weapons.” <http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45859.htm>.
134 Stevens. (13 December 2007) “Re: Reply to your query.”
135 John Stevens. (4 December 2007) “Reply to your query about PM/WRA's contract and grant funding.” 
Personal email to author.
136 Ibid.
137 Lois Carter Fay. (23 August 2006) Telephone conversation with author.
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process. Therefore the number of WRA grantees has risen from 19 in FY2003 to 42 in 
FY2007.
In the past four years there has been an increase of funding allocated through grants 
rather than commercial contracts. However, WRA asserts that this should not be 
interpreted as a policy change or “necessarily be taken as predictive of future U.S. 
allocations.” 138 Rather, the reduction in overall funds to commercial companies is due 
more to such contingent factors as a decrease in the previously large appropriations to 
Iraq and the recent completion of several contracts for programs in Lebanon and Sri 
Lanka.139
In addition to the above NADR funding, WRA also oversees a direct congressional 
appropriation to the Slovenian International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim 
Assistance (ITF), the primary funder of mine action projects in the Balkans. The US 
provides a matching grant to the ITF, to act “as a draw for other international 
donors...”140 As will be described in more detail in later chapters, the ITF allocates its 
funding to both NGOs and commercial companies largely through a tendering model.
Not included in the NADR and ITF appropriations is the US assessed contribution to 
the UN peacekeeping budget, that pays for just over 20% of the budget for the UN Mine 
Action Service.
Table 2: WRA Modes of Fund Dispersal.141
Contracts $29.7 42 s o i . : 51 S3 2.4 42 $20.1 27 S21.5 V3
Grants $29.0 41 $43.3 36 $34.8 45 $40.5 55 $33.5 52
ITF* $10.0 14 $9.9 8 $9.9 13 $9.9 13 $8.6 13
Other** $1.9 3 $4.5 4 $0.8 1 $2.9 4 $1.2 2
■ ■ ■ ■ H H ■ ■
* The International Trust Fund contribution is classified neither as a grant or a contract, though 
ITF’s competitive tenders include contracting and granting to implementing agencies.
** All other WRA obligations, including “voluntary contributions, administrative expenses 
(including salaries and travel), fund cite transfers to other operating units for obligation and 
expenditure, purchase orders, and other such obligations as the Department may enter into.”
138 Stevens. (5 December 2007) “Re: Reply to your query.”
139 Ibid.
140 US Department o f State, (n.d.) “International Trust Fund.” <http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/65536.htm>.
141 Stevens. (4 December 2007) “Reply to your query.”
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ii. Department of Defense Programs
The Department of Defense (DoD) runs three activities under the rubric of
‘humanitarian mine action’: ‘humanitarian demining’, mine awareness and technical 
research. In addition to ‘humanitarian demining’, the various branches of the US military 
contract demining and explosive ordnance disposal tasks required for their mission (such 
as clearing military bases) to commercial companies.142
The ‘humanitarian demining’ and mine awareness activities are funded by the DoD 
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid account and overseen by the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The DSCA is “the primary DOD body 
responsible for foreign military financing and training programs”143 and also organizes 
bilateral arms sales.144 The programs are implemented by US Special Operations Forces 
-  a form of ‘tied aid’ as a significant amount of the budget goes into training Special 
Forces at the Humanitarian Demining Training Center at Fort Leonard Wood, 
Missouri.145 As US troops are forbidden by law from actually engaging in humanitarian 
mine clearance themselves, these soldiers train local troops in mine clearance methods.146 
The mine awareness program is carried out by Psychological Operations units. 
Sometimes these troops are aided in their work by private contractors such as RONCO. 
Beneficiary countries are selected by the regional military commands, in consultation 
with the State Department.147
As can be seen in figure 3 above, in FY2006 the DoD’s humanitarian mine action 
activities were worth $6.5 million. However, in past years, this figure was much higher, 
for example, $28.9 million in FY2000. The reduction is due to Special Forces being tied 
down with combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, leaving fewer surplus troops available for 
humanitarian demining.148 While this training can undoubtedly play an important role in 
a local mine action program, the DoD sees its mine action efforts as a way to “counter
142 e.g. US Department of Defense. (28 March 2007) “Contracts: Defense Logistics Agency.” 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx ?contractid=3483>.
143 Tamoff & Nowels. “Foreign Aid.” p. 22.
144 US Department of Defense. (March 2006) “Defense Security Cooperation Agency.” 
<http://www.dsca.osd.mil/Default.htm>.
145 US Department of Defense. (17 April 2006) “Humanitarian Demining Training Center.” 
<http://www.wood.army.mil/hdtc/default.htm>.
146 US Department of State. “The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program.”
147 Tom Smith. (August 2006) Personal interview with author in Crystal City, Virginia.
148 Ibid.
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ideological support for terrorism”, “provide access to regions where traditional military- 
to-military engagement is virtually impossible”, provide “training opportunities in remote 
and austere environments” and enable troops to “learn about the host nations’ economy, 
culture, and hone their foreign language skills.”149 Special Forces mine action is seen as a 
“first foot forward” into a country that may be suspicious of the US military, opening the 
way for further cooperation through joint exercises, partnership and eventual contribution 
to NATO or other alliances. A program administrator pointed out that mine action 
training had opened up dialogue with Laos and Vietnam and was an important tool in 
leading to counterterrorism cooperation with Yemen.150
In his review of mine action, Stuart Maslen heavily criticized the US tendency to “put 
its military at the heart of its mine action strategy,” arguing that the training efforts have 
had “uneven” results and that civilian control is more effective. He is particularly critical 
of conceptualizing mine risk education as a form of psychological operations, saying that 
concentrating “excessively on the high-tech production of printed media...[is] an 
unsustainable and typically inappropriate approach in a developing country.”151
The Pentagon also provides funds -  about $13.8 million in FY2006 -  to the 
Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program within the US Army’s 
Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate (NVESD) for “research and
1 S9development of promising mine detection and removal technologies.” The NVESD is 
also mandated with research into combat countermining. Again, this is a form of tied aid, 
because the money generally goes to research institutions and contractors based in the US 
that are often engaged in defense research. For all the millions of dollars spent on 
developing high-tech solutions to mine contamination, the broad consensus in the mine 
action community is that the most reliable demining methods are still low tech -  human 
beings or dogs. Some have suggested, therefore, that DoD funding for demining is more 
concerned with developing new defense technology, especially technology that could be
149 Defense Security Cooperation Agency. (February 2006) “Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) 
and Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Programs of the Department of Defense.” Document obtained by 
author through Freedom of Information Act Request 06-F-2708 to the Department of Defense, p. 1.
150 Tom Smith. Personal interview.
151 Stuart Maslen. (2004) Mine Action After Diana: Progress in the Struggle Against Landmines. London, 
Pluto Press, pp. 138-140.
152 US Department of State. “The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program.”
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used to cross minefields during combat, than making a significant contribution to 
humanitarian mine action.153
iii. US Agency for International Development
Though it is the primary conduit of non-military US foreign assistance, and is on the
steering committee for US mine action, USAID plays a relatively minor role in mine 
action funding. That said, when sponsoring major infrastructural programs in mine 
affected countries, such as Afghanistan and Bosnia, it has funded its prime contractors’ 
subcontracts with demining companies. In both those countries, the infrastructure 
programs were closely tied to US strategic objectives and often incorporated significant 
involvement of the military in influencing priorities. More details about some of these 
contracts will be discussed in following chapters.
USAID also oversees the Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund ($14.4 million in 
FY2005).154 This fund “contributes to improving the mobility, health, and social 
integration of the war disabled, including landmine survivors.”155 This program seems to 
be less influenced by strategic priorities than others. It was started by Senator Leahy in 
the late 1980s after he met a boy in Honduras during the Nicaraguan war who was a 
landmine survivor. Leahy asked him which faction had laid the mine but the boy did not 
know as both side had used mines. Leahy was moved by this experience (citing it as a 
primary reason for his involvement in the mine ban campaign) and set up the fund for 
civilian victims of conflict.156 However, the Leahy Fund represented only some 15% of 
US mine action funding in FY2005.
iv. Other Government Agencies
Several other US government agencies have made a minor contribution to mine
action, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,157 the Department of
153 Maslen. Mine Action After Diana, pp. 49-53, 151-152.
154 US Department of State. “To Walk the Earth in Safety.”
155 US Department of State. “The U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program.”; US Agency for International 
Development (USAID). (5 May 2005) “Leahy War Victims Fund.” 
<http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_funds/lwvf/index.html>.
156 Patrick Leahy. (1993) “Congressional Record -  Senate. S9290.” Landmines: A Deadly Legacy. The 
Arms Project of Human Rights Watch & Physicians for Human Rights. New York, Human Rights Watch. 
Appendix 8.
15 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (November 2004) “War-related Injury Prevention.” 
<http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/publications/factsheets/War-relatedInjuryPrevention.pdf>.
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Education and the US Department of Agriculture. However, the role of these agencies is 
rather limited.
v. Primary Implementing Partner: RONCO Consulting Corporation
Among the many organizations implementing US mine action projects, RONCO
Consulting Corporation has had a particularly prominent position. The following 
provides background on RONCO, showing how the nature and motivations of the 
implementing institutions themselves can influence the way in which their respective 
donors’ policies are carried out.
Founded in 1974 by Ronald Boyd and Stephen Edelmann, who “wanted to do 
something profitable and humanitarian”,158 RONCO’s early projects managed 
agribusiness development programs and logistical pipelines for USAID. After pulling 
out of Afghanistan in 1994, where it had set up the first major US demining program, 
RONCO seems to have specialized in running programs treading the fine line between 
US politico-security functions and developmental objectives. A Human Rights Watch 
investigator alleged their Rwandan demining program was a cover to supply military 
assistance to the Rwandan Patriotic Front in 1994, in violation of a UN arms embargo.159 
In Serbia, RONCO played an important role in surreptitiously providing USAID supplies 
to the democratic opposition to Milosevic.160 During Operation Enduring Freedom in 
2001, RONCO returned to Afghanistan, demining US and Afghan military bases and 
clearing up unexploded munitions.161 It has recently found a burgeoning market for its
1 f \ 7services in Iraq. In addition to demining, RONCO developed a plan to restructure the
158 Amy Joyce. (4 January 2002) “A Mission to Remove Land Mines; D.C. Firm Is Sending Team to 
Afghanistan to Help Defuse Devices.” The Washington Post. p. E5.
159 Ken Silverstein. (28 July 1997) “Privatizing War.” The Nation; Christopher Spearin. (November 2001) 
“Ends and Means: Assessing the Humanitarian Impact of Commercialised Security on the Ottawa 
Convention Banning Anti-Personnel Mines.” YCISS Occasional Paper Number. 69. 
<http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP69-Spearin.pdf>. p. 22; UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
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Iraqi Army in 2003.163 RONCO’s current work in Afghanistan and Iraq appears to have 
further militarized their approach, as their employees in Iraq carry arms.164
RONCO has continued to be a favored US demining contractor -  indeed, for a long 
time RONCO was the only contractor doing US operational demining. In addition to 
State Department-funded contracts with the Slovenian International Trust Fund, RONCO 
won a five year worldwide demining contract worth up to $250 million from WRA in 
October 1999.165 Though RONCO continues to hold a prime position in US demining 
contracting, its position as market leader has been challenged in recent years by several 
other companies. UXB International has won contracts with USAID and the US military. 
Likewise, RONCO is no longer the sole holder of the primary WRA contract. Since 
2005 it has shared this with two large military contracting firms, DynCorp and 
ArmorGroup.166 These two companies, which have major private security operations, are 
significantly more militarized than RONCO, perhaps indicating the trend toward 
increasingly blurred lines between commercial demining and private security operations.
RONCO itself has been drawn into closer integration with the private security market, 
following its acquisition (along with ArmorGroup) in April 2008 by Group 4 Securicor 
(G4S), one of the world’s largest security companies.167 RONCO is now a subsidiary of 
Wackenhut Services Incorporated (WSI), itself a subsidiary of G4S. WSI provides 
“high-end armed and unarmed security personnel, paramilitary protective forces, law 
enforcement officers” and other security related services.168 Both G4S and WSI have 
controversial reputations and have been accused of human rights abuses in their work.169
163 Michael R. Gordon. (21 October 2004) “Abolishing the Iraq Army: The Fallout.” International Herald 
Tribune.
164 Kris Hundley. (5 July 2004) “Money, and Worries, in Iraq.” St Petersburg Times. 
<http://www.stpetetimes.com/2004/07/05/news_pf/Business/Money_and_worries_i.shtml>.
165 US Department of State. (20 August 1999) “State Department Statement on Mine Action Support 
Contract.” USIS Washington File. <http://canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/WF990823/epfl05.htm>.
166 US Department of State. “U.S. Department of State Awards.”
167 Group 4 Securicor. (4 April 2008) “G4S pic Acquisition of RONCO Consulting Corporation.” 
<http://www.g4s.com/home/home-news_and_media/home-news_and_media-pr.htm?id=46702>.
168 Wackenhut Services Incorporated, (n.d.) “U.S. Government Services.” <http://www.wsihq.com/>.
169 Solomon Hughes. (2007) War on Terror, Inc.: Corporate Profiteering from the Politics of Fear. 
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vi. Summary
While there is undoubtedly significant humanitarian motivation behind the US 
provision of aid for mine action, this is shaped and constrained by the country’s strategic 
interests as a military power and growing trends of privatization. Therefore, a significant 
portion of US mine action takes the form of military-to-military training or is 
implemented through private security companies. Therefore, one can argue its represents 
a rough proxy for a ‘Strategic-Commercial Complex’ of mine action.
Nevertheless, it would wrong to completely pigeonhole US mine action. For instance, 
the Leahy War Victims Fund derives from compassion for civilians affected by conflict 
and WRA provides considerable funds to mine action NGOs. Thus one observes that 
when the US has fewer strategic needs to control the process and outcomes, it is also able 
to operate in a more ‘Human Security-Civil Society’ mode.
e. The Current Structure of Norwegian Mine Action Funding
In contrast to the array of government agencies involved in US mine action funding, 
Norway’s support to mine action is led almost exclusively by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA), with no more than five key staff involved. While for a time NORAD was 
involved in providing some funding, and Norwegian troops have participated in some 
demining operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Macedonia, the vast majority of 
funding is now dispersed by MFA. Mine action funding structures and policy are 
therefore much more coherent and simple than in the US.
Since 1997, when Norway pledged $120 million over five years to mine action, its 
support has been rooted in the Ottawa Convention’s articles on stockpile destruction, 
demining and survivor assistance and concentrated in highly mine affected countries 
party to the convention.170 In 2002 Norway’s five year pledge ended, but it has indicated 
that it will continue to provide similar levels of funding. In 2006 Norway provided almost 
$36 million for mine action programs, making it the third biggest donor both in absolute
170ICBL. (1999) “Norway.”; Annette Abelsen. (26 April 2007) “Cooperation and assistance in clearing 




terms and relative to GNI.171 Twenty percent of this budget generally goes to survivor
assistance.172
Norway’s commitment to the Ottawa Convention means that it supports making 
countries ‘mine free’ rather than just ‘mine impact free.’173 While many see the ‘impact 
free’ formulation as an economically sensible approach, Norway sees it as a rhetorical 
device to undermine the Ottawa treaty. Firstly, it is not clear that budgeting money for 
mine action necessarily takes it away from other foreign aid budgets. Therefore, Norway 
believes the US argument that the diminishing returns from demining takes money from 
other humanitarian efforts is inaccurate. Moreover, they would argue that the ‘impact 
free’ formulation gives donors like the US an excuse to declare success while leaving the 
job unfinished -  with countries that are supposedly ‘impact free’ still having a significant 
mine contamination.
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In addition to technocratic criteria of efficiency and coherence, Norway’s mine action 
funding is allocated on the basis of three key principles “humanitarianism,” 
“partnerships,” and “national ownership.”175 Each of these is considered in detail below.
i. Humanitarianism
Reflecting the normative concerns of Norway’s broader foreign policy,
humanitarianism -  the allocation of resources according to need, rather than political,
171 ICBL. “Mine Action Funding.”
172 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (2006) “Norway.” Landmine Monitor 2006. 
<http://www.icbl.org/lm/2006/norway>.
173 ICBL. (2004) “Norway.”
174 Compiled by author from several Landmine Monitor reports: <http://www.icbl.org/lm>.
175 Abelsen. “Cooperation and assistance.”
145
economic or strategic priorities -  is one of the most important guiding principles of 
Norwegian mine action funding. Therefore, Norway supports demining in areas that are 
“worst affected by mines,” specifically where they “constitute unacceptable threats to the 
lives and livelihoods of civilians” or “seriously hamper the return and resettlement” of 
displaced persons.176 Hence in the table below, one sees that the countries receiving the 
most mine action funding from Norway are not necessarily strategically important.
Figure 6: Top Recipients of Norwegian Mine Action Funding, 2003.177
1 Iraq $3.0








10 Sri Lanka $0.9
This principle also guides the types of partner organizations selected to implement 
projects (see subsection below). Norway generally picks implementing agencies that at 
least claim to act on behalf of the poor and needy, rather than profit or national interest. 
Norwegian diplomats explained that implementing partners should “have some values 
which coincide”178 with the MFA and that “We think humanitarian work should be done 
according to humanitarian principles....”179 They have also made a concerted effort to
push implementing agencies to take gender issues seriously, because they feel this angle
180has been overlooked and ignored by other donors and mine action agencies.
The one political conditionality that does impact their allocation of funding is a 
preference for countries that have ratified the Ottawa Convention. However, this has not 
been applied rigidly (for example Lebanon and Sri Lanka are not signatories, nor was 
Iraq at the time of the above statistics), and Norway would argue that this conditionality 
is actually in place for the larger humanitarian ideal of eradicating landmines altogether.
177 ICBL. (2004) “Norway.” A similar breakdown is unfortunately not available for later years.
178 Yngvild Berggrav. (3 September 2007) Personal interview with author in Oslo.
179 Stig Traavik. (5 September 2007) Personal interview with the author in Oslo.
180 Berggrav. Personal interview.
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Its emphasis on humanitarianism means Norway is critical of efforts to ‘securitize’ or 
militarize mine action, saying the use of aid for “hearts and minds” builds “mistrust” in 
local population, reducing “humanitarian space.”181 This means they are also displeased 
with the power the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has over UN mine action 
efforts. Norway would prefer OCHA or UNDP, rooted in the humanitarian and 
development communities, to have more control.182
ii. Partnership
Reflecting Norway’s commitment to multilateralism and close cooperation between 
the MFA and civil society organizations, “Norway structures its support for mine 
clearance as partnerships” with host states, NGOs and UN agencies.183 Most of the 
assistance for demining programs is channeled through Norwegian People’s Aid (see 
subsection below), though the MFA also funds other NGOs such as MAG and the HALO 
Trust. Much of the assistance to mine accident survivors is channeled through the 
Tromsp Trauma Care Foundation, another Norwegian NGO, though it also supports 
groups like Landmine Survivors Network. None of its funds are dispersed through 
commercial-style tendering.184 Therefore, in comparison with US-issued tenders and 
Requests for Proposals there is much less competition for funding. As one Norwegian 
diplomat explained:
We don’t like to provide assistance money to commercial companies...they are there to make 
money and for them making money means that they will try to provide the least amount of service 
in order to maximize their profit. ... We think that NGOs have a tendency to work somewhat 
differently, that there’s a stronger sense of idealism, that they’re more committed to the task at 
hand, rather than being committed to the bottom line and the statement of accounts and 
shareholder responsibilities.185
As a result Norway has a principal-steward relationship with its implementers. It 
trusts them with long term grants (at least a year) and implicit guarantees of funding over 
long periods of time. In comparison with US funding, there is much more flexibility 
program design and reporting requirements are much less onerous. As a one diplomat 
explained, “Even though we have a dialogue with these organizations we don’t ask them
181 Susan Eckey. (3 September 2007) Personal interview with author in Oslo.
182 Kongstad. Personal interview.
183 Abelsen. “Cooperation and assistance.” x
184 Kongstad. Personal interview.
185 Braatha. Personal interview.
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to go to particular areas...or clear the mines along this road or that road. ... We’re not 
really interested in exactly where they are, as long as they do a decent job.” 186
The MFA also grants money to progressive and technical thinktanks, such as the 
Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), the Institute of Applied Social Science (FAFO), 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and advocacy 
organizations, as a way of moving the agenda and discourse on mine action in directions 
it feels to be particularly important. For instance, it has funded research on incorporating 
peacebuilding, national ownership and community participation concerns into mine 
action.187 It has also contributed to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and 
the Cluster Munitions Coalition.
Figure 7: Top Implementers of Norwegian Mine Action Funding, 2003.188
1 Norwegian People’s Aid SI  3 . 0
2 1CRC and Norwegian Red Cross $4.2
3 UN Development Programme $3.3
4 HALO Trust $1.2
5 Trauma Care Foundation/Troms0 Mine Victim Resource Center $0.9
6 Landmine Survivors Network $0.7
7 Mines Advisory Group $0.7
8 International Campaign to Ban Landmines $0.7
9 Organization of American States $0.6
10 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining $0.5
iii. National Ownership
As the Ottawa Convention gives primary responsibility for mine action to the
countries affected by mines, Norway gives priority to governments “that demonstrate and
189mobilise the political will necessary to tackle their own problem.” This does not 
necessarily mean the country has to divert significant resources to mine action, but rather 
that the government is able to develop a national plan and establish local priorities. This 
concern for local ownership of mine action planning is a major reason why Norway has
186 Traavik. Personal interview.
187 Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). (n.d.) “Assistance to Mine-Affected Communities (AMAC).” 
<http://www.prio.no/amac>.
188 Compiled by author from: ICBL. (2004) “Norway.” A similar breakdown is unfortunately not available 
for later years.
189 Abelsen. “Cooperation and assistance.”
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taken its funding for Afghanistan out of the UN Trust Fund, arguing that the UN has not 
done enough to build national governmental structures to regulate demining.190
This principle also means that Norway gives priority to “reinforc[ing] rather than 
undercut [ting] existing capacities.” 191 Implementing partners are expected to build local 
capacity and the excessive use of expatriate staff is discouraged. Nevertheless, some 
argue that Norway’s tendency to fund international NGOs actually contradicts this 
principle and that Norway should funnel more of its resources through local government 
or NGOs. Indeed, one Norwegian diplomat admitted that “It’s easier to explain to the 
Norwegian parliament that we’re providing all this money for mine clearing, if it’s a 
Norwegian entity involved.” 192
iv. Primary Implementing Partner: Norwegian People’s Aid
Like the US, Norway has a primary implementing partner -  Norwegian People’s Aid
(Norsk Folkehjelp) -  that it consistently relied upon to carry out most of its mine action 
assistance. Indeed, NPA received more funding in 2003 than the rest of the top ten 
recipients put together. Unlike RONCO, however, NPA is driven by its strong ideological 
and leftist roots, rather than commercial profit.
Created from the amalgamation of an organization that had supported the 
Republicans in the Spanish civil war and a worker’s health program, NPA is the 
humanitarian wing of the Norwegian labor movement. It has a long-standing relationship 
with the Norwegian Labor Party, which has guaranteed access to significant public funds 
-  in 2006 about 60% of NPA’s income came from Norwegian government agencies.193 
Its first program sent aid to Soviet-occupied Finland in 1940. The German occupation of 
Norway prevented NPA from engaging in major operations during the war, but after 1945 
it channeled aid for the reconstruction of Norway and began advocacy for greater social 
welfare spending. It also provided aid to war victims in Austria and contributed to 
UNICEF’s work throughout Europe.194
190 Kongstad. Personal interview.
191 Abelsen. “Cooperation and assistance.”
192 Braatha. Personal interview.
193 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). (2007) “Annual Report 2006.” 
<http://www.npaid.org/filestore/FolkehjelpEngelsk.pdf>. pp. 14,17.
194 Aid Watch. (6 March 2006) “Norwegian People’s Aid [Norsk Folkehjelp].” <http://www.observatoire- 
humanitaire.org/fusion.php?l=GB&id=75>.
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Reflecting its roots in the labor movement, NPA says its humanitarian and 
development programs are motivated by ‘solidarity’ with the poor and oppressed.195 
Therefore, its programs are largely targeted at groups considered particularly needy and 
are often linked to broader advocacy and awareness raising campaigns. However, it has 
often taken its notion of ‘solidarity’ to much more militant conclusions than most 
international NGOs. Throughout its history, NPA has believed that it “is not possible to 
be neutral” when working in conflict zones -  “Not taking a stand against oppression is 
also to take sides.”196 As a result it was the primary conduit of Norwegian support to the
1 07African ‘liberation movements’ and historically maintained close links to the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army, PLO, Eritrean government, Tamil Tigers and Sandinista 
regime. An independent evaluation of NPA found that their explicitly political stance:
facilitates access to guerilla zones...[and] has the advantage of allowing the population to own and 
evaluate aid programmes. But...NPA always risks to legitimise violence and political forces 
which are not necessarily representative and can divert humanitarian logistics to military ends.198
As outlined above, NPA’s involvement in mine action evolved out of requests that it 
support UN peacebuilding missions in Cambodia, Mozambique and Angola in the early 
1990s. Since then it has continued to expand its operations to a range of mine- 
contaminated countries, especially to places where it has felt demining could be an act of 
‘solidarity’ with a particularly oppressed group. For instance, it began a program in Iraqi 
Kurdistan in 1995, as a way of showing support to the Kurds in their struggle against the 
Iraqi government.199 Similar sentiments have motivated NPA programs in Western 
Sahara (a secessionist region of Morocco), Kosovo, Lebanon and Sri Lanka. Indeed, a 
1999 NPA strategy paper asserted that its mine action programs should be “implemented
195 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). (22 June 2003) “Solidarity: principles and value basis for Norwegian 
Peoples’s Aid.” Oslo, NPA.
196 NPA internal document quoted in: Aid Watch. “Norwegian People’s Aid.”
197 Eva Helene 0stbye. (2000) ‘The South African Liberation Struggle: Official Norwegian Support.” In: 
Eriksen (Ed.). Norway and National Liberation, pp. 148-149; Vesla Vetlesen. (2000) “Trade Union 
Support to the Struggle Against Apartheid: the Role of the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions.” In: 
Eriksen (Ed.). Norway and National Liberation, pp. 340-342.
198 Aid Watch. (6 March 2006) “Norwegian People’s Aid [Norsk Folkehjelp].” <http://www.observatoire- 
humanitaire.org/fusion .php?l=GB &id=75>.
199 Ketil Volden. (2001) “Working among a forgotten people.” A Mine-Free World is Possible. NPA (Ed.). 
Oslo, NPA. pp. 8-9.
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according to our ideological foundation and principles” including “human dignity, 
equality, solidarity, unity, peace and freedom.”200
Likewise, NPA has linked its demining operations to advocacy for bans on landmines 
and cluster munitions: “To NPA, field operations and advocacy are mutually reinforcing 
activities, both aimed at changing realities on the ground.”201 Therefore it is “engaged 
politically... to prevent the use of landmines and increasing political awareness among 
governments and the general public....”202 NPA played a critical role in lobbying the 
Norwegian government to take negotiations for a cluster munitions ban outside the CCW 
process and start the Oslo process.203
Nevertheless, the more conservative outlook of the primarily former military 
personnel staffing NPA’s demining programs has not always meshed well with the 
organization’s leftist and activist roots. Employees explained that there was a “culture 
clash” between NPA’s traditional “anti-militarist, anti-war, pacifist people” with 
backgrounds in sociology and anthropology and the ex-army people who came “crashing 
in” with the mine action program.204 As a result, there has been significant intra- 
organizational conflict over the role and nature of NPA’s mine action programs and how 
they fit into the broader framework of the organization’s work. For example, as part of a 
general effort to diversify its funding base, NPA’s mine action unit took contracts from 
Norwegian oil companies to provide mine clearance support in both Iran and Angola. 
This has not sat well with some of NPA’s other staff. During the early years, the mine 
action programs were hived off from the rest of the organization and operated almost as if 
they were an ‘NGO within an NGO.’ However, in recent years there has been both a 
pragmatic shift within the organization as a whole, and a concerted effort to integrate 
mine action into NPA’s broader strategic goals and principles.
200 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). (8 March 1999) “Strategy for Mine Action 1999-2002 for Norwegian 
People’s Aid.” In NPA archives, p. 9.
201 NPA. “NPA Humanitarian Mine Action 2007-2008.” p. 4.
202 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). (2004) “NPA Humanitarian Mine Action 2004.” Oslo, NPA.
203 NPA. “Annual Report 2006.” p. 11.
204 Breivik. (28 February 2007) Personal interview; Bach. Personal interview; Laila Nikolaisen. (4 
September 2007) Personal interview with author in Oslo.
205 Aid Watch. “Norwegian People’s Aid.”
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v. Summary
The institutional structure of Norway’s mine action funding is consistent with its 
overall foreign policy objectives of strengthening international humanitarian law and 
supporting efforts to reduce human suffering. Following the ‘Norwegian Model’ of 
foreign policy, Norway’s mine action is implemented through a network of NGOs and 
humanitarian agencies. Its primary grantee, NPA, is rooted in a leftist ideological project 
of ‘solidarity with the poor and oppressed.’ Since it is less likely to be motivated by 
concerns of material gain than companies like RONCO, NPA has the independence 
necessary to push the government to adopt more progressive stances. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this PhD, Norway’s mine action programs will used as a rough proxy of a 
‘Human Security-Civil Society Complex.’
f. Conclusion
Max Weber once argued that people are driven by material interests, but similar to a 
train running along tracks, the specific direction they go in is determined by the ideas that 
channel and shape their action. Interests are the engine of the train, ideals guide it. This 
seems an apt description of the way in which interests and ideals combine to shape US 
mine action policy. If the US government had no concern for the humanitarian effects of 
mines and UXO, it, like Russia and China, would not bother funding mine clearance or 
negotiating arms control measures. However, the strength of US strategic interests mean 
that these ideals merely shape the manner in which mine action policy is packaged and 
implemented -  they are not the driving force. As a result, the US approaches mine and 
UXO control negotiations with the intention of appearing humanitarian, while 
maintaining as many military capabilities as possible. Moreover, it distributes its mine 
action assistance largely through a network of military and commercial actors -  a 
Strategic-Commercial Complex. When strategic concerns are less important and the US 
feels it is less necessary to control the outcome, it is able to take a more idealistic 
approach, giving grants to mine action NGOs and operating in a Human-Security-Civil 
Society mode. However, it is difficult to gather the same level of political mobilization
206 Max Weber. (1958) “Religions Rejections of the World and Their Directions.” From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology. Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Trans.). New York, Oxford University 
Press, p. 280.
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within US governmental structures without the ‘fuel’ of a major strategic or commercial 
interest.
By contrast, Norway’s foreign policy seems to flip Weber’s metaphor. For Norway, 
the missionary impulse of their ideals and concern for the global public good do 
genuinely seem to be the engine of their interaction with the rest of the world, though it is 
constrained by the few genuine national interests they have. Concerning mines and UXO, 
the Norwegian government has been open to civil society pressure, overruling objections 
from its military in favor of becoming a leader in efforts to ban mines and cluster 
munitions. Similarly, Norway’s foreign assistance for mine action is distributed through 
a network of NGOs, particularly Norwegian People’s Aid, that are motivated by ideals of 
solidarity and service -  a Human Security-Civil Society Complex.
The next chapter will focus down to the level of implementation and examine how 
these two countries, and the two divergent approaches to mine action they roughly 




US and Norwegian-Funded Demining 
in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan
This chapter provides historical background to mine action in three affected countries, showing how different political structures of demining developed internally and how donors, especially the US and Norway, selected which 
systems to support. The analysis of the case histories focuses on the development of two 
broad typologies of mine action. First, the author found in each of the countries a civil 
society-driven approach, implemented generally by international NGOs that prioritized 
the humanitarian and socio-economic needs of communities and espoused a cosmopolitan 
politic. This approach was supported by Norway and fits into its broader political vision 
of collective security outlined in previous chapters. A second approach was driven by 
commercial tendering and was more integrated into the strategic and ‘national security’ 
politics of self-interested actors, both locally and internationally. This approach was often 
supported by the US, echoing the broader modus operandi of its foreign policy. In the 
case of Sudan, this approach was adopted more by the UN, which had significant 
politico-military interest in the country.
The chapter also examines three exceptions in Norwegian and US behavior: a) 
Norwegian support for Bosnian military demining b) US support for UN-led, local NGO- 
implemented demining in Taliban-era Afghanistan, and c) US support for international 
NGO-led demining in Sudan after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It accounts for 
these exceptions by arguing that when the US is strategically disengaged from a region it 
is more likely to frame its involvement as ‘humanitarian’ rather than political and
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diplomatic, and the significant, though weak, idealistic influences in US policy became 
ascendant, though underfunded.
Before continuing, there are a couple important points to note. This is, in effect, a 
political history of demining. Thus it focuses on the differing socio-political modes of 
US and Norwegian-supported demining, rather than any difference in technical methods 
(such as machines, dogs, prodding, metal detectors, etc.). Moreover, while the 
subsections analyzing the US support to mine action are generally longer than those 
about Norway, this is not because of bias or lack of information. It is because the US 
programs were generally more complicated, involving more donors (such as the State 
Department, USAID and Department of Defense) and implementing agencies.
a. Afghanistan1
Afghanistan is considered the birthplace of humanitarian mine action. In addition to 
being the oldest operation, the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) is also the 
biggest, employing almost 10,000 people at its peak. This section tells the story of three 
distinct Afghan demining programs that began at the end of the 1980s, how the UN-led 
program became ascendant and absorbed the others, and how the aftermath of September 
11 led to a major shake-up in Afghan demining. In particular, it focuses on structures 
supported by the US and Norway.
The roots of Afghan demining lie in the significant international humanitarian and 
strategic interest in Afghanistan at the end of 1980s. Following the Soviet invasion in 
1979, battles between Afghan communist government forces and the US, Saudi and 
Pakistan-backed rebels were devastating to life, infrastructure and livelihood and created 
staggering levels of mine contamination.2 While demining had always been considered a
1 A much lengthier version of this section was published as the following working paper: Matthew Bolton. 
(2008) “Goldmine? A Critical Look at the Commercialization of Afghan Demining.” Centre for the Study 
of Global Governance (LSE) Research Paper 01/2008.
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/ResearchPapers/RP_0108.pdf>.
2 For more details about the landmine situation in Afghanistan see: Survey Action Center. (2006) Landmine 
Impact Survey -  Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Takoma Park, MD, Survey Action Center. For details of 
how the landmine situation developed, see also: Lydia Monin & Andrew Gallimore. (2002) The Devil’s 
Gardens: A History of Landmines. London, Pimlico, pp. 162-163, 171; Mike Croll. (1998) The History of 
Landmines. Barnsley, UK, Leo Cooper, pp. 125-126; Shawn Roberts & Jody Williams. (1995) After the 
Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines. Washington, Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation; Defense Intelligence Agency. (1988) “Mine Warfare in Afghanistan: A Defense Research
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military issue, the high casualty rates and socio-economic blockages caused by mines 
became too big for humanitarian agencies to ignore.
i. USAID and RONCO, 1987-1994
Early US support to demining in Afghanistan developed in the context of the USAID
Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance Program (CBHA), which smuggled aid from 
Pakistan into mujahideen-controlled regions of Afghanistan.3 While cloaked in language 
of humanitarianism and providing only ‘nonlethal assistance’, the CBHA was closely 
integrated with the CIA effort supporting the mujahideen. The former CBHA director 
described USAID, the CIA and the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) as “one big 
happy family.”4
During the course of supplying American pack mules to the mujahideen to transport 
humanitarian cargo and ammunition over the mountains, USAID became concerned 
about the impact mines had on their supply lines. Therefore, in 1989, with the assistance 
of the CIA station in Bangkok, the CBHA persuaded the Thai military to help train the 
mujahideen in the use of demining dogs.5 RONCO Consulting Corporation, the 
contractor responsible for CBHA procurement and logistics, was running an Animal 
Holding Facility in Peshawar, Pakistan to train and care for the pack mules. At USAID’s 
request, RONCO expanded this to include a Mine Dog Center (MDC), training mine dog 
handlers and sending them into Afghanistan to clear roads and airstrips.6
The US continued to support MDC directly through RONCO until 1994, when it was 
reorganized as a local NGO and incorporated into the fold of the UN program (described
Assessment.” 88-DIA-0438 8G. Document 39223, Afghanistan Extras Unpublished Collection, Box 3, 
Folder 1986, George Washington University National Security Archive.
3 US Agency for International Development (USAID). (24 October 1988) “A.I.D. Strategy: Afghan 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation.” Development Experience Clearinghouse. Document PN-ABR-629. 
<http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNABR629.pdf>. p. 7; US Agency for International Development 
(USAID). (1 June 1989) “Afghanistan: Briefing for the Deputy Administrator-designate.” Development 
Experience Clearinghouse. Document PN-ABR-629. <http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNABR629.pdf>. p. 
3-4.
4 Larry Crandall. (1 July 2006) Personal interview with author in McLean, Virginia, cf. Kurt Lohbeck. 
(1993) Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA’s Secret War in Afghanistan. Washington DC, 
Regnery Gateway, p. 92.
5 Crandall. Personal interview.
6 RONCO. (18 April 1991) “Proposal to Transfer Management of MDD Program from RONCO Consulting 
Corporation to Afghan Technical Consultants, UNOCA.” Available from USAID Development Experience 
Clearinghouse. Document PD-ABJ-299. p. iii.
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below). The MDC is now the biggest mine detection dog NGO in the world.7 Because it 
was set up just as US interest in Afghanistan began to decline, MDC became a relatively 
depoliticized part of the larger UN program. However, its roots lay US covert action in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. While ostensibly a humanitarian program, it had also acted in 
support of a paramilitary campaign and was run by a commercial contractor.
ii. The HALO Trust, 1987-1994
The many international NGOs involved in providing aid to the Afghans in the 1980s
were also fully aware of the threat mines and UXO posed both to their own workers and 
the people they served, and began seeking ways to mitigate it. However, only one 
international NGO, the Hazardous Area Life-support Organisation (HALO) Trust 
developed a sustained, long-term mine clearance program in Afghanistan. Now one of 
the largest demining organizations in the world, the HALO Trust was set up by ex-British 
Army officers Colin Mitchell and Guy Willoughby, who had both worked in Afghanistan 
and were shocked at the humanitarian impact of mines. Rather than leaving it to the 
military, they felt demining should be “an act of charity.”8 Following an assessment in 
1988, they recruited Kabuli doctor Farid Homayoun and set up an office in communist- 
controlled Kabul.9 With ex-British Army volunteers, many of whom learned mine- 
clearing in the Falklands War, HALO began its nascent demining program in 1989.10
Since HALO was the only demining group and one of very few western NGOs that 
coordinated its efforts with the communist government, some NGOs saw their work as 
‘aiding the enemy.’ However, Willoughby, who was influenced by the ‘impartiality and 
neutrality’ doctrine of the Red Cross, felt that since the area around Kabul was the most 
heavily mined, HALO should focus where it could have the most humanitarian impact. 
This contrasted with the US-supported MDC and the UN-created NGOs that only worked 
in mujahideen-controlled regions. In order to bolster its credibility as a neutral third
7 Dan Hayter. (April 2003) ‘The Evolution of Mine Detection Dog Training.” Journal of Mine Action.
7(1). <http://maic.jmu.edU/journal/7.l/features/hayter/hayter.htm>; Margaret Buse. (June 2000) “RONCO 
Executives Talk About Demining, Integration and the IMAS Contract: (An Interview with Lawrence 
Crandall, Stephen Edelmann and A. David Lundberg).” Journal of Mine Action. 4(2). 
<http://maic.jmu.edii/joumal/4.2/Features/ronco/ronco.htm>.
8 Guy Willoughby. (21 September 2007) Personal interview with author in Thornhill, Scotland.
9 Farid Homayoun. (19 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
10 HALO Trust. (2 November 2006) “The HALO Trust Afghanistan.” PowerPoint Presentation given to 
author by Dr. Farid Homayoun. Slide 7; Homayoun. Personal interview.
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party, in 1990 the UN decided to also support HALO’s demining in communist- 
controlled areas and HALO has continued to be a UN implementing partner ever since. It 
has since grown into the biggest demining agency in Afghanistan, with some 2,800 staff.
iii. The UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan, 1989-1994
In 1988, the US and USSR signed the Geneva Accords, aimed at ending hostilities in
Afghanistan and the Soviets withdrew in 1989. Anticipating large-scale refugee return, 
the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) launched a massive 
program of assistance to Afghanistan, dubbed Operation Salam, which included a Mine 
Clearance Programme.11 Initially, this consisted of military personnel from several 
Western countries, including the US and Norway, training Afghan refugees to clear 
mines voluntarily when they returned home.12 However, this effort failed miserably, 
marked by “a good deal of confusion”, “lack of communication” and a “lack of planning 
at all levels.”13
After a “radical rethink,”14 OCHA developed a formal and specialized institutional 
structure to coordinate and implement demining in Afghanistan. OCHA would fund, 
coordinate and supervise the program and provide expatriate technical advisors to several 
local NGO implementing partners and the HALO Trust, through a Pakistan-based office 
called the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA). These NGOs and 
UNMACA, their supervisor and funder, were known collectively as the UN Mine Action 
Program for Afghanistan (MAPA).
The early expatriate military officers seconded as technical advisors to MAPA were 
from non-Communist states and were interested in learning about Soviet mine warfare.15 
Moreover, some of the Afghan NGOs, for a time, were associated with political 
factions.16 However, as mujahideen parties began fighting each other, following the
11 UNOCA. (December 1988) Operation Salam News. 1.
12 UNOCA. (1992) “UNOCA Demining Programme.” Document PC-AAA-509. USAID Development 
Experience Clearinghouse, pp. 2, 7.
13 Demining Headquarters Peshawar and Quetta. (1990) “1990 Annual Reports: Demining Headquarters 
Peshawar and Quetta.” Document PC-AAA-512. USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse, p. 17.
14 Martin Barber. (28 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
15 Ibid.
16 Robert Eaton, Chris Horwood & Norah Niland. (1997) Afghanistan: The Development of Indigenous 
Mine Action Capacities. New York, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs Lessons Learned Unit. p. 14, 
footnote 13.
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collapse of the communist government, OCHA was determined to maintain neutrality 
from factions.17 Using NGOs for implementation was seen as a better alternative to 
“carv[ing] it out for international commercial companies to make a lot of money out o f ’18 
and a way to keep the program out of the sphere of political contestation until an 
internationally recognized government sat in Kabul.
iv. UN Hegemony and the Taliban Era, 1994-2001
After the communist government fell in 1992 and the Soviet Union collapsed, the US
lost interest in Afghanistan as a strategic priority. Therefore, the CBHA pulled out in 
1994. MDC was reorganized as a local NGO and incorporated into the MAPA. The US 
continued to fund Afghan demining at a level of about $1 to 3 million a year from 1994 
to 2001, but channeled and coordinated all its assistance through the MAPA.19 Unlike 
the partisan spirit of the CBHA, the MDC, like the other Afghan NGOs, “established a 
working relationship with all sides”20 in the ongoing conflict between the mujahideen 
parties.
The HALO Trust, since it was largely funded through the UN system, also became 
subsumed under the MAPA umbrella, though it was “highly resistant to coordination by 
UNOCHA.”21 An uneasy truce developed, analogous to a ‘federal’ system, where HALO 
was under the UN umbrella, but had more autonomy that the local mine action NGOs. 
Thus from 1994 to 2001, the system remained largely unchanged and unchallenged.
The rise of the Taliban in 1997 posed some difficulties; they objected to the 
employment of women as mine awareness instructors and harshly persecuted some non- 
Pastun deminers. However, most mine action agencies had tolerable relations with them. 
Security for deminers improved considerably as the Taliban cracked down on warlordism 
and violent crime. The Taliban, like many Afghans, viewed demining as a continuation 
of the jihad against the Soviets and were largely supportive, even donating land to some 
of the NGOs. The Taliban also used few mines and in 1998 publicly backed a ban on
17 UNOCHA (1993) “Afghanistan: Mine Clearance Programme for 1993: Annual Report 1992.” Document 
PC-AAA-511. USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse, p. 6.
18 Barber. Personal interview.
19 UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan. (UNMACA). (2006) “Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan 
(MAPA) funding 1994 /  2004 - Voluntary Trust Fund and Bilateral funds.” Excel spreadsheet given to 
author.
20 Mohammed Shohab Hakimi. (6 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
21 Eaton, Horwood & Niland. Afghanistan.
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them. The Northern Alliance, fighting a defensive war against the Taliban, continued to 
use mines extensively, but they too were largely supportive of the demining program in 
areas of low strategic importance. 22 The MAPA’s perceived neutrality was critical in 
maintaining its ability to work extensively all over the country.
However, due to the international isolation of the Taliban regime, the UN found it 
difficult to expand the program. Afghanistan had fallen off the strategic maps of the 
great powers. Donors were reluctant to engage too deeply with an Islamist regime linked 
to international terrorism. The political climate following the bombings of US embassies 
in East Africa in 1998 and subsequent US missile strikes on Afghanistan made it 
especially difficult to secure funding. Nevertheless, both the US and Norway maintained 
small commitments of funds to the UN-led MAPA throughout this period.
v. The 9/11 Sea Change
After seven years of disengagement from the country, September 11, 2001 put
Afghanistan back on the US geo-political map. Unlike in the 1980s, when the US mainly 
operated through Pakistani interlocutors from the safety of Islamabad, US agencies now 
involved themselves directly in Afghan politics. While they were relatively hands-off in 
comparison to their participation in Bosnia, Kosovo or Iraq, US involvement was 
unprecedented as far as Afghanistan was concerned. Other developed countries, including 
Norway, followed America’s lead, increasing their foreign aid contributions to 
Afghanistan substantially. The graphs below shows how US and Norwegian assistance in 
general, and demining assistance in particular, ramped up suddenly after 2002.
22 For an analysis of Taliban and North Alliance attitudes on landmines see: Geneva Call. (2005) Armed 
Non-State Actors and Landmines. Geneva, Program for the Study of International Organization(s). pp. 65- 
67. See also: Shalini Chawla. (June 2000) “Diffusion of Landmines in Afghanistan.” Strategic Analysis: A 
Monthly Journal of the IDSA. 24(3). <http://www.ciaonet.Org/olj/sa/sa_jun00chs01.html#note8>.
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As one might expect, the sudden new international interest in Afghanistan led to the 
explosive growth of the MAPA. The following graph shows how quickly the program 
grew post-9/11.
Figure 2: Contributions to UN Mine Action, 1991-2005.24
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23 US Agency for International Development (USAID). (2006) “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 
[Greenbook].” <http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/>. Statistics Norway. (2007) “Public expenditure on 
development aid etc. Bilateral and multi-bi assistance, by recipient countries. NOK million.” 
<http://www.ssb.no/english/yearbook/tab/tab-481.html>. Donation data from: UNMACA. “Mine Action 
Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) funding.”
24 Donation data from: UNMACA. “Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) funding.”
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At the same time, funding modalities for demining multiplied. The staggering 
increase and diversification of funds led to demands for reform and greater scrutiny. One 
of the major policy shifts, in 2004, was an UNMACA decision to allow the accreditation 
of commercial companies interested in the new demand for military and commercial 
reconstruction tasks. The rationale given by UNMACA and donors was that the new 
Afghan NGO Law forbade NGOs from bidding directly on commercial reconstruction 
tasks.25 However, some have argued that this problem could have been circumvented by 
donors channeling money for demining as separate grants coordinated with 
reconstruction work (rather than commercial tenders) through the UN system. It is more 
likely that the decision was made as a result of pressure from the US and that UN Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS), located in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, took 
over management of UNMACA from OCHA in June 2002. OCHA, rooted in the 
humanitarian aid world, had a bias toward using aid agencies like NGOs. UNMAS, on 
the other hand, has tended to contract out its operations through the UN Office of Project 
Services (UNOPS) and was more open to commercial demining.
Despite its efforts, however, neither the US nor the Norwegian government have been 
fully satisfied with UNMACA’s reform. USAID’s demining coordinator, Dean Hutson, 
said he saw UNMACA as a “broken” and “failed organization.”26 Both the US and 
Norway have chosen to direct their demining funding outside the UN system, but for 
different reasons and in different directions. The divergence in the US and Norwegian 
post-9/11 approaches derives from their differing interests in and perspectives of the 
situation in Afghanistan.
vi. US-Driven Commercialization and Militarization
The US foreign policy community sees Afghanistan as a location of immense
strategic importance in the Global War on Terror. Thus US aid to the country has 
bolstered broader strategic objectives of promoting political stability, countering the
25 Article 8 prohibits NGOs from “Participation in construction projects and contracts” except in 
“exceptional cases” when the Minister of Economy “may issue special permission at the request of the 
Chief of the Diplomatic Agency of the donor country.” Government of Afghanistan. (June 2005) “Law on 
Non-Governmental Organizations.” Official Gazette. 857/2005.
<http://www.usig.org/countryinfo/laws/Afghanistan/Afghan%20NGO%20Law%20Final%20ENG%20(10.
July.05).pdf>.
26 Dean Hutson. (30 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
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blooming narcotics trade and building support for counterinsurgency efforts. The first 
paragraph of USAID’s current Strategic Plan for Afghanistan asserts that it is “a critical 
partner” in the “fight against terrorism and tyranny.”27
The US post-9/11 strategic interest in Afghanistan has also shaped its demining 
funding. Initially, USAID channeled its new funding for reconstruction demining 
through the UN system and RONCO was contracted by the State Department to build the 
capacity of the Afghan NGOs.28 However, a parallel structure also began to emerge, with 
a growing commercialization, politicization and militarization of US demining funding. 
This derived from the following factors:
Firstly, the US military worried that mines could hinder its mission. When occupying 
the massive former Soviet military bases at Bagram and Kandahar, US forces found high
90levels of mine and UXO contamination but lacked demining capacity. In April 2002,
30four US soldiers were killed in explosive ordnance disposal operations in Kandahar. 
Thus, the US State Department asked RONCO, which returned to Afghanistan after an 
eight year absence in 2002, to assist military engineers in demining Bagram and 
Kandahar air bases. Moreover, RONCO helped the US Army develop its first mine dog 
teams deployed since the wars in Indochina.31
Though RONCO lost its position as the sole commercial demining company in 
Afghanistan in 2004, it has continued to do military demining at bases and airfields, 
winning a $16.4 million three year contract with the US Army in 2007.32 Several other 
companies also do military-related mine/UXO tasks. For instance, UXB International, on
27 US Agency for International Development (USAID). (May 2005) “USAID/Afghanistan Strategic Plan: 
2005-2010.” <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/afghanistan/Afghanistan_2005- 
2010_Strategy.pdf>. pp. 1,5.
28 John Lundberg. (August 2005) “Reflecting on 10 Years of RONCO Operations in Mine Action.” 
Journal of Mine Action. 9(1).
29 John L.Wilkinson. (December 2002) “Demining During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.” 
Journal of Mine Action. 6(3). <http://maic.jmu.edU/JOURNAL/6.3/notes/wilkinson/wilkinson.htm>.
30 Arlington National Cemetery Website. “Justin Joseph Galewski.” 
<http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jjgalewski.htm>.
31 Lundberg. “Reflecting on 10 Years of RONCO Operations.”; RONCO. (April 2003) “Mine Detection 
Dogs: An Integral Tool in RONCO Mine Clearance Operations” Journal of Mine Action. 7(1).
<http:// maic .j mu.edu/j oumal/7.1 /features/ronco/ronco .htm>.
32 US Department of Defense. (28 March 2007) “Contracts.”
<http://www.defenselink.mi l/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3483>.
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sub-contract to DynCorp, provided demining and explosive ordnance disposal services to 
US-funded forced poppy eradication efforts.33
Secondly, the US was concerned about the enormous caches of unsecured munitions, 
including mines, scattered around the country -  a potential bonanza for the insurgency, 
terrorist networks, drug traffickers and warlords. As part of its State Department contract, 
RONCO developed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams to clear strike zones and 
arms caches.34 RONCO cites the following anecdote as one of its success stories:
When the coalition airfield at Kandahar came under numerous rocket attacks in early 2004, 
regional authorities requested RONCO deploy its teams to clear up munitions sites in the area 
surrounding the base. Clearance operations lasted five months, and since their completion, there 
have been no significant rocket attacks.35
After August 2005, this contract went to DynCorp (and subcontractor UXB) and 
included support for destroying small arms, anti-aircraft rockets and other ordnance.36
Thirdly, increasing US demining support reflected a general growth in US funding for 
reconstruction, aimed at building US political capital in the country. USAID’s “largest 
project category” is road building,37 seen by the US government as a way to increase 
NATO and US access to remote regions. As one US commander put it, “where the roads 
end, the Taliban begin.”38
USAID decided in July 2006 that it would no longer fund UN-led, NGO- 
implemented demining, instead prime reconstruction contractors would subcontract 
needed tasks to commercial demining companies. In September 2006, USAID awarded a 
five year $1.4 billion energy, water and transportation infrastructure contract to Louis 
Berger Group, Inc. and Black & Veatch Special Projects Corp39 and in August 2007, 
issued a Request for Applications for a further $400 million to construct “Strategic
33 Colin Wanley. (30 October 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
34 Lundberg. “Reflecting on 10 Years of RONCO Operations.”; RONCO. “Mine Detection Dogs.”; Robert 
Gannon. (20 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
35 Lundberg. “Reflecting on 10 Years of RONCO Operations.”
36 Anonymous. (8 September 2005) “DynCorp International to Remove Land Mines In Afghanistan.” 
Business Wire. <http://www.findarticles.eom/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2005_Sept_8/ai_nl5375022>. The 
US has also provided funding to the HALO Trust for weapons destruction.
37 Kenneth Katzman. (10 September 2007) “Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S.
Policy.” CRS Report for Congress. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf>. p. 20.
38 George W. Bush. (15 February 2007) “President Bush Discusses Progress in Afghanistan, Global War on 
Terror.” <http://www.state.gOv/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/80548.htm>.
39 US Agency for International Development (USAID). (22 September 2006) “USAID Awards $1.4 Billion 
Contract for Infrastructure in Afghanistan.” <http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2006/pr060922.html>.
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Provincial Roads” in South and East Afghanistan -  those areas most affected by 
insurgencies.40 It is understood that a sizable portion of both these contracts will be sub­
contracted for demining and battle area clearance. This arguably erodes the needs-based 
prioritization of demining assets in favor of strategically important tasks.
Finally, the commercialization of demining reflects a broader trend in US security 
and development policy. In Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, the US military has 
outsourced many of its core functions to private contractors.41 Moreover, USAID’s 
overall economic strategy for Afghanistan relies on encouraging private sector-led 
growth through liberalization and privatization42 This is applied both to Afghan 
institutions and to USAID’s own services, which have shifted from grants to contracts.43 
Privatizing the functions of public service institutions like the MAPA was seen as a way 
of correcting dysfunctions, by introducing standards of competition and transparency. 
USAID demining coordinator Dean Hutson said:
We don’t want to babysit this country for the next twenty years, we want this country to stand up 
on its own, with its own business, its own private enterprise. ... We don’t want this to be a non­
stop, continuing welfare operation where we just hand out money to do it.44
Therefore, while the US State Department continues to fund and provide technical 
assistance to the Afghan NGOs through DynCorp in 2005, part of this program’s 
emphasis has shifted to assisting the local Afghan NGOs spin off commercial 
operations.45 Moreover, the US State Department has agreed to allow equipment donated 
to local NGOs to be used by local commercial companies, if the NGOs have a surplus of
40 US Agency for International Development (USAID). (1 August 2007) “Strategic Provincial Roads-South 
& East Afghanistan (SPR-SEA).”
<http://www07.grants.gov/search/search.do;jsessionid=Gk3 WKnGGcWJ24tbJ 19hMgy51 KwXFPgJ 1695s7 
cgQ5XtLpJhHczyY!696297004?oppId=14852&flag2006=true&mode=VIEW >.
41 The best overviews of the role of private military companies are: Deborah D. Avant. (2005) The Market 
for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; P.W. 
Singer. (2004) Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press. Other sources include: Robert Young Pelton. (2006) Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on 
Terror. New York, Crown Publishers; Gerald Schumacher. (2006) A Bloody Business: America's War 
Zone Contractors and the Occupation of Iraq. St. Paul, Minnesota, Zenith Press.
42 USAID. “USAID/Afghanistan Strategic Plan: 2005-2010.” p. 7.
43 Chris Johnson & Jolyon Leslie. (2004) Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace. London, Zed Books, p. 106.
44 Hutson. Personal interview.
45 Lloyd Carpenter. (21 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
165
equipment.46 Meanwhile several private corporations, such as the mobile 
telecommunications firm Roshan, have begun to contract commercial clearance.
As a result of this liberalization and deregulation, at the time of the author’s fieldwork 
there were seven international commercial companies involved in mine action and three 
local start-ups. Many of the international companies had other divisions that were 
providing security services and several companies’ staff also carried arms.
vii. Norway’s Support to the HALO Trust
Norwegian interest in Afghanistan also increased precipitously after 9/11, prompted
largely by its commitment to NATO. Afghanistan, according to the Norwegian Minister 
of Defense, is Norway’s “most important international operation.”47 For the first time in 
its history, Norway deployed troops outside Europe on a non-UN mission, facing real 
combat. Since 2001, Norway has contributed both to the US-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom48 and the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). From 
February 2006, all its troops all came under ISAF command and were deployed largely in 
northern Afghanistan, centered around Mazar-i-Sharif. It retained a small Special Forces 
counterterrorism capacity around Kabul.49
Like the US, Norway supported the UN-led demining program till 2002, but soon 
became frustrated. Its objections to UNMACA, however, were very different. It felt that 
the massive expansion of UNMACA’s international staff after 2002 undermined the 
possibilities of transferring the responsibility for demining to a local institution -  a policy 
Norway felt would be more democratic, more sustainable and less expensive.50 At the 
same time however, Norway also felt uneasy about the transparency of the local Afghan 
NGOs. Therefore, in 2003, Norway began giving its Afghan demining funds to the
46 Cranfield University. (December 2006) “Minutes of the Strategic Organizational development 
Workshop.” p. 7-8. Document given to author.
47 Anne-Grethe Strpm-Erichsen. (January 2007) “Norway’s Interests in the North.” Norwegian Defence 
Review: Status of Norwegian Defence 2007. p. 7.
48 Tom Robertsen. (2007) “Making New Ambitions Work: The Transformation of Norwegian Special 
Operations Forces.” Defence and Security Studies (Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies). 1/2007. pp. 
42, 59,61.
49 Jan Reksten. (January 2007) “International Operations -  Where Are We Now?” Norwegian Defence 
Review: Status of Norwegian Defence 2007. pp. 26-28.
50 Stig Traavik. (5 September 2007) Personal interview with the author in Oslo.
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HALO Trust, which is largely run by Afghans, but conforms to international standards of 
accounting and reporting.
The Norwegian ISAF contribution has included a mine clearance unit which did some 
limited demining efforts for military purposes51 and HALO’s main area of operation -  
Kabul and northern Afghanistan -  corresponds to the deployment of Norwegian troops 
and where most Norwegian aid is directed. However, Norwegian diplomats insist that 
they maintain a clear separation between the humanitarian nature of demining and the 
politico-military objectives of the NATO mission. Multiple officials denied HALO was 
supported because they were working in similar areas as Norwegian troops, and 
denounced the tendency to blur the lines between humanitarian and security objectives. 
Other Norwegian aid projects are also kept separate from military efforts, with 
implementation left to the World Bank, UN and NGOs.52
Thus it is likely that Norway supports the HALO Trust for reasons other than 
potential strategic gains. The Norwegian government prefers giving demining funds to 
international NGOs since they tend to have greater standards of financial accountability. 
Other than Danish Demining Group, which is new to Afghanistan, HALO Trust is the 
only such group in the country. Moreover, HALO, as the biggest operational demining 
organization in Afghanistan, has a good reputation, is able to leverage other funding and 
gains from economies of scale. Though HALO is an international NGO and rotates a few 
expatriate technical advisors through the program, its country director, Dr. Farid, is from 
Kabul and all the rest of its 2,800 staff are Afghans. It thus embodies the kind of local 
ownership the Norwegians wish to see UNMACA adopt.
Finally, HALO’s organizational culture is in line with the kind of humanitarianism 
Norway wishes to support in Afghanistan. In contrast to the private demining companies,
51 News of Norway. (16 January 2002) “Additional Norwegian support for Afghanistan.” 
<http://www.norway.org/News/archive/2001/200105afghanistan.htm>; US Department of Defense. 
(February 2002) “Multinational Effort Aims to Rid War-torn Afghanistan of Mines.” Defend America. 
<http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/feb2002/a021902b.html>.
52 Royal Norwegian Embassy in Kabul. (2007) “Norwegian led PRT in Faryab.” 
<http://www.norway.org.af/prt/faryab/>. Nonetheless, the following report questioned whether Norway 
was doing enough to draw a clear line between military and civilian activities: Petter Bauck, Arne Strand, 
Mohammad Hakim and Arghawan Akbari. (2007) “Afghanistan: An Assessment of Conflict and Actors in 




HALO works hard to cultivate ‘humanitarian space’ for mine clearance: “The important 
thing is to keep neutrality, so you are not seen as pro this or against that group,” said Dr 
Farid. “That’s the key thing -  having a neutral, impartial humanitarian organization.”
viii. Summary
In sum, the origins of Afghan humanitarian mine action offered three alternative 
models of organizing demining:
1) Demining in support of broader US security objectives, contracted through a 
private company (the RONCO/MDC program),
2) International NGO mine action claiming political neutrality (the HALO 
Trust),
3) UN coordinated mine action, implemented by local NGOs and also claiming 
political neutrality (the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan).
From 1994 to 2001, the UN-led model was ascendant and supported by both Norway 
and the US. However, US re-engagement in Afghan politics after 9/11 saw it return to a 
‘securitized’ and commercialized model. In contrast, objecting to the massive top-heavy 
growth of UNMACA, Norway switched to funding the HALO Trust in order to support 
an Afghan-led civil-society actor espousing traditional humanitarian values.
b. Bosnia and Herzegovina54
i. Background
Following the 1995 endgame of Bosnia’s war, the frontlines dividing Bosnian 
Government territory from its separatist statelets -  the ‘Republika Srpska’, ‘Herzeg- 
Bosna’ and the ‘Bihac pocket’ -  were littered with extremely high levels of mine and 
UXO contamination.55 Reflecting the little experience the US negotiators had of mines,
53 Homayoun. Personal interview.
54 This section, though substantially rewritten and paraphrasing Hugh Griffiths’ contributions, draws 
largely on: Matthew Bolton & Hugh Griffiths. (September 2006) Bosnia’s Political Landmines: A Call for 
Socially Responsible and Conflict-Sensitive Mine Action. London, Landmine Action. It also draws on the 
author’s Master’s thesis: Matthew Bolton. (2005) “Bosnia’s Political Landmines: Privatized Demining, 
Patronage Machines and the Security Functions of Aid.” Unpublished dissertation submitted for MSc 
Development Studies (Research) at the London School of Economics and Political Science.
55 For an extremely detailed look at Bosnia’s mine problem, see: Darvin Lisica. (2006) Risk Management in 
Mine Action Planning. Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Civil Affairs & Norwegian People’s 
Aid. pp. 42-45, 62-94.
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the Dayton peace agreement required factions to clear all their minefields in 30 days.56 
This was a ludicrous deadline, given the heavy contamination and lack of accurate 
minefield maps.
It quickly became clear that demining required a long, intensive effort and significant 
international funding. In early 1996, a Bosnian Mine Protection and Removal Agency 
(MPRA) was set up to oversee mine action. This was soon embroiled in political 
contestation and was replaced by a new system. The highest Bosnian mine action 
authority became the Demining Commission, with three Commissioners, each 
representing a ‘constituent ethnic group’ (Bosniak, Serb and Croat). This was advised 
and assisted by an internationally staffed UN Mine Action Center (UNMAC), set up in 
May 1996, which also gathered data and conducted quality assurance inspections. 
UNMAC was localized in 1998 as the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center 
(BHMAC), which became the coordinating body, accreditation and quality assurance 
authority and data depository for Bosnian mine action, with counterpart Entity Mine 
Action Centers (EMACs) in the Federation and Republika Srpska. In 2002, following the 
passage of a Law on Demining, BHMAC was reorganized to incorporate both the 
EMACs.57
The vast majority of mine action funding was provided by international donors and 
implemented by a diverse set of local and international actors. As per their obligations 
under the peace agreement, the militaries of both of Bosnia’s decentralized entities -  the 
Federation (populated mostly by Bosniaks and Croats) and Republika Srpska (populated 
mostly by Serbs) -  have performed a significant proportion of demining in Bosnia. Local 
civil protection units, responsible for disaster preparedness and civil defense, have taken 
responsibility for small tasks and explosive ordnance disposal. Private actors, 
international and local commercial companies and NGOs, have also played a large role.
56 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (14 December 1995) “Annex 1A: 
Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement.” 
<http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=368>. Article IV, 2e.
57 Lisica. Risk Management, pp. 115-150; Financial Police Head Inspectors Office Sarajevo. (12 December 
2000) “Prvi Izvejestaj: O utvrdenim cinjenicama I prikupljenim dokazima u postupku istrage, nacina 
raspolaganja sredstvima namijenjenim programima deminiranja u Bosni i Hercegovini odnosno Federaciji 
Bosne i Hercegovine, zloupotrebama utvrdenim u dosadasnjem toku istrage te njihovim nosiocima.” (“First 
report: On established facts and gathered evidence during the investigation on ways of handling funds 
meant for demining programs in BiH, that is FBiH, abuses proved during the investigation and on their 
perpetrators.”) Sarajevo, Ministry of Finance. Obtained by author, pp. 2-10.
169
This section on Bosnia will not cover the history of all these actors and their programs; it 
will focus solely on those funded by the US and Norway.
ii. US Military Demining Programs
Though through most of early 1990s the US carefully avoided getting involved in the
wars of Yugoslav succession, growing pressure from human rights groups and concerns 
about the credibility of the US and NATO’s ‘security blanket’ in Europe provoked the 
US into leading robust NATO intervention in 1995.58 The Bush administration has 
slowly disengaged from the region, prompted by military overstretch elsewhere and 
replaced by a growing EU presence. However, during the late 1990s, the US staked a 
great deal of its superpower credibility on the success of the peace agreement it had 
brokered, deploying 16,000 troops to Bosnia and establishing one of the largest CIA 
stations in the region.59 As in Afghanistan, the US strategic stake in Bosnian stabilization 
shaped its support for demining programs.
From a military perspective, landmines posed a major threat to US troops stationed in 
Bosnia -  the first US casualty of the NATO peacekeeping mission fell to a landmine.60 
Therefore, the US military saw mines as “the greatest threat to force protection and the 
success of the mission.”61 US troops gathered information about mines in their area of 
operation and were mandated by Dayton to monitor the entity militaries’ efforts to meet 
clearance obligations.
The US security agencies also realized that cooperation with the entity armies in mine 
action could provide them with valuable intelligence and assist in transforming the 
Bosnian militaries from being a security threat into potential future NATO contributors. 
The US and NATO saw demining and explosive ordnance disposal as a possible 
contribution the Bosnian military could offer NATO, if it became a member.62 While
58 For details on the US intervention, see: Richard Holbrooke. (1999) To End a War. New York, Random 
House; Brendan Simms. (2003) Unfmest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia. New Ed. New York, 
Penguin Global.
59 Tracy Wilkinson. (11 November 1997) “In Bosnia, U.S. Creeps Deeper.” Los Angeles Times, p. A1.
60 Philip P. Pan. (31 December 1995) “Rockville Man Is First American Injured in Bosnian Peace 
Mission.” The Washington Post. p. A24.
61 Jacquetta A. Dunmyer & Adele Nicholson. (1996) “A Note on the Operational Environment in Bosnia.” 
Drawing a Line in the Mud. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Center for Army Lessons Learned. 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_96-5_seclzos.htm>.
62 HQ SFOR. (August 2003) “A Joint Demining Battalion for BiH: A Proposal for the Reorganisation of 
Armed Forces Demining in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” Unpublished document obtained by author. See also:
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some countries were nervous about directly training the entity armed forces in anything, 
the US decided to train and equip the Bosnian military demining units.63 In 1997, 55 US 
Special Forces troops, supported by RONCO, trained 450 personnel from the entity 
armed forces in basic demining.64 Both Johnson65 and Priest66 have described how US 
Special Forces training opens doors for the US to gain influence with the host country
fnarmed forces. The next year, the US Defense Department expanded its efforts, training 
71 military demining instructors and building three military demining academies (one for 
each ‘constituent people’)68 -  “because they didn’t want to be trained together.”69 With 
encouragement from the US, Bosnia deployed a multiethnic military demining unit to 
Iraq as a part of the “Coalition of the Willing” in 2005, showing that the US’ investment 
in training the Bosnian military had reaped a small strategic return.70
ii. US Civilian Demining Programs
The US poured millions of dollars into Bosnian reconstruction efforts, attempting to
create noticeable benefits from a ‘peace dividend.’ Much of this focused on creating 
conditions for the return of displaced persons. A keystone of Dayton’s legitimacy, 
preventing it from becoming a crude ethnic partition, was the return process. In terms of 
economic reconstruction, as it did throughout Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union, the US encouraged the privatization and liberalization of Bosnia’s centrally 
planned economy. As a result, most US support for Bosnian demining focused on return 
areas and infrastructure projects and operated in a variety of commercial tendering 
frameworks.
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (June 2005) Defense White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 31-33.
63 Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). (June 2003) The Role of the Military 
in Mine Action. Geneva, GICHD.
<http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Role_Military_MA.pdf>. p. 37.
64 Ibid.
65 Chalmers Johnson. (2004) The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic. 
New York, Metropolitan Books, pp. 124, 132-134.
66 Dana Priest. (2004) The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America’s Military. New York, 
W.W. Norton and Company, p. 75.
67 Johnson. Sorrows of Empire, pp. 124.
68 GICHD. Role of the Military, p. 39.
69 Tom Smith. (August 2006) Personal interview with author in Crystal City, Virginia.
70 Mine.ba. (21 September 2007) “Thirty-Six Members of BiH Armed Forces Travel to Iraq.” 
<http://mine.ba/?PID=7&RID=64>; Reuters. (15 April 2005) “Bosnia to send explosives unit to Iraq in 
June.” <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACIO-6BGJTC7OpenDocument>.
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For example, USAID funded demining through its infrastructure programs, which 
“focused on restoring electric power, water, sanitation, shelter, schools and other public 
services”71 in minority return areas. Many of these projects were “developed in 
cooperation with the U.S. Army and implemented in the U.S. Army SFOR Area of 
Operation.”72 Parsons, an engineering firm acting as prime contractor for these projects, 
subcontracted management of any necessary demining work to UXB International, an 
American demining company. UXB subcontracted much of the work to local companies. 
UXB also did some demining for corporate clients, including the energy company 
Energoinvest.
The local firms dominant at the beginning of Bosnian mine action were created in 
1996 and 1997 when the US State Department contracted RONCO to train three 
‘demining units’ -  one Serb, one Croat and one Bosniak. These units were transformed 
by local entrepreneurs into the companies UNIPAK (Serb), SI/OKTOL (Bosniak) and 
DECOP (Croat). In 1999, the State Department also assisted in the creation of three 
local NGOs, again along ethnic lines: STOP Mines (Serb), BH Demining (Bosniak) and 
PROVITA (Croat). In addition to small grants to help them start up, they were given 
sole-sourced (non-competitive) contracts from the State Department through the ITF for 
the first few years of their operation, though these were later turned into competitive 
tenders.73 Many other local commercial companies and NGOs soon developed.
From late 1996, the World Bank, funded in part by the State Department, contracted 
14 commercial companies to implement its demining program in Bosnia. Over 60% of 
the project funds went to two international contractors -  Mine Tech International and 
RONCO Consulting Corporation.74 Mine Tech teamed up with UNIPAK and worked in 
the Republika Srpska; RONCO worked with SI/OKTOL and DECOP in the Federation. 
Mine Tech left Bosnia in 1998, and RONCO took over as the main intermediary between
71 UXB Balkans. (2006) “UXB Balkans d.o.o.” Unpublished document given to author by UXB Sarajevo 
office.
72 Parsons Global Services, Inc. (October 2004) “Community Reintegration and Stabilization Program 
(CRSP) in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Final Progress Report.” USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse, 
Document No. PD-ACF-581. Available from <http://www.dec.org>. p. 4.
73 Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). (November 2004) A Study of Local 
Organisations in Mine Action. Geneva, GICHD.
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&id=26816>. pp. 164-166.
74 Nick van Praag. (2004) Email correspondence with Hugh Griffiths. Shown to author in June 2005. Van 
Praag was responsible for external affairs for the Europe and Central Asia Region at the World Bank.
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international donors and the three main local companies until 2000. RONCO claims 
credit for shaping SI/OKTOL, UNIPAK and DECOP into viable commercial operations 
and ran its demining operations through them.75 Actual contracting and tasking was 
handled by Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in each of the entities, staffed by the 
entity government, which administered World Bank money.
This system became extremely controversial, with reports of local “cowboy
7 f\companies” using government connections to gain contracts. Indeed owners of the local 
companies, several of whom had links with war criminals and organized crime, had deep 
familial and political ties to key persons in the government.77 The World Bank, 
concerned with the extent of corruption, terminated its demining funding in 1999; an 
internal evaluation of damned it “Highly Unsatisfactory.”78 In summer 2000 Bosnian 
Financial Police raided the offices of several demining companies, including RONCO. 
As a result of these investigations, the three Demining Commissioners were removed 
from office in October 2000 by the Bosnia’s international High Representative, citing 
“misuse of office,” “breach of public trust” and “widespread conflict of interest.”79 The
75 Buse. “RONCO Executives Talk.”
76 International Crisis Group (ICG). (18 July 1997) “Ridding Bosnia of Landmines: The Urgent Need for a 
Sustainable Policy.” ICG Bosnia Report No. 25. pp. 14-22.
77 Details of the nature of corruption in the demining sector are outlined in: State Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. (22 November 2006) Custody decision against Radomir Kojic and Radoslav Ilic. Number: 
X-KRN-06/250; Cantonal Prosecutor’s Office Mostar. (5 July 2001) Criminal charges against Berislav 
Pusic and Davor Kolenda. Number: 700-213/01; Financial Police Department Sarajevo. (27 March 2001) 
Criminal Complaint against Mirzad Gradascevic. Number: 101-511/01; Financial Police Department 
Sarajevo. (23 March 2001) Criminal Complaint against Damir Kunsten. Number 101-492-/01; Financial 
Police Department Sarajevo. (22 March 2001) Criminal Complaint against Stjepan Strbad. Number 700- 
76/01; Financial Police Head Inspectors Office Sarajevo. “Prvi Izvejestaj.”; GICHD. Role of the Military; 
Melissa Eddy. (22 May 2000) “Mine removal snarled in conflicting interests, mismanagement.” The 
Associated Press.
78 World Bank. (19 March 2004) “Project Performance Assessment Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
Report No. 28288. p. v.
79 Office of the High Representative (OHR). (12 October 2000) “Decision removing Milos Krstic from his 
position as a member of the Demining Commission and banning him from holding any official or 
appointive public office.” <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=317>;
Office of the High Representative (OHR). (12 October 2000) “Decision removing Enes Cengic from his 
position as a member of the Demining Commission and banning him from holding any official or 
appointive public office.” <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=318>;
Office of the High Representative (OHR). (12 October 2000) “Decision removing Berislav Pusic from his 
position as a member of the Demining Commission and banning him from holding any official or 
appointive public office.” <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=319>.
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next week, local newspaper Slobodna Bosna ran a major expose on the demining sector.80 
RONCO left Bosnia later that year, with bitter complaints of a “smear campaign.”81
In 1999 the US began channeling its funds through the International Trust Fund for 
Demining and Mine Victim Assistance (ITF), set up by the Slovenian government. The 
State Department promised to match funds raised by ITF up to a certain level. This 
moved contracting out of the country, away from the PIUs and thus less susceptible to 
nepotism and corruption. However, until 2003 the ITF continued to award US-funded 
tenders to the same companies that had been at the center of the World Bank scandals.
The US finally moved against demining corruption in mid-2003 when renewed 
international efforts to tackle organized crime and networks supporting Persons Indicted 
for War Crimes led the State Department to blacklist demining organizations allegedly 
linked to the network hiding war crimes fugitive Radovan Karadzic. The blacklist, which 
barred organizations from receiving US demining funds, but was not publicly 
disseminated, was essentially reactive -  organizations were placed on the list when links 
to such clandestine networks were discovered.
The blacklist ran into criticism because it was nontransparent. There was no way to 
publicly determine the reasoning behind placing a company on the list, which did not 
officially exist. It was also controversial because it seemed to focus solely on those 
companies linked to Serb organized crime networks, neglecting those operated by other 
ethnicities. Following the presentation of a report on the political problems in Bosnian 
demining by the author and Hugh Griffiths at the Meeting of States Parties to the Mine 
Ban Treaty in Geneva in September 2006,83 the State Department conducted thorough 
investigations and organizational audits of the local Bosnian demining organizations. 
The result was a continued commitment to ITF commercial tendering, but with one key
80 Danka Savic & Mirsad Fazlic. (19 October 2000) “Demining Program Abuses in BiH.” Slobodna Bosna. 
English translation available from Adopt-A-Minefield. 
<http://www.landmines.org.uk/NewsWire_Article/231>.
81 RONCO. (27 October 2000) “Official Press Release: Humanitarian Demining in Bosnia ‘Smear 
Campaign.’” Document obtained by author.
82 Bolton & Griffiths. Bosnia’s Political Landmines, pp. 12-13.
83 Ibid.
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modification: in April 2007 the State Department released a shortlist of organizations 
eligible to be US-funded contractors.84
iii. Was Demining Corruption in the US Interest?
Why did the US continue for so long to support organizations uncovered as corrupt
and linked to organized crime? Though there were warnings as early as 1997 that the 
whole demining system was in danger of being captured by private interests,85 State 
Department officials involved at the time claim that they did not know of the 
backgrounds and suspect practices of the main local companies until 2003. It is possible 
that this was simply due to naivete. One official said the early passive State Department 
policy was a “function of information”; when they finally found out about links to war 
criminals, they took action. This explanation is implied by the State Department’s 
embarrassed muddling over the local company MEDECOM, which was blacklisted in 
August 2005, but received a US-funded contract for a clearance project in Serbia the very 
same month. Investigations by the author and Hugh Griffiths suggested this was due to 
bureaucratic inertia preventing the news of MEDECOM’s blacklisting from reaching the 
US Embassy in Belgrade.86
However, as Keen87 and Clay and Schaffer88 warn, observers should be careful not to 
prematurely judge a policy as a failure. It can be helpful to ask what functions and 
unstated objectives might be disguised by a policy’s rhetoric. The key is to bracket 
questions of motivations and intentions (notoriously difficult to discern) and focus on 
how actions function. It makes sense then, to ask whether contracting demining to 
nationalistic and criminalized elite in post-conflict Bosnia also served the political and 
security objectives of the US.
Getting the buy-in of powerful nationalists was crucial for ensuring the stability of the 
country. In the early days, the nationalists still had secret arms caches and the power of 
mass mobilization, while the international community lacked the political will to tackle
84 US Department of State. (11 April 2007) “United States Funding Support for Humanitarian Demining in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.” <http://www.state.gOv/t/pm/rls/fs/82833.htm>.
85 ICG. “Ridding Bosnia of Landmines.”
86 Bolton & Griffiths. Bosnia's Political Landmines, pp. 12-13.
87 David Keen. (1994) The Benefits o f Famine. Princeton, Princeton University Press; David Keen. (1998) 
The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper 320. London, Oxford University Press.
88 Edward J. Clay & Bernard B. Schaffer. (1984) Room for Manoeuvre: An Exploration of Public Policy in 
Agriculture and Rural Development. London, Heinemann Educational Books, pp. 142-190.
175
them head on. Providing lucrative contracts may have encouraged potentially dangerous 
men to engage with the reconstruction process rather than shoot at US troops. This may 
be a necessary evil, though could be corrosive to the political system. It is conceivable 
then that the $1 billion of aid to Bosnia reported to have disappeared by 1999,89 and the 
estimated $6.7 million of demining funding unaccounted for,90 might have functioned 
(whether intended or not) as a pay off for elites who stood to lose from the emergence of 
peace -  a political “transition cost” of moving from one social system (war) to another 
(peace).91 Indeed, in an interview with the author, former High Representative Wolfgang 
Petrisch, said his order firing the Demining Commissioners, was the only occasion during 
his tenure when the US ambassador attempted to stop a High Representative’s order. 
Petrisch believes the US Embassy was acting to protect RONCO, and the State 
Department, from a public scandal.92
Even if individual State Department bureaucrats were unaware of the level of 
corruption and shady pasts of its primary Bosnian contractors, a lack of knowledge about 
war crimes often reflects political choices over intelligence priorities, as Samantha Power 
has argued.93 Information is often available in public sources -  indeed the involvement 
of organized crime in demining had been covered by several newspapers and was well 
known by demining personnel. However information is only processed into actionable 
data when enough political pressure builds to analyze it in a systematic manner -  as 
happened when the US finally moved against demining corruption. Therefore, even if 
the US funneling of money to the ‘nationalist-criminal nexus’ was a complete accident, 
such a policy decision operated in a Darwinian framework. As the World Bank says, 
“An institution [or policy] exists in part because some constituencies gain from its
89 Chris Hedges. (17 August 1999) “Leaders in Bosnia Are Said to Steal Up to $1 Billion.” New York 
Times.
90 Amer Kapetanovic. (2000) “Kako Je Nestalo 6,7 Miliona Dolara.” (“How 6.7 Million Dollars 
Disappeared.”) Dani. <http://www.bhdani.com/arhiva/177/tl7705.htm>; Savic & Fazlic. “Demining 
Program Abuses in BiH.”
91 cf. Mushtaq Kahn. (1995) “State Failure in Weak States: A critique of new institutionalist explanations.” 
The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development. John Harriss, Janet Hunter & Colin 
Lewis (Eds.). London, Routledge.
92 Wolfgang Petrisch. (1 December 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
93 Samantha Power. (July 2005) Keynote address at “The International Scientific Conference on the 
Genocide over Bosniaks of the UN Safe Area in Srebrenica, July 1995” at the Holiday Inn, Sarajevo.
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existence and so have the incentives and influence to support it.”94 Accidental policies 
only survive if they are well-adapted to the broader political context. In the early post­
war period, the US policies that survived were those of accommodation and collaboration 
with the nationalist status quo in the interests of stability.95 Therefore, “Nationalist, and in 
many cases criminal, politicians [became]... the key interlocutors for the international 
community and their principal entry points into local communities.”96
iv. Norwegian Assistance for Demining
During the Bosnian war, Norway had contributed to the UN Protection Force.
Following the peace agreement, Norway contributed troops to the NATO and EU 
peacekeeping missions. Since 1992 at least 9,000 Norwegian troops have rotated through 
Bosnia, five of whom lost their lives.97 This was a major military commitment for a 
small state. In addition to its usual support for peacekeeping missions, Norway felt it was 
obligated by NATO membership to provide maximum support for NATO’s Bosnian 
missions. Therefore, like the US, Norway provided assistance to the entity military 
demining teams, including insurance coverage to deminers,98 training in the use of a 
Bozena mechanical mine clearance machine99 and a technical advisor to the entity 
armies’ Humanitarian Mine Action Coordination Cell, seconded from Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA).100 However support to the military deminers remained limited.
Norway also provided significant humanitarian assistance to Bosnia during the war, 
much channeled through Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). NPA worked largely in 
Bosnian government territory, following its custom of working in ‘solidarity’ with the 
people it views as most oppressed in a social conflict. NPA focused on the area around 
the northern city of Tuzla, whose municipal government tried hard to maintain a
94 World Bank. (2002) World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets. New York, 
Oxford University Press.
95 International Crisis Group (ICG). (2 November 2000) “War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska: 
Who are the People in Your Neighborhood.” ICG Balkans Report No. 103. pp. iii, 70,76-77.




98 GICHD. Role of the Military, p. 44.
99 Ibid. p. 40.
100 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). (2002) “MFA Report 2002: Project Presentation.” In NPA archives, p. 
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cosmopolitan and multiethnic polity. Following the peace agreement in 1996, NPA 
supported several youth and media programs aimed at encouraging inter-ethnic 
integration and grass-roots peace and democratization processes. NPA also had a major 
Shelter and Reconstruction program facilitating the return of refugees and displaced 
persons, by building more than 5,600 houses.101
NPA began preparing for a demining program in October 1995, by giving mine action 
training to Bosnian refugees in Norway.102 In 1996, supported by the Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MFA), it deployed to the Tuzla area and began demining tasks in 
support of the Shelter and Reconstruction programs.103 In 1997, it also seconded staff to 
UNMAC, as a way to develop the central coordination capacity in Bosnia.104 In addition 
to its humanitarian and development value, the MFA saw mine clearance as a way to 
support several political peacebuilding objectives, such as restoring freedom of 
movement and facilitating refugee return -  so that “ethnic cleansing was not to be seen to 
succeed.” Through this they would also support broader global aims of strengthening 
international legal norms such as the Refugee Convention and the Ottawa Treaty.105
Since the advent of the ITF, the MFA has channelled its assistance through the 
Slovenian body, earmarked for NPA. This has been to attract US matching funds -  
“working together with allies...is always a good thing” -  and because it “provides some 
basic kind of oversight over the money spent.”106 Nonetheless, the MFA gave NPA 
significant freedom in determining the scope and operation of the program. Said a 
former manager, “They never tried to interfere...they’ve never...tried to dictate, in any 
way where we work.”107
NPA relocated its operations to Sarajevo in 1997 to support UNMAC’s Mine Action 
Plan for Sarajevo, since the city’s population density and wartime legacy left it one of the
101 Lisa Kirkengen. (2006) “Norwegian Housing and Return Projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
NORDEM Report. 18/2006. <http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2006/1806.pdf >. p. 18.
102 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). (25 March 1996) “Project Presentation: NPA De-Mining Project, 
Former Yugoslavia.” Unpublished document in NPA archives.
103 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). (February 1998) “Final Report: Mine disposal in Bosnia Herzegovina.” 
Report to Royal Netherlands Embassy Sarajevo in NPA archives.
104 UN Mine Action Center (UNMAC). (4 October 1997) “Monthly Report for September 1997 
Sekondering av Instruktorer UNMAC.” Fax to Per Nergaard in NPA archives.
105 Jan Braatha. (8 March 2007) Personal interview with author in Sarajevo.
106 Ibid.
107 Per Breivik. (28 February 2007) Personal interview with author in Sarajevo.
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most heavily mine-impacted areas. As a result of the wartime siege, the city was ringed 
by a belt of minefields that, in a sense, perpetuated the siege into peacetime. UNMAC 
recommended that NPA be the primary implementing partner for the plan because it felt 
the priority tasks in Sarajevo, such as houses, apartment blocks and office buildings were 
extremely complex tasks, complicated by the proximity of the city population, that could 
not be easily parceled up for commercial clearance. UNMAC also felt an NGO would be 
“better placed to provide assistance with staff training and capacity building.”108 NPA’s 
work was thus “particularly time consuming and laborious”109 and very treacherous, but 
was vital for restoring public safety in Sarajevo.110 During the winters in Sarajevo (and 
previously in Tuzla), when the weather became untenable for demining, NPA moved its 
operations to the Mostar area, where the climate is warmer.
After 2003, as downtown Sarajevo became relatively mine-free, NPA shifted the 
locus of its operations to the Brcko District. Brcko, a strategically important and divided 
municipality, was designated a “special” autonomous district under international 
supervision in 2000. A site of brutal ‘ethnic cleansing’ and heavy fighting during the 
war, it was one of Bosnia’s most heavily mine contaminated regions.111 However, with 
heavy-handed international intervention, it was the first municipality to reintegrate its 
police force and school system and had the highest rate of return of displaced persons in 
the country. The District was seen by international actors as a ‘showcase’ of how Bosnia 
could return to a multiethnic polity, and demining was seen as a “crucial condition for 
sustainability of returns, improving both the economic and social environment.”112 
NPA’s demining was closely integrated with efforts to reconstruct returnee villages in the
108 UN Mine Action Center (UNMAC). (17 May 1998) “Mine Action Plan for Sarajevo Canton.” In NPA 
archives, p. 11.
109 Ibid. p. 17.
110 John Rodsted. ( 2005) Mine Action in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996-2005. Oslo, Norwegian Peoples Aid.
111 Matthew Bolton. (August 2003) “Mine Action in Bosnia’s Special District: A Case Study.” Journal of 
Mine Action. 7(2). <http://maic.jmu.edU/JOURNAL/7.2/focus/bolton/bolton.htm>.
112 Office of the High Representative (OHR). (8 March 2002) “Report from the Supervisor of Brcko to the 
PIC Steering Board on the Progress of Implementation of the Final Award of the International Arbitral 
Tribunal for Brcko (8 March 2001 - 8 March 2002).” Brcko District, Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR. p. 12. 
See also: Alex Jeffrey. (February 2006) “Building state capacity in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
The case of Brcko District.” Political Geography. 25(2).
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District and was seen as a way to support “one of the key areas for return and further 
normalization and development of the country”113
Initially NPA’s program was very expatriate-heavy. However, in a similar fashion to 
the Sudan program (see below), they slowly trained up and promoted talented Bosnians, 
who replaced their expatriate managers. NPA’s in-country operations, employing 147 
people, are now completely run by Bosnians of several ethnicities. Their country 
director, Darvin Lisica, former deputy director of BHMAC, is a widely respected 
authority on Bosnian mine action, and a main intellectual author behind BHMAC’s 
attempts to encourage community participation in mine action priority-setting.114
v. Summary
US support to Bosnian demining took two forms: a) support to the entity militaries, as 
part of a larger effort to transform them from a threat to European security into future 
NATO contributors, and b) a commercial tendering system that for several years was 
captured by a criminalized ethno-nationalist elite. This may have functioned as part of a 
broader US ‘passive policy’ toward such elites, aimed at getting their buy-in to the 
Dayton process. In contrast, while Norway gave some token assistance to military 
deminers, the vast majority of its assistance was channeled through an international NGO 
that employed a multiethnic staff and supported efforts to build a cosmopolitan polity in 
Bosnia.
c. Sudan115
i. Background on Sudanese Mine Action
At war since 1983, Sudan has an as yet undefined landmine and UXO contamination
problem, caused largely by fighting between the Northern government and Southern 
rebels, which has resulted at least 3,700 mine and UXO casualties.116 Most of this
113 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). (n.d.) “Mine Action Programme.” <http://www.npa- 
bosnia.org/MAIN/page%202/mine%20action%20team%202.htm>; Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). (2004) 
“What is TAP.” <http://www.npa-bosnia.org/operations/TAP/mine%20cont%20map.htm>.
114 Lisica. Risk Management, pp. 42-45, 62-94.
115 Parts of this section were published in: Matthew Bolton. (2008) “Sudan’s Expensive Landmines: An 
Evaluation of Political and Economic Problems in Sudanese Mine Clearance.” Political Minefields. 
<http://politicalminefields.wordpress.com/2008/07/sudansexpensivelandminesl.pdf>.
116 UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO). (July 2007) “IMSMA Monthly Report.” Obtained by author from 
UNMAO. p. 8.
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problem is concentrated in the South, around former government garrison towns and 
along major roads. The level of contamination appears initially to have been dubiously 
overestimated, fueling a massive expansion of demining efforts in recent years. 
However, the ongoing Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) suggests that the level of 
contamination is probably much lower than previously expected.117
Mine action began in Sudan in 1996, when the southern rebel group, the Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), declared a unilateral moratorium on the use of mines. 
This prompted the Government of Sudan to sign, though not ratify, the Antipersonnel 
Mine Ban treaty in 1997. The SPLA then created two national ‘NGOs’ (more like 
parastatals) -  Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) to coordinate clearance and Sudan 
Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS) to coordinate mine risk education and victim 
assistance. In the north, the Sudanese Red Crescent Society and the Sudan Campaign Ban 
Landmines (SCBL) successfully lobbied the government on landmine issues and by 1999 
both the SPLA and the government re-affirmed a commitment not to use mines. That 
same year, OSIL, which received some limited assistance from NGOs and UN agencies, 
reported that it had cleared a total of 236 miles of roads, 2,179 mines and 20,740 UXO 
from the south. The Government of Sudan Army also reported doing limited clearance. 
However, these efforts were not subjected to any independent quality assurance nor 
conducted to the UN-recognized International Mine Action Standards.118
Large scale international intervention was prevented by the ongoing conflict. Few 
mine action donors were willing to put money forward while there was the possibility 
that factions could begin re-mining demined areas or threaten the security of demining 
agencies. Moreover, while the SPLA signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment (an 
equivalent of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty for non-state actors) in 2001, many
117 Survey Action Center (SAC), Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Sudanese Association for Combating 
Landmines (JASMAR). (September 2007) “Landmine Impact Survey Sudan: Kassala, Red Sea, Gadaref 
and Sennar States.” <http://www.sac-na.org/pdf_text/sudan/ES_Report_Sep07.pdf>;
Survey Action Center (SAC), Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Sudanese Association for Combating 
Landmines (JASMAR). (March 2007) “Landmine Impact Survey Sudan: Blue Nile State.” 
<http://www.sac-na.org/pdf_text/sudan/BN_Report_Mar07.pdf>;
Survey Action Center (SAC) & Mines Advisory Group (MAG). (March 2006) “Landmine Impact Survey 
Sudan: Eastern Equatoria.” < http://www.sac-na.org/pdf_text/sudan/EE_Report_Sep06.pdf>.
118 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). “Sudan.” Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward 
a Mine Free World, <http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/sudan.html>.
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bilateral and multilateral donors were reluctant to fund mine action in a country whose 
government had not ratified the Treaty.119
In 2002, the combined diplomatic efforts of the US, Norway and Switzerland 
achieved a ceasefire between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA in the Nuba 
Mountains region. This was seen by the international community as a major opportunity 
to build confidence between the two parties and demonstrate the potential ‘peace 
dividend,’ in terms of socio-economic assistance, of an end to the fighting.
The Joint Military Commission (JMC), created to monitor compliance with the 
ceasefire, saw mine survey and clearance of roads as critical to its mission and a possible 
means to build cooperation across lines. Therefore, Landmine Action, which had been 
involved in organizing ‘crosslines’ meetings between mine action groups from the North 
and South, began training teams of deminers and surveyors from both sides to work on a 
project called Sudan Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI). 
Meanwhile, DanChurchAid (DCA), supported by Norway, set up a similar program 
working in cooperation with JASMAR, a mine action NGO with ties to the northern 
government, and OSIL. The US also funded RONCO, a commercial demining company 
to provide demining support to JMC, which itself had significant US involvement.
Progress on the ground in the Nuba Mountains contributed to political progress 
toward mine action cooperation. Three years before the signing of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), the Government, SPLA and United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) signed a memorandum of understanding laying out the framework of 
a mine action program for Sudan. In 2003 the Sudanese government ratified the Mine 
Ban Treaty, making it attractive to donors.
The international involvement in Nuba Mountains mine action presaged the trend 
toward greater internationalization as the general peace process between the Government 
of Sudan and the SPLA improved. In 2004 WFP and UNMAS began survey and 
clearance operations in the south. The next year, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
between the SPLA and the government, brokered in large part by the US and Norway,
119 Peter Moszynski. (27 November 2005) “Mine Action in the Midst of Internal Conflict: The Case of 
Sudan.” Mine Action in the Midst of Internal Conflict. Geneva, Geneva Call. p. 31.
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allocated responsibility for mine action technical assistance and coordination to a UN 
Mine Action Office (UNMAO) within the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).
ii. Tendered Contracts
The vast majority of demining in Sudan has been done on contracts tendered by WFP
or UNOPS (on behalf of UNMAS). Implementers bid on specifically defined tasks and 
contracts generally go to the lowest bidder, with some considerations of experience and 
organizational capacity. The UNMAS/UNOPS contracts were funded from the UN’s 
assessed peacekeeping budget and have focused on clearing major roads to open access, 
mostly in South Sudan, for UN peacekeepers, as well as commerce, returning refugees 
and humanitarian aid. Since DPKO’s priority has been to gain rapid access for 
peacekeepers to all parts of the country, the UNMAS/UNOPS contracts have only cleared 
roads to a width of eight meters.
The WFP contracts are part of a larger road rehabilitation project started in 2004 as a 
way to reduce the cost of transporting humanitarian aid to the South. Since WFP’s focus 
has been on long term infrastructural rehabilitation -  including the verges and drainage 
systems of roads -  WFP contracts cleared roads to a width of 25 meters. The contracts 
were funded through member states’ voluntary contributions to WFP; both the US 
(USAID and State Department) and Norway have contributed.120 WFP’s original projects 
in Sudan were contracted to an NGO, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), on a 
‘cost-plus’ basis -  FSD was paid a premium on top of costs incurred in conducting 
operations. However, WFP felt the cost-plus contract, though useful for starting up the 
program rapidly, incentivized overspending. WFP thus switched to a tendering model 
similar to the UNMAS/UNOPS system, contracting both international NGOs and
commercial companies. A WFP manager explained that they switched to tendering
121because they wanted “to gain as much control over the operation as possible.”
UN officials believe the increased competition between agencies in the tendering 
process encouraged efficiency. Moreover, they felt tendering gave them more control,
120 World Food Program (WFP). (September 2005) “W.F.P. Sudan Progress Report Road Repair and 
Demining Activities As At End September 2005.”
<http://www.unjlc.org/sudan/infrastructure/roads/wfp_roads_progress_report/2006-05- 
17.9085524273/view>. p. 4.
121 Steve Crosskey. (11 August 2007) Personal interview with author in Juba.
183
enabling them to stipulate precisely which areas should be cleared, in what order they 
should be tackled and to punish -  through penalty clauses in the contracts -  poor quality 
or slow work. It is also possible that, as seen in Afghanistan, the earlier shift from 
OCHA and UNDP toward UNMAS/UNOPS managing the bulk of UN demining has led 
to a greater UN openness to commercial demining. For instance, UNMAS officials in 
Sudan have talked about wanting to “do a Kosovo,” where the UN had tight control over 
coordinating mine action and tendered most contracts to commercial operators.122
Early US demining efforts in Sudan followed a similar model of commercial 
demining in support of a military peacekeeping force. Immediately after the Nuba 
Mountains ceasefire, the State Department contracted RONCO to use its Mozambique- 
based Quick Reaction Demining Force to begin clearance work “as a confidence 
enhancing and peacebuilding effort.” In 2004 it then contracted RONCO to expand its 
operations to work throughout the Nuba Mountains “in direct support of the Joint 
Military Commission” which monitored the agreement.123 A RONCO supervisor 
explained that they cleared “roads to make the job easy for the JMC monitors, so they 
could reach the isolated villages.”124 In the same year, the State Department also 
contributed to the WFP commercial tenders for “high priority roads in South Sudan.” As 
will be explained below, however, the State Department abandoned the commercial 
model of funding Sudanese mine action in 2005.125
Nonetheless, USAID appears to be moving back in that direction. Despite having 
been a major donor to the WFP road rehabilitation program since 2004,126 in mid-2006 
(at about the same time it pulled its money out of UNMACA’s trust fund for Afghan 
demining) USAID decided contract reconstruction directly. It thus announced the award 
of a five year South Sudan infrastructure contract worth up to $700 million to Berger
122 Rebecca Roberts & Mads Frilander. (2004 ) “Preparing for Peace Mine Action’s Investment in the 
Future of Sudan.” Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine Action in Support o f Peacebuilding. PRIO Report 
2/2004. Kristian Berg Harpviken & Rebecca Roberts (Eds.). Oslo, PRIO. p. 14.
123 Matt Murphy. (11 January 2007) “The U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program in Sudan.”
Unpublished paper written in answer to author’s email questions to the State Department, p. 1.
124 Tempas Camilo Moses. (7 August 2007) Personal interview with author in Juba.
125 Murphy. “U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program in Sudan.” p. 2.
126 US Agency for International Development (USAID). (2 June 2006) “USAID/Sudan Operational Plan 
FY2006.” <http://ww.dec.org>. p. 5; US Agency for International Development (USAID). (16 June 2005) 
“USAID/Sudan Annual Report FY2005.” <http://ww.dec.org>.
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Group.127 One of the first projects on this contract will probably be the rehabilitation of a 
road from Juba to Nimule, and Berger will subcontract RONCO for at least $1 million, to 
provide demining support.128
iii. Military Demining
In addition to the UNOPS contractors, UNMAO also coordinated several UNMIS
military peacekeeping contingents doing demining. This is another example of how 
UNMIS has integrated mine action into the politico-military objectives of the UN 
peacekeeping mission. At the local level, UNDP has assisted in the creation of Joint 
Integrated Demining Units (JIDUs), incorporating Government of Sudan and SPLA 
soldiers and under the joint management of the northern and southern Sudanese demining 
authorities. However, as neither the US nor Norway support the international 
peacekeeping military demining units nor the JIDUs, this chapter will not explore 
Sudan’s military ‘humanitarian’ demining in more detail.
iv. International and Local NGOs
Starting with Landmine Action’s operations in the Nuba Mountains, international 
NGOs have been major players in Sudanese mine action, largely supported by the 
European Commission and bilateral donors, though some, especially FSD, have also 
competed for UN tenders. Unlike other UN agencies, UNHCR supports DDG’s 
unexploded ordnance disposal in returnee areas through annual grants. Most of these 
international NGOs have worked in partnership with local NGOs.
Following the CPA, the US State Department switched from commercial mine action 
to supporting international NGOs and building the capacity of local mine action 
authorities. Contradicting its commonly stated position that commercial mine action is 
faster and more efficient (also espoused by UNMAO), the State Department explained its 
shift in policy by saying “the use of grants to NGOs enabled a more rapid response to the 
emergency landmine/UXO threat.” It also said the grants aimed to “provide the
127 Berger Group. (16 October 2006) “Berger Awarded Five-Year USAID Contract for Southern Sudan 
Reconstruction.” <http://www.louisberger.com/phpscr/press_list_one.php3?idnum=180>.
128 Andy Bailey. (28 August 2007) Personal email to author.
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necessary infrastructure and management/technical training for the Sudanese to ‘own’ the 
program themselves and hopefully develop the indigenous capacity.”129
The State Department supported the mine risk education, survey, clearance, EOD and 
small arms destruction efforts of Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Landmine Action and 
the HALO Trust, largely in South Sudan. MAG, which works in partnership with OSIL 
and JASMAR, is one of the largest demining NGOs in Sudan and works both in the 
North and South of the country. While MAG has done considerable work on the roads, it 
is beginning to focus its efforts on local communities and integrating mine action 
operations into broader development efforts. In keeping with these priorities, MAG has 
led the gathering of data for the Sudan Landmine Impact Survey, which will clarify the
extent of mine contamination and how it impacts public safety and socio-economic
130concerns.
Landmine Action, and its programmatic successor HALO, however, have not had as 
much success. Following a review of their programs in 2006, Landmine Action 
determined that low productivity levels and fraught organizational politics were beyond 
their capacity as a small mine action organization. They thus pulled out and handed over 
some of their South Sudanese projects to the HALO Trust. However, the HALO Trust, 
despite being one of the world’s largest demining organizations, with experience in some 
of the most complex political situations in the world, was not able to report any concrete 
successes from their $3 million program in the year they were operational. Following an 
ordeal of endless strike action, staff members threatened and subjected to physical 
violence and crude attempts to seize their funds and equipment, HALO was finally 
expelled from the country by the South Sudanese government in late 2006.
The State Department has also supported DCA and NPA, the same organizations that 
Norway has used to fund Sudanese demining. Like MAG, DCA works with JASMAR 
and OSIL, but in the Nuba Mountains. The aim of the program has been to build 
‘crosslines’ collaboration between deminers from the two sides. Intended to “contribute 
to the peace and confidence-building effort... Every aspect of the programme is carried
129 Murphy. “U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program in Sudan.” p. 1.
130 Fred Maio. (20 August 2007) Personal interview with author in Khartoum. Evy Van Weezendonk and 
Christine Murphy. (3 August 2008) Personal interview with author in Yei.
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out together and joint capacity building has led to increased trust and reliance on each 
other.”131
NPA, in contrast, is one of only two international demining NGOs that does not work 
in partnership with local NGOs. With a 20-year legacy of humanitarian operations in 
South Sudan, NPA has a close relationship with the SPLA leadership. This may be why 
it has escaped pressure from the local authorities to work with a local partner. From its 
base in the far southern city of Yei, NPA’s mine action team has focused its efforts on 
roads, especially the Juba to Yei road. However, using the Task Impact Assessment 
methodology it also used in Bosnia, NPA has begun retargeting its efforts toward local 
communities.
v. Summary
US support to demining between the Nuba Mountains ceasefire and the CPA 
followed the commercialized and securitized patterns seen in Afghanistan and Bosnia. 
The recent USAID contract to RONCO through Berger Group continues in this vein. 
However, following the CPA, the State Department concentrated on funding international 
NGOs and local government capacity building. Indeed, its funding of the Scandinavian 
NGOs Norwegian People’s Aid and DanChurchAid overlaps with Norway’s choice of 
implementing partners. This contrasts with the UNMIS model of commercializing and 
integrating mine action into the politico-military objectives of the peacekeeping mission, 
which, actually resembles the US strategic-commercial approach in Afghanistan and 
Bosnia. The next section of this chapter will analyze the reasons why US and Norwegian 
demining funding modalities have occasionally converged, as they did in Sudan.
d. Accounting for Convergences
The case study analysis shows that US and Norway’s funding of mine action often 
took divergent paths. Norway consistently supported NGOs, generally international 
ones, while the US often opted for a more militarized and commercialized approach. 
However, as the analysis has indicated, there are three important exceptions where the 
two countries’ policies converged. First, Norway, like the US, supported entity armed




forces demining in Bosnia. Second, from 1994 to 2001, in Afghanistan the US supported 
the same UN-led, NGO-implemented program as Norway. Third, following the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan, the State Department has supported 
demining by NGOs, including the two groups supported by Norway. The following will 
explore possible reasons for these convergences.
i. Norway and Bosnian Military Deminers
Norway’s provision of equipment and insurance for Bosnian military demining was
quite unusual. It is possible that this divergence from Norway’s ordinary mine action 
policy stems from two factors. First, the entity armed forces were required by the Dayton 
Peace Accords to engage in landmine clearance. Norway, with its commitment to 
international peacemaking may have felt it was important to encourage the entity armed 
forces to meet their obligations. Second, the NATO intervention in Bosnia was the first 
non-UN peacekeeping mission undertaken by Norway (other than the multinational force 
in the Sinai mandated by the Camp David Accords), its first in Europe and its first 
overseas NATO deployment. While their military operations in Bosnia were consistent 
with its history of peacekeeping, it also represented a break with the past, toward a more 
strategic deployment in support of its NATO allies. As the Norwegian ambassador to 
Sarajevo said,
...[W]e have interests in the success of NATO and therefore we support NATO actions. So that’s 
not altruism, it’s a vital foreign policy interest. We want a strong NATO because a strong NATO 
is the best guarantor for Norwegian and collective security.132
This may have influenced its willingness to more readily engage with the security 
structures of a non-NATO foreign country. However, this seems to be an exception in
Norwegian practice. Though it has supported military demining in Nicaragua, where
1 ^there are no other organizations operating, and has occasionally deployed its own 
military demining units in the context of peacekeeping units (such as in Lebanon134), 
these seem to be isolated occurrences.
132 Braatha. Personal interview.
133 GICHD. Role of the Military, p. 98.
134 Ibid. p. 82.
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ii. US Relations with Afghanistan, 1994-2001
Following the end of the Cold War, the US saw little need for major commitments in
Afghanistan. By 1994, US aid to the country, both overt and covert, had plummeted. 
Rather than controlling its humanitarian aid contributions directly, or through commercial 
contractors, it began giving them to NGOs and the UN. Though Afghanistan’s civil war 
continued with great ferocity, it had shifted, in US policy, from being constructed as a 
politico-military problem within a Cold War strategic framework, to a ‘humanitarian’ 
problem. As Rubin said, for the US “Afghanistan became an object of charity and 
neglect, not necessarily in that order.”135 Discourse, followed by limited covert funding, 
began to shift following the Taliban ascendency, growing interest in oil pipeline 
politics,136 A1 Qaeda’s bombing of the US embassies in East Africa and the US missile 
strikes in 1998. However, it was not until 9/11 that pressure for a full strategic re­
engagement with Afghanistan returned to US foreign policy. It is likely then, that in the 
absence of clear political objectives in Afghanistan, the US felt it unnecessary to control 
demining efforts directly, preferring to delegate to the UN. That the US continued to 
provide Afghanistan with demining aid at all points to the existence of humanitarian 
elements to US mine action funding. However, it took renewed post 9/11 strategic 
interest, rather than a sudden rise in charitable concern, for the US to increase its 
demining funding by a factor of 10.
iii. US Foreign Policy in Sudan
Post-Cold War US foreign policy in Sudan is driven in multiple directions by the
competing interests and ideals of different branches of the US government and society.137 
The CIA, though concerned about the northern government’s previous links to terrorism 
also sees this as an opportunity to gain important sources of information on A1 Qaeda 
(Osama Bin Laden lived in Sudan between 1991 and 1996). Thus it has built a
135 Barnett Rubin. (2002) The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the 
International System. 2nd Ed. New Haven, Yale University Press, p. x.
136 Ahmed Rashid. (2001) Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords. London, Pan Books.
137 Alex de Waal. (April 2007) “Sudan: International Dimensions to the State and Its Crisis.” LSE Crisis 
States Research Centre Occasional Paper. 3.
<http://www.crisisstates.com/download/op/op3.DeWaal.pdf>. p. 18; Severine Autesserre. (January 2002) 
“United States ‘Humanitarian Diplomacy’ in South Sudan.” Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. 
<http://www.jha.ac/articles/a085.htm>.
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cooperative information-sharing relationship with government security organs. In 
contrast, Congress is aggressively pro-South and pro-Darfur, influenced by a unique 
coalition of four powerful pressure groups -  human rights groups, African-Americans 
(originally concerned about slavery in Sudan), Jewish groups (concerned about genocide) 
and churches, including the evangelical religious right (which sees the SPLA as a 
Christian institution fighting Islamic persecution).139 American petrochemical businesses, 
on the other hand, are interested in Sudan’s abundant natural resources and the US 
Treasury has been “favourably impressed” by its rapid economic growth.140 The State 
Department, while sympathetic to the South and Darfur, wants to avoid the renegotiation 
of borders in Africa or give encouragement to separatist movements elsewhere.141 Thus 
the State Department’s guiding policy is “making unity attractive to the South” to prevent 
it from declaring independence.142 Adjudicating between all these competing groups is 
the White House, which is itself tom between a commitment to the War on Terror (thus 
needing Sudanese intelligence information) and its core political support from the 
evangelical churches.
During the 1990s the complex tangle of US strategic and humanitarian interest in 
Sudan shaped a policy in which the US tilted toward the SPLA, but without a making 
major commitment: “supporting the rebels, but not openly, and not enough to enable 
them to win the war.”143 The US criticized Sudan’s human rights record, imposed 
sanctions and even launched a cruise missile strike in 1998 following the East African 
embassy bombings. However, the US was not willing to dedicate significant overt or 
covert assistance directly to the SPLA. Instead, it became the largest donor of 
humanitarian aid to the South, tacitly understanding that this would indirectly support the
138 Ted Dagne. (12 April 2006) “Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. Policy.” 
CRS Issue Brief for Congress. Washington DC, Congressional Research Service. 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IB98043.pdf>. p. 14; Kenneth Silverstein. (29 April 2005) “Official 
Pariah Sudan Valuable to America’s War on Terrorism.” Los Angeles Times. 
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/terrorwar/analysis/2005/0429sudan.htm>.
139 John Young. (2005) “Sudan: A Rawed Peace Process Leading to a Rawed Peace.” Review of African 
Political Economy. 103. p. 103.
140 de Waal. “Sudan: International Dimensions.” p. 7.
141 Neil Middleton & Phil O’Keefe. (2006) “Politics, History & Problems of Humanitarian Assistance in 
Sudan.” Review of African Political Economy. 109. p. 555.
142 Lauren Landis. (10 April 2007) Personal interview in Washington DC. Lauren Landis is Senior 
Representative to Sudan at the US State Department African Affairs Bureau.
143 Autesserre. “United States ‘Humanitarian Diplomacy.’”
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SPLA, through fungibility and diversion. Thus humanitarian aid “with its reputation of 
neutrality and its moral appeal concealing a fundamental vulnerability to all sorts of 
manipulation” became the “main channel of the US’s Sudan policy.”144 The US also 
directed significant amounts of its assistance to NGOs operating outside the UN 
framework of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which was required to coordinate all its 
activities with the northern government.145 The non-OLS NGOs were far more likely to 
be close to the SPLA and take a pro-Southern, rather than neutral, stand on the conflict.146 
By 2001, USAID was also funding “civil administration training” for the SPLA to 
“transform itself into a robust and internally democratic political party.”147
Norwegian People’s Aid was a non-OLS NGO and has been one of the favored US 
recipients of assistance for Sudan. NPA’s role in Sudan during the North-South war was 
very controversial and reflected its history as the conduit of Norwegian funding to
11 SAfrican ‘liberation movements.’ From the beginning of their program they took a 
partisan position ‘in solidarity’ with the SPLA. Egil Hagen, their first country director 
and former Norwegian ski commando and counterespionage officer, was nicknamed 
“The Rambo of Relief’ for his militant support for the south. “Relief in war situations is 
politics,” he said. “I am one hundred percent with the SPLA. ... I do the maximum to see 
that they get the material aid they need apart from weapons.”149 A later country director, 
Dan Eiffe (nicknamed ‘Commander Dan’150), became very close to John Garang, the
145 US Agency for International Development (USAID). (1 July 2002) “USAID/REDSO/ESA FY2002 
Annual Report Sudan Program.” <http://ww.dec.org>. p. 6.
146 John C. Danforth. (26 April 2002) “Report to the President of the United States on the Outlook for 
Peace in Sudan.” <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/outlook_for_peace_in_sudan.pdf >. 
p. 31.
147 International Republican Institute. (2005) “Southern Sudan Political Party Development & Legislative 
Strengthening Program USAID CEPPS II Agreement 623-A-00-04-00072-00: USAID Semi-Annual 
Narrative Report September 15, 2004 -  March 15, 2005.” <http://ww.dec.org>; USAID. 
“USAID/REDSO/ESA FY2002.” p. 4.
148 Vesla Vetlesen. (2000) “Trade Union Support to the Struggle Against Apartheid: The Role of the 
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions.” Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa. Tore 
Linne Eriksen (Ed.). Stockholm, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. pp. 148-149; Eva Helene 0stbye. “The South 
African Liberation Struggle.” In: Eriksen. Norway and National Liberation, pp. 340-342.
149 Larry Minnear. (1991) Humanitarianism under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan. 
Trenton, New Jersey, p. 85. Emphasis in original.
150 Michael Griffin. (Third Quarter 2004) “Mirror Launches in New Sudan.” Global Journalist. 
<http://www.globaljoumalist.org/magazine/2004-3/sudan.html>.
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SPLA founder and leader for over two decades, and a major apologist for the SPLA.151 A 
Norwegian government evaluation in 1997 found that NPA workers turned a blind eye to 
the ways their work aided and abetted SPLA operations.152 NPA was even accused of
153ignoring weapons smuggling on airplanes they used to transport humanitarian relief. 
While NPA has tempered its rhetoric in recent years, and has tried to influence the SPLA 
in a democratic direction, a recent NPA public statement in the Sudan Mirror called 
Garang a “giant hero” and reaffirmed “NPA’s continued commitment and support to the 
realization of his visions....”154 In light of its historical relationship with NPA Sudan, it 
is not surprising that the US would direct some of its demining assistance to them. It is 
possible, also, that the US use of NGOs to conduct demining in South Sudan is driven by 
path dependency, following a long history of using NGOs as intermediaries in the 
Sudanese conflicts.
While it may be a coincidence, it appears that when US strategic interest in Sudan has 
been higher, it has reverted to the commercialized model of demining. In 2002, not long 
after the 9/11 attacks, masterminded by a former resident of Sudan (Osama Bin Laden), 
the US put a great deal of pressure on the Sudanese government and SPLA to sign the 
Nuba Mountains Ceasefire.155 It then played a major role in the Joint Military 
Commission, and unsurprisingly, supported RONCO’s commercial mine clearance in 
support of the JMC objectives. As the North-South war subsided with the CPA, attention 
shifted to Darfur and the war in Iraq took strategic precedence, the US continued to 
support mine clearance, perhaps kept alive by the humanitarian strains in US foreign 
policy, but switched to funding NGOs. Interestingly, the decision by USAID to return to 
supporting commercial demining, coincided with renewed US attention in Sudan and the
151 Bertha Kang’ong’oi. (6 August 2005) “Dying in the Crash Was a Great Irony.” The Nation (Nairobi). 
<http://www.gurtong.com/forums/index.php ?showtopic=2040&st=25>.
152 Quoted in: Aid Watch. (6 March 2006) “Norwegian People’s Aid [Norsk Folkehjelp].” 
<http://www.observatoire-humanitaire.org/fusion.php?l=GB&id=75>.
153 NRK Television. (17 November 1999) “Vapensmugleme I Sudan.” (“Weapons Smuggling in Sudan.”) 
Brennpunkt. NRK Television. Though probably a form of grey propaganda produced by a pro-Sudan 
Government lobby group, the following report compiles some of the allegations and reports about NPA’s 
closeness to the SPLA from other sources: The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council. (December 
1999) “Perpetuating Conflict and Sustaining Repression: Norwegian People’s Aid and the Militarisation of 
Aid in Sudan.” <http://www.espac.org/pdf/Perpetuating%20Conflict%20and%20Sustaining.pdf>.
154 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). (30 July -  12 August 2007) “Norwegian People’s Aid.” Sudan Mirror.
p. 12.
155 Young. “Sudan: A Flawed Peace.” pp. 103-104.
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Horn of Africa. A USAID 2006 report declared Sudan the “highest...priority country in 
Africa” due to “counterterrorism and regional stability concerns.156 Moreover, in 
October 2007, the US military set up a new Africa Command (AFRICOM) in recognition 
of Africa’s “growing strategic importance.”157
iii. Summary
Observing the above three convergences in US and Norwegian demining policy, it 
appears that when a donor has a higher strategic interest in a region, it is more likely to 
commercialize and militarize its demining funding. That the UN DPKO adopted such an 
approach in Sudan, where the UN does not want to see another failed peacekeeping 
mission in Africa, shows that the impulse to control and securitize the process when there 
are more interests at stake may not be limited to the US.
When strategic interest is lower, donors seem more willing to grant their demining 
funding to NGOs. This could be due to the tendency among Western countries to frame 
conflicts of low strategic importance as zones for ‘humanitarian’ rather than politico- 
military intervention.158 NGOs and the UN are seen as tools for managing, rather than 
tackling head on, the political problems that exist in such countries.
e. Conclusion
In conclusion, just as the differing Norwegian and US visions of security impact their 
global policy on mines and cluster munitions, their different foreign policy motivations 
have impacted the manner in which they fund mine action on the ground in the mine- 
affected countries Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan. The case studies show that Norwegian 
foreign policy is not entirely idealistic or humanitarian, especially when called to uphold 
its NATO commitments. Norway’s national security is so intrinsically linked to NATO 
that in Afghanistan and Bosnia, one can detect some impact of national security concerns 
upon its demining funding. However, with a few small exceptions, Norway was
156 USAID. “USAID/Sudan Operational Plan FY2006.” p. 3.
157 US Africa Command. (October 2007) “Questions and Answers about AFRICOM.” 
<http://www.africom.mil/afficomFAQs.asp>.
158 cf. Mark Duffield. (December 2001) “Governing the Borderlands: Decoding the Power of Aid.” 
Disasters. 25(4); Alex de Waal. (1997) Famine Crimes: Politics & the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. 
Oxford, James Currey; Autesserre. “United States ‘Humanitarian Diplomacy.’”
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remarkably consistent across all three case studies in its funding of civil society-driven 
and non-militarized demining.
US funding converged with this style of demining when it had lower strategic 
interests in a region. In these situations, US-funded demining was kept alive by the 
humanitarian strains in US foreign policy, but at a low level. However, when the US 
engaged politically and strategically in the case countries, it opted for a more militarized 
and commercialized approach. The fact that the UN also adopted this approach in Sudan, 
suggests that other donors may also seek greater control over the demining process and 
integration into politico-military objectives when they have more strategic interests at 
stake.
The following table summarizes how differing levels of strategic interest may shape 
demining programs.
Table 1: Demining Complexes





■ Private security companies
■ Military demining units
■ International NGOs
■ Local NGOs
■ UN Humanitarian Agencies
Tasks ■ Military Bases
■ Securing Weapons Caches
■ Access Roads Important to Military
■ Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects
■ Community-Based Priorities
■ Areas of High Human Impact
■ Focus on Marginalized Populations
Therefore, in the remaining chapters the Norwegian-funded programs, and to a 
certain extent the US funding of NGOs in Sudan, will be used as rough proxies to 
measure the impact of Human Security-Civil Society Complexes. US funding of 
commercial companies and the UN tendering system in Sudan will be used as proxies for 
Strategic-Commercial Complexes. The next chapter will examine ‘the sharp end’ of these 
contrasting complexes, comparing their relative performance in demining, using 
quantitative statistics gathered in the three mine affected countries.
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CHAPTER 6
Comparing Demining Performance: 
Commercial Tendering vs. Grants to NGOs 
in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan
“[The] insistence on the magical pow er o f market forces 
seems at best misplaced and a t worst irresponsible. ”
-  Timothy Donais.1
A key element of this dissertation’s thesis is that the two types of demining complexes produce different outcomes. This chapter examines the performance of both complexes in terms of the demining process, showing 
how the two modes of operation produced differing results in terms of price, speed, task 
complexity, quality and safety. Ultimately the differing outcomes suggest the divergent 
conceptions of risk and resource allocation that underlie the two complexes, as well as 
the impact of competition on public service provision.
As proxies for the two complexes, this chapter compares organizations that received 
the majority of their funding from tendered contracts with those receiving longer-term 
grants. First, it compares performance in terms of the price and speed of demining. It 
will show that, as Eddie Banks earlier argued,2 commercially tendered mine action was 
often cheaper and faster than that done on grants to international NGOs or by public 
bodies. This may be because commercial contracting encourages frugality and 
innovation. However, the chapter also argues that this should not be taken at face value; 
sometimes commercial demining may be cheaper simply because it does easier, thus
1 Timothy Donais. (2005) The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia. London, 
Routledge. p. 117.
2 Eddie Banks. (August 2003) “In the Name of Humanity.” Journal of Mine Action. 7(2). 
<http://maic.jmu.edU/joumal/7.2/focus/banks/banks.htm>.
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cheaper, tasks. Secondly, using quality inspection and demining accident data, the 
chapter will show that NGO demining funded by grants was conducted at a higher level 
of quality and safety than commercially tendered or government-implemented demining. 
It will argue specifically that cut-throat competition erodes a public service ethic, 
increases tolerance of risk to deminers’ lives and fragments accountability, leading to 
comer-cutting and a ‘race to the bottom.’ In contrast, donors had higher ethical 
expectations of NGOs, leading them to take fewer risks with the safety of their deminers. 
With less pressure to be profitable, NGOs could concentrate on quality and invest in 
training and capacity building. Finally, the chapter will close with an attempt at 
generalizable model-building, showing the impact of competition and profit-seeking on 
demining and the relevance of the principal-agent and principal-steward models. While it 
is obviously unwise to believe in a watertight generalizable model derived from only 
three cases, there is broad agreement between the three countries, which exhibited vastly 
different cultures, geographies, climactic conditions and socio-political contexts.
a. Price and Speed
i. Price
In conventional wisdom, contracting out public services increases competition, 
leading to improvements in efficiency and price. In many cases, across many different 
sectors, this is indeed true. Anecdotal evidence in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan all 
suggested that demining done on a tendered contract was cheaper than that done by 
agencies who received most of their funds from grants. However, this is difficult to test 
systematically because in all three cases price data was scarce, due to the reluctance of 
demining agencies to release the size of their contracts. Moreover, complicating factors 
include the difficulty of establishing comparability of the type of areas cleared and the 
absence of data separating the cost of minefield clearance (which is much more 
expensive and time-consuming) from battle area clearance.
3 Graeme A. Hodge. (2000) Privatization: An International Review of Performance. Boulder, Colorado, 
Westview Press, p. 107; World Bank. (1997) World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing 
World. New York, Oxford University Press, p. 6; Robert Camaghan & Barry Bracewell-Milnes. (1996) 
“Conclusions and Recommendations.” Privatization: Critical Perspectives on the World Economy. Vol. 
n. George Yarrow & Piotr Jasinski (Eds.). London, Routledge. p. 318-319.
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In Afghanistan, the author was able to obtain only vaguely comparable and reliable 
data for clearance at Kabul International Airport. The NGOs ATC and OMAR 
(supported by UN grants) were clearing civilian areas of the airport while several 
commercial companies were clearing adjacent military areas (on contract to the US Air 
Force). Thus the terrain was similar and on both sides most of the contamination was 
from UXO rather than mines. In this very limited case, NGO clearance, funded by grants 
was indeed significantly more expensive. However, to make a generalization from this 
one particular place to a very large country, especially since the NGO clearance data was 
for the year prior to the commercial data, would be unwise.
Figure 1: Tentative Cost Comparisons between NGO 
and Commercial Clearance at Kabul International Airport4
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In Bosnia, two earlier studies concluded that commercially tendered demining was 
cheaper than grants to NGOs or public agencies. As cited earlier, Banks’ analysis argued 
that commercially contracted demining was much cheaper than that done by international 
NGOs and government agencies.5 A later study by Lisica & Rowe calculated that an 
average commercial team in Bosnia demined for 72% of the cost of one employed by an 
NGO (see table below). They believed that commercial companies were more exposed to 
competition, forcing better productivity and lower prices.6
4 Data on NGO clearance from: UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA). (November 2006) 
IMSMA Database. Obtained by author. Data queries on clearance area. Approximation of NGO cost of 
clearance from list of KAIA NGO contracts shown to author by UNMACA source. Data on commercial 
clearance and cost was self-reported by email to the author by the companies.
5 Banks. “In the Name of Humanity.”
6 Darvin Lisica & David Rowe. (2004) “Strategic Analysis of Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
Available from the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center, Sarajevo, p. 53. See also: Ann Fitz­
Gerald & Derrick J. Neal. (2000) “Dispelling the Myth Between Humanitarian and Commercial Mine 














Table 1: Price of Demining in Bosnia, by Sector.7
Private Commercial 1.70 1.61
Nongovernmental 2.47 2.25
Public Governmental 2.00 2.82
| Country Average 2.09 2.22
This general picture in Bosnia appears to hold when specific comparison is made 
between the price of demining by Norwegian People’s Aid and the average price in 
contracts let by the Slovenian International Trust Fund. NPA’s cost per square meter was 
almost three times that of organizations (both commercial companies and local NGOs) 
working on ITF tendered contracts.
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The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining estimated that the cost 
of clearance by the Bosnian militaries was somewhere between $4.80 and $14.39 a 
square meter in 2002. One can thus say with a high degree of confidence that the rigors 
of competition (lowest for the military, highest for ITF contracts, NPA and other 
international NGOs in between) did contribute to lower prices of clearance in Bosnia.8
The author found it difficult to obtain precise cost data to allow for a proper statistical 
comparison of costs between the tendering and granting models of funding in Sudan 
because many organizations were wary of releasing what they saw as proprietary 
information. There was, however, some anecdotal information. WFP changed from a 
long-term cost-plus contract with the NGO FSD to a competitive tendering system
7 Adapted from: Lisica & Rowe. “Strategic Analysis.” p. 53.
8 Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). (June 2003) The Role o f the Military 
in Mine Action. Geneva, GICHD.
<http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Role_Military_MA.pdf>. p. 45.
198
because they felt FSD had had incentives to overspend.9 That said, one evaluation found 
that Landmine Action, an NGO funded largely by grants from the European Commission 
“was probably one of the most efficient programmes in northern Sudan” in terms of 
clearance costs.10 Similarly, a MAG employee said that, unlike commercial companies, 
they often incorporated areas around UN-tendered tasks if asked by local communities. 
Moreover, when they finished tasks early or under budget, they used this time and money 
to take on other priority tasks pro bono. Therefore, he said that the international NGOs’ 
lack of profit motive can give donors better value for money.11
While not one of the cases studied, extant price data from Mozambique for 1993- 
1998 confirms the overall picture from Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan. The four lowest 
priced organizations were commercial companies while four of the five highest priced 
were NGOs:
Table 2: Average Price of Demining in Mozambique, 1993-1998.12
Handicap Inti NGO 41.83
CIDEV Inti Comm 4.81
ADP Local NGO 3.05
NPA Inti NGO 1.61
HALO Inti NGO 0.63
Ronco Inti Comm 0.57
SCS Inti Comm 0.44
Mechem Inti Comm 0.23
Mine-Tech Inti Comm 0.02
In sum, it appears that commercially tendered demining is generally cheaper than that 
done by NGOs on grants. However, the paucity of data means that one can make only 
the most tentative of generalizations. Thus it may be helpful to look for other measures 
of efficient performance. The following section will look at speed of demining.
9 Steve Crosskey. (11 August 2007) Personal interview with author in Juba.
10 Russell Gasser. (November 2006) “Landmine Action Nuba Mountains Evaluation.” Unpublished 
document obtained by author, p. 31.
11 Jamie Franklin. (31 July 2007) Personal interview with author in Juba.
12 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (1999) “Mozambique.” Landmine Monitor 1999. 
<http://www.icbl.Org/lm/1999/mozambique.html#Headingl 108>. The unusually high costs for Handicap 
and CIDEV are explained in part by high start-up costs.
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ii. Speed
In all three cases, commercial companies claimed a higher speed of clearance than 
NGOs and governmental agencies. Companies argued that profit motive forced them to 
use labor more efficiently and use new technologies such as mechanical clearance. As 
one RONCO manager said, “The quicker you do that job, the better your profit is; the 
longer it takes you ... the more it eats into your profit.” He estimated that RONCO 
Afghanistan deminers worked three more hours a day than local NGO deminers, due to 
shorter breaks and beginning the work day when deminers arrive on site, rather than upon 
leaving their base camp.13
Again, systematic comparison was difficult in Afghanistan, as the author was not able 
to gain sufficient data to make comparisons. The only comparison the author was able to 
make in Afghanistan was using data from Kabul International Airport. Note that this is 
may be specific to this particular location, and the NGO clearance data was for the year 
prior to the commercial data. It does appear that some commercial companies were able 
to achieve a higher speed of clearance, but the following graph is far from conclusive.
Figure 3: Square Meters Cleared per Month by NGOs 














In Bosnia, the author found comprehensive speed data only for 2002. The following 
graph shows that competition may have had some positive impact on speed, though the 
margins of error are quite wide and one must be careful of reading too much into the 
statistical significance. Moving from left to right along the x-axis roughly approximates 
an increase in competition for funding and the prominence of profit-seeking as a
13 Robert Gannon. (20 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
14 Data on NGO clearance from: UNMACA. IMSMA Database. Data queries on clearance area and dates. 
Data on commercial clearance and cost was self-reported by email to the author by the companies.
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motivation. The local government and military units, on the left, were funded through 
public budgets and bilateral contributions. International NGOs largely relied on grants, 
especially NPA (which is shown below disaggregated). Local NGOs received funding 
from a mix of ITF tenders and bilateral grants and had “almost the same behavior as the 
commercial companies.”15 Finally, the local and international commercials, on the right, 
received all their funding through competitive tenders.
Figure 4: Deminer Productivity Rates:
Square Meters Cleared per Deminer in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 200216
■
t
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The best data on comparative demining speed was from Sudan. Agreeing with the 
tentative results above, UNMAO statistics showed that organizations receiving the 
majority of funding from tenders (including one NGO), cleared more square meters per 
work-hour than peacekeeping units or NGO funded by grants. Again the x-axis moves 
roughly from low to high competition and profit-seeking. Again, one must, of course, be 
cautious as to statistical significance, given the large margins of error.
15 Darvin Lisica. (22 February 2007) Personal interview with author in Sarajevo.
16 Data from: Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC). (2002) Report on Mine Action in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo, BHMAC. p. 16. Error bars represent the interquartile range of variation 
between different organizations within the category in 2002. The points are plotted at the median.
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Figure 5: Speed of Clearance (Square Meters Cleared per Work Hour) 
by Organization’s Dominant Funding Mode, 2005-July 200717
1 1 *
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In sum, though the data is again rough, it does appear that commercially tendered 
demining is correlated with a slightly higher speed of clearance. However, this should 
not lead immediately to hard and fast conclusions. At this level of aggregation it is 
difficult to determine whether commercials and NGOs are clearing comparable tasks 
(which the following subsection will analyze in more detail).
iii. Analysis: Cost-Cutting, Innovation and Comparability of Tasks
Why did the commercial contracting model appear to yield lower prices and a higher
speed of demining? And what impact did motivations of humanitarianism versus profit 
have?
The most obvious reason why commercially tendered demining might have lower 
costs is the profit motive forces cutting of excess costs. In all three case studies, 
commercial companies were far more likely than international NGOs to cut back on 
retirement and health insurance costs and reduce the size of administrative staff. One 
company in Afghanistan even saved on secretarial salaries by having deminers do their 
own paperwork. By contrast, the international NGOs’ public service ethic and security of 
funding often led them to spend more. While they sometimes were not able to pay as 
high salaries as the commercial companies, they were more likely to pay fringe benefits 
and offer longer-term contracts. For instance, several NGOs in Sudan paid deminers for 
expensive HIV/AIDS medication. International NGOs also tended to spend more money
17 Data from UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO). (July 2007) IMSMA database. Obtained by author. Error 
bars indicate the variation in average speed per organization per year. The points represent the median.
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and effort in training and capacity building for local staff. Year-around employment
1 ftmeant that NGOs could ensure that staff maintained their training in the off-season.
Moreover, in all three cases international NGOs were more likely to integrate their 
demining into a wider ‘package’ of services, such as community liaison and mine risk 
education. For instance, in Bosnia, before demining begins, NPA community liaison 
teams conduct task impact assessments (which include basic socio-economic studies) for 
every demining task, to identify the level of impact of mine contamination, the likelihood 
the land will be used productively in the future and how it will impact the local political 
economy -  to “make sure we’re not demining the back garden of the mayor of 
Sarajevo.”19 During demining operations, NPA community liaison teams meet with local 
authorities and visit residents bordering the minefield, to listen to their concerns and 
educate them about the nature of the process and residual threat. Likewise, in Sudan, 
Landmine Action and DanChurchAid’s operations in the Nuba Mountains were probably 
made more difficult by their attempts to incorporate demining into a peacebuilding 
framework, integrating deminers from both sides of the conflict. Unlike RONCO (a 
commercial company), which swept into the Nuba Mountains with Mozambican 
deminers and was able to move fairly quickly, Landmine Action and DCA spent 
significant time negotiating local political issues and disputes between deminers. In 
contrast, one RONCO executive argued that “Trying to integrate all aspects under one 
organization just can’t happen, and, if it does, it is under extraordinarily high cost. ... 
Demining is demining, as far as we are concerned.”
In addition to the predictable cutting of ‘excess costs’, the profit motive may spur 
innovation. Commercial companies in both Afghanistan and Sudan were more likely 
than some of the NGOs to adopt new detection and clearance technologies.21 Moreover,
18 Eva Veble. (20 September 2008) Personal interview with author in Geneva.
19 Per Breivik in: Matthew Bolton & Hugh Griffiths. (September 2006) Bosnia’s Political Landmines: A 
Call for Socially Responsible and Conflict-Sensitive Mine Action. London, Landmine Action. 
<http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Bosnias_Political_Landmines.pdf>. p. 14.
20 Larry Crandall in: Margaret Buse. (June 2000) “RONCO Executives Talk About Demining, Integration 
and the IMAS Contract: (An Interview with Lawrence Crandall, Stephen Edelmann and A. David 
Lundberg).” Journal of Mine Action. 4(2). <http://maic.jmu.edU/journal/4.2/Features/ronco/ronco.htm>.
21 That said, international NGOs in all three cases, such as HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid have 
also shown an ability to adopt new innovations. NPA has pioneered the use of mechanical demining in 
both Bosnia and Sudan. In Bosnia it has also set up a dog training center to both train dogs for use in its 
programs worldwide.
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by broadening the market through deregulation and commercialization, there is greater 
potential for different actors to specialize according to their respective comparative 
advantages. If one company is particularly good at manual demining and another in 
canine demining, each can concentrate on excellence in their specific niche. This gives 
added value to the client, who is able to pick and choose specific service providers 
according to the needs of the task.
However, there is a danger of overstating the impact of competition on the price and 
speed of demining because it is very difficult to establish the comparability of tasks. It is 
possible that NGO clearance is slower and more expensive because commercials are 
doing simpler tasks. This has been noted in the general literature on public service 
privatization.22 Across the case studies, it appeared that NGOs were deliberately selecting 
or being assigned more difficult tasks, often areas with a high humanitarian impact. In 
contrast, the more strategically-driven donors often wanted large areas cleared quickly in 
order to gain a rapid strategic dividend, either preparing the way for military deployment, 
or winning ‘hearts and minds’ through kickstarting infrastructure projects. This means 
the tasks given to commercial contractors may not be the most complex ones.
For example, because of liability concerns, some US-funded reconstruction 
companies in Afghanistan were contracting commercial demining even when there was 
little chance of contamination. The NGOs were less likely to see these tasks as a useful 
allocation of resources. Paul Molam of the British/Zimbabwean firm MineTech said,
A lot of the work the commercials are doing, ... there’s nothing there, but before the [US Army] 
Corps of Engineers will allow a [construction] contractor onto an area, you’ve got to go and put 
your assets over the ground although you know there’s nothing there.23
The below graphs show that in the last couple years NGOs have been clearing a 
larger amount of ordnance from its tasks than commercials in Afghanistan. This is 
sometimes a rough, though not foolproof, proxy for the difficulty of a task. According to 
Guy Willoughby of HALO Trust, this is deliberate. HALO chose to work in some of the
22 Marc Bendick, Jr. (1989) “Privatizing the Delivery of Social Welfare Services: An Idea to Be Taken 
Seriously.” Privatization and the Welfare State. Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn (Eds.). Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, p. 107.
23 Paul Molam. (7 December 2006) Comment at presentation of preliminary research findings by author to 
the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA), Kabul.
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most heavily mined and high impact areas in Afghanistan because they saw this as a 
humanitarian imperative.24
Figure 6: Comparing the 'Density' of NGO and Commercial Clearance Tasks in Afghanistan25







Another indicator that commercial organizations may be doing simpler tasks in 
Afghanistan is to look at the type of task completed. Battle area clearance (BAC), which 
is done in areas where there may be unexploded ordnance but little chance of mine 
contamination, is more easily mechanized, has less stringent safety regulations and can be 
completed faster than minefield clearance. The following graphs show that the 
commercial companies cleared much less minefield area than NGOs as a percentage of 
the total area they cleared:
Figure 7: Type of Clearance Conducted as a Percentage of Total Area Cleared, 






24 Guy Willoughby. (21 September 2007) Personal interview with author in Thornhill, Scotland
25 Data on NGO clearance from: UNMACA. IMSMA Database. Data queries on clearance area 
commercial clearance was self-reported by email to the author by the companies.
26 Data on NGO clearance from: UNMACA. IMSMA Database. Data queries on clearance area 
commercial clearance was self-reported by email to the author by the companies.
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In Bosnia, Per Breivik, former program manager of NPA, claims NGO average costs 
were higher because they were driven by humanitarian concerns to demine difficult tasks 
like apartment blocks, rather than flat open fields.27 In contrast, a former senior official at 
the UN Mine Action Center in Bosnia (UNMAC) said RONCO, a commercial company, 
chose to clear “nice easy areas that had no one living there.” The following graphs, 
illustrate how government agencies and international NGOs (primarily funded by public 
budgeting or grants) took on more complex tasks than companies and local NGOs, (both 
funded by competitive contracting). Note that here, especially with regards to areas 
cleared without ordnance, the statistical significance is probably higher than with the 
speed data.
Figure 8: Task Complexity in Bosnia and Herzegovina.28
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The same pattern was found in Sudan. Organizations funded by grants cleared areas 
with a much denser concentration of mines. This is probably because most tenders have
Per Breivik. (22 June 2005) Interview with author in Sarajevo; Melissa Eddy. (22 May 2000) “Mine 
removal snarled in conflicting interests, mismanagement.” The Associated Press', Stuart Maslen. (2004) 
Mine Action After Diana: Progress in the Struggle Against Landmines. London, Landmine Action/Pluto 
Press, p. 148.
“ Data from BHMAC Annual Reports and Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC). 
(2007) IMSMA Database. Obtained by author. Error bars represented the interquartile range of average 
values per year. The dots are plotted at the median value per year.
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been for roads, while NGOs (generally funded by grants) have concentrated on high- 
impact areas. Moreover, when NGOs have participated in UN-tendered demining, they 
have often expanded the tasks to include contaminated areas outside the initial contracted 
area when requested to do so by local communities.29 Commercial companies, driven by 
their bottom lines, have stuck strictly to the parameters of their contracts.
Figure 9: Density of Minefields Cleared in Sudan (Mines per 1 Million Square Meters Cleared) 
by Organization’s Dominant Funding Mode, 2005-July 2007.30
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Peacekeeping NPA Grants Tenders
That the commercials may be doing simpler tasks should not necessarily be taken as a 
criticism of them. In fact, it may be a wise division of labor to focus commercial 
demining on tasks that can be done quickly and allow humanitarian NGOs to focus on 
slower, more difficult ones. Having NGOs do tasks where there is minimal risk of 
contamination would be a waste of humanitarian resources. However, to then use the 
price and speed data to make firm assertions of commercial preeminence, as Banks does, 
is misleading.
iv. Summary
From the admittedly rough data obtained by the author, it is possible to conclude that 
commercial companies may have cleared contaminated areas faster and cheaper than 
NGOs and public entities. However, part of this increased productivity and efficiency 
may be the result of commercial companies’ preference for battle area clearance and 
tasks that have fewer mines and UXO per square meter. Contracted demining might thus
29 Crosskey. Personal interview.
30 Data from UNMAO. IMSMA database. Error bars indicate the interquartile range in variation of average 
density per organization per year. The points represent the median.
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be cheaper simply because contractors choose to do cheaper tasks. Therefore, NGO 
grants may lead to some inflation of costs, but may also lead to better targeting of efforts.
b. Quality and Safety
While there may be efficiency benefits to commercialization, simple price 
comparisons do not account for potential human costs, such as lowered safety. Indeed, 
the literature on public service privatization has generally found that cost savings in 
contracting out often come at the risk of reduced quality and/or safety. As one demining 
manager said simply, “A high level of quality means more costs.”31
i. Quality Assurance Inspections
While slightly different systems were used, in each case country public quality
assurance teams visited demining sites and issued reports indicating whether the 
demining agency was following safety and quality regulations. Data from these 
inspections thus measures the quality of the demining process, which obviously 
influences the quality of the product. In all three cases, agencies receiving grant funding 
had better quality assurance records (measured by comparing the percentage of good 
versus bad quality assurance reports) than those working on tenders.
In Afghanistan, if an organization’s site complied with mine action standards, the 
quality assurance team issued a Conformity Report. If there were small infractions, they 
issued a Minor Non-Conformity Report, indicating errors observed and suggested 
corrections. For infractions that threatened lives -  of either deminers or future users of 
the land -  the quality management team issued a Major Non-Conformity Report. 
Unfortunately, at the time of the author’s fieldwork the Quality Assurance reports were 
not all centralized at UNMACA headquarters, due to the decentralized nature of data 
collection and some technical problems setting up a central database. Therefore, a 
country-wide comparison of quality assurance reports was not possible. However, the 
author obtained the paper records for 2005 and 2006 (till September) for the Central 
AMAC, covering Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Bamyan, Wardak and Logar provinces. The 
Central AMAC region is a good case study for comparison as some 36% of mine affected
31 Lisica. Personal interview.
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communities are located there32 and around 42% of all Afghan clearance (in terms of 
square meters) in 2005 and 2006 occurred there.33 Every demining actor, NGO and 
commercial, carried out demining and battle area clearance in the region in 2005 and 
2006. The Central AMAC is thus relatively representative of Afghan demining as a 
whole. Moreover, the author believes this dataset to be the most reliable of the 
quantitative data from Afghanistan used in this chapter.
The following graph shows the percentage distribution of Central AMAC Quality 
Assurance reports, by organizational type. It shows that commercial companies had a 
significantly higher rate of Major Non-Conformity. That is, according to the Central 
AMAC quality management specialists, the commercial companies were more likely to 
engage in activities posing a direct threat to the lives of deminers or future users of 
cleared land.34 As in previous sections, the x-axis moves roughly from low to high 
competition (on the left the UN-funded local NGOs effectively have guaranteed funding, 
in the middle, international NGOs have to compete for grants given by bilateral donors, 
on the right commercials compete for tenders).
32 Survey Action Center. (2006) Landmine Impact Survey -  Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Takoma Park, 
Maryland, Survey Action Center, p. 21.
33 UNMACA. IMSMA Database. Data queries on clearance area and devices.
34 One should note that there is a possibility that, and there were some anecdotal reports of, the quality 
management inspectors having a bias against commercial companies, because they are unfamiliar with the 
new technologies they used. A recent strategic planning meeting held in Dubai also identified the quality 
management teams as a major weakness of UNMACA. The NGO Danish Demining Group is conducting a 
project to build the capacity of the quality management teams and one element of the training will be to 
familiarize them with the new technologies used by commercial companies.
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Figure 10: Distribution of Quality Assurance Reports by the 
Central Area Mine Action Center, Afghanistan, 2005-September 2006.35
Local NGOs HALO Trust All Inti NGOs Commercials
| U Major Non-Conformity □  Minor Non-Conformity E3 Conformity
Unlike in Afghanistan, the author was able to get volumous quality assurance data for 
the whole country of Bosnia, from 2000 onwards. While the methodology for issuing a 
report detailing deviance with standing operating procedures changed in June 2003, both 
the old and new methods display generally the same picture. Organizations receiving 
resources through tendered contracts (commercial companies and local NGOs) were 
much more likely to deviate from safety procedures than those receiving grants or funded 
through public budgets. NPA’s record is particularly good. Looking at the graph for 
June 2003 onwards, one can see that the NPA is between six and eight times less likely to 
commit a ‘Critical Error’ -  one that could risk someone’s life -  than an organization 
receiving money from the US-funded ITF.
35 Quality assurance report data provided to the author by UNM ACA’s Kabul Area Mine Action Center 
(AMAC). Unfortunately, at the time of the author’s fieldwork in Afghanistan, the Quality Assurance 
reports were not all centralized at UNMACA headquarters, due to the decentralized nature of the data 
collection and some technical problems setting up a central database. Therefore, a country-wide 
comparison of quality assurance reports was not possible at the time of writing. However, the author was 
able to obtain the paper records for 2005 and 2006 (till September) for the Central AMAC, which covers 
Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Bamyan, Wardak and Logar provinces. The Central AMAC region is a good case 
study for comparison as some 36% of mine affected communities are located there (Survey Action Center. 
Landmine Impact Survey -  Islamic Republic o f Afghanistan, p. 21.) and around 42% of all demining and 
battle area clearance (in terms of square meters) in 2005 and 2006 occurred there. (UNMACA. IMSMA 
Database. Data queries on clearance area and devices.) Moreover, every demining actor, NGO and 
commercial, carried out demining and battle area clearance in this region in 2005 and 2006. It is therefore 
probable that the Central AMAC is relatively representative of Afghan demining as a whole.
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Figure 11: Percentage Non-Compliance with 
Standing Operating Procedures, Bosnia and Herzegovina36
Old Method (January 2000-May 2003) New Method (June 2003-December 2006)
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While the difference is less stark than in Afghanistan and Bosnia, the tendering model 
appears also correlated with a slight reduction in quality of demining in Sudan. 
Organizations funded by tenders were three times more likely to receive an order to stop 
work due to work practice that posed a risk to life (a “Fail-Stop” rating), and received 
less “High-Good” ratings than those funded by grants.
Figure 12: Quality Assurance Record, by Organization's Dominant Funding Mode,
Sudan 2004-July 200737
100%
Peacekeeping Units Grants Tenders
I ■Fail-Stop ■Low-Fal □Medium-Satisfactory ■High-Good |
36 Percentage of Quality Assurance Reports that report errors. Note the method of determining what was an 
error changed in June 2003, hence the need for two graphs. Note that from June 2003, a ‘Critical Error’ 
was one that could endanger a person’s life, whether a deminer or a future user o f the land. From BHMAC. 
IMSMA Database.
37 UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO). (July 2007) “IMSMA Monthly Report.” Obtained by author from 
UNMAO. p. 13. This data is generated by UNMAO quality assurance personnel who conduct random 
spotchecks on demining tasks. At the end of the inspection they issue a quality assurance report rating the 
task as “High-Good”, “Medium-Satisfactory”, “Low-Fail” and “Fail-Stop.” A Low-Fail rating would 
indicate that the task is being cleared in a manner that could pose a danger to the life of a deminer or a 
future user of the land. A Fail-Stop rating indicates a deviance from standing operating procedures that is 
so severe that the task must be stopped until the situation and the problem can be properly reviewed. This 
graph consolidates all of the quality assurance reports and compares their distribution as a percentage of all 
the reports issued about that organization.
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ii. Interaction between Poor Quality and Poor Safety
The consistency of commercial underperformance in quality assurance inspections
across the three case studies highlights the inadequacy of the simple price and efficiency 
approach to examining demining privatization taken, for instance, by Banks.38 While low 
quality work is a serious problem in any industry, in demining it can literally be fatal. 
Therefore, in cost-benefit analysis of contracting-out, one must account for ‘human costs’ 
in additional to financial ones.
As one might expect, the author found that in both Afghanistan and Bosnia, an 
increase in failing quality assurance ratings was roughly correlated with higher accident 
rates. The number of accidents that have occurred in Sudan are too few to make 
meaningful comparison, so it is unclear whether this also would be the case in Sudan. 
However, the correlation in two other countries should serve as a warning to those who 
might discount the importance of analyzing quality assurance data systematically. The 
following graphs plot demining agencies’ non-conformity with safety procedures against 
their accident records.
Figure 13: The Effect of Major Non-Conformity with Standing Operating Procedures 
on Accident Rates in Afghanistan, January 2005-September 200639
* 2
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38 Banks. “In the Name of Humanity.”
39 Data points are agencies. Quality assurance report data provided to the author by UNMACA’s Kabul 
Area Mine Action Center (AMAC). Of the commercial companies only S3AG, RONCO and UXB were 
included because data on the others was lacking. UXB data is only for 2006. MCPA and AREA were 
excluded due to the very low levels of clearance work in the period. UXB was excluded from the 
Demining/BAC accidents per 1,000 mines found graph because the data point skewed the dataset 
excessively in favor of the correlation between the two variables.
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Figure 14: The Effect of Non-Conformity with Standing Operating 
Procedures on Accident Rates in Bosnia40
% QA R eports th a t R eported Errors (2000-May 2003) % QA R eports th a t R eported  Errors (2000-May 2003)
While the above graphs show the correlation between poor quality and poor safety in 
general, the next subsection will show how this lead organizations working on tendered 
contracts to have more demining accidents than great-funded NGOs and some public 
agencies. Since more than 80% of demining accidents are avoidable, caused by lack of 
proper management, supervision or training,41 the poor safety record of commercial 
deminers may be a further indication of the poor quality of their demining.
iii. Accident Records
Consistent with the above findings, a comparison of accidents per area or ordnance
cleared shows that commercial companies had a significantly poorer safety record in 
Afghanistan than international and local NGOs.
40 Data points are agencies. Quality assurance records and clearance data from BHMAC. IMSMA 
Database, and the author’s accident dataset.
41 Andy Smith. (June 2000) “The Facts on Protection Needs in Humanitarian Demining.” Journal o f Mine 
Action. 4(2). <http://maic.jmu.edU/joumal/4.2/focus/PN/protectneeds.htm>. cf. James Trevelyan. (June 
2000) “Reducing Accidents in Demining: Achievements in Afghanistan.” Journal o f Mine Action. 4(2). 
<http://maic.jmu.edU/joumal/4.2/Focus/Accidents/accidents.htm>; Maslen. Mine Action After Diana, p. 
50.
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Figure 15: Accident Record by Organization Type in Afghanistan,
January 2005 to November 2006.42
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Some have suggested that the commercial companies’ bad run of accidents in 
Afghanistan is due to their recent arrival in the country -  that it takes time to get used to 
the conditions. However, one sees a similar pattern in Bosnia, where local military and 
NGO demining units consistently outperformed commercial companies and local NGOs 
that received significant portions of their budgets from tendered contracts. NPA’s safety 





While the Sudan accident data was too scarce to make meaningful comparisons, the 
Afghan and Bosnian experiences show that while a competitive tendering process may
42 M ine and UXO data is for ordnance found in clearance only, not stockpile destruction or EOD 
operations. Data on accidents from: UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA). (November 
2006) “Demining Accidents, Incidents, IED attacks and Major Non-Demining Accidents.” Spreadsheet 
given to author. Data on NGO clearance from: UNMACA. IMSMA Database. Data queries on clearance 
area. Data on commercial clearance was self-reported by email to the author by the companies.
43 Clearance data from BHMAC. IMSMA Database. Author’s compiled accident database using records 
from BHMAC, ICRC, GICHD and the press. This graph displays accidents as unweighted because 
correcting for the lower probability of accidents in later years does not change the overall picture of the 
graph significantly.
43Figure 16: Safety Record by Organization Type in Bosnia, 1999-2006. 
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reduce financial costs of demining, there are high human costs -  accidents -  which 
appear correlated with the contract model of funding.
iv. Analysis: Professional Ethics, the Race to the Bottom and 
Accountability
NGO personnel in each of the case countries asserted that their better quality and 
safety record stemmed from their professional ethics. As one manager explained, “For an 
organization that is called Danish Church Aid, it cannot make certain [unethical] 
choices.”44 In contrast with companies, which exist to make a profit for their owners, the 
international NGOs largely exist because of some sense of social responsibility. For 
NPA, it is solidarity with the oppressed; for HALO, a traditional notion of charity; for 
DCA, it is Christian service to those in need. NGOs argue that these values extend to 
their work. Unnecessarily risking the lives of deminers, or future users of the land, would 
contravene international NGOs’ very raison d'etre. Within the commercial sector there 
is variation in professional ethics. A representative of ArmorGroup in Bosnia argued that 
the international commercial companies (which had fewer accidents than local companies 
in Bosnia) were constrained by their worldwide brand image, which prevented them from 
taking the risks that local companies did. Likewise, in Afghanistan RONCO was able to 
spend much more money on training, and consequently have a better quality and safety 
record than other commercial companies because its reputation and relatively secure 
position as the market leader meant it was not forced to cut costs as harshly.45
Further, the professional ethics of NGOs may be supported by their secure funding as 
they are not forced to make sacrifices. In Bosnia UNMAC argued that NGOs had fewer 
accidents because NGOs were “normally not so productivity-orientated as commercial 
organisations are and can progress at a rate not driven mainly by the financial aspects of 
an operation.”46 In contrast, driven by the need to turn a profit at the end of every task, 
commercial companies often have to speed up the demining process, perhaps leading to 
greater risk of errors.47 One UNMACA employee said that for commercial companies to
44 Marco Buono. (15 August 2007) Personal interview with author in Khartoum.
45 Gannon. Personal interview.
46 UN Mine Action Center (UNMAC). (11 December 1997) “Demining Accidents by Mine-Tech in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.” p. 3.
47 James Trevelyan, (n.d.) “Alternatives to the 99.6% demining standard.”
<http://www.mech.uwa.edu.au/jpt/demining/quality/standards4.pdf>.p. 2; James Trevelyan. (August 1999)
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make profit on clearance, “you have to tell the deminers ‘go, go, go and go faster!’ and 
then -  accidents.”48 In Bosnia, some companies even paid deminers by square meter 
cleared, which encouraged deminers to rush their work.49 In a sense, commercial 
companies cannot afford the expensive morals of NGOs. The demining accidents reveal 
some commercial companies’ general callousness in cutting corners. The following 
quotes from UNMAC inquiries into accidents by companies in Bosnia reveal a 
scandalous disregard toward Standing Operating Procedures:
The [Mine Tech] Team Leader acted irresponsibly and the site was marked inadequately.50
[Inappropriate emphasis has been placed on [Mine Tech] field workers to complete a stated 
minimum square metres each day.51
Mines were stored in an unacceptable way and were not destroyed at the end of the working 
day [by UXB/Amphibia].52
[T]he flagrant disregard of such a fundamental and common-sensical procedural regulation as 
the appropriate minimum distancing between deminers constitutes in the Board’s view a gross 
deficiency in supervision at all levels [by RONCO/UNIPAK].53
[There is a] lack of a firm quality assurance and quality control policy in the company [AKD 
Mungos].54
Therefore, as competition increases, the space for professional ethics decreases. The 
most serious problems occur at the cutthroat competitive margin of the market, where
“Landmines in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.”
<http://www.mech.uwa.edu.au/jpt/demining/countries/balkans/cro-bos.html>; UNMAC. “Demining 
Accidents by Mine-Tech.”; International Crisis Group (ICG). (18 July 1997) “Ridding Bosnia of 
Landmines: The Urgent Need for a Sustainable Policy.” ICG Bosnia Report No. 25. p. 14; Don Hubert. 
(1998) “The Challenge of Humanitarian Mine Clearance.” To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to 
Ban Landmines. Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson & Brian W. Tomlin (Eds.). Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, p. 326; Eddy. “Mine removal snarled.”; Christopher Spearin. (November 2001) “Ends 
and Means: Assessing the Humanitarian Impact of Commercialised Security on the Ottawa Convention 
Banning Anti-Personnel Mines.” YCISS Occasional Paper Number. 69.
<http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publications/OP69-Spearin.pdf>. pp. 9-10; Shannon K. Mitchell. (2004) 
“Death, Disability, Displaced Persons and Development: The case of Landmines in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.” World Development. 32(12). p. 866.
48 Daniel Bellamy. (22 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
49 UNMAC. “Demining Accidents by Mine-Tech.”; Eddy. “Mine removal snarled .”; Neil McKenzie. (7 
July 2005) Interview with author in Sarajevo.
50 UN Mine Action Center (UNMAC). (23 July 1997) “Report on Accident at Sevarlije, Near Doboj.” p. 7.
51 UNMAC. “Demining Accidents by Mine-Tech.” p. 3.
52 UN Mine Action Center (UNMAC). (14 April 1999) “Report of Board of Inquiry into Accident 08 April 
1999.” p. 9.
53 UN Mine Action Center (UNMAC). (27 July 1999) “Report of Board of Inquiry into Accident of 27 July 
1999.” p. 7.
54 UN Mine Action Center (UNMAC). (11 August 1999) “Report of Board of Inquiry into an Accident on 5 
August 1999.” p. 7.
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companies make up for lack of reputation or brand in speed and price. In all three cases, 
the most competitive margin of the market seemed to display element of a ‘race to the 
bottom’, where quality and safety was sacrificed for profit. In Bosnia this was seen 
among the local commercial companies. In Sudan there was less variation among quality 
assurance records, but again it was the groups that had to compete for funding that had 
the poorer overall record. In Afghanistan it was the less well established commercial 
companies, competing with RONCO, which had the most quality and safety problems. 
The competitive system created incentives to seek profit not through an improvement of 
the quality of demining, but through dangerous comer-cutting practices, such as poor 
spacing of deminers, increased speed, inappropriate use of machines, poor oversight and 
improper safety equipment.
An illustration of how bad this can get is the corner-cutting of an American company, 
Explosive Ordnance Technology, Inc. (EODT) in Afghanistan. EODT was clearing a 
military area of Kabul International Airport on a NATO contract with the US Air Force. 
They were new to Afghanistan, and had little in the way of assets -  they had to rent 
personal protective equipment (PPE) from another commercial company. However, 
when interviewed, the EODT demining operations manager said EODT was able to clear 
areas much quicker and more cheaply than Afghan NGOs, even though they paid their 
deminers as much as 30% more. He attributed their speed to effective use of mechanical 
technologies and the “motivation that a privately owned company has got.” He said that 
the increased speed did not come at a cost to safety, “because of the simple reason that all 
of our safety procedures, our standard operating procedures are set up specifically for 
mechanical clearance operations.”55
However, when shown around their battle area clearance site, the author was shocked 
to find several life-endangering deviations from internationally-recognized mine action 
standards. Even more disturbingly, a report in the files of the Central AMAC outlined 
observations of similar poor practice three or four months earlier. For instance, in August 
2006, the AMAC report observed, “Since the bulldozer machine which was busy in
55 Source X. (24 November 2006) Personal interview with the author in Kabul.
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clearance of the task was un-armoured, it was unsuitable for mine clearance program.”56 
However, in October 2006, the author took the below picture of an EODT digger 
excavating a bunker in a battle area. Note that despite the risk of there being unexploded 
ordnance buried in the ground being excavated, the digger’s cab is unarmored, the cab 
door is open, and the digger’s mechanic is hanging out of the door while the digger is in 
operation:






too close to 
digger
In the same August report, the Kabul AMAC team observed that “The relevant site 
supervisor and his colleagues were standing near the machine without PPE [Personal 
Protective Equipment] and maintaining safety distance.”57 In November, the author was 
told by the demining operations manager that the digger in the photograph below was 
excavating a suspected mine line. Note that the digger, while this time armored, again 
has its door open, and the machines’ spotter, lacking a visor, is not wearing the required 
PPE.
56 Kabul Central Area Mine Action Center (AMAC) Quality Management Investigation Team (QMIT) 15. 
(3 August 2006) “Observation Form.” Available from Kabul AMAC.
57 Ibid.
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Figure 18: EODT Mineline Clearance at Kabul International Airport, 24 November 2006.
No visor
Despite commercial corner cutting, the commercialization process, as a form of 
deregulation, can actually lead to lower levels of accountability and supervision. Without 
effective rule of law and centralized authority, all the three case countries lacked public 
agencies able to enforce the kind of regulation necessary to prevent a race to the bottom. 
Maintaining a professional standard was often left to the internal checks on an agency’s 
behavior -  whether ‘good intentions’ or a reliable brand.
In Afghanistan, the commercialization process eroded the regulatory power of 
UNMACA. For instance, the EODT example illustrates that UNMACA struggled to 
impose its authority on the company. The author overheard an EODT manager express 
confusion and incredulity about why UNMACA inspectors must visit the site and certify 
clearance. While UNMACA could take away their accreditation, since it did not fund the 
commercial companies it had fewer levers to force good behavior than with the NGOs. 
Moreover, many organizations that were contracting commercial demining did not 
include clauses requiring coordination with and submission of data to UNMACA. 
Therefore, UNMACA felt the commercials were “not properly reporting to us”58 and 
there were “multiple incidents where an organization will come us and say ‘we need a 
clearance certificate for our task that we have completed,’ ... and we will go, ‘What 
task?”’59 Some clients hired their own independent quality assurance personnel to 
supervise commercial deminers’ work. However, this system was decentralized and 
privatized -  reports were not submitted to a central and public repository. Indeed, the
58 Mohammed Sediq. (23 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
59 Chris Stephens. (16 April 2007) Personal interview with author in New York.
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limited attempts by the author to obtain access to their reports were unfruitful. This could 
create ‘information asymmetries’ as information on quality of work was not available to 
all potential clients.
UNMACA also had difficulty keeping track of commercial demining on US military 
bases. Afghans working as UNMACA’s quality assurance inspectors found it difficult to 
gain the security clearance to go on base. While the US military had its own office 
controlling demining on US bases, coordination and information sharing with UNMACA 
was patchy. Therefore, despite UNMACA’s mandate of ultimate responsibility for all 
demining on Afghan territory, the Coalition bases had a parallel and stove-piped system.
Thus the commercial companies in Afghanistan were subject to far less oversight than 
the NGOs. The following graph shows that in 2005 (the only year where complete 
quality assurance data was available at the time of the fieldwork) quality management 
investigation teams from the Central Area Mine Action Team did far fewer spotchecks on 
commercial companies than NGOs.
Figure 19: Level of Quality Assurance Surveillance over NGOs and Commercial Companies in the 
Central Area Mine Action Center, Afghanistan.60
Number of Quality Assurance Reports per 







Clearance NGOs (Ie excluding Commercials (RONCO & S3Ag only) 
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In Bosnia it is also possible that commercial companies, especially local ones, faced 
lower standards of accountability. Firstly, they were less able to afford to pay for the 
high levels of internal supervision, in terms of a larger management and administrative 
staff. In contrast, NPA had regular evaluation visits from staff in Oslo and paid for an 
external evaluation by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. 
Secondly, the early corruption of the commercial demining sector suggests that many
60 Data on NGO clearance from: UNMACA. IMSMA Database. Data queries on clearance area. Data on 
commercial clearance was self-reported by email to the author by the companies. Quality assurance report 
data provided to the author by UNMACA’s Kabul Area Mine Action Center (AMAC).
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companies were able to buy their way out of accountability. Finally, through their 
consultations with local community leaders and beneficiaries, international NGOs like 
NPA were probably more accountable to the local population. They would be far more 
likely to notice and acknowledge complaints from local residents.
In Sudan it is possible that the commercial companies were actually subjected to 
tighter control from UNMAO than the NGOs, as UNMAO was their donor and contract 
supervisor, in addition to being their regulator. However, this has also meant that they 
have been subject to less independent external criticism. The bilateral donors and 
individual NGOs have commissioned several independent evaluations of their work. In 
contrast, the UN-led system has only been evaluated internally in a manner that several 
have described as ‘covering the UN’s back.’
v. Summary
There is a danger that without proper control and oversight, the increased productivity 
and lower price of commercial demining may come at a human cost -  a loss of safety -  
and a reduction of quality. This is suggested both by quality assurance records and 
accident data. Analyzing qualitative data from the cases indicates that this reduction in 
quality may come from the inability of commercial companies, especially those 
competing at the margin, to afford the ‘luxury’ of professional ethics. Moreover, it is 
possible that commercial companies have been subjected to lower levels of accountability 
than NGOs, especially in Afghanistan and Bosnia.
c. Modeling the Results
While one must be cautious about creating a generalizable theory from only three 
case studies, the data presented above is sufficient to begin a process of model-building 
for others to test elsewhere. The following looks at what the above data might say 
regarding the impact of competition on demining and agency versus stewardship models 
of contracting.
i. The Impact of Competition
From the data, it appears the following can be said about the impact of competition
and profit-seeking on key demining indicators:
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1) Price: Increasing competition and profit-seeking lowers the price of clearance 
per square meter, though eventually a law of diminishing returns applies. One 
should note however, that this proposition is based on some of the lowest 
quality data.
2) Speed: Increasing competition and profit-seeking leads to an increase in speed 
(though at a slower rate than the decrease in price), though the law of 
diminishing returns eventually applies. One should note, however, that the link 
between competition and speed was not ironclad.
3) Task Complexity: Increasing competition and profit-seeking initially makes 
demining agencies more accountable and thus more likely to target their 
efforts on more difficult tasks, but eventually the drive to cut costs leads them 
to seek the ‘lower hanging fruit’ of easier work. This correlation was fairly 
strong.
4) Quality/Safety: Increasing competition forces demining agencies to be 
accountable and increase the quality and safety of their work, though as 
competition and profit-seeking becomes more cutthroat, there is a race to the 
bottom at the expense of quality. This correlation appeared to be strong across 
the case studies.
These variables can be illustrated as following:
Figure 20: The Impact of Competition and Profit-Seeking on Demining
:Point 2: Grants to NOOs
jPoint 3: Corrrretcial Tendering
Com petition and  Profit-SeekingCom petition and Prollt-Seeking [ - ••Pr ice  Speed  Quality- -•Pr ice  Speed  Task Complexity
As indicated on the graphs, there seem to be three points where demining programs 
can settle, depend on the level of deregulation and competition in the market.
The first point, with high prices, low speed, low complexity and low quality/safety, 
represents a monopolized market, where an agency has no incentive to improve the
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efficiency or quality of their work. This might be approximated by the poor record of the 
local government civil protection teams in Bosnia. This is the result of a statist model of 
demining or of non-competitive cost-plus contracts.
The second point, with fairly high prices and low speed but high levels of task 
complexity and quality/safety, represents granting to international NGOs. There is more 
competition than in a monopoly, as the NGOs must apply for their funding, which can 
always go to an alternative, competing NGO. However, it is a more protected market 
than commercial tendering. This is represented by the Human Security-Civil Society 
demining complex, which puts greater premium on the value of preventing accidents and 
errors than on saving money.
The third point, with lower prices and higher speeds, though lower task complexity 
and quality/safety, represents the relatively open market of commercial tendering. The 
higher levels of competition and profit-seeking enforce a level of efficiency not seen in 
the previous two points, though this comes at the cost of quality and targeting efforts at 
more difficult demining. This is represented by the Strategic-Commercial demining 
complex, which assigns a high value to profit, and thus efficiency.
The three points also represent three alternative examples of how increasing 
competition and profit-seeking creates and destroys incentives and space for morally- 
driven action -  service provision guided by professional ethics. A complete monopoly 
gives no incentive for having humanitarian intentions -  in fact it invites abuse. At the 
other end of the spectrum, cutthroat competition leaves little room for ethics, as cutting 
corners is the only way to avoid being priced out of the market by the lowest common 
moral denominator. However, a system of grants, blending a low-level of competition 
with enough space to focus on longer-term time horizons, allows agencies to encourage a 
higher regard for professional ethics. Between grants and cutthroat competition, some 
companies may be able to trade on a high quality international brand, rather than comer- 
cutting, to gain moral space.
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Figure 21: The Impact of Competition on Moral Space
s
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ii. Agents vs. Stewards
As outlined in Chapter 1, when donors contract to commercial demining companies,
they operate according to a ‘principal-agent’ relationship, in which the donor relies on the 
company’s pursuit of profit, and the contract’s stipulations, to ensure demining objectives 
are met.61 When donors give long-term grants to trusted partner agencies, they operate 
according to a ‘principal-steward’ relationship, relying on the implementer’s normative 
and professional commitment to the achievement of the donor’s goals.
Studies of other public service contracting have also found that the high levels of 
competition and re-tendering in the ‘principal-agent’ model can encourage agents to take 
advantage of information asymmetries or engage in a destructive ‘race to the bottom’ 
with competitors. Counter to free-market conventional wisdom, some scholars have 
found that the ‘principal-steward’ model can actually hold stewards more accountable 
than agents, and that their ideological commitments can spur them to produce more 
effectively.62 In other words, stewardship employs forms of accountability beyond free 
market competition, such as professional ethics and high expectations.
61 John W Pratt & Richard J Zeckhauser (Eds.). (1984) Principals and agents: The structure o f business. 
Boston, Harvard Business School Press, pp. 1-35; Kathleen M. Eisenhardt. (1989) “Agency theory: An 
assessment and review.” Academy of Management Review. 14. pp.57-74; Dietmar Braun. (April-June 
1993) “Who Governs Intermediary Agencies? Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making.” 
Journal of Public Policy. 13(2). pp. 135-162.
62James H. Davis, F. David Schoorman & Lex Donaldson. (1997) “Toward a Stewardship Theory of 
Management.” The Academy of Management Review. 22(1). pp. 20-47; David M. Van Slyke. (April 2007) 
“Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting 
Relationship.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 17(2). pp. 164-167; Lisa A Dicke. 
(2002) “Ensuring accountability in human services contracting: Can stewardship theory fill the bill?” 
American Review of Public Administration 32. pp. 455-70; Lisa A Dicke & Steven J. Ott. (2002) “A test: 
Can stewardship theory serve as a second conceptual foundation for accountability methods in contracted 
human services?” International Journal o f Public Administration. 25. pp. 463-87.
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Therefore, while monopoly can allow agencies to become complacent, excessive 
competition in a ‘principal-agent’ model can actually erode professional ethics. 
Stewardship involves low levels of competition but has other accountability mechanisms 
(such as trust, commitment and the importance of maintaining a trustworthy 
organizational brand) that maintain high standards of ethics.
iii. Summary
To put it bluntly, mine action donors are faced with a value judgment of how much 
quality, safety and task complexity they are willing to sacrifice in order to lower the cost 
and speed of demining. Increasing competition and profit-seeking, while initially 
encouraging accountability, eventually shifts agencies’ attention away from quality to 
ensuring profitability. This gives less room for ethical considerations and professional 
ethics. Whether it is worth risking the lives of deminers in order to more quickly reduce 
the risk to the lives of civilians in proximity to dangerous areas is a value judgment that 
needs to be considered carefully by the donor. Operating according to a ‘principal- 
steward’ model may offer the appropriate balance between accountability and trust 
necessary to encourage efficient and high quality demining.
d. Conclusion
Whether the correlations drawn in this paper are generalizable will depend on further 
analysis and study in other cases. However, there appears to be clear indications that the 
two demining complexes, rooted in their differing understandings of security, constituent 
organizations and contractual relationships, produced differing outcomes.
Due to the pressures of strategic expedience and the commercial bottom line, the 
Strategic-Commercial Complex produced greater volume of square meters cleared at 
lower cost. However, this was partly because the tasks prioritized were not always the 
most difficult nor of the greatest humanitarian impact. Moreover, donors and 
implementers chose a higher level of risk to the lives of deminers and future land users, 
reducing the quality and safety of the process. This was incentivized by the high levels 
of competition and profit-seeking that meant implementers were forced to prioritize the 
bottom line over humanitarian considerations.
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In contrast, the slower speed and higher cost of demining done by the Human 
Security-Civil Society Complex was in part due to choosing tasks according to 
humanitarian priorities, yielding more difficult working conditions. However, it also 
derived from the lower willingness of the donors and implementing agencies to risk the 
lives of their deminers and future land users. This was incentivized by long-term grants 
to trusted ‘stewards’, encouraging implementing agencies to invest time in training; good 
equipment and working conditions; providing high levels of supervision and oversight; 
and surveying land to make sure it is of high humanitarian priority. This encouraged 
demining agencies to prioritize humanitarianism and professional ethics over 
profitmaking.
The analysis of differing outcomes cannot, however, stop there. The two complexes 
also had a wider impact on the socio-political context of the beneficiary country. 
Speaking of economic policy in Bosnia, Donais said, “in post-conflict situations 
economic reform efforts should be measured not only in terms of narrow economic 
impacts, but also -  equally if not more importantly -  in terms of the impact of such 
efforts on the broader peace process.”63 Applied to demining, this will be the subject of 
the next chapter.
63 Donais. Political Economy of Peacebuilding, p. 111.
226
CHAPTER 7
Considering Wider Impact: 
Mine Action’s Impact on Peacebuilding 
in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan
The challenge o f peacebuilding...lies... 
in finding ways to dismantle the very structures 
that prevent such a post-war order from  
taking root, and which in many ways replicate 
and reinforce the logic o f conflict.
-  Timothy Donais.1
The literature on the political economy of aid in conflict2 -  notably by Mary Anderson3 and Jonathan Goodhand,4 -  highlights aid’s embeddedness in a web of political, economic and social relationships. Aid agencies’ activities 
invariably impact the local political economy and are interpreted through local socio­
cultural lenses. Therefore, aid organizations can inadvertently contribute to conflict by 
collaborating with vested interests or sending wrong signals. Conversely, their activities 
can contribute to peacebuilding by strengthening local constituencies for peace or by
1 Timothy Donais. (2005) The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia. London, 
Routledge p. 81.
2 David J. Keen. (2008) Complex Emergencies. Cambridge, Polity; Fiona Terry. (2002) Condemned to 
Repeat?: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action. Ithaca, Cornell University Press; Alex de Waal. (1998) 
Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. Bloomington, Indiana University 
Press; Mark Duffield. (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and 
Security. London, Zed Books; Mark Duffield. (2007) Development, Security and Unending War: 
Governing the World of Peoples. Cambridge, Polity Press.
3 Mary B. Anderson. (1999) Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace -  or War. Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers.
4 Jonathan Goodhand. (2006) Aiding Peace? The Role of NGOs in Armed Conflict. Bourton on Dunsmore, 
Intermediate Technology Publications.
227
taking a principled stand for nonviolent politics. This chapter draws conceptually from 
this literature, showing that demining agencies also have a wider impact on the local 
context of transitions from war to peace.
The chapter argues that shorter-term profit-seeking objectives of commercial 
companies supported by the US (and the UN in Sudan) constrained them with the 
necessities of expediency. They had to collaborate with the powerful political actors, 
both donors who might be engaged in the conflict, as well as local vested interests. As a 
result, the Strategic-Commercial Complex probably contributed to military stabilization 
in the three cases, but was also more likely to become embedded in the illiberal political 
economy of war. Moreover, by contributing to the privatization of protection, they may 
have exacerbated the fragmentation of security provision for ordinary people.
In contrast, as stewards of a humanitarian mission, constrained by public expectations 
of strong professional ethics and having the space of long-term time horizons, the 
international NGOs supported by Norway were able to invest effort in contributing 
positively to the peace process. Specifically, they contributed to integrative and non­
violent politics through inclusive hiring practices, resisting the political economy of 
conflict and advocating for limits on the technologies of violence. Moreover, they helped 
restore public security by distributing protection from explosive remnants of war by need, 
rather than ability to pay or strategic rationale. That said, by using international NGOs 
and creating organizations that were independent from other local institutions, it is 
possible that the Human Security-Civil Society Complex was less effective at building 
the capacity of the local state, especially in terms of its ability to respond to violent 
threats.
The chapter first considers the wider impact of the Strategic-Commercial Complex, 
considering issues of state stabilization, commercialization of protection, local capacity 
and the political economy of war. It then examines the impact of the Human Security- 
Civil Society Complex, focusing on needs-based distribution of protection, local 
capacity, inclusivity and advocacy for limits on violent politics.
a. Wider Impact of the Strategic-Commercial Complex
As outlined in earlier chapters, the motivations and sources of power of the Strategic- 
Commercial Complex influence its priorities and systems of implementation. The
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motivations of strategic and commercial interest mean that implementing agencies 
operating in this mode were more likely to engage in demining aimed at building the 
‘national security’ of the donor or host state and to support the privatization of security. 
Requiring rapid implementation and guided by expediency, implementing bodies were 
also more likely to collude with the political economy of conflict. However, their 
embeddedness in these illiberal socio-political networks meant they had difficulty 
resisting capture by vested interests and occasionally faced ‘blowback’ -  unintended 
consequences -  from strengthening chauvinistic or reactionary groups.
i. Stabilization and Building State Security
In all three cases studies, demining was instrumentalized by intervening international
authorities and local state institutions to support the process of political stabilization and 
the assertion of state authority. Probably due to its greater comfort working with military 
institutions, the ‘Strategic-Commercial’ approach was generally more likely to pay 
attention to bolstering state security than the ‘Human Security-Civil Society’ approach.
In Afghanistan, commercial demining cleared land for the development of military 
and police infrastructure used by NATO forces and the Afghan government. Demining 
companies also collected and destroyed insecure ammunition, denying weapons to the 
insurgency. Moreover, the commercial companies hired many former soldiers from the 
UNDP demobilization process, giving them an alternative source of employment than 
armed groups. Bob Gannon of RONCO argued that commercial deminers supported the 
peace process more effectively than demining NGOs, because, by supporting the security 
structures of the US, NATO and the nascent Afghan state, it was aiding the stabilization 
of the country:
If you can get a stable government in a country then it’s going to go a long way towards bringing 
proper peace. And the way to get a stable government, is to make sure the government’s got the 
land, the property it needs to put good governance in place.5
In Bosnia, linking USAID infrastructure demining to US Army priorities probably 
contributed to NATO’s stabilization mission. Moreover, the close integration between the 
commercial companies and local NGOs with ethno-nationalistic structures may initially 
have contributed to stability in Bosnia. The strategy of the international community in
5 Robert Gannon. (20 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
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Bosnia incorporated a combination of both conflict and collusion with nationalists. 
Accommodation -  allowing capture of foreign aid, tax evasion and participation in 
privatization -  may have encouraged them to ‘buy-in’ to the Dayton state structures. In 
contrast, NPA was initially resistant to state coordination, preferring to work in the areas 
where it felt need was greatest. Moreover, in interviews with the author, BHMAC 
officials claimed that NPA, with its deeper pockets, was damaging BHMAC capacity by 
hiring away some of its most talented people -  notably former BHMAC deputy director 
Darvin Lisica, now NPA’s country program manager.
In Sudan, by prioritizing road clearance, commercial demining has helped UN 
peacekeepers to deploy throughout the South and oversee implementation of the CPA. 
Likewise, RONCO acted in support of the Joint Military Commission in the Nuba 
Mountains, enabling them to conduct the mission mandated by the ceasefire. In contrast, 
international NGOs seem to have had a more combatative relationship with Sudanese 
state institutions -  suspicious of attempts by the northern government and the SPLA to 
control their activities. Some NGOs tried to develop their own institutions outside the 
‘para-statal’ NGOs, OSIL and JASMAR, independent of the local authorities. This drew 
criticism from governmental officials who believed donors should channel more 
assistance through state organs. Indeed, international NGOs have long been criticized for 
creating “local substitutes for state administration” and “contributed unintentionally to 
the erosion of the authority of the very weak state” in South Sudan.6 Therefore one might 
argue that mine action NGOs exacerbate South Sudan’s fragmented polity, instead of 
channeling their assistance through and helping to develop the capacity of state 
institutions.
While the Strategic-Commercial approach to demining probably does more to assist 
in stabilization and re-establishment of the security structures of the state, when 
examining any political or governance system, it is important to consider how protection 
is distributed among the population. For, as with any service or commodity, it is rare that 
security is distributed evenly. Generally those with the most access to political power
6 Teije Tvedt. (1994) ‘The Collapse of the State in Southern Sudan after the Addis Ababa Agreement: A 
Study of Internal Causes and the Role of the NGOs.” Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of the Sudan. Sharif 
Harir & Terje Tvedt (Eds.). Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies; Volker Riehl. (2001) Who 
Is Ruling in South Sudan? The role of NGOs in rebuilding socio-political order. Uppsala, Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet.
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determine who is protected and how. The following sub-sections will examine how 
systems of security and protection were organized by the Strategic-Commercial 
Complex.
ii. Commercialization of Protection
Commercial demining contributed to and was influenced by broader processes of
commercializing and privatizing protection and security. It was part of a system in which 
protection from the threat of landmines and other insecurity was provided and distributed 
through market, rather than public bodies. Tendered demining reinforces the 
commercialization of security provision because the private security and commercial 
demining sectors are closely associated.7 Many companies provide both services and 
draw on an overlapping workforce of demobilized soldiers. As such mine action may 
provide a kind of figleaf for the private security industry -  a service more publicly 
palatable, employing the same type of people, operating in the same environment and 
providing the contacts and groundwork necessary to launch other operations.8 While 
mine action is not as profitable as private security operations, it provides a logical 
diversification for such companies, providing them with some lower risk business in their 
portfolio. While private security is a response to real demands for security, it may also 
contribute to the fragmentation and delegitimation of public control over violence. Mine 
action can facilitate this process by providing such companies with a stabilizing element 
of their portfolio and making them seem more socially acceptable.
In Afghanistan, many companies doing commercial demining had other divisions that 
provide private security services. They argued that the Afghan state was incapable of 
fielding adequate security for demining operations and that private security work 
provides employment for people who might otherwise use their military training for more 
nefarious activities.9 However, Mohammed Sediq of UNMACA worried that a key to 
mine action’s success in Afghanistan -  its “flag of impartiality and neutrality” -  may be
7 Christopher Spearin. (November 2001) “Ends and Means: Assessing the Humanitarian Impact of 
Commercialized Security on the Ottawa Convention Banning Anti-Personnel Mines.” YCISS Occasional 
Paper Number 69. <http://www.ucalgary.ca/~zamans/SMSS/pdf/spearin_smss2001.pdf>.
8 P.W. Singer. (2003) Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca, New York, 
Cornell University Press.
9 Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi. (6 December 2007) “Security Firms in Afghanistan: Part of the Problem?”
Institute for War and Peace Reporting.
<http://www.iwpr.net/index.php ?m=p&o=341232&s=f&apc_state=henfarr341232>.
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eroded by these companies’ image.10 For instance, all DynCoip mine action staff took 
weapons training, carried a pistol and rifle while traveling and had access to a DynCorp 
rapid reaction force if they came under attack.11 DynCorp itself has faced much criticism 
for its Afghan security operations.12 ArmorGroup had an entire military style-barracks on 
Kabul’s outskirts and was responsible for guarding the US Embassy.13 RONCO provided 
static guards around Kabul and bomb detection dogs to other security companies.14 The 
USAID demining coordinator, who, interestingly, was also the coordinator for security 
for USAID projects, told the author that even if the demining company did not have a 
private security arm, other private security companies would guard US reconstruction 
demining sites.15 In contrast, the HALO Trust compound and convoys were guarded by 
the Afghan police. While this does associate HALO with the Afghan state, perhaps 
compromising their neutrality, it does send the message that HALO supports public 
control over the use of force.
It would not be surprising then, if some Afghans, seeing commercial deminers 
carrying guns, jump to the conclusion that all demining is related to military operations. 
Research by Rimli and Schmeidl has shown that ordinary Afghans cannot distinguish 
private security contractors from other international organizations.16 This is not a good 
thing for demining, as private security companies, especially international ones, have a 
bad reputation among Afghans. Many security companies have contracted militia 
commanders as “an expedient and convenient way to obtain armed and trained guards”, 
which Rimli and Schmeidl argue means they are “essentially paying individuals to 
protect them, who might be the main source of insecurity in the region to begin with.”17 
Furthermore, private security contractors are less legally accountable than Afghan police 
or NATO military personnel, who are at least nominally accountable to military code. In
10 Mohammed Sediq. (23 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
11 Lloyd Carpenter. (21 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
12 e.g. Fariba Nawa. (6 October 2006) Afghanistan, Inc.: A Corpwatch Investigative Report. 
<http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/AfghanistanINCfinalsmall.pdf>. pp. 17-20.
13 David Robertson. (3 April 2007) “US Embassy calls in ArmorGroup.” The Times (London). 
<http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/support_services/articlel605075.ece>.
14 Gannon. Personal interview.
15 Dean Hutson. (30 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
16 Lisa Rimli & Susanne Schmeidl. (November 2007) Private Security Companies and Local Populations. 
An exploratory study of Afghanistan and Angola. Bern, Switzerland, SwissPeace. 
<http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/PSC.pdf>. p. 28.
17 Rimli & Schmeidl. Private Security Companies, p. 36.
232
late 2007, the Afghan Interior Ministry cracked down on security companies, claiming 
that they contributed to lawlessness, having been linked to several high profile murders 
and armed robberies.18 Indeed, many Afghans say the presence of private security firms 
actually makes them feel less secure.19 Thus some have argued that the privatization of 
security has actually increased insecurity for those who are not able to afford protection 
and that the commercial mine action contributes to this trend.
This has the potential to erode the popular legitimacy of demining and its long- 
cultivated neutrality. One Afghan NGO director explained that when providing demining 
to support the reconstruction of the Kabul to Kandahar road, his NGO was required to 
have an escort from an American private security contractor. He said that this 
“damaged” the NGO’s reputation because insurgents “thought that we are now with the 
Americans and with the military.”
In both Bosnia and Sudan, the links between commercial mine action and private 
security have had less impact than in Afghanistan. Generally, the private security 
companies engaged in demining at least claimed they were not involved in any security 
operations. However, there have been some less high-profile links. Both RONCO and 
DynCorp have recruited Bosnian deminers to work in Afghanistan. The Bosnian firm 
OKTOL actually turned into a private security company when their profits from 
demining decreased. There have also been reports (the author was not able to gain firm 
confirmation) that some of the nationalistic networks involved in demining have also 
been supplying private security personnel to international companies.
In Sudan, Minetech’s sister company Frontier Medical has been supplying medical 
supplies to the African Union force in Darfur, an experience which probably helped 
Minetech win the UN ordnance disposal contract in Darfur.21 Moreover, the private 
security industry has lobbied the UN and Western governments to hire them to restore 
security in Darfur. Even if they are not given such a ‘kinetic’ role, it is likely that the 
ongoing expansion of the UN peacekeeping force there will require contractors willing to
18 Ibrahimi. “Security Firms.”
19 Swissinfo. (13 November 2007) “Study criticises security firms in Afghanistan.” Swissinfo. 
<http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/top_news/detail/Study_criticises_security_firms_in_Afghanistan.html7siteSe 
ct= 106&sid=8413697&cKey=1194937728000&ty=st>.
20 Dusan Gavran. (16 February 2007) Personal interview with author in Sarajevo.
21 Frontier Medical, (n.d.) “Projects in Africa.” <http://www.frontiermedical.co.uk/projects_africa.html>.
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supply them goods and services. It may thus be possible that private security companies 
like ArmorGroup see Sudanese mine action as a beachhead into the possibility of more 
lucrative private security or military contracting work.22 In contrast, when the HALO 
Trust discovered that its local NGO partner was making forays into private security 
provision, by renting out armed escorts, it demanded SLR stop immediately. When the 
partnership fell apart, HALO alerted mine action donors to SLR’s private security work.
Privatizing security provision also affects the distribution of protection among the 
population. In contrast with the international NGO approach, the ‘Strategic-Commercial’ 
approach taken by the US (and by the UN in Sudan) generally prioritized demining that 
paid some strategic or commercial dividend. Strategic priorities were either directly 
related to military operations (such as demining military bases) or indirectly strategic, 
such as opening roads to give troops (and everyone else) access to remote areas. 
Commercial priorities included preparing the way for commercial infrastructure (such as 
telecoms antennae or oil pipelines) or to open access to primary commodities such as oil.
In Afghanistan, the US-led commercialization of demining challenged the 
UNMACA-led need-based system. By setting up a mixed market system, persons or 
organizations that wanted demining performed immediately no longer had to wait for 
higher priority tasks to be completed first. If they had the ability, they could pay for a 
commercial company to demine it immediately. In other words, demining became a 
purchasable commodity. For instance, the Afghan telecommunications company Roshan 
unilaterally contracted demining with commercial companies. The potential advantage is 
that it may introduce flexibility -  a two-track system -  like the mixed public and private 
health care system in Britain. Those who have money do not need to wait in line. Since 
there is a surplus of trained deminers in the market, at this point there is not too much of a 
danger of the commercial market drawing significant human and physical resources away 
from the humanitarian demining system. In fact, the commercial capacity has soaked up




some of the excess labor created by the UN-sponsored demobilization program that
9 ^trained ex-soldiers to be deminers.
However, since commercial operators pay more, there is a danger that the better 
quality people will be drawn away from the humanitarian sector and into the commercial 
sector -  just as the commercial legal sector draws the best lawyers away from public 
defense offices in the US and Britain. Thus there will be significant incentive for the best 
deminers to abandon NGOs, redistributing the best talent to the commercial sector. 
There has already been some bad feeling about this. One local NGO director complained 
that the commercials “steal the expertise” from the NGOs.24 Chief of staff Kerei Ruru 
admitted that there was “a wee bit” of “poaching of talent” by the commercial 
companies.25
In addition to making it more possible to allocate protection from mines through 
market-based ‘ability to pay’, the security objectives of US aid have posed a further 
challenge to the UNMACA/NGO system. By taking money out of the UN-led system, 
USAID has directed its demining funds to support the US reconstruction efforts. While 
Afghanistan certainly needs the roads, powerlines, schools and clinics built by these 
efforts, studies by others showed that many of these massive projects seem to be more for 
political and symbolic, rather than humanitarian, impact, sometimes affecting the quality 
of the work.26 Indeed, studies by UNDP/World Bank and MCPA have shown that the 
highest economic returns come from focusing demining efforts on irrigation and irrigated 
agriculture, not the roads that USAID has prioritized.27
23 From 2004-2005, UNDP funded demining training for demobilized combatants, placing them within 
mine action NGOs. However, lack of funding left many recent ex-combatant deminers unemployed. 
UNMACA encouraged commercial companies to hire from this pool, rather than take deminers from the 
NGOs. (Sandy Powell. (1 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul, Afghanistan). For 
more details on the UNDP-funded program, see: Arne Strand. (2004) “Transforming Local Relationships: 
Reintegration of Combatants through Mine Action in Afghanistan.” Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine 
Action in Support of Peacebuilding. Kristian Berg Harpviken & Rebecca Roberts (Eds.). Oslo, PRIO.
24 Mohammed Shohab Hakimi. (6 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul. Also: Fazel 
Karim Fazel. (29 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
25 Kerei Ruru. (29 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
26 See, for instance, this damning report on the privatization of the reconstruction process in Afghanistan: 
Nawa. Afghanistan, Inc. Also: William Maley. (2006) Rescuing Afghanistan. London, C. Hurst & Co. p. 
98-99.
27 Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). (2004) A Study of Local 
Organisations in Mine Action. Geneva, GICHD. pp. 104-105. Mine Clearance and Planning Agency 
(MCPA). (December 1999) Socio-Economic Impact Study of Landmines and Mine Action Operations in 
Afghanistan. Islamabad, Pakistan, UNMAPA.
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Moreover, one must problematize the word ‘security.’ There is no doubt that security 
is in desperate need in Afghanistan. However, one must question whose security the US 
is aiming to secure. For instance, a significant portion of US troops and military budget 
are assigned to the hunt for Bin Laden and A1 Qaeda, which affects the national security 
of the US more than human security of the Afghan people.28 By shifting the focus of US- 
funded demining away from the needs-based system of the UN to supporting the 
Coalition’s military objectives, the US is prioritizing its own security over that of the 
Afghan people.
One sees similar patterns in Bosnia, where the commercial system set up by the US 
and other donors allowed certain clients with large purchasing power to sidestep the 
need-based prioritization systems set up by public agencies. For instance, the para-statal 
energy giant Energoinvest contracted the US company UXB to do several tasks. During 
the era of World Bank demining funding, the public prioritization of tasks was easily 
influenced improperly by vested interests linked to the commercial demining companies 
(for instance prioritizing easy tasks that were more likely to turn a profit) or for ethno- 
chauvinistic reasons. While the ITF system supported by the US State Department 
accepted priorities chosen by the national body, BHMAC, USAID funding prioritized 
preparing the way for macro-infrastructure (mostly energy) and projects selected by the 
US Army.
Following this pattern, the commercialization of Sudanese demining has allowed 
clients with deep pockets to sidestep the ‘waiting line’ of national priorities. For instance, 
an oil company contracted Zimbabwean demining firm The Development Initiative to 
support operations in South Sudan29 Moreover, UNMAO prioritized road demining, 
based on the UN’s strategic necessity of opening access for UN peacekeeping troops. 
Therefore UN-funded commercial demining in Sudan bore similarity to the commercial 
approaches in Afghanistan and Bosnia. Clearance was prioritized on the basis of 
strategic rationale and ability to pay.
28 Christian Aid. (2004) The Politics of Poverty: Aid in the New Cold War. London, Christian Aid. 
<http://christianaid.org.uk/indepth/404caweek/index.htnro.pp. 40-51.
29 The Development Initiative, (n.d.) “TDI Projects.” <http://thedevelopmentinitiative.com/projects.asp>.
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In short, the ‘strategic-commercial’ approach to demining allocates protection 
according to strategic rationale or the purchasing power of the client rather than an 
analysis of where human need is greatest.
iii. Local Capacity Building
Any international agency working in the local environment will obviously need to
engage with at least some local professionals or partner organizations to gain local 
knowledge and contacts. However, if a commercial company is too successful at 
developing local institutions it, in effect, creates its own competition. For example, in 
one of DSL’s (later called ArmorGroup) first contracts in Bosnia they trained local 
deminers who then created local companies that beat DSL/ArmorGroup in tenders. 
Therefore, one can expect an institutional reluctance (even if unspoken or unconscious) 
among international commercial companies to build local capacity ‘too effectively.’ This 
may be compounded by a donor tendency to favor companies from their own countries.
Indeed they may have no incentive to build institutional structures that will persist 
beyond their contracts. As one Afghan NGO director said, ‘They try to do it quick, in 
order to make money...and then they go.” Similarly, in Sudan the UNMAO head 
acknowledged that “commercial companies...don’t put up structures that can stay 
behind.” As a result, there are no viable local commercial operations in Sudan and 
international companies have relied heavily on expatriates and mechanization, avoiding 
hiring large numbers of Sudanese. A commercial demining supervisor explained that this 
was “because of the timeframe, we needed the job to be done quickly”32 -  hiring and 
training local Sudanese would take too much time and investment. Distrusting the local 
population and fearing importation of local political tensions into the workplace, some 
commercial companies find it easier to ‘parachute’ in deminers from other countries. For 
example, while the State Department provided resources to the local Afghan NGOs, 
simultaneously USAID and the US military eroded the strength of local NGOs by 
encouraging the entry of international commercial companies into the country. These
30 Fazel. Personal interview.
31 Jim Pansegrouw. (14 August 2007) Personal interview with author in Khartoum.
32 Tempas Camilo Moses. (7 August 2007) Personal interview with author in Juba.
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companies use far more expatriates than the NGOs, including HALO. Their tasks inside 
US military bases use almost no Afghans, since few can obtain security clearance.
Nonetheless, there are cases where the interests of strategic or commercial 
motivations encourage cooperation with local society. Companies may find that 
collaborating with local subcontractors gives them a commercial advantage, due to 
connections with local authorities and ability to better recruit and manage local labor. In 
the early years of Bosnian demining, RONCO dominated the market using subcontractors 
intertwined with the local political economy. In Afghanistan, both RONCO and 
DynCorp were actually contracted to build local NGO capacity. Some have argued that 
certain international companies in Afghanistan have pushed for the creation of local 
companies, because they see them as potential partners in challenging RONCO’s market 
dominance.
A technocratic analysis of capacity-building would probably stop here.33 However, a 
social scientific understanding of capacity has to be rooted in understandings of power. 
As postmodern theorists have argued, organizations are not simply containers for power 
that can be simply filled up through capacity building efforts. Rather, power is a 
relational concept -  it is exercised in relation to other people and organizations that may 
have other interests and objectives. Without a serious discussion of power or the political 
struggles that accompany the development of any institution, ‘capacity’ becomes a 
vacuous concept and a technocratic euphemism. Shafer’s work on state capacity is 
particularly helpful. By comparing South Korea and Zambia, Shafer sought to “replace 
the current tautological and static understanding of state strength in economic
33 cf. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). (2006) The Challenge of 
Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice. Paris, OECD.
<http://www.oecd.Org/dataoecd/4/36/36326495.pdf>; UN Development Programme (UNDP). “Capacity 
Development.”
<http://www.capacity.undp.org/index.cfm7modul e=ActiveWeb&page=WebPage&s=capacity_development 
>. Within the mine action sector, capacity building is often similarly technocratic: cf. Olaf Juergensen. 
(Summer 2007) “Capacity Building in Mine Action: Are We There Yet?” Journal of Mine Action. 11(1). 
<http://maic.jmu.edU/joumal/ll.l/editorials/juergensen/juergensen.htm>; Dennis Barlow & Daniele 
Ressler. (Summer 2007) “Mine-action Capacity Development at a Crossroads.” Journal of Mine Action.
11(1). <http://maic.jmu.edu/Joumal/!l.l/editorials/barlow/barlow.htm>.
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policymaking with a dynamic, relational one.” 34 He argued that state capacity and 
strength
on a given issue at a given time is relative to the strength of the interest groups the state confronts 
and of coalitional allies it might invoke. Over time state strength will vary as a function of 
changes in its capacity in relation to changes in the capacity of its opponents and allies.35
As a result, the nature of an organization and the impact it will have are determined in 
part by the social sources of its power. In the process of choosing allies (such as 
employees, fixers, government supporters) to help carry out their agenda, organizations 
compromise their agendas, become embedded in other social networks or even become 
captured by other interests. Therefore, building the capacity of an organization may 
inadvertently grant power to particular social networks. While the capacity building 
literature often speaks as though ‘local capacity’ and ‘local ownership’ are inherently 
good, one has to ask ‘building the capacity of whom and of what socio-political 
structures?’ It may be that there are some social institutions, such as criminal or 
chauvinistic networks, that are better left without capacity.
The next subsection shows that if capacity-building is understood as empowerment of 
particular social actors, the Strategic-Commercial Complex often built the capacity of 
networks partially responsible for the country’s ongoing instability. Motivated by 
strategic and commercial interests, Strategic-Commercial Complexes were incentivized 
to act quickly and produce the results dictated by the donor. This encouraged them to act 
according to expediency, leading them to accept and collude with the status quo, 
borrowing the power of existing social structures. This left them embedded in the local 
political economy of war, where strength derived from ability to wield money and 
violence.
iv. Embeddedness in the Political Economy of War
Literature on the political economy of war has highlighted how international aid can
interact negatively with violent and illiberal structures led by warlords, profiteers and
34 D. Michael Shafer. (January 1990) “Sectors, States, and Social Forces: Korea and Zambia Confront 
Economic Restructuring.” Comparative Politics. 22(2). p. 127.
35 Ibid. p. 128.
36 David Keen. (1998) The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper 320. London, 
Oxford University Press; de Waal. Famine Crimes; Michael Charles Pugh, Neil Cooper & Jonathan 
Goodhand (Eds.). (2004) War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation. London,
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chauvinistic networks aiming to capture rents.37 By reinforcing structures responsible for 
violent politics, aid can actually contribute to conflict.38 Mine action is not immune from 
these risks. In fact it is probably more susceptible, because in addition to pumping large 
amounts of money in conflict zones, for an aid sector, demining has an uncommon level 
of interaction with the security structures of the affected country. In order to find out 
where mines are, demining agencies must persuade armed groups to share military 
secrets, such as the location of minefields, frontlines and garrisons. They must also 
persuade these groups to allow removal and destruction of mines, which factions may 
rather leave in the ground. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, most deminers 
working for NGOs and commercial companies tend to be former soldiers. One often sees 
the organizational structure of armed factions reproduced within demining teams, with 
officers acting as supervisors and footsoldiers becoming deminers. Thus there are often 
significant connections between demining agencies and the security forces, armed groups 
and paramilitary networks that developed during the conflict. This carries obvious risks. 
On one hand, demining agencies face ‘capture’ by the political (and/or economic) 
objectives of an armed group. On the other hand, drawing deminers from multiple sides 
risks importing broader societal conflicts into the organization. If they become too 
deeply embedded in the political economy of conflict, demining agencies may find their 
work shaped and directed by interests that have objectives at cross-purposes to their own.
Commercial companies, with their shorter-term time horizons, are drawn to people 
and social structures, both local and international, that can ‘get the job done’. These 
people are often those who are well-connected, powerful and who learned logistical skills 
in organizing wartime supply chains. This political ‘path of least resistance’, accepts 
social divisions as they are, leaving companies less able to transcend existing political 
structures.
Lynne Reiner Publishers, Inc.; Karen Ballentine & Jake Sherman. (2003) The Political Economy of Armed 
Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder, Co., Lynne Reiner Publishers.
37 cf. Mary Kaldor & Vesna Bojicic. (1999) “The ‘Abnormal’ Economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina.” 
Scramble for the Balkans: Nationalism, Globalism and the Political Economy of Reconstruction. Carl- 
Ulrick Schierup (Ed.). New York, Macmillan; Michael Pugh. (2002) “Postwar Political Economy in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Spoils of Peace.” Global Governance. 8; Peter Andreas. (2004) “The 
Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia.” International Studies Quarterly. 48.
38 Anderson. Do No Harm.
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In Afghanistan, US-supported ‘reforms’ to the sector have eroded the long-cultivated 
neutrality and separation of demining from armed groups. With no incentive or 
motivation to resist their donors and clients, demining companies have readily accepted 
their integration into the US politico-military effort. As a result, US-led 
commercialization has blurred the lines between civilian and military demining. Instead 
of using uniformed military personnel conduct military demining tasks, they are done by 
the same commercial companies that also bid on civilian tasks. Many of these companies 
also engage in private security operations. Occasionally one sees a merging of the two 
kinds of operations when demining companies provide bomb dogs to private security 
units or support unpopular US-funded forced poppy eradication. Through integrating 
demining funding into security operations and funneling money through commercial 
channels, the US has eroded the power of implementing agencies to resist capture by the 
agenda of a party to the conflict. Unlike the NGOs, who have tried to guard their 
autonomy by declaring political neutrality, commercial companies are fully embedded 
into US policy.
In Bosnia, both the US (through RONCO, the US Special Forces and NATO) and 
Norway (through NPA and NATO) worked to develop the capacity of the entity armed 
forces. While it could be argued that this may have legitimized the very institutions that 
were responsible for the war, it may also have provided a catalyst for the integration of 
the armed forces and a productive role for them. One sees a divergence, however, 
between US and Norwegian-supported demining in its interaction with the more 
subterranean paramilitary networks that continued to dominate Bosnian politics even 
after the peace agreement. In contrast to the relatively independent and multiethnic NPA, 
US-supported demining, contracted through the World Bank, UXB, RONCO and ITF, 
became deeply embedded in ethno-nationalist and criminal politics. The US reacted 
passively to the involvement of criminalized elite in demining until 2003, when the 
international community began a reinvigorated campaign against war crimes fugitives. 
Rather than taking a proactive role in reorganizing Bosnian demining in a multiethnic 
manner, it instead acted reactively, while trying to limit its embarrassment in the media.
39 Colin Wanley. (30 October 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
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As such, contracting demining to commercial entities mirrored broader problems with 
privatization in Bosnia.40 In Bosnia, the true ‘winners’ of the conflict were a class of ‘war 
entrepreneurs,’ who continued to subvert and undermine already weak central public 
institutions. In this, they found common ground with the international community’s neo­
liberal agenda. They benefited from privatization, deregulation and liberalization, 
capturing lucrative public assets and reducing government oversight of their activities 41 
The result was a political economy dominated by ethnicized political machines, which 
distributed the windfalls of international aid through ethnic patron-client networks 42 
Said Donais:
the way the privatization process has unfolded in Bosnia ... has done more to date to entrench 
the economic positions of the country’s nationalists and reduce the prospects of ethnic 
reintegration than to establish the foundations for sustained economic growth and recovery.43
These patterns of ‘illiberal privatization’ were also reproduced in Bosnian demining. 
As one former senior UNMAC official said, “Local mine action was based firmly on 
nepotism and the patronage of unscrupulous men in high places.” From 1996 to 2000, 
each Demining Commissioner functioned as patron and protector of a local demining 
company representing their ethnic group. The Commissioners pressured the World Bank 
PIUs to direct contracts to their favored companies and obstructed investigations into 
corruption or poor safety practices.44
40 Donais. Political Economy of Peacebuilding.
41 Ibid.
42 Hugh Griffiths. (Summer 1999) “A Political Economy of Ethnic Conflict, Ethno-nationalism and 
Organised Crime.” Civil Wars. 2(2). pp. 56-73; Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic. (2000) “From Humanitarianism 
to Reconstruction: Towards an Alternative Approach to Economic and Social Recovery from War.” Global 
Insecurity: Restructuring the Global Military Sector. Vol. HI. Mary Kaldor (Ed.). London, Pinter, p. 115; 
General Accounting Office. (June 2000) “Crime and Corruption Threaten Successful Implementation of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement.” GAO/NSIAD-00-156; International Crisis Group (ICG). (2 November 
2000) “War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska: Who are the People in Your Neighborhood.” ICG 
Balkans Report No. 103. p. 2; Pugh. “Postwar Political Economy.” pp. 467-482; Andreas. “Clandestine 
Political Economy.” pp. 29-51; Vera Devine. (2005) “Corruption in Post-War Reconstruction: The 
Experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” TIRI.
<http://www.tiri.org/documents/press_releases/20_jan_05/PWRBosniaHerz_Devine.pdf>.
43 Donais. Political Economy of Peacebuilding, p. 119.
44 cf. International Crisis Group (ICG). (18 July 1997) “Ridding Bosnia of Landmines: The Urgent Need 
for a Sustainable Policy.” ICG Bosnia Report No. 25. pp. 14; Don Hubert. (1998) “The Challenge of 
Humanitarian Mine Clearance.” To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines.
Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson and Brian W. Tomlin (Eds.). Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
pp. 323-324; Melissa Eddy. (22 May 2000) “Mine removal snarled in conflicting interests, 
mismanagement.” The Associated Press', Danka Savic & Mirsad Fazlic. (19 October 2000) “Demining
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The first Serb Demining Commissioner, Radislav Ilic, was brother-in-law of Radomir 
Kojic, owner of the main Serb demining company, UNIPAK, and director of Kojic’s 
import-export company. Ilic later set up another demining company, MEDECOM, and a 
quality assurance company, TERAPROM, which won contracts to be an ‘independent’ 
evaluator of both UNIPAK and MEDECOM’s work. For his part, Kojic allegedly 
organized the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs from Pale,45 supervised torture centers46 and 
commanded a unit shelling Sarajevo 47 Since the war’s end, press reports regularly 
accused Kojic of illegal and ultra-nationalist activities, most notably supporting the 
network protecting Radovan Karadzic, one of the most wanted war crimes fugitives.48 
State prosecutors also claimed “grounded suspicion” that during the war, prior to turning 
its attention to demining, UNIPAK “performed operations exclusively in the interest of 
the Government of Republika Srpska and for the purpose of financing war activities.”49 
While Kojic has so far avoided conviction for any of the above alleged offenses, he 
and Ilic were arrested in August 2006 for money laundering, tax evasion, and abuse of
Program Abuses in BiH.” Slobodna Bosna. English translation available from Adopt-A-Minefield. 
<http://www.landmines.org.uk/NewsWire_Article/231>.
45 Sulejman Cmcalo. (2 September 2004) Transcript of witness testimony in “Prosecutor vs. Momcilo 
Krajisnik.” International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
<http://www.un.org/icty/transe39/040902IT.htm>. pp. 5292, 5321, 5348)
46 UN Human Rights Committee. (27 April 1993) “Document submitted in compliance with a special 
decision of the Committee: Bosnia and Herzegovina. 27/04/93. CCPR/C/89.”
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/333378630589b6d680256674005bc280?0pendocument>. para. 54.
47 Ian Traynor, Yigal Chazan & Ian Black. (19 February 1994) “Serbs’ Retreat Ruffles NATO: UN says 
pullback is going ahead.” The Guardian; American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (28 September 1994,
11:30 pm ET) Transcript 3483. Nightline\ Julijana Mojsilovic. (12 February 1994) “If NATO Bombs, 
‘The People Will Kill Those Frenchmen’ With Yugoslavia.” Associated Press Worldstream.
48 Les Courrir des Balkans. (12 March 2002) “Bosnie: Comment l ’arrestation de Karadzic a echoue.” 
(“Bosnia: How the Arrest of Karadzic Failed.”) Les Courrir des Balkans.
<http://www.balkans.eu.org/articlel48.html>; European Council. (27 June 2003) “COUNCIL DECISION 
2003/484/CFSP of 27 June 2003 implementing Common Position 2003/280/CFSP in support of the 
effective implementation of the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).” <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_162/l_16220030701en00770079.pdf>; US 
Department of the Treasury. (9 February 2004) “Operation Balkan Vice III: Treasury Designation of 
Thirteen Individuals Obstructing the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia.”
<http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/jsl 162.htm>; Hugh Griffiths & Nerma Jelacic. (5 February 2004) 
“Investigative Report: Karadzic Protective Shield Cracking.” Institute for War and Peace Reporting: 
Balkan Crisis Report, <http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl7archive/bcr3/bcr3_200402_479_4_eng.txt>; Agence 
France Presse (AFP). (5 November 2004) “New NATO operation in stronghold of wanted Bosnian Serb.” 
Agence France Presse; Hidajet Delic. (5 November 2004) “NATO troops search homes of alleged 
supporters of war-crimes suspects in Bosnia.” Associated Press.
49 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (22 November 2006) Custody decision against Radomir Kojic and 
Radislav Ilic. No. X-KRN-06/250. Obtained by author, p. 2.
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office.50 At the time of writing, it appeared the case had run out of steam; the two were 
still awaiting trial. However, prosecution evidence suggested that UNIPAK had engaged 
in tax evasion by transferring income in cash to Ilic’s companies MEDECOM and 
TERAPROM.51 While the author was on fieldwork in Bosnia, Kojic’s house was raided 
by NATO in an attempt to gather further information on the Karadzic network.52
The Croat Demining Commissioner, Berislav Pusic had been the “Head of the 
Service for the Exchange of Prisoners and Other Persons” in the breakaway Bosnian 
Croat statelet, the ‘Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna.’ Currently on trial for war 
crimes at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Pusic’s 
2004 indictment alleges he ordered “deportation of Bosnian Muslims” from the so-called 
‘Hezeg-Bosna’ region.53 Various Financial Police documents alleged Pusic had 
improperly arranged for DECOP to rent donated equipment, tried to pressure an 
international firm to take DECOP, instead of another local company, as a subcontractor 
and generally gave the RONCO-DECOP partnership “privileged status” over other 
companies.54 The Financial Police also accused DECOP of falsely reporting income and 
evading taxes.55 It is not clear why these indictments and investigations never led to 
actual court cases.
Pusic also had close links to the Bosnian Croat demining NGO PROVITA. Among 
the founding members were his son-in-law and his daughter, Sandi Kozul, who was
50 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (28 August 2006) “Custody ordered for Radomir Kojic.” 
<http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?id=218&jezik=e>; Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Custody decision 
against Radomir Kojic.
51 Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Custody decision against Radomir Kojic. p. 2-3.
52 Anonymous. (11 February 2007) “Vojnici sest sati pretresali kucu Radomira Kojica.” (“Soldiers raid 
Radomir Kojic’s house at 6 a.m..”) Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), p. 3.
53 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). (2 March 2004) ‘The Office of the 
Prosecutor Against Prlic et al.” <http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/prl-ii040304e.htm>.
54 Cantonal Prosecutor’s Office Mostar. (5 July 2001) Criminal Charges against Berislav Pusic and Davor 
Kolenda. No. 700 -  213/01. p.4 .
55 Financial Police Department Sarajevo. (22 March 2001) Criminal Complaint against Stjepan Strbad. 
Number 700-76/01; Financial Police Head Inspectors Office Sarajevo. (12 December 2000) “Prvi 
IzvejeStaj: O utvrdenim cinjenicama i prikupljenim dokazima u postupku istrage, nacina raspolaganja 
sredstvima namijenjenim programima deminiranja u Bosni i Hercegovini odnosno Federaciji Bosne i 
Hercegovine, zloupotrebama utvrdenim u dosadaSnjem toku istrage te njihovim nosiocima.” (“First report: 
On established facts and gathered evidence during the investigation on ways of handling funds meant for 
demining programs in BiH, that is FBiH, abuses proved during the investigation and on their perpetrators.”) 
Sarajevo, Ministry of Finance. Obtained by author, pp. 172-173.
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PROVITA’s first director.56 The Financial Police claimed that Pusic arranged for 
PRO VITA to rent donated equipment to DECOP and divert a portion of the rental fees to 
a personal slush fund, which he used to make unauthorized loans, donate to philanthropic 
causes, pay traffic fines and road tolls and purchase gifts and personal affects like clothes, 
paintings, perfume and a hunting rifle.57 Several of the items were bought from 
Biokomerc, a company owned by his brother.58 He even apparently transferred money to 
the Service for the Exchange of Prisoners and Other Persons, his war-time employer, that, 
according to the ICTY, had facilitated ethnic cleansing of Herzegovina.59
Although considered by many to be “better behaved” than the others, Bosniak 
Commissioner Enes Cengic was the former director of the discredited MPRA. He was a 
member of the Bosniak nationalist party and held several influential political positions in 
Sarajevo local government during and after the war.60 He was also close friends with and 
a former colleague at MPRA of Adnan Gradasovic. Gradasovic, with his brother Mirzad, 
was co-founder of the main Bosniak company SI Company (which formed a partnership 
with another Bosniak Company OKTOL). According to Financial Police files, 
SI/OKTOL rented US-donated equipment from MPRA at a highly discounted rate, even 
before receiving demining accreditation or hiring more than one employee.61 
Furthermore, a Financial Police indictment accused SI/OKTOL of evading taxes by 
failing to properly report profits from its partnership with RONCO.62 Again, it is not 
clear why these indictments did not end up in actual court cases.
As narrated in Chapter 5, the corruption of the demining program deeply concerned 
many actors in the international community operating in Bosnia. The World Bank 
initiated an investigation with the collaboration of the Bosnian Financial Police. In
56 Financial Police Department Sarajevo. Criminal Complaint against Stjepan Strbad; Financial Police Head 
Inspectors Office Sarajevo. “Prvi Izvejestaj.” pp. 180-182.
57 Cantonal Prosecutor’s Office Mostar. Criminal Charges against Berislav Pusic. pp. 3-4, 13-20.
58 Ibid. p. 16.
59 Ibid. p. 14.
60 bpo. (19 April 1994) “Sarajevo wird nie eine geteilte Stadt sein.” (“Sarajevo will not be a divided city.”) 
taz, die tageszeitung. p. 22; Office of the High Representative (OHR). (27 March 1997) “Side Agreement 
on the Implementation of Sarajevo Protocol.” <http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/fed- 
mtng/default.asp?content_id=3610>.
61 Financial Police Head Inspectors Office Sarajevo. “Prvi Izvejestaj.” pp. 14-16.
62 Financial Police Department Sarajevo. (27 March 2001) Criminal Complaint against Mirzad 
Gradascevic. Number: 101-511/01; Financial Police Head Inspectors Office Sarajevo. “Prvi Izvejestaj.” pp. 
136-171.
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October 2000, Wolfgang Petrisch, the High Representative mandated by the peace 
process to oversee the country’s political institutions, fired all three Demining 
Commissioners.63 Despite the involvement of these local companies in high profile 
scandals, US money continued to flow to them through the ITF until 2003, when the 
international community finally took action against Kojic. The US has continued to fund 
PROVITA through the ITF to the present day. They also continued to fund MEDECOM, 
run by Kojic’s brother-in-law Ilic, until 2005 64
Whether or not the US intentionally supported them, these patronage networks 
displayed mafia-like behavior, drained public budget and played into the nationalistic 
logic of Bosnia’s conflict. While neo-liberals see privatization and deregulation as 
encouraging peaceful interdependence and trade, Duffield has shown that in many ‘new’ 
conflicts, such policies allow “local strongmen” to capture the political space and funds 
necessary to forward a subversive ‘illiberal’ agenda.65 Likewise, Bosnian political 
machines -  funded, equipped and trained by the international community -  created three 
‘ethnically clean’ companies and an ethnicized political structure to support them, 
enriching and strengthening nationalist elites. Several key actors in the demining 
patronage networks were deeply implicated in the nationalist-criminal networks that have 
paralyzed the peace process. As Donais observed about Bosnia generally,
giving international blessing to what has essentially been an ethnically divided privatization 
process appears to be clearly inconsistent with broader international goals of multi-ethnicity and 
ethnic reintegration.66
There has been a tendency in the mine action literature to assume the Bosnian illiberal 
political economy was a ‘problem with the locals.’ However, this would be mistaken.
63 Office of the High Representative. (12 October 2000) “Decision removing Milos Krstic from his position 
as a member of the Demining Commission and banning him from holding any official or appointive public 
office.” <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=317>; Office of the High 
Representative. (12 October 2000) “Decision removing Enes Cengic from his position as a member of the 
Demining Commission and banning him from holding any official or appointive public office.” 
<http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=318>; Office of the High 
Representative. (12 October 2000) “Decision removing Berislav Pusic from his position as a member of the 
Demining Commission and banning him from holding any official or appointive public office.” 
<http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp ?content_id=319>.
64 For more details, see: Matthew Bolton & Hugh Griffiths. (September 2006) Bosnia’s Political 
Landmines: A Call for Socially Responsible and Conflict-Sensitive Mine Action. London, Landmine Action. 
<http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Bosnias_Political_Landmines.pdf>.
65 Duffield. Global Governance and the New Wars. pp. 14-15,161-201.
66 Donais. Political Economy of Peacebuilding, p. 107.
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Many of the international managers of commercial demining companies also came from 
military and police backgrounds, several having fought for illiberal regimes. For 
instance, as a member of the South African police, MECHEM’s early program manager 
in Bosnia, Johannes “Sakkie” van Zyl, had been involved in covert extrajudicial killings 
of anti-apartheid activists.67 Col. Lionel Dyck, head of Minetech, had been an elite officer 
in both the Rhodesian and Zimbabwean armies and had commanded elite paratroopers 
operating in Mozambique in support of FRELIMO.68 As an Australian Army officer 
David Rowe, early manager of DSL in Bosnia, claimed he had been involved in a covert 
effort pitting mercenaries against the Viet Cong.69 It is therefore possible that these 
people would be more used to ‘doing deals’ with unsavory characters and feel less 
uncomfortable about working with groups deeply embedded in Bosnia’s political 
economy of war. Indeed, Dyck told investigative reporter Hugh Griffiths that he had been 
aware of possible links between Kojic and Karadzic while using UNIPAK as a
70subcontractor.
In Sudan, UNMAS has attempted to develop a ‘one-country’ approach to mine
71action, in the framework of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. As a result, UN 
mine action has continued to contribute to the peace process in a number of ways. Firstly, 
UNMAS brought together representatives from both sides to develop the mine action 
sections of the peace treaty at a much faster speed than other parts of the treaty. 
Participants in these talks say that the experience of working together on mine action 
issues in the Nuba Mountains built the trust necessary to negotiate in good faith. 
Secondly, by clearing roads and settlements, mine action agencies opened the country to
67 Truth and Reconciliation Commission. (29 October 1998) Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South 
Africa Report. Vol. 3. pp. 11, 182-183.
<http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%203.pdf >. Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. (18 June 1999) “The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Decision Regarding the 
Pebco Killings.” <http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1999/9906211042al003.htm>.
68 David Masunda. (1 November 2001) “Dyck heads for war-torn Afghan territory.” Financial Gazette. 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (1999) “Mozambique.” Landmine Monitor 1999. 
<http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/mozambique>. International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (1999) 
“Zimbabwe.” Landmine Monitor 1999. <http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/zimbabwe>.
69 David Rowe. (2 February 2007) Personal interview with author in Sarajevo.
70 Col. Dyck described Kojic as “very useful and as tricky as a barrel load of monkeys. ... Kojic was 
certainly involved in the protective screen [of Karadzic] and this intelligence we passed on to the 
UNMACC [sic].” Lionel Dyck, (n.d.) Email to Hugh Griffiths shown to author on 20 June 2005.
71 Peter Moszynski. (27 November 2005) “Mine Action in the Midst of Internal Conflict: The Case of 
Sudan.” Geneva Call (Ed.). Mine Action in the Midst of Internal Conflict. Geneva, Geneva Call. pp. 29-39.
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peacekeepers, aid, commerce and the census-takers who will prepare the way for the 
CPA-mandated elections mandated. The UNOPS and WFP program have also taken into 
consideration return issues when determining priority roads.
In reality, however, the UN mine action program, operating in a Strategic- 
Commercial manner, has done little to transform the constellation of Sudanese politics. 
The CPA is essentially a pact between two armed groups -  the Government of Sudan and 
the SPLA -  guaranteeing hegemony in their respective regions of strength, to the 
detriment of other groups.72 Moreover, despite a declared ‘one-country approach,’ in 
reality there was little cooperation between the two local authorities beyond macro-policy 
making.
Given the UN’s structural bias towards operating through national institutions, has 
tended to accept the status quo of the polity. UNMAO works through local structures 
intimately linked to the political economy of the war. In the north, the UN’s local 
counterpart is the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), co-chaired by the Sudanese 
Ministry of Defense. Moreover, the Secretary General of the National Mine Action 
Committee, who has also represented Sudan at international mine ban conferences,73 is 
Ahmed Haroun, the northern government’s Humanitarian Affairs Minister who is wanted 
by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity in Darfur.74 While 
UNMAO now limits interaction with him, they worked more closely with him in the past, 
even paying for him to go on a ‘capacity building’ trip to Jordan (an example of how the 
technocratic understanding of capacity building is sometimes blind to political 
sensibilities).75
72 John Young. (2005) “Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace.” Review of African 
Political Economy. 103. pp. 103-104.
73 Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction: Sixth Meeting, Zagreb. (2 December 2005) 
“List of Participants.”
<http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/mbc/MSP/6MSP/6MSP_List_of_participants.pdf>; 
Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction: Seventh Meeting, Geneva. (22 September 
2006) “List of Participants.”
<http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/mbc/MSP/7MSP/7MSP_List_of_Participants.pdf>.
74 BBC. (21 September 2007) “Prosecutor demands Sudan arrests.” BBC News. 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/7006180.stm>.
75 UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO). (2006) “Capacity Building.” 
<http://www.sudanmap.org/CapacityBuilding.html>.
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In the south, UNMAO’s counterpart is the South Sudan Demining Commission 
(SSDC) that, like all other South Sudanese government institutions, is dominated by the 
SPLA. Indicative of UNMAO’s inability to challenge the power of the SPLA-created 
SSDC was their slow response to protect HALO’s assets in the debacle with its local 
partner NGO SLR. SLR attempted to misdirect significant resources from the 
partnership and as relations with HALO deteriorated, engineered HALO’s expulsion 
from South Sudan. They then attempted to grab HALO’s assets and bank accounts. The 
extremely slow action by SSDC, which then hired SLR’s former deputy director and 
rented land from SLR, suggests it was deeply complicit in this scandal and that SLR was 
protected by figures high in the SPLA. While UNMAO was finally able to secure 
HALO’s equipment, at the time of the fieldwork, it lay in limbo at a UN compound. 
UNMAO never took a strong public stand supporting HALO nor publicly condemned the 
SSDC’s complicity in the affair. WFP has coordinated even closer with the SPLA, letting 
them influence which roads should be rehabilitated, even before the peace agreement was 
signed, despite the obvious benefits to the SPLA’s logistical chains.
The companies contracted to UNMAO and WFP had limited policy autonomy and 
generally worked within the larger framework developed by their client agencies. As a 
result, the commercial companies have operated within the political status quo without 
attempting to change or transform it. Further, the presence in Sudan of the demining 
company MECHEM, should be considered in the context of the long history in the 
country of its arms manufacturer parent company, DENEL. Human Rights Watch
7  f taccused DENEL of selling military equipment and services to Sudan at least until 1998. 
Recently DENEL made an agreement with the Government of South Sudan to help with 
the creation of a South Sudanese Air Force.77
Because the Strategic-Commercial Complex embeds demining in the political 
economy of conflict, vested interests may have other objectives or invite reaction from 
opponents, that can result in damaging unintended consequences both to the program and
76 Human Rights Watch (HRW). (August 1998) “Arms Transfers to the Government Of Sudan.” Sudan: 
Global Trade, Local Impact: Arms Transfers to all Sides in the Civil War in Sudan.
<http:// www.hrw.org/reports9 8/sudan/S udarm988-05 .htm>.
77 Piet Van Niekerk. (8 February 2008) “SA to train pilots and technicians from Sudan.” Daily Dispatch. 
<http://www.dispatch.co.za/article.aspx?id=173789>; Ncedo Kumbaca. “Bhisho Airport upgrade job 
creation reaches 300.” Eastern Cape Provincial Government News. 
<http://www.ecprov.gov.za/index.php?module=news&id=57>.
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wider society. Therefore, the interaction of demining with the political economy of war 
may contribute to blowback -  spy jargon for unintended effects of an operation that 
rebounds against its creator78 -  against donor interests. Advocates of ‘engagement’ with 
extremists, terrorists and war criminals must accept the fact that money used to buy 
support for a policy may be used to subvert it by the very same people. A classic case of 
blowback is the US and British arming of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which later enabled it 
to invade Kuwait and in 2003 create enormous discord in the UN Security Council.
Afghanistan offers perhaps the most dramatic example of blowback. The early 
demining program developed at the end of the 1980s operated in the context of and 
supported US covert action. USAID’s local counterparts in the Cross-Border 
Humanitarian Assistance Program were the Pakistani intelligence service and the 
mujahideen parties. Much of its assistance was distributed directly to resistance factions 
-  a disproportionate amount going to the fundamentalist parties. Said one Afghanistan 
expert:
Dependence on Afghan resistance leaders...compromised much of the humanitarian response of 
the 1980s, giving rise to widespread diversion of resources, and strengthening the new, armed elite 
at the expense of more traditional structures.79
The US is now reaping what it sowed in Afghanistan, say Girardet & Walter,80 as 
those jihadist networks funded and trained by the US, turn against them.
While it is too early to discern the impact of the recent US-led demining 
commercialization in Afghanistan, privatizing protection could also contribute to 
blowback. As mentioned previously, security companies have hired warlords and their 
militias and legitimized the fragmentation of sovereignty. This legitimation of warlords 
could lead to problems as the US attempts to stabilize the Afghan state and eradicate the 
opium trade. Further, the significant public distrust of private security companies is 
contributing to suspicion of the US effort in Afghanistan, eroding possibilities for local 
collaboration with US objectives.
78 Andrew Marshall. (1 November 1998) “Terror ‘Blowback’ Bums CIA.” The Independent, p. 17; 
Chalmers Johnson. (2000) Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. New York, Henry 
Holt and Company, pp. 8, 11 & 2002, p 23.
79 Christine Johnson. (2004) “Aid and Recovery.” Afghanistan. Edward Girardet & Jonathan Walter (Eds.). 
2nd Ed. Geneva, CROSSLINES Publications, p 22.
80 Edward Girardet & Jonathan Walter (Eds.). (2004) “Aid and Recovery.” Afghanistan. 2nd Ed. Geneva, 
CROSSLINES Publications.
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As demining began losing its neutral, impartial and nonviolent reputation it was 
increasingly targeted by the insurgency. The embeddedness of demining into US security 
objectives provoked an unintended reaction against deminers. According to UNMACA 
data, between January and November 2006 more demining personnel died in terrorist 
attacks than demining accidents. This trend appeared to be increasingly serious. In April 
2007 “dozens of Taliban militants” in western Farah province ambushed a RONCO 
demining team, though it is not clear whether RONCO itself was the intended target.81 In 
June 2007, Taliban insurgents in Ghazni province kidnapped 18 deminers from MDC and 
MCPA and “threatened to kill them if investigations suggest they are working for U.S.- 
led forces.” The following month three MDC deminers were shot dead in Kandahar 
province, leading the organization to suspend its operations in the Kandahar and 
Helmand region. Unfortunately, if deminers come under increasing attack it will 
probably lead to calls for increasing militarization of the process, further reducing the 
widespread legitimacy of demining agencies.
The Strategic-Commercial approach also generated blowback against the US in 
Bosnia, as US funds for demining were diverted to nationalistic networks that later 
hindered US objectives. These networks obstructed the peace process and raised the 
costs of the NATO peacekeeping mission. Moreover, the alleged connection of Kojic 
and Ilic’s companies to the network supporting Radovan Karadzic was a public relations 
embarrassment for the US State Department, sending the message that they were either 
colluding with the nationalists or bungling and uninformed.
In Sudan it is possible that associating demining with UN attempts to impose stability 
on South Sudan encouraged the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels (who used South 
Sudan as a haven from Ugandan troops) to view demining as a threat. For instance, in
81 Agence France Presse (AFP). (8 April 2007) “7 Die in Taliban Raid on Mine-Clearing Team.” The New 
York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/08/world/asia/08afghan.html>.
82 David Fox. (24 June 2007) ‘Taliban seize 18 Afghan mine clearing experts.” 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/featuredCrisis/idUSL24706480>.




2005 the LRA attacked an FSD convoy.84 That said, the LRA have threatened a wide 
variety of aid agencies, so one must be careful in reading too much into the attacks.
In short, therefore, embedding demining in the highly polarized nature of strategic 
politics and collaborating with violent clandestine structures may have unexpected and 
highly dangerous side-effects.
v. Summary
The interests of Strategic-Commercial implementers and their use of expediency in 
guiding their relations with other groups, made them more likely to support the security 
structures of their donor’s intervening forces and those of the host state (if it was in their 
donor’s strategic interests). This may mean that commercial demining companies 
contribute more than international NGOs to stabilization and the national security of the 
host state. That said, using commercial companies erodes the concept of a broad public 
provision of security, contributing to the privatization of protection. Moreover, 
companies may contribute to the structures that are the very source of instability, by 
collaborating with the local political economy of war. This may, in turn, generate 
blowback against the donor’s strategic interests.
b. Wider Impact of the Human Security-Civil Society Complex
The following section argues that the humanitarian mission of the Human Security- 
Civil Society Complex led implementing NGOs to attempt to resist or transform the 
political economy of conflict. It argues that long-term grant funding, such as from 
Norway, provided them space and autonomy from donors’ strategic interests and gave 
them time to build independent institutions reproducing their cosmopolitan and 
humanitarian ideals. NGOs’ ability to implement such as mission depended on how 
successful they were in creating alternatives to the structures of power institutionalized 
by war.
i. Needs-Based Distribution of Protection
Unlike the Strategic-Commercial Complex, which distributed protection from
landmines according to strategic rationale and/or a market system, the Human Security-
84IRIN. (2 November 2005) “SUDAN: Swiss de-mining company suspends operations in the south.” 
<http://www.globalsecurity.Org/military/library/news/2005/l l/mil-051102-irin02.htm>.
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Civil Society Complex was more receptive to local community needs and focused on 
areas of high human impact.
In Afghanistan, the UNMACA system, implemented through local NGOs and the 
HALO Trust, operated like a government public service. Beneficiaries received 
demining for free and UNMACA claimed prioritization resulted from assessment of need 
and potential humanitarian and socio-economic benefits of clearance. Thus beneficiaries’ 
ability to pay for the service should not have been reflected in priorities, nor the 
allocation of demining resources. This system would be beneficial to the poor who were 
unable to afford to clear minefields threatening their lives and livelihood. UNMACA has 
drawn criticism that is common of many public services -  that priority-setting was non­
transparent, occasionally influenced inappropriately and focused more on the processes 
of reconstructing destroyed infrastructure (which benefits those who were privileged to 
have infrastructure previously) than providing new infrastructure for the poor (which 
expands access). However, despite these admittedly serious problems, there still existed 
elements of fairness in the distribution of demining resources -  at least lip service to the
O ff
allocation by need, not ability to pay. Moreover, the completion of the Afghanistan 
Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) in late 2005, which categorized communities according to 
the impact of landmines on public safety and socio-economic development, has allowed 
for more precise targeting of priorities.86
Likewise, in Bosnia NPA invested significant effort into ensuring that its demining 
priorities were driven by needs-based concerns. NPA focused on areas where there was 
both high concentration of mines and high impact upon dense human populations. Hence 
their efforts concentrated on Sarajevo, Mostar and Brcko. For each individual demining 
task, NPA carried out a ‘Task Impact Assessment,’ a simple socio-economic assessment 
of the impact of the minefield on the surrounding community. This aimed to ensure that 
the land posed a genuine threat to people and/or their livelihoods, and that the task was 
not prioritized simply by vested interests. NPA then followed up post-clearance to 
evaluate how cleared land was used, in order to better target future efforts on land that 
would be used productively. Recently, NPA have piloted a new methodology of mine
85 Sediq. Personal interview.
86 Survey Action Center. (2006) Landmine Impact Survey -  Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Takoma Park, 
MD, Survey Action Center.
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action planning developed by UNICEF and BHMAC called “Task Assessment and 
Planning” that helps local communities map their mine problems and prioritize the 
responses to the problem. This community-based planning takes the views of local people 
seriously, rather than directing priorities from the central government.
NPA did occasionally do tasks prioritized for reasons other than simply need. 
However, these were generally intended to further a political agenda of cosmopolitanism 
and transitional justice. For instance, one of its first projects in 1996 brought a team of 
its mine dog handlers from Mozambique to help open mass graves for the international
0 7
war crimes tribunal at The Hague. It also dedicated considerable resources to the 
complex and difficult process of demining the Sarajevo Jewish cemetery, the second 
oldest in Europe.88 The Norwegian Ambassador explained that they wanted to send a 
“political and symbolic message” that Sarajevo was an “interethnic city.”89 In addition, 
NPA has integrated its work in Bosnia into broader campaigning in favour of the 
landmine ban.
In Sudan, international NGOs funded by bilateral contributions have tended to pay 
better attention to need-based considerations in setting priorities. Landmine Action used 
its own survey capacity to determine where demining was most needed and would have 
the most impact on local communities. MAG was implementing the Sudanese Landmine 
Impact Survey and was targeting its operations according to their findings. They also 
worked with an NGO consortium in Blue Nile State, trying to integrate mine action into 
broader community development efforts. NPA used the same Task Impact Assessment 
methodology as in Bosnia, identifying “land being denied for agriculture or housing or 
other local cultural needs.”90 A DanChurchAid employee argued that being a 
development organization, with a broad range of expertise in interacting with 
communities, it understood the local context better than commercial companies: it had 
“the capacity to think 360 degrees, to see all the problems related to the population.” 91
87 David Isaksson. (4 June 1998) “Doghandlers from Mozambique transfer knowledge to Bosnia.” Global 
Reporting. In NPA archives.
88 John Rodsted. (2005) Mine Action in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996-2005. Oslo, Norwegian Peoples Aid.
See also: Samuel Gruber. “U.S. Commission Urges Sarajevo Cemetery Restoration.” 
<http://www.isjm.org/Links/Sarajevo.htm>.
89 Jan Braatha. (8 March 2007) Personal interview with author in Sarajevo.
90 Charles Frisby. (2 August 2008) Personal interview with the author in Yei.
91 Marco Buono. (15 August 2007) Personal interview with author in Khartoum.
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The Human Security-Civil Society Complex was also able to contribute to more 
traditional security stabilization efforts. For instance, both Handicap International and the 
HALO Trust (with funds from both the US State Department and Norway) engaged in 
‘humanitarian disarmament’ in Afghanistan -  securing and destroying abandoned arms 
caches.92 Likewise, NPA’s demining of major areas of Sarajevo helped make it a viable 
capital city again, perhaps contributing to stabilization of the city and the re­
establishment of government. In Sudan, Landmine Action and DanChurchAid played 
important roles in facilitating contacts between the government and SPLA in the Nuba 
Mountain, as well as the leadership level. This undoubtedly contributed, at least in a 
small way, to the success of the Nuba Mountains ceasefire. Moreover, several mine 
action NGOs in Sudan were securing and destroying abandoned caches of mines, 
ordnance and weapons.93 This may have helped reduce arms available to armed groups.
In short, the ‘Human Security-Civil Society’ approach set up systems to distribute 
protection from landmines according to criteria based on need and fairness. This resulted 
from commitments to humanitarianism and justice, but, as the next sub-section shows, 
was also enabled by their independence from vested interests, both of the donor and the 
local political economy.
ii. Local Capacity Building
Just as with commercial companies, the international NGOs also have some
disincentives to build local capacity. NGOs have material interests in institutional 
survival that may disincentivize creating local competitors and expatriates may be 
reluctant to ‘work themselves out of a job.’ There are also political disincentives. As 
noted previously, the local people best placed to be demining entrepreneurs are often 
those linked to the political economy of war. Therefore, while Norway trumpets the 
importance of ‘national ownership’ in mine action, in the each of case studies it opted to 
support international agencies and was nervous about directly funding organizations 
embedded in the local political economy. Therefore, there was an implicit concern about 
building the capacity of the ‘wrong’ local institutions.
92 HALO Trust. (2 November 2006) “The HALO Trust Afghanistan.” PowerPoint Presentation given to 
author by Dr. Farid Homayoun. Slide 59-64.
93 e.g. Mines Advisory Group (MAG), (n.d.) “SUDAN: Clearing Small Arms & Light Weapons.” 
<http://www.mag.org.uk/news.php?s=2&p=2775>.
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That said, in all three cases, Norwegian-supported international NGOs had a strong 
commitment to “capacity build from within.”94 Many NGO professionals argued this 
was the best way to organize demining programs; blending both the local and 
international enabled them to bridge both worlds. Hiring local staff saved money, eased 
navigation of local political complexities and simplified negotiation with vendors. 
External ties enable NGOs to diversify their funding base internationally, gain from 
economies of scale and professionalize staff through training, mentoring and 
development based on experience the organization gained outside the country.
Examples of this model include the HALO Trust in Afghanistan and NPA in Bosnia 
and Sudan. In all three cases, while ultimately controlled by their headquarters, local 
offices had considerable local autonomy. Further, while there was a large expatriate 
presence at the beginning, they slowly trained up local staff to take over management 
functions. HALO in Afghanistan is run largely by Afghan managers. Expatriates only 
rotate in on short term contracts to build capacity on specific issues. In Bosnia, NPA’s 
last expatriate position -  that of the country program manager -  was handed over to a 
local staff member in 2006. In Sudan, NPA has developed a detailed capacity building 
plan and intends to draw down expatriates staff by two-thirds in five years as “talented 
local candidates [are] educated and promoted.” The plan outlined training courses and 
mentoring relationships to be offered to local staff in both technical and management 
issues.95 Beyond core demining skills, NPA has trained staff in other skills like 
management and cross-cultural communication.96 Many commercial operators would not 
have the time or budget to invest in these ‘softer’ skills.
That said, most of the other international NGOs in Sudan have worked in partnership 
with local partner NGOs, largely, it seems, due to pressure from donors and local 
authorities. This seems to have had less success, perhaps because little capacity and 
responsibility were really transferred to the local NGOs. Most meaningful decisions in 
these partnerships continued to be made by expatriates within the international NGOs and 
really the only authority left to the local NGOs was to stall and obstruct decisions.
94 Frisby. Personal interview.
95 Rune Kristian Andersen. (11 June 2007) “Capacity Building Plan.” Obtained by author from NPA.
96 Frisby. Personal interview.
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Paradoxically, it appeared that the NGO programs that did not have local partners often 
gave local people more authority.
Therefore, given space by long-term grants, implementing partners operating in a 
Human Security-Civil Society Complex were not as forced by expediency concerns. 
This gave them time to develop alternative sources of power, internally within the 
organization, and through alliances with civil society, both globally and locally. As a 
South Sudanese government official expressed, NGOs “are not limited by a contract” and 
“can stay in Sudan for maybe six or eight years.”97 Norway consistently supported 
organizations that, despite initially hiring many expatriates, and continuing to maintain 
international links, developed into strong, healthy and sustainable local institutions that 
were at least somewhat independent of the state and the local political economy of war. 
As a result, the following subsections will show that the Human Security-Civil Society 
Complex was able to build alternative structures that were more inclusive than many 
local organizations, could avoid co-option by vested interests and advocated 
humanitarian limits on war.
iii. Inclusivity
War, by its very nature, is exclusive, for violence excludes the voice of the violated. 
In every conflict certain people are excluded from decision-making, access to resources 
and protection from armed groups. These may those considered ‘the enemy’, civilians 
victimized by armed factions or disempowered groups (such as women, children, 
minority groups and refugees). Marginalization can be institutionalized and continue in 
the post-war era, stoking grievances and contributing to further social unrest. It can also 
be reproduced in the agencies involved in reconstruction, including demining. However, 
the international NGOs operating in the three cases made more effort than commercial 
companies to create inclusive workplaces.
In Afghanistan, the UN and USAID-created demining NGOs first recruited refugees 
from the camps in northern Pakistan. These camps were largely populated by people of 
Pashtun ethnicity and mujahideen supporters. In the years after the fall of the communist 
regime, the various resistance groups began fighting each other. The demining agencies
97 Margaret Mathiang. (21 August 2007) Personal interview with author in Juba.
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worked hard to span the mujahideen parties to avoid becoming partisan. ATC had 
employees surrender their party ID cards, replacing them an organizational card and 
saying “from today, you are not a party-member, you are an ATC member, you are 
neutral ... you have to follow the policy of the United Nations.”98 Today demining 
continues to be dominated by Pashtuns and former mujahideen. This has also carried 
over into the commercial companies operating in Afghanistan. The HALO Trust is a key 
exception, however. Largely because its area of operations has traditionally been Kabul 
and the north, which are ethnically diverse regions, it has both a multiethnic leadership 
and workforce. Further, though it began in communist government territory, it now 
employs a mix of both former communist and former mujahideen supporters.
One sees similarities with NPA in Bosnia. While most of NPA’s operations took 
place in the Federation, it has always focused on the areas of Bosnia which have the 
highest levels of mine contamination and on cities with multiethnic populations. NPA 
has worked on both sides of the inter-entity boundary line, claiming that “Any effort of 
reconciliation...must include assistance to both entities.”99 While most of its demining 
staff was drawn from people who fought on the Bosnian government side, many of whom 
are Bosniak, it has been more multiethnic than most other demining organizations, 
especially the local companies and NGOs. Its current country program manager is Croat. 
In 2000, it also incorporated a team from the Republika Srpska, transferred from a 
UNHCR demining project. It is thus one of the very few multiethnic Bosnian-led 
institutions in the country -  no small achievement. In contrast, the US played into the 
‘Dayton logic’ of ethnic parity by supporting the creation of ethnically exclusive 
demining organizations.
In Sudan, the international NGOs, especially DanChurchAid (supported by both 
Norway and the US State Department) and Landmine Action (supported briefly by the 
State Department), were more likely to try to build links between deminers from both 
sides of the conflict than the commercial companies. Landmine Action initially tried to 
transcend the conflict by building a politically independent local capacity. However, this 
was blocked by both the Government of Sudan and the SPLA and eventually became
98 Kefayatullah Eblagh. (26 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul.
99 O. Flem. (1998) “Proposal for Manual Demining in Republika Srpska 1998.” In NPA archives.
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polarized and collapsed. HALO also tried to span the north and south but was similarly 
blocked. In contrast, the commercial companies have avoided ‘peacebuilding’ activities, 
considering them outside the purview of their contracts. That said, some NGOs also 
focused exclusively on the south, including DDG and the SPLA-friendly NPA. 
Moreover, while MAG (supported by the State Department) had partners both in the 
north and the south, there was little attempt to bring them into a unified whole. They 
were, in effect, two regional subcontractors to MAG. It may be that because the 
international NGOs were less able to build institutions autonomous from the political 
economy of conflict in Sudan, they were less able than in Afghanistan and Bosnia to 
resist countervailing exclusive forces.
Nonetheless, one should not overlook NPA and MAG’s employment of women 
deminers in South Sudan. NPA has also deliberately tried to achieve more gender 
balance in back office positions like finance and logistics.100 While not a separate ethnic 
or political group, women have often been excluded in South Sudan and have suffered 
the effects of the war disproportionately. The SPLA, now the ruling group in the South, 
is an overwhelmingly patriarchal and militarized institution. By including women in 
what is a male-dominated process of restoring security, NPA and MAG are contributing 
to the development of a more gender inclusive society. The deputy director of the South 
Sudan Demining Commission said she was “impressed” to see that “Ladies were leading 
the demining process” 101
In all three cases, then, with some small exceptions, it appears that international 
demining NGOs, often those supported by Norway, at least attempted to develop more 
integrative polities than international companies, local companies and local NGOs. This 
is probably because international NGOs are themselves often cosmopolitan entities with 
staff spanning many different countries and cultures. Moreover, they tend to be shaped 
by cosmopolitan ideals and see the value of contributing to the development of an 
inclusive polity in the host country. Having a diverse workforce may mean that the NGO 
is less able to count on the loyalty and protection of particular local groups. However, it 
also gives them greater independence from local social divisions, and may inoculate them
100 Frisby. Personal interview.
101 Mathiang. Personal interview.
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to the sort of capture commonly faced by the Strategic-Commercial Complex. This 
enables them to resist violent structures and create alternatives.
iv. Advocacy for Non-Violent Politics and Limits on War
Given longer-term time horizons and concern for human rights, international NGOs,
more than commercial companies, attempted to overcome and occasionally transform the 
politics of violence encountered in the field. Their ability to do this was strengthened by 
building institutions autonomous from both the local political economy of war and 
‘belligerent donors’ with interests in the conflict.
In Afghanistan in the early 1990s, local demining NGOs, despite largely being staffed 
by former mujahidden, quickly learned to mitigate potential conflict by cultivating an 
image of neutrality and dialogue with all armed groups. Likewise, the HALO Trust’s 
neutrality enabled it to continue work in Kabul and the north, despite the fall of the 
communist government. Thus, while keeping open lines of communication to the Taliban 
and the Northern Alliance, the demining NGOs avoided being drawn into the conflict. 
HALO has continued this policy, trying to make a clear distinction between them and the 
NATO military effort. They have especially resisted requests to demine military bases or
109lend equipment to commercial companies doing military tasks.
The local demining NGOs and the HALO Trust also developed an ideology of 
demining as ‘nonviolent jihad’ that earned it widespread legitimacy, including with the 
Taliban and Northern Alliance. Drawing on a passage from the Qu’ran that states “if any 
one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people,”103 demining was 
framed as an extension of the struggle for liberation from Soviet occupation, an act of 
service to the Afghan people and a struggle against “the enemy of everyone.”104 This 
passage was quoted by most of the Afghan UN and NGO demining personnel 
interviewed by the author. It was also often displayed on banners in NGO offices and at 
meetings. Deminers killed in demining accidents were considered martyrs. UNMACA 
Chief of Operations Muhammed Sediq said that many Afghans became disillusioned with 
the mujahideen that fought the Soviets “when they started to fight each other, they
102 Guy Willoughby. (21 September 2007) Personal interview with author in Thornhill, Scotland.
103 Al-Qu’ran 5:32.
104 Sediq. Personal interview.
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destroyed Kabul city and did a lot of bad things.” In contrast he said many Afghans 
called the deminers “the real mujahideen” because their work benefits everyone, and 
unlike the armed factions, have maintained contacts with local communities.105 This is an 
incredibly powerful idea, which largely protected the demining agencies during the 
1990s. It also represents a counter-hegemonic discourse, posing an alternative form of 
service, masculinity and sacrifice to the violent discourses of the armed factions. It also 
contrasts with the image of masculinity projected by the private security companies, in 
which the male role is defined by their ability to wield violence.106 The NGOs projected a 
masculinity of nonviolent protection and of restoring the earth to safety.
In Bosnia, while it admitted that at times it had had to live with “tolerable levels of 
corruption” within the organization,107 NPA was able to avoid the transformation of 
demining into a large politicized patronage machine. Given time by their donor to 
develop slowly, NPA was able to do this by building a multiethnic institution that 
maintained an arm’s length from the cutthroat ethnic politics of the country.
Likewise, in Sudan, many of the international demining NGOs framed their work in 
terms of peacebuilding. They attempted, with admittedly limited success, to try to build 
links between deminers from different factions and strengthen transformative and 
demilitarizing processes within the country. MAG and several other NGOs insisted on a 
strict ‘No Guns’ policy in their vehicles. SPLA soldiers riding in their cars as guards or 
liaison officers assigned to meet with the organization were instructed not to bring their 
weapons into the car. Moreover, NGO mine action has contributed to the return of 
refugees and internally displaced persons. Both MAG and DDG (which is funded by 
UNHCR) have focused their efforts on clearing area that would have the maximum 
impact on returning refugees and displaced persons.
The NGO that made the most explicit connection between demining and 
peacebuilding was Landmine Action. Their ‘crosslines’ work in the Nuba Mountains 
attempted to build links between deminers from both government and SPLA 
backgrounds. Because they framed the project as an attempt to work outside the 
polarized context of the war, the government and SPLA naturally viewed it suspiciously.
105 Ibid.
106 Rimli & Schmeidl. Private Security Companies, p. 42.
107 Per Breivik. (16 February 2007) Personal interview with author in Sarajevo.
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The northern government blocked the registration of a local NGO affiliated with the 
project and tried to get Landmine Action to work with the government-affiliated 
JASMAR instead. When Landmine Action left Sudan, intending to hand over its project 
to HALO, HALO was also blocked from registering in the north. The SPLA also initially 
blocked Landmine Action’s attempts to register a local NGO in the south, though finally 
allowed it to create Sudan Landmine Response (SLR). While this initially was viewed as 
a success, it actually meant that powerful interests within the South, well connected to the 
SPLA, were able to capture the organization. When HALO took over as SLR’s partner, it 
discovered what it alleged were massive misallocations of resources and nepotism, 
protected by powerful men in the SPLA.
This shows that while international NGOs were more motivated to transform the 
political economy of conflict within Sudan, their capacity to actually do so was fairly 
limited. In the absence of a broader political transformation, the ability of NGOs to 
contribute to peace is obviously limited, they face powerful countercurrents against their 
liberal visions.108 Indeed NPA has made no attempt to build links between north and 
south, preferring to focus its attention on the south and remain politically close to the 
SPLA. Moreover, those international NGOs that are working with local NGOs, such as 
JASMAR and OSIL (which are more like parastatals linked to the northern government 
and SPLA respectively), were rarely able to integrate their northern and southern 
programs into a meaningful whole. So while MAG and DCA work ‘crosslines’, their 
local partners rarely do. Furthermore, the structure of these partnerships probably 
encouraged rent-seeking, because while the international NGO provided funding and had 
some influence over staffing within the local NGO, the local partner was still an 
independent organization with considerable autonomy and better relations with local 
authorities (enabling them to influence the outcomes of disputes between them and their 
international partners). This meant the international NGOs had less control over staffing 
and resource allocation than if they had hired their own deminers.
That said, the work of Landmine Action and DCA in the Nuba Mountains have been 
widely praised for the humble, but not insignificant impact they had on facilitating links 
between the government and SPLA between the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire and the CPA.
108 Goodhand. Aiding Peace?
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Roberts and Frilander said, “Professional working relationships have been developed at 
the national, intermediate and local levels, and in some cases personal friendships have 
followed.” 109 Even local Sudanese who later fell out badly with Landmine Action 
admitted to the author that their involvement in Nuba Mountains crosslines work made 
them more trustful of their counterparts when negotiating the mine action elements of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Another way international NGOs were contributed to the demilitarization of politics 
was through advocating humanitarian limits to technologies of violence. Many 
international demining NGOs were also part of the movements to ban mines and cluster 
munitions. In contrast, commercial companies in all three cases limited their lobbying 
efforts to advocating further funding and facilitation of their operations. For example, 
many international NGOs have been critical of the US refusal to join the landmine and 
cluster munitions bans, whereas commercial companies’ public relations efforts 
highlighted their support for the US ‘War on Terror.’110
In Afghanistan, while the local NGOs are more like UN contractors than traditional 
notions of ‘civil society,’ they also played an advocacy role -  highlighting humanitarian 
issues and recommending policy. The Afghan NGOs together form the Afghan 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL), which successfully pushed Afghanistan to sign the 
Mine Ban Treaty and has raised objections to US mine ban policy.111 Commercial 
companies are far less likely to question US policy in Afghanistan and have much less 
organizational autonomy from the US government.112 When the author asked RONCO’s 
president to comment on their programs in Afghanistan he said, “I suggest you talk to the 
State Department because I don’t want to say something that might jeopardize the 
position of the company.”113 Likewise, DynCorp’s mine action coordinator told the
109 Rebecca Roberts & Mads Frilander. (2004) “Preparing for Peace: Mine Action’s Investment in the 
Future of Sudan.” Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine Action in Support of Peacebuilding. PRIO Report 
2/2004. Kristian Berg Harpviken & Rebecca Roberts (Eds.). Oslo, PRIO. p. 18.
110 e.g. John L. Wilkinson. (December 2002) “Demining During Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan.” Journal of Mine Action. 6.3.
<http://maic.jmu.edU/JOURNAL/6.3/notes/wilkinson/wilkinson.htm>.
111 Kristian Berg Harpviken. (2002) “Breaking new ground: Afghanistan’s response to landmines and 
unexploded ordnance.” Third World Quarterly. 23(5). p. 940.
112 cf. Chris Johnson & Jolyon Leslie. (2005) Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace. London, Zed Books, p. 
106.
113 Stephen Edelmann. (3 August 2006) Telephone conversation with author.
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author, “State Department is paying DynCorp to represent them on the WRA [State 
Department Office for Weapons Removal and Abatement] project so our logo says WRA 
on it, our letterhead says WRA and we are listed here in country as WRA and we are 
accredited as WRA Afghanistan.”114 Thus commercialization of mine action could 
function as a way to neutralize advocacy and opposition from civil society actors 
involved in mine action.
In Bosnia, NPA and other NGOs have leveraged their field experience to assist in 
global advocacy efforts against mines and cluster munitions. With the US NGO 
Landmine Survivor’s Network, NPA helped to organize Princess Diana’s visit to Bosnia 
(just two weeks before she died in August 1997) publicizing landmine issues. 
Photographs from this visit played a significant role in raising public awareness of the 
impact of mines. More recently, NPA lobbied the Bosnian government to support the 
Norwegian cluster munitions ban initiative.115 The US-supported commercial companies 
and local NGOs have been almost invisible in these campaigns, focusing solely on their 
operations.
Finally, mine action NGOs may have had small but important effects on the behavior 
of the Sudanese government’s military and possibly the SPLA. The significance of the 
Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines’ (indirectly supported by the US and Norway 
through MAG and DCA’s support to JASMAR) successful lobbying of the Sudanese 
government to sign and honor the landmine ban should also not be downplayed. The 
Sudanese government has a history of suspicion toward NGOs and the fact that SCBL 
persuaded the government to cede the right to use a weapon and allow non-state actors to 
engage in gathering information about a security threat (when NGOs assess the mine 
situation), should be considered a small victory for civil society. As one evaluation of 
SCBL noted, “SCBL managed to transform the image of...landmines from a military and 
security issue to its humanitarian dimension.”116 Indeed, exposure to mine action and a 
local political constituency committed to the landmine ban may have been why the 
Sudanese government has largely avoided the use of mines in Darfur.
114 Carpenter. Personal interview.
115 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). (15 February 2007) “Update on NPA’s work against cluster 
munitions.” <http://www.npaid.org/./?module=Articles;action=Article.publicShow;ID=4533>.
116 Save the Children Sweden. (December 2004) “Organizational Capacity and Impact Assessment to 
Selected Partners in Sudan.” Unpublished document obtained by author.
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v. Summary
Idealistic motivations and long-term grant support gave Human-Security-Civil 
Society implementers the freedom to create inclusive demining institutions seeking to 
resist and transform conflict. Autonomous of state organs and the local political 
economy of war, they were able to make principled stands advocating for a non-violent 
politics and limits on war. However, where countervailing forces were much stronger, or 
when NGOs became close to chauvinistic groups, they were less able to implement their 
humanitarian mission or resist capture by vested agendas.
c. Conclusion
Instead of re-establishing and strengthening the power structures most associated with 
the politics of violence, those interested in peacebuilding must seek to resist them, 
establishing in their place institutions that replace relationships of coercion with those of 
trust and nonviolence. A demining organization’s ability to play a positive role in this 
process is related to its motivations, interests and the nature of the networks of power 
relations in which it is embedded. An organization’s capacity to act is both enabled and 
circumscribed by its relationships to other groups in society. When it is deeply 
embedded in the networks involved in the conflict, it is unable to resist or transform them 
into something new.
Therefore, implementing agencies operating in a Strategic-Commercial mode are less 
likely to have a positive impact on the political processes of peacebuilding, though they 
may contribute to the donor’s strategic interests. This is because their donor may have 
interests in the conflict (such as in the US in Afghanistan). Even when this is not the 
case, a modus operandi of expedience and pressure to achieve results quickly, creates 
strong incentives to cooperate with those currently in power, who can ‘get the job done.’ 
Though it may contribute to the strengthening of state security organs, this means 
commercial demining is also more likely to strength the fragmentation and privatization 
of security, granted only to the few with political and economic power. As a result, they 
may generate unexpected blowback against the very strategic interests the donor aimed to 
protect.
In contrast, the humanitarian mission, lack of donor strategic interest and the 
flexibility of funding of implementers operating in a Human Security-Complex gives
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them time and opportunity to build new structures that are inclusive and not captive to the 
status quo. This allows them to resist the politics of violence, advocate for limits on the 
technologies of war and set up systems that distribute protection according to need.
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CONCLUSION & REFLECTIONS
Governance, Security and Mine Action
“To live in a secure world, a new partnership fo r  
human security must be forged.... Governments and 
civil society must work together to advance human security 
as a viable alternative to militarism and war. ”
-Jo d y  Williams.1
Political life in the 21st century is marked by a shift from nationalized relationships of government command-and-control to globalized governance by coalitions, partnerships and contractual relationships between diverse sets of 
public and private actors. The highly structured bureaucracy has been augmented and/or 
replaced by hollowed-out, outsourced and privatized networks. As a result, the statist 
manner in which scholars traditionally conceived security is inadequate for an era of 
globalization and transnational security threats. In fact, it is unlikely that international 
politics was ever as straightforward as a simple game of utility-maximizing states. To 
correct this misguided assumption the study of politics, as Mark Duffield has argued, 
must be rooted in an examination of how the messy mix of state and non-state actors 
organize themselves into networks to address security challenges. Nowhere is this more 
clearly demonstrated than in the conflicted ‘frontiers’ of the international system. 
Countries such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan are ruled not by the classic Weberian 
state, but rather by complexes -  dizzying arrays of multilateral agencies, bilateral donors, 
foreign troops, NGOs, commercial companies, warlords, armed factions and criminal
1 Jody Williams. (2008) “New Approaches in a Changing World: The Human Security Agenda.” Banning 
Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security. Jody Williams, Stephen D. Goose & 
Mary Ware ham (Eds.). Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 293-294.
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networks. These actors come together in shifting relationships of conflict, collusion and 
compromise.
However, to describe these networks as complexes does not mean that one cannot 
discern patterns and logic to the complexity. To do this, one must get in close -  examine 
the complexes at the macro and micro level, understanding the motivations, institutional 
structures and actions of each of the actors and the manner in which they interact. This 
dissertation has attempted this task by looking in detail at one particular sector of 
international intervention in conflicted regions -  the mitigation and neutralization of the 
threat of landmines and other explosive remnants of war.
While Mark Duffield has a tendency to conflate these new networks into one 
“emerging system of global liberal governance”, this can actually prevent understanding. 
There is not one emerging system, but many, driven together into constellations by 
shared interests or norms. The author’s research discovered that there were actually at 
least two forms of complexes governing the clearance of mines and UXO, incorporating 
different sets of actors, operating in different ways and producing different outcomes, 
both in terms of the demining process and the impact on the surrounding context:
1) A Strategic-Commercial Complex, in which mines and cluster munitions 
were seen as legitimate weapons in a great power arsenal. Mine clearance was 
shaped by the securitized foreign policy of a governmental donor with a high 
level of strategic interest in the region and implemented largely by private 
security companies and military units. The complex was held together by a 
sense of national interest and the profit motive of contracted agents. It 
prioritized demining tasks that furthered donor’s particularist interests and 
emphasized speed and cost-efficiency over quality and safety. Its tendency 
toward expediency meant that it was more likely to compromise, even collude, 
with the political economy of conflict. As it was itself a network including 
private security companies, it may also have contributed to the privatization 
and fragmentation of the public monopoly on the use of force.
2 Mark Duffield. (2001) Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security. 
London, Zed Books, p. 2.
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2) A Human Security-Civil Society Complex, in which middle powers saw 
mines and UXO as a threat to the global public good that should be regulated, 
proscribed and neutralized. Clearance programs were shaped by notions of 
humanitarianism and implemented in partnership with UN aid agencies and 
international NGOs. The complex was held together by shared norms, 
missions and values. It prioritized demining tasks with high human impact (in 
terms of causalities, refugee return and livelihood opportunities) and 
emphasized targeting, quality and safety over speed and cost-efficiency. Due 
to its longer-term time horizons and normative commitments, it tried to 
transform the political economy of conflict by building inclusive institutions 
and advocating for limits on the politics of violence.
These main findings are summarized in the table below:
Table 1: Two ‘Emerging Political Complexes’ of Demining: Summary of Key Findings
Example Donor ■ United States ■ Norway
Understanding of 
Interest
■ National interest and the profit 
motive




■ Private security companies
■ Military demining units
■ International NGOs
■ Local NGOs




■ Principal-Agent Model ■ Principal-Steward Model
Attitude to 
International Laws 
on Mines and UXO 
Price of Demining
■ Prefer as few restrictions as possible
■ Low
■ Campaign for strict regulation
■ High
Speed of Demining ■ High ■ Low
Complexity of 
Demining Tasks
■ Low ■ High
Quality of Demining ■ Low ■ High
Safety of Demining ■ Low ■ High
Priority Tasks ■ Military Bases
■ Insecure Weapons Caches
■ Access Roads Important to Military
■ Large-Scale Infrastructure Projects
■ Community-Based Priorities
■ Areas of High Human Impact
■ Focus on Marginalized Populations
Impact on 
Peacebuilding
■ Strengthens political economy of 
war
■ Contributes to privatization of force
■ Builds links across social cleavages
■ Builds institutions independent of 
the political economy of war
■ Advocates for limits on the politics 
of violence
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The rest of this concluding chapter will reflect more broadly on the roles of ideals, 
interests and institutions in shaping security provision and foreign aid agendas. It will 
close with a few final reflections on security in a post-statist world. For specific 
recommendations regarding implications for mine action policy, see the appendix entitled 
‘Mine Action with a Human Face.’
a. Agency and Structure: The Roles of Interests, Ideals and 
Institutions
Some of the dissertation’s dominant underlying themes have been the ways in which 
factors of interests, ideals and institutions interact to create systems of demining and 
impact the surrounding context. Motivations (interests and ideals) make a considerable 
difference. They shape the way in which agents interacts with others around them and 
order their internal organizational incentives and structures. Nevertheless, the systems 
and institutions that structure and guide the behavior of these agents are also of crucial 
importance. Institutions (such as negotiating fora or donor contracts) shape the extent to 
which agents are incentivized to act according to ideals, self-interest or the public good. 
Therefore, this dissertation has found that both agency and structure matter in the creation 
of effective demining programs.
At the global level, it has been norm-motivated entrepreneurs (such as NGOs, 
churches and middle powers) not more strategically-driven great powers or profit-driven 
companies that have driven the development of a global regime governing mines, cluster 
munitions and other explosive detritus of war. However, the structure of negotiating fora 
used by states to develop regimes governing the use of mines and cluster munitions 
seemed to matter as much as the motivations of the entities themselves. The Convention 
on Conventional Weapons, with its consensus process, effectively encouraged states to 
adopt the lowest common denominator of the most self-interested state. By contrast, the 
‘opt-in’ system of the Ottawa and Oslo processes encouraged states to take maximalist 
positions; the inclusion of NGOs in the discussions further pushed them to do so, in the 
face of potential embarrassment.
At the donor level, Norway has an idealist foreign policy, but as chapter 4 showed, 
this may be as much about its place in the international system as its internal motivations. 
While it has consistently framed its foreign policy in terms of normative commitments, as
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a small state, Norway may benefit from ensuring that great powers (and other agents 
threatening their vital interests) play by the rules of law-governed world. Thus its 
advocacy for humanitarianism and international law may be more about state survival 
than high-minded ideals. Likewise, there is no shortage in the US of idealist churches, 
NGOs, peace activists and concerned citizens. However, as Egeland has argued, the US 
government is constrained by transnational strategic and economic interests, which often 
prevent it from taking the moral high ground.
At the level of implementation, international NGOs were more likely than 
commercial companies to be expected (by donors, employees and the public) to live up to 
humanitarian ideals and a concern for the global public good. This pushed them to adopt 
high expectations of quality, safety and conduct. These motives differed across different 
agencies. HALO Trust’s conception of demining as an act of charity is a more traditional 
view of humanitarianism than NPA’s left-leaning conception of demining as an act of 
solidarity with the oppressed. Both of these secular institutions diverge somewhat from 
DCA’s religiously driven understanding of Christian service. However, most of these 
international NGOs did hold key ideals in common. Firstly, they were driven by 
considerations of justice -  that is, demining should be distributed by need, rather than 
ability to pay. Secondly, they had a strong professional ethic. These humanitarian 
intentions did seem to have a positive impact on demining performance. They increased 
the willingness of agencies to spend money on better targeting of resources and increased 
quality and safety. Moreover, many NGOs were motivated by a vision of transforming 
the conflict -  thus they were nervous about interacting with violent socio-political 
structures and tried to build institutions that bridged or transformed social divides and 
modes of exclusion. Since these objectives were also integral to Norway’s foreign 
policy, NGOs were given freedom to pursue these aims that were not simply about 
demining.
However, these humanitarian motivations did not exist in an institutional vacuum. 
The long-term granting mechanisms employed by Norway, with little competition for 
funding and multi-year funding almost guaranteed, allowed international NGOs to 
operate with longer-term time horizons. While these NGOs obviously had some material 
interests (competing for additional funding, ensuring decent salaries for staff, etc.), their
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core grants from Norway allowed them to operate outside the ordinary constraints of a 
material economy -  decisions could be made based on what was considered the ‘right 
thing’ rather than the cheapest option. Therefore, there was less need to sacrifice 
idealistic motivations. Freed from the need to make a profit, NGOs could sacrifice some 
elements of cost-effectiveness in exchange for taking time to ensure work was well 
targeted, of top quality and met high safety standards. In other words, the institutional 
structure set up by the donor opens or closes space for a demining agency to act more 
morally. It appears that granting demining funding to international NGOs (as Norway 
usually did) gave them more ethical space than commercial tendering (preferred by the 
US). Whether or not the agency uses this space productively, or squanders it, will depend 
on the internal drivers of the particular organization.
In contrast, the implementing partners in the Strategic-Commercial Complex were 
constrained by competition, the strategic interests of their donors and the short time 
horizons of their contracts. Thus implementers’ only interest in influencing donors 
would be to encourage them to make the process more profitable. Likewise, the 
discipline of competition and profit-seeking mean that quality is less important than cost- 
effectiveness -  especially at the margin of the market. As regards the surrounding socio­
political context, attempting to engage in transformative activities would be seen as a 
distraction from the priority of completing the terms of the contract. Therefore, accepting 
and working with the socio-political status quo is a natural outcome. If the contract is for 
demining, there is no money available for peacemaking, extra staff training or holding 
donor countries accountable. As a result, even when the donors that tend to operate in a 
Strategic-Commercial mode give money to NGOs, they rarely give them the same kind of 
room to maneuver as the grants from Norway. For instance, the US grants to NGOs in 
Sudan were on an annual basis and they competed with each other for funding. Likewise, 
UN tenders awarded to NGOs in Sudan followed the same contracts as those with 
commercial companies. This competition for resources left little room for broader idealist 
visions, and implementers often simply transmitted the strategic interests of their donors.
In short, in protecting populations from mines and UXO the idealistic or self- 
interested motivations of organizations matter. Indeed, this research has found that 
cosmopolitan and humanistic ideals can play crucial social and political functions. At
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least for beneficiaries, mine action, post-conflict reconstruction and foreign aid are better 
instruments of social, political and economic change if they are shaped and driven by a 
commitment to greater human welfare. However, the institutional structures in which 
organizations are embedded also shape the way they operate. Therefore, funding for 
demining should be carefully organized to bring out the best in organizations, rather than 
forcing them into a prisoner’s dilemma where they concentrate more on competing with 
each other than helping people. While self-interest -  the protection of life and livelihood 
-  is legitimate and can be a great engine of creativity and prosperity, it must be 
constrained and channeled by legitimate norms.
b. Final Thoughts: Security in a Post-Statist World
In closing with final, more personal, reflections on this research, I ask the reader to 
indulge a reversion to first person. I write this ending section from an apartment in 
Kampala, Uganda. It has bars on the windows and is surrounded by high walls. A private 
guard stands at the gate. I have spent much of this thesis pointing out the corrosive 
impact of such ‘hard security’ -  enclavization and privatization of protection. However, 
living in a place where insecurity and the lack of adequate state protection is a stark 
reality, I have developed some sympathy and insight into the very real security dilemmas 
people face in their daily lives. Security can either be sought by fortifying private and 
privileged space or through building general good will through persuasion, good offices 
and improving the lot of the general population. Unfortunately the latter, while more 
desirable, appears very difficult in the short-term. Thus those who respond to insecurity 
with militarization and fortification are neither irrational nor necessarily mal-intentioned. 
However, there is a definite cost to this choice. Walking down Kampala’s Naguru Hill, 
one descends from large homes with well-tended gardens, surrounded by high walls, 
alarm systems and private guards, to the bottom of the hill where, in a muddy slum, the 
unprotected people live. Fortification, while a rational response to insecurity, leaves out 
the vulnerable and no doubt increases resentment among those at the bottom of the hill 
for those at the top.
On the international scene, we have seen an analogous resurgence of these ‘hard’ 
approaches to security. Within the US, the trauma of 9/11 shocked the American people 
into discovering their vulnerability. It provoked a belligerent and militant response from
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the US government, which has waged war in two countries (and conducted aggressive 
covert operations in many more) through a complex network of public and private actors. 
For many conservatives, the Clinton years had been marked by negligence in the face of 
the tragic reality of global instability and a misplaced faith in the ability of treaties and 
alliances to protect American democracy and prosperity. Only through military strength 
and fortifying borders (such as building a fence along the Rio Grande and limiting 
immigration) could America become safe again. The rise of US unilateralism seems to 
have provoked, or at least occurred in parallel with, a resurgence of great power 
geopolitics in other parts of the world. The Russian government’s fear of NATO 
expansion and democratic ‘revolutions’ in several former Soviet states has prompted a 
comeback of militant Russian nationalism. The assassination of Litvinenko, use of 
natural gas as a political tool, antics in Kosovo and invasion of Georgia all point to 
Russia’s renewed commitment to a realist foreign policy aimed at restoring great power 
status. Similar trends can be observed in the foreign policies of China, India, Pakistan 
and Israel. Through deploying military and private actors (such as arms traders, oil firms, 
paramilitaries and private security firms) they are penetrating and governing the 
borderlands through projecting their ‘hard’ -  military and economic -  power.
Realists will tell us that such a reversion to great power militarism is entirely rational, 
perhaps inevitable, and a necessary result of the need for states to maintain national 
security. However, there are very real costs to this ‘hard’ militarist approach. In the 
international arena, the resurgence of great power unilateralism is creating a new multi­
polar security dilemma, which arguably makes the global situation more insecure. The 
competition between the US (with NATO) and Russia may come at the expense of 
insecurity in smaller states, like Georgia and Kosovo, which become sites of proxy 
maneuvering.
Great power competition also reduces the possibility that great powers will one day 
give up mines and cluster munitions, as they feel the necessity of maintaining all military 
options -  hence Bush Administration’s hardening of its line on mines. Militarism can 
also then creep into demining programs; in Afghanistan the US conceived of it as an 
element of counter-insurgency and contracted private security firms for implementation. 
Such militaristic-commercial approaches fail to provide protection from mines to those
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who need it the most and can result in sloppy work, fragmentation of use of force and a 
strengthening of the political economy of war.
While there can often be an overwhelming sense that fortification and militarization 
are the inevitable and tragic sole solutions to insecurity, this PhD has demonstrated that 
another option is possible, plausible and perhaps, in the long term, more able to sustain 
peace and reconstruction. There is then, perhaps, a ‘realism’ in the ‘idealist’ approach -  a 
recognition that peace cannot be built simply through walling off the privileged and 
managing the ‘rest’ through counterinsurgency and privatized governance.
Rather, peacebuilding requires the development of governance systems that provide 
protection to all people, particularly those most vulnerable. It requires the construction of 
institutions that provide inclusive and non-coercive alternatives to the political economy 
of war. And it requires resistance to the politics and discourses of violence and exclusion. 
My research has shown that a coalition of middle powers, UN humanitarian agencies, the 
ICRC and NGOs have managed to achieve such things in their attempts to govern, 
mitigate and neutralize the security threat of mines and unexploded ordnance. They have 
created new international norms, monitoring systems, clearance operations and awareness 
programs that have targeted efforts at those most vulnerable. They have constructed 
governance complexes in the global peripheries that are effectively reducing the threat of 
mines and UXO through humanitarianism, persuasion and international law. As Goose, 
Wareham and Williams argued, the Mine Ban Treaty
proved that it is possible for small and medium size countries, acting in concert with civil society, 
to provide global leadership and achieve major diplomatic results, even in the face of opposition 
from bigger powers.3
Therefore, in spite of resurgent great power militarism, middle powers still have room 
in the international system to reduce insecurity through ‘soft power.’ The ‘hard power’ 
option is not really open to them -  they have neither the money nor the manpower to 
project military power into the insecure borderlands in any significant way. However, 
through joining forces with a network of multilateral and non-profit agencies they have 
innovated ways to project soft power, penetrate the global peripheries and govern 
insecurity in other ways. While the campaign against landmines is perhaps the most
3 Stephen D. Goose, Mary Wareham & Jody Williams. (2008) “Banning Landmines and Beyond.” In: 
Williams, Goose & Wareham. Banning Landmines, p. 12.
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prominent of these efforts, these Human Security-Civil Society Complexes have also 
successfully innovated new norms regarding child soldiers, disability rights, the 
International Criminal Court and cluster munitions. While they have not been very 
successful in obtaining great power support for such new international treaties, by 
creating new customary norms, they have been able to constrain the behavior of the great 
powers. Indeed, few countries now use mines. The US has had many opportunities to 
use them in Iraq and Afghanistan and has avoided doing so. Moreover, the US has felt 
obligated to provide significant support to clearance and mitigation programs.
Some might argue that while creating Human Security-Civil Society Complexes may 
be an appropriate course of action for middle powers, it is unrealistic to expect great 
powers to follow a similar approach. Indeed, they seem trapped in a security dilemma 
that requires them to project strength, maintain military dominance and avoid 
entanglements in limiting treaties. However, perhaps because of the idealist strain in its 
foreign policy and its democratic politics, this research has shown that the US can adopt a 
Human Security-Civil Society approach in places where its strategic interests are less 
pressing. In Afghanistan during the Taliban era, the US supported the UN-sponsored 
NGO program. In Sudan, following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the US 
provided grants to international NGOs.
Thus, while it may be too much to ask for the US to abandon militaristic approaches 
to security in Iraq and Afghanistan, it may be possible for the US to take a Human 
Security-Civil Society approach in times and places where the political space exists. This 
will give the US an opportunity to implement policies that do justice to the idealist strains 
in American thinking about foreign relations. It could also build a reserve of good will 
toward the US in the global peripheries and contribute to the governance of insecurity 
that is ungovernable simply through military tactics and counterinsurgency.
Similarly, other, non-state, actors in insecure places -  individuals, communities, 
NGOs, companies -  may be driven by sheer necessity to barricade themselves behind 
walls, fortifying private space and withdrawing into privatized forms of governance, safe 
from the ‘red zones’ that surround them. However, we should not delude ourselves that 
this will ultimately create peace and security for entire populations. If that is what we 
want, enclavization and fortification can only ever be a temporary measure. When and
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where space opens for alternative approaches, we must cease the moment. We must 
come out of our enclaves, dismantle our walls, diffuse security out from the core into the 
peripheries, provide protection and assistance to the vulnerable, govern human conflict 




Toward Mine Action with a Human Face
In this appendix, I  outline a doctrine o f mine action, based on the findings o f my PhD 
research, with recommendations fo r  the practice o f clearance and mitigation. I  call fo r  
centering mine action on the human person, rather than state security or commercial 
objectives.
* * *
After a decade of neoliberal ‘structural adjustment’ programs enforced by the IMF and World Bank in the name of development, UNICEF released a report in 1987 calling for ‘Adjustment with a Human Face.’1 The authors argued 
that development had lost its humanistic vision and failed to focus on those most 
vulnerable. Instead, structural adjustment had myopically focused on a small set of 
economic indicators (such as GDP growth, prices, currency reserves and government 
spending) that did not adequately measure the state of wellbeing in a country. Human 
welfare, they believed, had to be at the center of any attempt to transform and develop a 
country.2 To adapt a phrase used in another context,3 UNICEF was ‘bringing the human 
back in’ to development efforts. This concern also contributed to UNDP’s launch of the 
Human Development Reports, in an attempt to create quantitative measures of 
development that went beyond GDP per capita. Similarly, in recent years, human 
security advocates have attempted to ‘bring the human back in’ to concepts of security
1 Giovanni Andrea Comia, Richard Jolly and Frances Stewart (Eds.) (1987) Adjustment with a Human 
Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
2 Ibid. p. 2.
3 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (Eds.). (1985) Bringing the State Back in. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
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and protection. UNDP originally formulated the idea of human security as a sister 
concept of human development.4
I believe that mine action too needs to rediscover its ‘human face’, to remember, as 
UNMAS has said, that “It is not so much about mines as it is about people....”5 This PhD 
has shown that mine action is in danger of becoming distracted by commercial and 
strategic priorities. This is especially true since the advent of the ‘War on Terror’ and the 
continuing trend of consolidating the commercial mine action sector into the private 
security sector. Mine action is becoming a commodity to buy or an activity in support of 
counterinsurgency. To counteract these trends, we need a ‘doctrine’ of mine action that 
puts human welfare at its center.
Ten years ago, a group of NGOs critical of donor and commercial interests shaping 
programs tried to develop a framework to guide mine action. The resulting document, 
“Mine Action Programmes from a Development-oriented Point of View”, sometimes 
referred to as ‘The Bad Honnef Framework’, argued that mine action must be guided by 
basic principles of participation, co-operation, coherence, sustainability and solidarity.6 
Unfortunately, its influence has been relatively limited; an online search of the Journal o f 
Mine Action for the term “Bad Honnef’ produces only two articles, in comparison with 
23 for “national security” and 190 for “commercial.”7 ‘Mine Action with a Human Face’ 
must rediscover and reinvigorate this document, but also recognize its problems. While 
rooted in the civil society and participatory development schools of thought, it was 
somewhat technocratic and apolitical. It lacked a clear recognition of the political 
economy of conflict with which demining inevitably must interact.
Therefore, I believe my research implies a return to ‘Mine Action with a Human 
Face’, building on the ‘Bad Honnef Framework’ and guided by the following six 
principles:
4 UN Development Programme (UNDP). (1994) Human Development Report 1994: New dimensions of 
human security. New York, Oxford University Press.
5 UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). (2005) “Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United 
Nations Policy.” p. 3.
<http://www.undp.org/cpr/documents/mine_action/role_undpAJN_Mine_Action_Policy.pdf>.
6 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). (June 1999) “Mine Action Programmes from a 
development-oriented point of view ( ‘The Bad Honnef Framework’).”
<http://w w w. apminebancon vention .org/index .php ?id=424>.
7 James Madison University Mine Action Information Center, (n.d.) “Search the JMA.”
<http:// maic .j mu .edu/j oumal/index/search2 .htm> .
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1. Doing no harm
2. Moving beyond technocracy




The following will outline each of these principles in more detail and explain how 
they relate to mine action.
i. Doing No Harm
This PhD, confirming the findings of the political economy of aid in conflict
literature, has shown how demining interacts with the politics of the post-war context. 
Too often, demining agencies have been unaware or unperturbed by way their programs 
are captured by local vested interests or strengthen networks that are opposed to peace. 
Demining agencies must become more aware of how their funding, priorities, 
recruitment, information gathering and management practices can exacerbate conflict or
Q
contribute to peace. This will require demining agencies to recruit people from outside 
its traditional ex-military circles -  development professionals, political scientists, 
anthropologists, sociologists, management specialists and economists -  who are able to 
analyze social and organizational issues from different perspectives.
Particularly important are considerations of whether to accept money from 
‘belligerent donors’ (donors that are involved in the conflict), whether to use demining 
units of the military forces which were responsible for the conflict, how to vet potential 
deminers who have links to war crimes and atrocities and how to prevent the 
fragmentation of the public monopoly of force when using private security companies. 
While this leads to some difficult choices, doing no harm must always be the guiding 
aspiration.
This also applies to more technical matters. Demining agencies must put safety first 
in their clearance efforts, ensuring their deminers are well trained, managed and equipped 
to do their dangerous work. They must also open channels of communication to the local
8 Mary B. Anderson. (1999) Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace -  or War. Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
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communities surrounding their task to raise awareness of the mine problem and explain 
what is and what is not being cleared. Donors have a responsibility to ensure that their 
contracting systems do not incentivize comer-cutting and a ‘race to the bottom.’ Stable 
and long-term grants to humanitarian and professional institutions encourage investment 
in safety and quality.
ii. Moving beyond Technocracy
Much of the literature on mine action, especially in organizational and policy
documents, tends to be very technocratic, stripping it of the political, economic, social 
and cultural layers that are so crucial to understanding how it really works. While the 
dissertation has not really addressed this issue directly, it has attempted to move mine 
action discourse away from technocracy. For while obviously necessary, the knowledge 
of how to defuse a landmine, run a minefield database or manage a team of deminers is 
not sufficient to navigate the complex social milieu of a post-war country. Indeed, my 
research has confirmed Timothy Donais’ findings, in another setting, that “the application 
of technical solutions to what are inherently political problems risks being futile at best 
and, at worst, reinforcing and perpetuating the very conditions that produced the conflict 
in the first place.”9 Minefields are political, economic and social problems, not only 
technical ones. They thus require political, economic and social solutions. This means 
mine action agencies and scholars must dedicate more resources to researching the ways 
in which their work interacts with the political economy of conflict and the social and 
cultural tensions that may hinder their work.
iii. Protecting the Vulnerable
The Bad Honnef Framework declares that “The needs and aspirations of people
affected by mines are the starting point for mine action programmes.”10 However, as this 
dissertation has shown, commercialization of clearance can erode this humanitarian 
principle, allocating demining according to ability to pay, rather than need. Moreover, 
the integration of demining into the strategic objectives of counterinsurgency campaigns 
(such as in Afghanistan and Iraq) further corrodes mine action’s ‘humanitarian space.’
9 Timothy Donais. (2005) The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia. London, 
Routledge. p. 41.
10ICBL. “Mine Action Programmes.”
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Putting military concerns first also allows countries to claim the right to use mines and 
cluster munitions to devastating effect upon civilians (as seen in Lebanon in 2006 and 
Georgia in 2008).
Reconceiving security as the protection of those most vulnerable, rather than those 
most privileged by nation or class, mine action must focus on securing the lives and 
livelihoods of those most affected by mine and UXO contamination. At the same time, 
mine action agencies, the UN and progressive states must continue to strengthen and 
deepen international norms protecting non-combatants from both the short and long term 
effects of mines and cluster munitions.
iv. Participation
Protecting the vulnerable cannot be an exercise in paternalism, for “As much as any 
human being, mine affected people and communities have the right to shape their own 
lives and to participate in political and economic decision making which concerns their 
interests.”11 Therefore, as the Bad Honnef Framework asserted, ‘participation’ must be a 
guiding principle of mine action programs. This means demining agencies should use 
community-based mapping and priority setting methods (such as those successfully 
pioneered in Bosnia) employ local people as deminers and build local capacities to 
manage the mine and UXO problem.
Moreover, mine action must be inclusive -  aiming to incorporate persons from across 
local social divides of ethnicity, religion or political affiliation. It must attempt to resist 
oppressive gender norms and recruit female deminers where possible. It must involve 
people from non-military backgrounds, to encourage a diversity of perspectives.
v. Stewardship
This research project has demonstrated how the ‘principal-agent’ model of 
competitive tendering does not produce the results it promises and is clearly not the 
panacea that it is sometimes touted to be by the US, commercial companies and some 
staff within UNMAS and UNOPS. Instead of increasing quality, there is a danger that it 
will encourage a ‘race to the bottom’, incentivizing comer-cutting, poor treatment of 
labor and unsafe practices. Some may argue, as Banks did, that in order to save the lives
11 Ibid.
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of the public, donors must sacrifice some of the safety and quality of the demining 
process in return for volume.12 The best way to do this would be through a commercial 
tendering process. Though this argument is seductive, it is dangerously so. Firstly, poor 
quality demining may result in the need to revisit, and re-clear, tasks done by agencies 
that have failed to meet adequate quality standards. Demining relies heavily on trust in 
the process -  people who distrust the quality of clearance they will act as if a demined
1 -J
area is still mined. Thus money wasted on shoddy clearance that has to be repeated or 
is never trusted by the potential users of the land may not be accounted for in price 
considerations. Secondly, in the politically fragmented and lawless context of a conflict 
or post-conflict country it may be very difficult to enforce the kind of regulation 
necessary to prevent a race to the bottom. Finally, many of the international NGOs pay 
more attention to targeting their demining on areas that have the highest human impact or 
make the most difference to marginalized populations. Therefore, while the commercial 
companies may be clearing a higher volume, if this is not carefully targeted by the donor, 
it may have less impact on reducing risk to the population.
In place of commercial tendering, mine action donors should be guided by a 
‘principal-steward’ model, in which they build long-term partnerships with trusted 
organizations that show dedication, professionalism and resolve. The ‘good intentions’ 
of international NGOs, especially those supported by Norway, (and the necessity of 
maintaining a reputable brand among some companies) provide an additional mechanism 
regulating the risk of unethical behavior in the lawless environment of a post-conflict 
country. By granting long-term funding, donors, in effect, create a property right for the 
implementer, encouraging them to invest in high standards. Thus donors should 
encourage and enable their implementers to avoid cutting costs on training, equipment, 
oversight, insurance and health care for deminers. Only through investing in people and 
organizations can one expect them to perform to their full capacity.
12 Eddie Banks. (August 2003) “In the Name of Humanity.” Journal of Mine Action. 7(2). 
<http://maic.jmu.edu/joumal/7.2/focus/banks/banks.htm>.
13 Ananda S. Millard, Kristian Berg Harpviken & Kjell E. Kjellman. (2002) “Risk Removed? Steps 
Towards Building Trust in Humanitarian Mine Action.” Disasters. 26(2).
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vi. Building Peace
Ultimately, mine action is about restoring confidence that people are safe from
violent threats of harm in their daily lives. It is about removing barriers to safe freedom 
of movement and exchange. Thus, it is an integral part of a society’s recovery from war. 
As the Bad Honnef Framework asserted, mine action programs should “support peace­
building including reconstruction and development of the community and aim at 
enhancing the socio-economic and cultural infrastructure.”14 Mine action must thus work 
to encourage the return of displaced people, kickstart the legitimate economy and restore 
cultural symbols of integration such as museums, monuments and centers of learning.
Beyond this, however, mine action organizations should embody the peace 
envisioned. Espousing a multiethnic, law-governed society while supporting mono­
ethnic demining agencies with links to organized crime, as some donors did in Bosnia, 
seems counterproductive. Mine action agencies should be inclusive, incorporating people 
across social divisions of ethnicity, class or political affiliation. They should also try to 
resist patriarchal patterns that entrench violence, by employing women deminers where 
possible and offering alternative constructions of masculinity based on service and saving 
lives.
Moreover, through campaigning for regulations on the use of mines, cluster 
munitions and other technologies, mine action organizations should advocate for limits 
on the politics of violence. They should further embody non-violent politics by limiting 
links to private military contracting and military forces and, where possible, prevent 
employees from bearing arms.




Unless otherwise noted, all photos were taken by the author between 2006 and 2007.
Department of State, Washington DC, USA.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, Norway.
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Russian PMN-2 Antipersonnel Mine, near Kabul Airport, Afghanistan.
Assorted Cluster Munitions, OMAR Mine Museum, Kabul, Afghanistan.
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RONCO Deminers with Large-Loop Metal Detector, Kabul, Afghanistan.
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Demining Dog Training, Mine Dog Center, Kabul, Afghanistan.
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HALO Trust Deminer, Shomali Valley, Afghanistan
Author at HALO Trust Demining Site, Shomali Valley, Afghanistan.
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Norwegian People’s Aid Demining Machine, Brcko District, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Norwegian People’s Aid Deminer, Outside Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Radomir Kojic, Director of UNIPAK Demining, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
(Photo obtained from intelligence source in 2005)
UNIPAK Demining Site, near Arizona Market, Brcko District, Bosnia and Herzegovina
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Sign by Roadside, Outskirts of Juba, Sudan.
Unrecovered HALO Trust Vehicle in SLR Compound, Yei, Sudan,
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